

THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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


JOHN

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PREFACE

THE present edition of the Ethics was planned on a more ambitious scale twelve years ago, and most of it was written before 1890. At that time I was unaware that Mr Bywater was so soon to give us a revised text, and that Mr Stewart was about to publish his "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics." When these facts came to my knowledge, I laid my own work aside, as I could not suppose it would any longer be required. But, when the publishers informed me that they intended to bring out an edition of a less elaborate kind, and asked me to undertake it, I felt that it might be worth while to bring the work I had already done into more moderate compass, especially as I was conscious that my method of interpretation was a somewhat novel one, and might possess a certain interest for students of Aristotle. I had come to the conclusion that most of the difficulties that have been raised about the Ethics were due to the fact that, though the dialectical character of many passages had long been admitted, commentators had never thoroughly recognised that the treatise was dialectical throughout. They had tried to find in it the scientific and metaphysical basis of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy, and when they discovered instead that the foundations of the doctrine here set forth were of the most shifting character, taken as they are at one time from the opinions of ordinary people, at another from

popular Platonism, they have been ready to accuse Aristotle of inconsistency, or to doubt the authenticity of the treatise in its present form. There are indications in the writings of Diels and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff referred to in the Introduction that a different view is gaining ground in Germany, and this edition is a humble contribution to its advancement.

From the nature of the case, the text I have given is a somewhat eclectic affair, and is not intended as a contribution to Aristotelian criticism. It would doubtless have been more convenient for the student if I had simply reprinted Professor Bywater's text as it stands, but such a proceeding would hardly have been justifiable. I have therefore taken as a basis my own revision of Bekker's text, made with the help of Susemihl's edition ten years ago. As was to be expected, it presents some points of resemblance to Professor Bywater's text, though I have been less decided in preferring K^b to L^b where these MSS. differ. I had published a few of my notes on the text in the *Classical Review* before the publication of Professor Bywater's edition, and had hit upon some of the corrections he has introduced, a fact which he has most generously acknowledged. It is, however, in matters of punctuation that I owe most to Professor Bywater. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the improved punctuation he has given us is as good as an exegetical commentary, based as it is on an unrivalled knowledge of Aristotle's use of language. It will be understood that I have not hesitated to adopt many of Mr Bywater's readings, including a considerable number that he has not received into the text himself. The text of the Eudemian extracts which, for reasons given in the Introduction, I have printed at the bottom of the page, is mainly Susemihl's. I regret that I have not been able to make more use of the notes which Dr Henry Jackson is now contributing to the *Journal of Philology*, though I have been able to incorporate a few of

his suggestions, and especially the admirable conjecture by which he has restored to us a new fragment of Eunikos (p. 375).

It is inevitable that, in a commentary like the present, most of the illustrations should be old, though I think I may claim to have added some new ones. I have, of course, made constant use of Bonitz's Index, and that indeed is the source of the greater part of my quotations. My own contribution to the illustration of the Ethics lies chiefly in the direction of tracing the originals of many passages in Plato and Isokrates. This was closely connected with my general method of interpretation, and I may fairly claim that some of the material has been collected for the first time; but no one can be more conscious than I am how much still remains to be done in this field.

I owe much to conversations with my friends, especially Mr J. A. Smith and Mr Joachim, on difficult points, and it has not always been easy for me to distinguish what is mine and what is theirs. Dr Latta gave me the quotation from Leibniz which illustrates 1166 a, 20-22. The Index is mainly the work of Miss E. M. Samson.

J. B.

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INTRODUCTION

I.

§ 1. AMONG the writings that have come down to us as Aristotle's, there are three that bear the title "Ethics." This makes it necessary to state at the outset the critical assumptions on which the present essay in interpretation is based, and which, so far as it is successful, it tends to confirm. Every interpretation implies some critical hypothesis, and our acceptance or rejection of that hypothesis must in turn depend mainly on its adequacy as a basis for interpretation.

§ 2. We may fairly take it for granted that the so-called *Magna Moralia* is a Peripatetic hand-book written after Aristotle's time; for all competent judges are now agreed upon this. Still, as it shows no trace of Stoic influence or of opposition to Stoic views, it cannot well be later than the third century B.C., and is therefore evidence of the school tradition at a time when there was still a school with a living tradition¹. The other two treatises present a more difficult problem. They both profess to be Aristotle's; but the first of them is called after Nikomachos, his natural son, the other after one of his most illustrious scholars, Eudemos of Rhodes. It is true that these titles first occur in a quotation from the Platonist Atticus, who lived in the time of the Antonines, but they are certainly much older. Cicero knew the *Nikomachean Ethics* by its present title; for he is inclined to think Nikomachos was actually its author. Aspasios, the earliest of the Aristotelian commentators, has already to face the question whether the discussion of Pleasure in Book VII is the work of Aristotle or Eudemos². We may be sure, then, that these titles go back to Alexandrian times at least, and that they were found in the edition of Andronikos; but there

is no authoritative tradition as to their meaning. We can hardly accept the statement that the present work is that of Nikomachos; for, according to the biographical tradition, which is founded on contemporary documents, he died while still a lad³. He would be too young, then, to write the Ethics, though he may have been old enough to edit his father's lectures under the guidance of Theophrastos. On the other hand, we cannot adopt the view of the later Greek commentators that the treatises were dedicated to Nikomachos and Eudemos respectively. This would imply that Aristotle himself prepared his lectures for publication, which is contrary to everything that can reasonably be inferred from the books themselves and others like them. Following the analogy of the Theophrastean and Eudemean Physics and Metaphysics, most modern scholars agree in regarding the Nikomachean Ethics as substantially the work of Aristotle himself, and in assigning the Eudemean to Eudemos; but the meaning of this conclusion differs widely according as the critic holds that the three central books are rightly placed in the one treatise or in the other. For the most serious difficulty is just this, that, according to our tradition, Books V—VII of the Nikomachean Ethics are identical with Books IV—VI of the Eudemean.

¹ Zeller's Aristotle, Eng. Trans. vol. ii, p. 497.

² Cicero de Finibus, v, 5, 12. Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristotelis, sed non video quare non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Aspasios, p. 151, 21 (Heylbut) ἐπεὶ ἐν γε τοῖς Νικομαχείοις, ἐνθα διείληπται καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἴρηκεν αὐτὴν μὴ ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἀλλὰ παρακολουθεῖν “ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀκμαίοις τὴν ὥραν.” σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦτ’ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλ’ Εὐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ <δεκάτῳ> λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὥς οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς διειλεγμένου· πλὴν εἴτε Εὐδήμου ταῦτά ἐστιν εἴτε Ἀριστοτέλους, ἐνδόξως εἴρηται. For the other references, see Zeller, vol. i, p. 97, n. 1.

³ He died in battle as a *μειρακίσκος* according to the biographers. Cf. the will of Theophrastos in D. L. v, 51. We must remember that the wills of Aristotle and Theophrastos were preserved in the school as charters of foundation. A Greek philosophical school was a corporation like a college, and had to keep its titles.

§ 3. From the nature of the case, most arguments on this subject are apt to involve a *petitio principii*. If we suppose

that these three books are in any sense the work of Aristotle, or even a fair reproduction of his thought, it becomes very hard to maintain that there is such a thing as a distinctively "Eudemean" doctrine; for the undoubtedly Eudemean books only differ from their Nikomachean counterparts in matters of detail and emphasis. On the other hand, if we hold that the three books are the original and independent work of Eudemos, we have to admit that we know nothing of Aristotle's views on some of the most important subjects, and that we have therefore no means of telling whether Eudemos gives us a faithful account of them or not. Of course it would be a different matter if, as some critics hold, any real inconsistency could be detected between the teaching of the doubtful books and the remainder of either treatise. I have tried to interpret them on the assumption that there is none, with what success the commentary must show. It would also alter the case if it could be shown that the central books contain expressions and thoughts not to be found in the undoubtedly Nikomachean books but easily paralleled from the undoubtedly Eudemean. But this argument loses all force when it is shown that these suspicious phrases and ideas can be matched from other works of which the Aristotelian origin has never been called in question, and that some of them even go back to Plato. This I believe I have shown in all important cases.

The assumption made in this edition, then, is that the disputed books are really Aristotle's, an assumption which may be provisionally commended by two general considerations. The interpretation of Book V is notoriously difficult owing to the use made in it of mathematical formulas which are not always clear, and which seem to give the writer almost as much trouble as they have given to his editors. Now Mathematics was just the one province of human knowledge in which Aristotle did not show himself a master, while Eudemos was one of the foremost mathematicians of an age in which that science made more progress than it ever did again till the seventeenth century. We can understand that Aristotle felt bound by the Platonic tradition to treat

Justice mathematically, but we can hardly understand Eudemos of Rhodes discussing so simple a matter as proportion in a way which, whatever we may think of it, has certainly produced an astonishing divergence in the interpretations of the most competent editors. The other point is this. The difficulties of Books VI and VII arise, as we shall see, from the presence in them of a dialectical element and a neglect of formal symmetry far more characteristic of the master than the scholar. If we look at the way in which Eudemos has reproduced the substance of Books VIII—IX, we shall find it very hard to believe that he would not have given us a more neatly formulated account of the “intellectual virtues,” and a less puzzling discussion of the relations between thought and feeling. There is a higher art in Aristotle’s apparent confusion, and the spirit of the Platonic dialogue with its tentative arguments and provisional conclusions still lives in his dialectic procedure. He is seeking the truth along with his hearers and not expounding a ready-made system. We do not expect this from Eudemos, whose chief interest would lie in giving a faithful reproduction of his master’s thought, and who would not feel in the same way the need of leading his audience step by step from the Academic standpoint to his own; but we do expect a more dogmatic and perspicuous exposition.

§ 4. Now, if this is the true account of the relation of Eudemos to Aristotle, it follows at once that we have in the Eudemian Ethics the most authoritative commentary on the *Nikomachean*. I have assumed that Eudemos gives us the thought of Aristotle, as he understood it, as faithfully as he can, though it is plain enough that he has added a good deal from other Aristotelian sources in order to bring out more clearly what he took to be the meaning, and even that he has here and there given a turn of his own to what Aristotle had said. The burden of proof certainly lies with those who maintain anything else; for it is clear that this is what Theophrastos and Eudemos did in the case of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. They followed the main lines, passing

lightly over those parts where Aristotle was full and clear, but formulating more precisely and discussing more minutely those subjects he had left with a less finished treatment. This statement, which is made on good authority of Theophrastos¹, is true also of the Eudemian Physics, as we can see from the numerous quotations in Simplicius². The Ethics of Theophrastos is unfortunately lost; but the few fragments we possess confirm the general impression so far as they go³. It is significant that one of these fragments is distinctly an amplification of a sentence in one of the disputed books⁴.

In view of all this, I have thought it right to print the relevant passages of Eudemos under the text to which they refer, and I have always hesitated to adopt an interpretation different from his. We must remember that he was in all probability there when the lectures were given, and that he would talk over all the difficulties with the master. We really cannot expect to know what Aristotle meant much better than he did, and we should always make the most of first-hand evidence. The superficial paraphrases of Byzantine commentators are quoted to-day as if those Graeculi had any authority in the matter; but the Eudemian Ethics, which takes us back to the Peripatos itself, has been too much neglected.

¹ Boethius Hermen. ii, 12, 9 In omnibus de quibus ipse disputat post magistrum leviter ea tangit quae ab Aristotele dicta antea cognovit, alias vero diligentius res non ab Aristotele tractatas consequitur. Priscianus Lydus, 33, 6 (Bywater) ἐκθέμενος τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους...ἐπιδιαρθροῖ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ ἐπαπορεῖ τινα.

² Simplicius has preserved a significant fragment of a correspondence between Eudemos and Theophrastos with regard to the text of the Physics (Zeller, vol. i, p. 136). Further, Simplicius, who had the Eudemian Physics before him, says in one place (p. 411, 37 Diels) μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Εὐδημος ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων. There can indeed be no doubt that he reproduced the teaching of Aristotle's Physics much more faithfully than Theophrastos. It is surely arbitrary to assume that he did anything else than this in the case of the Ethics, though no doubt his strong theological interest has coloured his account of the "Contemplative Life."

³ On the Ethics of Theophrastos, see G. Heylbut in the Archiv, vol. i, p. 194 sqq. and the notes on 1100 b, 29. 1123 a, 19. 1144 b, 33. 1145 a, 6. 1153 b, 19. 1154 b, 13.

⁴ Cf. 1154 b, 13 (from the "Eudemian" discussion of pleasure) ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα with Theophrastos quoted by Aspasios, p. 156, 17 (Heylbut) ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τε ἐναντία, οἶον κ.τ.λ....καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τουτέστιν κ.τ.λ....

II.

§ 5. All this is of course inconsistent with the widely-spread view that the Aristotelian corpus has come down to us in a more or less unauthentic form. Some recent scholars have gone great lengths in the assumption of "dislocations" and "duplicate passages," so far indeed that if they were right we could hardly say we possessed the works of Aristotle at all in any natural sense of the words. In its crudest form, this theory has been used to justify wholesale transpositions of sentences, paragraphs, and chapters to any place where, in the editor's opinion, they would be more appropriate. But it is very hard to see how the process of shuffling which this implies could actually have occurred¹. Even the story of the cellar at Skepsis does not suggest that the works of Aristotle were picked up in little bits like an Egyptian papyrus at the present day and pieced together as well as might be. And the external evidence that the works of Aristotle were known substantially in their present form from the time of Theophrastos to that of Andronikos is overwhelming. The rise of Stoicism would be inconceivable unless we might assume that the more important works of Aristotle were easily accessible. In this extreme form, then, the theory may be dismissed². But, in the form given to it by Professor Cook Wilson after Torstrik³, the theory of "duplicate passages" requires more serious consideration. According to this, the Aristotelian matter with which the early editors had to deal was regarded as sacred, and their chief aim was to prevent the loss of any of it. So several different versions of the same discussion were combined into a single treatise just as a "harmony of the gospels" might be. The possibility of this is undeniable and the facts upon which the theory is based⁴ are certain. It is the case that, in certain parts of the work, Aristotle appears to discuss the same subject several times over, and that these discussions are frequently inconsistent and apparently quite independent of each other. But I have tried to show that this fact admits of another explanation. The

Ethics is, and from the nature of the case must be, a dialectical and not a demonstrative work, and it is, as we shall see, entirely in accordance with Aristotle's own view of the method which is appropriate in such a case to give as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without any regard to the real philosophical validity of those solutions. If it can be shown that these apparent duplicates are really successive applications of the different dialectical *τόποι* appropriate to the subject, the critical problem does not arise. Aristotle is not committed to all or any of the solutions he gives any more than Plato is committed to the successive definitions of knowledge given in the *Theaitetos*. Nor can we even assume that the true solution is necessarily given at all. It often is given; but it was contrary to Aristotle's own principles to base the exposition of *Politics* on his metaphysical system.

¹ I do not mean to deny that there are traces of editing, and clumsy editing too, in the *Ethics*. In particular, many of the summaries and transitions break the argument in a way that can hardly be attributed to Aristotle himself, and which we do not observe in his more finished works. But this does not detract seriously from the integrity of the text. We may ascribe these connecting tags to *Nikomachos* if we please.

² It is really impossible to resist the arguments adduced by Zeller (*Aristotle*, Chapter III.) in favour of the view that the works of Aristotle as we have them were known and used all through the period from his death down to the recension of *Andronikos*. The statement that the successors of *Theophrastos* were ignorant of the physical and metaphysical treatises is simply untrue, as is proved by the whole history of philosophy in the third century B.C.

³ *Aristotelian Studies*, I (Oxford, Clarendon Press).

§ 6. The plausibility of all these theories is enhanced by certain undeniable peculiarities of style, and these must be explained at once if we are to judge the work fairly. It is clear to begin with that we have not before us a book intended for publication in the ordinary sense of the word. Primarily it is the manuscript of a course of lectures intended for the lecturer's own use, and also doubtless for consultation by members of the school. In any case the writings of *Theophrastos* and *Eudemos* had, so far as we can see, exactly the same character, and no account of that character

which applies only to the Aristotelian corpus can be accepted. What we have to explain is not the form in which Aristotle's works have come down to us, but the nature of the Peripatetic *ἀκρόασις*. "Now," as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff puts it¹, "there has been no lack of people who have tried to force upon Aristotle the pedantry of a well-paragraphed lecture notebook that sends the audience to sleep. We must allow, indeed, that as an oral teacher he had the vice of recapitulations and of declarations that now one subject has been exhausted and it is the turn of the next. But that is just the public speaker's vice, and if we take the akroamatic writings as spoken discourses, they lose much of what certainly annoys the reader. It is clear, however, that Aristotle was eloquent only with the pen, or he would not have written out all the indifferent stuff as well." The point of view here indicated appears to me the right one, and we may be glad that Aristotle found it necessary to write down what he was going to say word for word, and that his pupils, as was natural, caught the trick from him.

¹ Aristoteles und Athen, vol. i, p. 66, n. 37.

§ 7. But there is a further peculiarity in the style of such works as the Ethics which is of great importance for their right understanding, and which has been most distinctly brought out by Diels¹. He has called attention to the curious fact that "we read on through long tracts of his ordinary dry prose, and are suddenly surprised by a charming oasis. It is observable too that in those more literary and popular passages we usually find a Platonic element, a reference to Platonic 'divisions' and Platonic dialogues. In this respect the Ethics holds a middle place between the purely scientific writings and the wholly popular such as the Rhetoric." How natural this is we shall see when we come to consider Aristotle's method in the Ethics; here it will be sufficient to quote the explanation given by Diels himself. He says:—

"I can think of no other ground for this alternation, to speak for the present only of the Nikomachean Ethics, than

a paedagogic one. Aristotle saw before him at the lecture on Ethics of which this treatise is the reflexion, hearers of riper years (1095 a, 1), whose minute familiarity with the Platonic dialogues he could count upon unconditionally, just as the audience at his course on Rhetoric must have had a number of model speeches, especially those of Isokrates, in their heads. So he gave them first the skeleton of his doctrine, and then tried to clothe it with flesh and blood by explanations in a more popular style and by instructive digressions, to bring it nearer to the understanding of his scholars by attaching it to what was familiar and exoteric. This certainly introduces some unevenness into the terminology and treatment, which has often had a confusing effect and has led some to assume a discrepancy of doctrine where there is really nothing but an accommodation of the expression to his Platonically schooled public."

Diels goes on to show the truth of this by a most skilful analysis of the opening of Book I, of which I have made free use in my notes. If I have succeeded in showing that the rest of the Ethics lends itself just as easily to the same treatment, the substantial unity and integrity of the work will become much more credible.

¹ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i, pp. 494 sqq.

III.

§ 8. Besides the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, there are several ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics. Only two of these are of real value, the commentary of Aspasios (2nd century A.D.) and the relevant parts of the *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις* of Alexander of Aphrodisias. These two works contain genuine Peripatetic tradition and are often of service in interpreting the treatise. They also throw very considerable light upon the text by preserving readings older than those of our MSS. The commentaries of Michael (11th century A.D.) and Eustratios (12th century A.D.) with the 14th century Paraphrase now attributed to Heliodoros of

Prusa are of the usual Byzantine type and add little or nothing to our knowledge¹.

¹ The commentaries on the Ethics have been edited by Heylbut for the Royal Prussian Academy (Berlin, 1889). For Alexander's *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις* see the edition of Ivo Bruns in the *Supplementum Aristotelicum* vol. ii.

§ 9. The modern commentaries on the Ethics of earlier date than the present century may be divided into two classes, those that throw light upon the argument and those that illustrate the language. Of the former class, the most valuable is the commentary of Giphanius, while the edition of Zell is a most useful summary of the latter. Michelet's edition (Berlin 1829) contains many good things, though his method of interpretation is somewhat arbitrary. Sir Alexander Grant's commentary was the first attempt to explain Aristotle's real meaning in accordance with the methods of historical criticism. However much we may differ from it in detail, it is a work of permanent value. Ramsauer's edition is difficult to work with and hardly marks an advance. Professor Stewart's "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics" is a work of great learning and provides a store of matter from which all subsequent writers on the subject will continue to draw. Dr Henry Jackson has given us an edition of Book V, and there is an admirable little edition of Book X by Monsieur G. Rodier (Paris, Delagrave, 1897). Fritzsche's editions of the Eudemian Ethics and of Books VIII and IX of the Nikomachean Ethics contain much interesting matter, and the tracts of Rassow and Susemihl may always be consulted with profit.

IV.

§ 10. With the Ethics we enter upon that part of Aristotle's system which has to do with Man, "the philosophy of things human," as he once calls it¹ in the popular phraseology of his time. From the nature of the case, the philosophy of Man as studied by men must be a practical and not a theoretical science; for that is the true division of the sciences and is rightly put in the forefront by Eudemos². It is true, as Zeller has pointed out³, that this particular

classification is nowhere expressly made by Aristotle himself, but that is only because it was a Platonic "division"⁴ and might therefore be assumed. It is the only one recognised by the early Peripatetics and it is certainly implied by very many passages in Aristotle. Thought has only two forms; it is always either (1) theoretical or (2) practical and productive, and the difference between these is that the former has to do with things which are either immovable or have their source of motion in themselves, while the latter deals with such things as require an external cause to set them in motion, things which have their efficient or motive cause in something else, that is to say in human will or skill⁵. We must not be misled by the minor distinction between practical and productive. Now and then it becomes desirable for dialectical purposes to mark the difference between those sciences which have some action as their end and those which produce some external product, and then the latter are more properly called arts than sciences. But this distinction is referred by Aristotle himself to "extraneous discussions,"⁶ and he seldom or never makes serious use of it. As a general rule the terms "practical science," "productive science" and "art" are used quite indiscriminately.

¹ 1181 b, 15.

² EE. 1214 a, 10 quoted on p. 7.

³ Eng. Trans. vol. i, p. 181 sqq.

⁴ Cf. Polit. 258 e *Ταύτη τοίνυν συμπάσας ἐπιστήμας διαίρει, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν προσειπὼν, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικὴν.*

⁵ We find *θεωρητικὸς νοῦς* opposed to *πρακτικὸς* (De An. 407 a, 25. 415 a, 11. 432 b, 27. 435 a, 15), and so Met. 1026 a, 25 *πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ (1) πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ (2) θεωρητικὴ*. Cf. also Met. 1025 b, 18 *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνει οὕσα περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος* (περὶ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐστὶν οὐσίαν ἐν ᾗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ), *δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε πρακτικὴ ἐστὶν οὔτε ποιητικὴ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις.*

⁶ Cf. 1140 a, 3. It is characteristic that the appearance of a threefold division is commonest in the Topics. Cf. 145 a, 15 *θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται (ἢ ἐπιστήμη)*; 157 a, 16 *τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μὲν θεωρητικαὶ αἱ δὲ πρακτικαὶ αἱ δὲ ποιητικαὶ*. But the true doctrine is given in EN 1139 b, 1 *αὕτη γὰρ* (sc. *ἡ ἐνεκά του διάνοια*) *καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχεῖ.*

§ 11. A practical science or art, then, such as that of the statesman¹ is essentially a source of change in something else,

the efficient cause of motion in something which has no motive cause in itself. Some things are wholly immoveable, and these are the objects of First Philosophy and Mathematics; other things, though moveable, have their source of motion and rest in themselves². A tree grows of itself, a house is brought into being by the art of the housebuilder. Those things which have their motive cause in themselves are the sphere of Nature; Art or Practical Science has to do with things which have to be moved from outside. It is true, as we shall see, that in some cases the same result may be produced by Nature and by Art. Health, for instance, may be the result of the natural growth of the body, or it may be artificially produced by the doctor. There are other things, again, that can only be produced by art and do not come into existence by nature at all³. Any classification based solely on the nature of the objects would, therefore, be endlessly complicated. We must hold fast to the simple distinction based on the fundamental difference between theoretical and practical or productive intelligence.

¹ Plato had referred the science of the king or statesman to the cognitive class (Polit. 259 c); Aristotle, on the contrary, never tires of insisting on its practical character. This is a fundamental distinction, and is well brought out by Eudemos. Cf. EE. 1216 b, 3 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος ᾤετο εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἐπεζητεῖ τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτα εὐλόγως· ἐπιστήμης γὰρ ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμεν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. διόπερ ἐζητεῖ τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν). τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἥ τι τοιοῦθ' ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμιώτατον τί ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδὲ τί ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

² Met. 1026 a, 13 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἕνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.... ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογικὴ.

³ Cf. 1140 a, 18. Part. An. 640 a, 28 *ἐνια γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου γίνεται ταῦτὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης*. Met. 1034 a, 9 *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίνεται καὶ τέχνη καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ' οὐ, οἷον οἰκία, κ.τ.λ.*

§ 12. Each of these kinds of science has its own good or end, something that makes it worth knowing; but this will be different in each case. The end of theoretical science cannot be to make any change in its object; for that object is either incapable of change altogether or at least of all change from an external source. In theoretical science we are, therefore, simply in the position of spectators, and this is the original signification of the word *θεωρία*. The end or good of such science lies in conformity to reality, and this conformity is truth. When we have reached this, we have reached the completion (*τέλος*) of the science, and there is nothing beyond it for us to attain¹.

If, however, the object of a science is something which has not its source of motion in itself, our relation to it at once becomes different. If the efficient cause is in ourselves, it becomes possible for us to realise the object of our science, and this realisation becomes the "end" or completion of the science. The object of it is no longer "what is" (*τὸ ὄν*), but the *γένεσις* of "what is to be" (*τὸ ἐσόμενον*); we are no longer spectators but actors². Popular language already uses the word *δύναμις* for such a science³, and this is quite correct; for the definition of *δύναμις* is just *ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ*⁴.

¹ Met. 993 b, 20 *θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον*. ib. 1051 b, 3 *ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος διηρηθῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα*.

² An. Post. 100 a, 9 *εἰάν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, εἰάν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης*. Part. An. 640 a, 3 *ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὄν, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐσόμενον*.

³ Plato, Polit. 304 d *ἢ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δύναμις*. Isokr. Panath. § 30 *τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις διαφερόντων*. So Ar. Met. 1046 b, 2 *διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο*.

⁴ Met. 1020 a, 4 *ὥστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικῆ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο*. De Cael. 301 b, 18 *φύσις μὲν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχουσα κινήσεως ἀρχή, δύναμις δ' ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο*. The addition *ἢ ἢ ἄλλο* is intended to provide for such cases as the physician healing himself.

V.

§ 13. We see that there are many practical and productive sciences or arts, just as there are many things that are good for Man; but we see also that the ends of some of those arts are subordinate to those of others. Plato had already divided arts into those that "make" and those that "use," those that make the tools and those that make the thing itself. The art of weaving uses the art of shuttle-making, and therefore the shuttle-maker must take his instructions as to the proper form of shuttles from the weaver, just as the weaver in turn takes his instructions as to cloth from the tailor. In the same way, to take an illustration which was in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the first chapter of the "Ethics," the maker of bridles must take his instructions from the horseman who uses them¹. This relation of the higher to the lower arts is otherwise expressed by saying that the former are "architectonic" with regard to the lower, a term also of Platonic origin².

Now, for reasons which will be explained presently, there must be some one good which is in a pre-eminent sense the Good for Man, and to which all other goods are subservient, and it is the art of producing this we are to study now. Clearly, if we wish to know what this art is, we must ask what is the art that "uses" all the other arts, the most "architectonic" of the practical sciences, the science that has the plan of human life as the master-builder has the plan of the house. This point too has been settled by Plato; for he has shown that the two sciences which are most apt to claim the chief place, namely Rhetoric and Strategy, are both subordinate to Politics³. This, then, is the art or science we must study if we wish to produce the Good for Man⁴.

¹ Plato, *Krat.* 390 c (of the *κερκίς*) *τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσήκον εἶδος ἐν ὁποιοῦν ξύλῳ κεῖται; ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ὑφάντης;* The *χρησομένη τέχνη* is said *ἐπιστατεῖν τῇ ποιούσῃ*. In *Polit.* 281 d the distinction is expressed as one between *αἰτίαι* and *συναίτιοι τέχναι*. We read there *ὅσαι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργούσαις ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν, ... ταύτας μὲν συναιτίους, τὰς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀπεργαζόμενας αἰτίας*. The

example of χαλινοποιική in EN. 1094 a, 11 is a clear allusion to Rep. 601 c (where a third art, the imitative, is added) Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡνίας τε γράφει καὶ χαλινόν; Ναί. Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπαῖτει οἷας δεῖ τὰς ἡνίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὃ τε χαλκεύς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος, ὅσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, μόνος ὁ ἱππικός; Ἀληθέστατα. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν; Πῶς; Περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινας τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; Ναί.

² The term ἀρχιτεκτονικός is derived from Plato Polit. 259 e καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργάτης ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. He furnishes γνῶσις and not χειρουργία. On the other hand he is not merely κριτικός but ἐπιτακτικός. So in Ar. Phys. 194 a, 36 we have δύο δὴ αἱ ἄρχουσai τῆς ὕλης καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσai τέχναι, ἥ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς.

³ The problem of Plato's "Statesman" is to distinguish by the use of dialectics the true King or Statesman from the countless claimants of the title. After the kingly art has been distinguished from the other arts of tending live animals in herds, we have still to distinguish it from the other arts within the state, both those which produce the things themselves (αἱ αἰτιαί) and those which produce the tools for making them (αἱ συναίτιοι). After enumerating seven classes of arts which produce inanimate possessions, we come to the animate. We pass in review slaves, hirelings, heralds, secretaries and priests, till at last we have left only τὰ τίμια καὶ συγγενῇ, namely στρατηγία, δικαστική and the highest kind of ῥητορεία (Polit. 303 e, cf. EN. 1094 b, 3).

Now, if we take any art, we find that there is a higher art which prescribes whether we are to learn it or not (Polit. 304 b, cf. EN. 1094 b, 1), and the other arts must yield precedence to this. So Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, must yield precedence to the art which decides whether persuasion or force is to be used, and Strategy, the art of war, must yield to the art which determines whether we are to be at war or at peace. That Aristotle had all this in mind when he wrote the first chapter of the Ethics is plain, not only from its general tenour, but from coincidences of language such as πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πράξις (1094 a, 12 n.), the use of δύναμις (§ 12, n. 3), the phrase αἱ τιμιώταται τῶν δυνάμεων and the like. The argument was familiar in the Platonic school and is found also in the Euthydemus (289—291).

⁴ The interpretation of the first chapter of the Ethics here implied is, so far as I know, a new one. It is generally supposed that the passage deals with ends in general and not simply with the distinction between the ends of theoretical and practical science and the proof that the end of the most architectonic of the practical sciences will be the good for Man. The external evidence for the interpretation I have adopted consists of (1) the obvious fact that Aristotle is simply reproducing the familiar argument of Plato given above, n. 3, (2) the brief syllogistic summary of the argument in the Politics, 1282 b, 14, quoted on p. 7, (3) the tradition of the school as represented by MM. 1182 a, 32 sqq., quoted on p. 6.

§ 14. A modern writer who wished to draw a distinction between Ethics and Politics would probably rest his case on the view that the good of the individual is something different

from the good of the state. It is significant that the only objection foreseen by Aristotle to his use of the name Politics for the science of human good is the objection that the good of the individual is the same as that of the state, and that some name should therefore be chosen which would include the whole subject instead of one that seems to emphasise unduly a single aspect of it. So far from apologising for "confounding Ethics and Politics," Aristotle excuses himself for appearing to separate them. His reason is that a science which dealt with the good of the individual alone would be incomplete, a mere makeshift¹. It may be that circumstances prevent us from doing more than making an attempt to realise the good for a few or even for one, but that can never take the place of the full realisation of the good in a community which is the natural end of human nature.

¹ EN. 1094 b, 7 sqq., where observe that ἀγαπητόν has its usual sense of 'better than nothing,' *faute de mieux*.

§ 15. It will be seen from this that it is quite wrong to say the Ethics studies the Good for Man from the point of view of the individual, while the Politics deals with the realisation of that good by the agency of the state. The subject of both works is equally "Politics," and there is not a single word in either of them or anywhere else which could be interpreted as setting up any such science as ἠθική in distinction to πολιτική¹. It is quite true that Aristotle himself in other writings, though never in the Ethics itself, refers to this first part of his course on Politics as ἠθικοὶ λόγοι and the like, but that is quite a different matter². The work we are about to study may fairly be called ἠθικά because it is, as we shall see, a piece of dialectic based on ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις³, that is to say, premisses derived from an examination of human character; but it is none the less a part of Aristotle's system of Politics, and has no special reference to the individual considered apart from the community.

It is true that we cannot consider the Ethics and Politics in their present form as parts of one work. They are not

a continuous whole, and the plan laid down for the Politics at the end of the Ethics is not the plan which the latter work carries out. There are, too, undeniable differences of standpoint and terminology, which have been well brought out by Mr Newman and need not therefore be enumerated here. But all that these differences imply is an interval of time between the two works and a consequent modification of Aristotle's views in some particulars. It still remains true that the Ethics everywhere looks forward to some such sequel as the Politics, and that the Politics everywhere presupposes the results of some such treatise as the Ethics. The Ethics asks the question "How is the Good for Man realised?" and the answer it gives is that legislation is the means of producing character, and that upon character depends the possibility of that activity which constitutes Happiness or the Good for Man. The Politics takes up the inquiry at this point and discusses everything connected with legislation and the constitution of the state⁴. The whole forms one *πραγματεία* or *μέθοδος*, and there is no word anywhere of *ἠθική* as a separate branch of study.

¹ The word *ἠθική* as a substantive does not occur once in Aristotle. In MM. 1181 a, 24 we have *λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν*, so that *τὰ ἠθικά* was already a separate science by that time.

² We have *ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς* in Pol. 1261 a, 31. 1280 a, 18. 1295 a, 36. 1332 a, 8. This is varied in Pol. 1332 a, 22 by *κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους*, and in 1282 b, 20 we have *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν*.

³ Top. 105 b, 20 *αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί. ἠθικαὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ τοιαῦται, οἷον πρότερον δεῖ τοῖς γονεῦσι ἢ τοῖς νόμοις μᾶλλον πειθαρχεῖν, ἐὰν διαφωνῶσιν. λογικαὶ δὲ οἷον πρότερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ οὐ, φυσικαὶ δὲ οἷον πρότερον ἀλδῖος ὁ κόσμος ἢ οὐ.*

⁴ Aristotle himself generally refers to what we call the "Politics" by the more appropriate title *περὶ πολιτείας* or *περὶ πολιτειῶν*. Once only do we find the title *τὰ πολιτικά* (Rhet. 1366 a, 21), and there the reference is quite general. It may as well include the "Ethics" as not. Cf. for the details, Newman's edition of the Politics, vol. II, p. iii.

§ 16. This absolute identification of two things which, from the accident of the titles given to Aristotle's works, have come to be distinguished by the names of Ethics and Politics, is apt to suggest to us that the good of the individual is to be sacrificed to that of an abstraction called the state.

Such an idea, however, is wholly foreign to Aristotle's way of thinking. No one knew better than he did that a happiness which is not the happiness of individual souls is nothing at all. The state as such has no good that can be secured at the expense of the individuals who compose it. What Aristotle did hold was that, if we wish to find the Good for Man, we must seek it in a community of some sort; for man is by nature a being who finds his good only in a community, and can only find it completely in the most "full-grown" or complete community, that is, in the city-state. Lesser communities like the family and the village are enough for the needs of bare life; but Man's nature requires more than this for its full developement, and it is the state alone that can secure for him the good life¹.

On the other hand, it is true that the organisation of the state involves a restriction of happiness in the fullest sense to certain of its members. The state exists for the sake of the comparatively few rare souls that are able to lead the highest life, and it is undeniable that the rest are to some extent sacrificed to these. But in reply to this Aristotle would say that in a well-ordered state all the citizens have such happiness as they are capable of, and we cannot ask for more. Even slavery, which Aristotle regarded as necessary and natural, he at least attempted to justify on the ground that it is best for the slave himself to be the "living tool" which enables his master to lead the good life. Were it not that some men are "slaves by nature," slavery would be unjustifiable altogether².

¹ Pol. 1252 b, 28 (after a description of the οἰκία and the κώμη) ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἡ δὲ πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκειας ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὔσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας (cf. below § 27).

² Aristotle therefore condemns the indiscriminate treatment of prisoners of war as slaves (Pol. 1255 a, 24); τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον.

§ 17. There is another mistaken view of the identification of Ethics and Politics which we have to guard against. We feel that somehow the ideal of a community is not always the same as that of the individuals who compose it. It may occasionally be higher, as most Greeks would have said was the case at Sparta; usually it is a good deal lower. Now Aristotle was keenly alive to this fact and the problems to which it gives rise. To the Greeks such questions were apt to present themselves in a personal form—a peculiarity which saved them from much confused thinking—and Aristotle therefore asks himself “Is the good man the same as the good citizen?” The answer which he gives to this is quite clear. The good man and the good citizen are not the same except in the case of the man who is leading the highest life in the ideal state¹. Here we certainly have no lowering of the moral ideal to suit the middling practice of the ordinary state; for we may make our ideal state as ideal as we please. The only thing we must insist on is that, except in a community of some kind, man can never be complete, can never be all that he has it in him to be.

¹ Cf. EN. 1130 b, 26 sqq. with the notes, and the full discussion in Pol. 1276 b, 16 sqq. Newman's Politics, vol. i, pp. 234 sqq.

§ 18. Aristotle, then, was quite aware of the fact that the ideal was nowhere realised, and he knew that, as things were, there was a discrepancy between individual and social morality. But he did not separate Ethics and Politics because he did not despair yet of the Greek city-state. No one who reads these lectures can doubt that they were delivered as a serious contribution to the realisation of the ideal state as Aristotle conceived it. There is a hopeful tone in all he says which shows he really thought the thing could be done if only people would go about it in the right way. He is no idle speculator, but a man in all earnestness making practical proposals which he has hopes of getting adopted. We feel the contrast between this and the far less sanguine view that was natural to Plato's deeper nature. The fact is that Aristotle, with all his intellectual greatness, was a child to his

master in the understanding of human life. On the other hand, it may be noted that his strong sense of reality prevented him from ignoring altogether, as Plato was sometimes apt to do, the relative worth of the various imperfect ideals realised by the Hellenic states as he found them, and this enabled him to become the founder of Politics in the modern sense of the word.

§ 19. It is only another consequence of the personal way in which such problems presented themselves to the Greek mind that the question of how to save the city-state took the shape "How can we best train a lawgiver?" The whole course of Greek history illustrates the importance of personality. The laws of most states had been framed by legislators whose names were known, and where none was known a mythical one was soon invented. This was the only form in which a Greek could imagine a reformation, and we need not wonder if Aristotle thought he might be able to train a new Solon. The discovery of the long-lost "Constitution of the Athenians" has proved that the historical works of Aristotle were composed with the same idea. They were no mere collections of facts on which a generalisation of purely scientific importance might be based, but also political pamphlets intended to commend certain definite views to practical statesmen. As it has been well put by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Aristotle wished to train a generation that should be enabled, by insight into the nature and end of the state and into the forms it assumes, to have a practical effect in the right sense among the thousandfold different conditions which the Hellenic states presented....To this task he addressed his efforts, and he thought not a little of his performance¹."

The strange thing is, as has often been pointed out, that Aristotle, himself a man without a city and closely connected with the Macedonian court, should never have suspected that the days of the city-state were numbered, and that the Diadochoi were creating a new political unity, the Empire, which was not indeed to reach its full developement on Greek

soil, but was to act as the most powerful of the influences that led an Italian city-state to become the capital of the world.

¹ Aristoteles und Athen, vol. ii, p. 361.

VI.

§ 20. The question of method is always vital to Aristotle, and he seems to have found his hearers very deficient in a due sense of its importance. He complains in one place that people dislike any method of exposition they are not accustomed to, and mean by intelligible no more than familiar. It is just the same as with the ancient laws, which are often childish, but have been sanctified by long custom. Thus it is that some will not listen to a lecture unless it is put into mathematical form, while others demand examples and illustrations, and others again require the evidence of some poet. One class want everything put with minute exactitude; others are annoyed by precision, either because they are incapable of connected thought, or because they think it is mean and petty. There is something about it, in philosophy as well as in business, that repels them. What is wanted to remedy all this is Culture. We cannot be always looking for the method of knowledge and for knowledge itself at the same time. Neither is easy to find. It is clearly necessary, then, that we should have some preliminary training in these matters, so that we may know where we are entitled to demand mathematical precision and where anything of the sort would be entirely out of place¹.

¹ Met. 995 a, 3 αἱ δ' ἀκροάσεις κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη συμβαίνουσιν· ὥς γὰρ εἰώθαμεν οὕτως ἀξιούμεν λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν ἀγνωστότερα καὶ ξενικώτερα. τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες γνωριμώτερον, ἡλικίην δ' ἰσχὺν ἔχει τὸ σύνηθες οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μείζον ἰσχύει τοῦ γινώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθος. οἱ μὲν οὖν, ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγῃ τις, οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τῶν λεγόντων, οἱ δ' ἐὰν μὴ παραδειγματικῶς, οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιούσιν ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητήν. καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν. ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ. διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδευθῆναι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης· ἔστι δ' οὐδέτερον ῥάδιον λαβεῖν. τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ᾧπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην.

§ 21. We see that Aristotle calls this preliminary training *παιδεία*. This word in the fourth century B.C. was very commonly contrasted with *τέχνη*, to express the idea of culture as opposed to professional knowledge or skill. It was the proudest boast of Isokrates that he, alone among the teachers of his time, kept this end steadily in view; for to him it seemed that Plato and Aristotle taught a mere specialism, and that of no very exalted kind. In the Protagoras of Plato the young Hippokrates actually blushes at the suggestion that he is going to take lessons with any other view than to get that unprofessional culture which alone becomes a gentleman. It is clear, however, that Aristotle means something far more definite than this. With him the man of culture is above all things the arbiter of method. He is the judge of how much precision is fairly to be expected in any inquiry (EN. 1094 b, 23), and in the Metaphysics we are told that it shows want of culture not to know what can be demonstrated and what can not¹.

The clearest account of the matter, however, is to be found in a remarkable passage at the beginning of the treatise on the Parts of Animals. There we read that there are two ways of possessing any science whether it be humble or exalted, one of which may be called knowledge of the subject and the other a sort of culture. It shows culture to be able to form a right judgment instinctively as to where the speaker's exposition of a subject is methodically correct and where it is amiss. This is general culture, the power of judging all scientific method correctly. But there is another kind of culture which has to do with some definite part of knowledge only. In Natural History as in other branches of study there is a culture of this kind which enables us to approve or condemn the form of the exposition quite apart from the question of the truth or falsehood of the matter².

We have to do, then, with two distinct kinds of culture, general and special, and we must ask what precisely each of these is. Now, there is a passage in the Metaphysics where want of culture is identified with ignorance of "Analytics³."

This seems to be the key. Giphanius said long ago "*Vocat ille παιδείαν habitum quendam recte iudicandi de rebus omnibus quod docet doctrina Analytica; contra ἀπαιδευσία contrarius ab illo habitus dicitur, hoc est ignoratio doctrinae Analyticae.*" This is quite correct; for "general culture" is evidently what we call Aristotelian Logic, a knowledge of which is, therefore, essential to a right understanding of the Ethics.

But, in addition to this, Aristotle demands a special kind of culture from the student of Politics, just as he demanded a special culture from the student of Natural History. In the Politics we are told that, just as a doctor must render his account to doctors, so must all others be judged by their peers. But by a doctor we mean not only the practitioner, but also the architectonic doctor and thirdly the man of culture; for, we are told, there are people of that class in nearly all the arts. We must allow the right of judgment to men of culture as fully as to men of knowledge⁴.

The kind of culture referred to here is clearly not Aristotelian Logic. The "architectonic" doctor is the great physiologist or pathologist, to whom the practitioner is related as the builder is to the architect, and the man of culture must be the man who has an intelligent, but non-professional, knowledge of medicine, enough, let us say, to know a quack when he sees one. Just so in Politics. The architectonic politician is, as we have seen already, the lawgiver, the "practical politician" corresponds to the medical practitioner, and the man of culture to the citizen who, without necessarily taking an active part in political life, can form an intelligent judgment on political questions, and who knows what sort of treatment is applicable to so complex a thing as human society. Just as the man of medical culture will see at once through the quack's nostrum, even though he may be unable to justify his rejection of it on scientific grounds, so the man of whom we are speaking will at once distrust any talk upon such subjects which seems to suggest that good citizens can be made by theoretical instruction in the duties of citizenship, and any attempt to regulate the

state on the basis of rigid and abstract formulas like the axioms of the mathematician.

¹ Met. 1006 a, 6 ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο (the principle of contradiction) ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ.

² Part. An. 639 a, 1 Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινότεραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' ὅλον παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. τοιοῦτον γὰρ δὴ τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἴομεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικὸν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μόριον. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ιστορίας δεῖ τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὄρους τοιούτους, πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τάληθές, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως.

³ Met. 1005 b, 3 δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν.

⁴ Pol. 1282 a, 1 ὥσπερ οὖν ἱατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἱατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἱατρὸς δ' ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἥττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν.

VII.

§ 22. The first lesson we have to learn from our man of culture is that every science must have a starting-point (*ἀρχή*). Geometry, for instance, starts from certain definitions and axioms which define the nature of space, and we must have a similar starting-point for Politics.

From what has been said as to the nature of practical science, however, it follows that the starting-point of Politics will be a definition, not of something that is, but of something that is to be. It will not resemble the definitions from which deductive geometry starts, but rather the enunciation of a problem in geometrical construction, what in the older Greek geometry was called a *ὑπόθεσις*¹. Now the method by which we solve a problem of this kind is analysis, that is to say, we assume that the construction is made, and then ask what are the conditions of its being made until we come to something that is in our power, just as in a theoretical analysis we go on until we come to something we know to be true.

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle gives us an example of a theoretical analysis. Figures are resolved by making actual the divisions into other figures which are there potentially. If they were already actually divided the proof would be plain; as it is, we must make a construction which is always in the long run some form of division. For instance, why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? It is because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If the line parallel to the side were already drawn, the truth would be plain at first sight. Again, why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? It is because, if you have three lines, the two segments of the base and the perpendicular raised on the centre, and if you know the previous proposition, the thing is clear at first sight².

The theoretical sciences cannot prove their starting-points or first principles. In the long run these must simply be perceived, and it is equally true that the practical sciences cannot deliberate about the end which forms their starting-point. The reason is that analysis, whether it takes the form of demonstration or deliberation, has to do only with the series of middle terms which appear in the theoretical sciences as causes, in the practical sciences as means. For instance, if we have to "demonstrate" an eclipse of the moon, we do so by finding the middle term *ἀντίφραξις γῆς*, and when we have found this, we know the cause of the eclipse³. In the same way, if we have to deliberate about health, we do so by seeking for middle terms or "means" till we come to one that it is in our power to produce⁴. And, on this side too, we are dependent on a simple "perception" or "intuition." If we are analysing a rectilinear figure, we simply "perceive" that triangles are the ultimate figures into which we can analyse it, a perception which is really identical with that of the axiom that two straight lines cannot inclose a space⁵. So too in practice. An act is always a particular act, and no particular can ever be reached by a process of reasoning. We simply "see" that this particular act which is within our power is a case of the general rule which we have found by deliberation. The whole process of analytic deliberation has

to do only with the middle terms which are intermediate between the definition of the end to be attained and the particular act, which is also an object of simple intuition. We start from an "immediate proposition" (*ἄμεσος πρότασις*), that is, a proposition which does not admit of any middle term between its subject and its predicate⁶, and we end with a particular act, which in turn cannot be connected with the rule under which it falls by a middle term. At each end of the scale we are dependent on immediate perception.

¹ The precise signification of *ὑπόθεσις* is *ὃ ὑποτίθεται τις*, that which one sets before oneself as a thing to be done or proved; for the meaning of *ὑποτίθεμαι* is not very different from that of *προτίθεμαι*. The *ὑπόθεσις* is properly the Q.E.D. or Q.E.F. of a geometrical problem. It is a conclusion assumed for purposes of analysis to be true, or an end assumed for purposes of deliberation to be realised. The method and terminology are alike Platonic, though in the Sixth Book of the Republic Plato insists that knowledge in the highest sense cannot be of this character, but must deduce everything from the Form of the Good. The analytic method proceeds *ἐξ ὑποθέσεων οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτὴν* (510 b); the true method would not regard these *ὑποθέσεις* as *ἀρχαί*. It is evidence of the Academic origin of the theory that we have in [Plato] Def. 415 b *ὑπόθεσις ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος*. See Jowett and Campbell's Republic, vol. ii, pp. 333 sqq.

² Met. 1051 a, 21 *εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ· διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ' ἦν διηρημένα, φανερὰ ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὄρθαι τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὄρθαις. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἢ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθύς δῆλον. διὰ τί ἢ ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου; διότι ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἢ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἢ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκείνῳ εἰδότει.*

³ An. Post. 93 a, 30 *ἐκλειψις ἐφ' οὗ τὸ Α, σελήνη ἐφ' οὗ Γ, ἀντίφραξις γῆς ἐφ' οὗ Β.* ib. 85 b, 23 *ἀπόδειξις μὲν ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί.* Met. 1041 a, 10 *ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί αἰεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει.* An. Post. (loc. cit.) *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι οἴομεθα ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, αἰτίαι δὲ τέτταρες, ... πᾶσαι αὗται διὰ τοῦ μέσου δεικνυνται.*

⁴ See EE. 1227 b, 28 sqq. quoted on pp. 323 sq. Cf. Met. 1032 b, 15 *τῶν δὲ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἡ μὲν νόσις καλεῖται* (the deliberative analysis), *ἡ δὲ ποίησις, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἰδούς* (the *ὑπόθεσις* consisting of a formal cause or definition) *νόσις, ἡ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως* (the *ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει*) *ποίησις.* λέγω δ' οἶον εἰ ὑγιανεῖ, δεῖ ὁμαλυνθῆναι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμαλυνθῆναι; τοδί. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ εἰ θερμανθήσεται. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστὶ; τοδί. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοδί δυνάμει· τοῦτο δ' ἤδη ἐπ' αὐτῷ.

⁵ Cf. EN. 1142 a, 28 n. This passage, which has caused some difficulty, is well elucidated by Görland, *Aristoteles und die Mathematik*, pp. 79 sqq. The mathematical *ἔσχατον*, into which all rectilinear figures could be resolved, was the triangle. Cf. Met. 1054 a, 3 *καὶ εἰ σχήματα εὐθύγραμμα* (sc. *τὰ ὄντα ἦν*), *σχημάτων ἂν ἦν ἀριθμός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τὸ τρίγωνον.* De An. 414 b, 21 *οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς... παραπλησίως δ' ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν*

σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχὴν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπὶ τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ τρίγωνον κ.τ.λ.

⁶ An. Post. 72 a, 7 ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἀποδείξεως πρότασις ἄμεσος, ἄμεσος δὲ ἥς μή ἐστὶν ἄλλη προτέρα. 72 b, 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον...τὰ ἄμεσα...ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ib. 76 a, 19 φανερόν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὰς ἐκάστου ἰδίας ἀρχὰς ἀποδείξαι. ib. 90 b, 24 ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὀρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον. ib. 93 b, 21 ἔστι δὲ τῶν μὲν ἕτερόν τι τὸ αἷτιον, τῶν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἄμεσα καὶ ἀρχαὶ εἰσιν, ἃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερόν ποιῆσαι.

§ 23. How, then, do we know these "first principles," these ultimate definitions from which every science must start? The answer given by Aristotle in the Ethics (1098 b, 3) is that some are apprehended by means of induction (ἐπαγωγῇ), some by perception (αἰσθήσει), and some by "habituation" (ἐθισμῷ τινι). It is by perception or intuition that the first principles of mathematics, for instance, are apprehended. The definition of a triangle is reached simply by looking at a triangle. No one can prove to us that a figure with three angles will also have three sides; we must simply see that for ourselves. If we cannot imagine a triangle, no one can help us to do so. When, however, we have once got the definition, we can go on to demonstrate mediate propositions about triangles to any extent by finding middle terms which lead to new conclusions. This process is analysis; but without the definition of the triangle as a starting-point we should have nothing to analyse.

In most cases, however, the subject is more complex, and a single act of intuition does not suffice to make the definition clear to us. In such cases we must be made to see the truth of the immediate proposition by being called upon to recognise it in a number of instances adduced for the purpose. It is this process which Aristotle calls ἐπαγωγή, a word which literally signifies the citation of witnesses in a court of law. It is not a method of proof; for the propositions which we arrive at by its help are not capable of proof in the proper sense of the word. It is simply a way of making us see for ourselves what we cannot know in any other way. If we have not the "sense" to see the truth of an immediate proposition

for ourselves, no number of instances will make us sure of it, and this is what Aristotle means when he says *νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*, and identifies *νοῦς* with *αἴσθησις*, which is the most general term for immediate perception whether sensuous or intellectual¹.

But there are still more complicated cases, and these include, for reasons we shall see presently, the greater part of human affairs, which require something more than this inductive process, the chief sphere of which is the study of nature. The operations of nature are always in the same direction, whereas human action is always the result of a capacity of opposites, and therefore implies a choice between alternatives. Now, if we are to see for ourselves the first principle of which all human action ought to be the application, we must be habituated in such a way as always to choose the right alternative of the two which are possible in every act. If we were habituated in such a way as always to choose the wrong alternative, we should arrive at some sort of a first principle too, but it would be a false one; while if we were to choose now the one and now the other, our "moral sense" would be blunted and confused. And this explains why we must attend to the unproved statements and beliefs of experienced and elderly people (1143 b, 11). Their experience has given them an eye for such things and they see aright. But we must remember also that it is the "eye" and not the experience that really secures the truth of these statements. The first principles of the science of human conduct are as incapable of demonstration as those of any other science. They too must in the long run be "perceived" immediately, and if we cannot see them for ourselves, no one can make us see them.

¹ This is the *ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις* of Speusippos, *ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας* (Sext. Math. vii, 145). Cf. EN. 1042 a, 27, where it is contrasted with *ἡ τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθησις* and compared with the perception of the "common sensibles," i.e. those *αἰσθητά* which are not the object of any special sense.

VIII.

§ 24. Assuming, then, that the necessary habituation has been secured, how are we to get at the starting-point of our science in a form that admits of deliberative analysis? In other words, how are we to find the definition of the Good for Man? The answer is that we must adopt the method of Dialectic. The word *διαλεκτική* properly means nothing more than the art of dialogue or discussion—it signifies the theoretical formulation of the practice of Sokrates. Little as we know with certainty of the teaching of the historical Sokrates, we do know very accurately the method which he adopted. It was to make people see the truth by talking to them, to elicit by means of question and answer that knowledge which they possessed without being clearly conscious of it, the truth which was in them already in the sense that they could be made to see it as soon as it was put before them in a clear and distinct way. Plato developed this method and, by the help of the theory of Reminiscence, made Dialectic the science of the Forms or “Ideas.” In his hands it became the only instrument of all philosophical thinking, the ideal of a completed science. To this Aristotle could not agree. A dialectic proof was to him no proof at all; for it had no middle term¹. It could not be the right instrument for arriving at mediate propositions; for we can only be said to know these in the true sense of the word when we know them as the conclusions of a syllogism. This was Aristotle’s own contribution to Logic, and he is never weary of showing us that the syllogism is the only adequate form for the mediate truths of science. But it remains as true for him as it was for Plato that the dialectic method is the only way of arriving at immediate propositions, propositions which can have no middle term between their subject and their predicate, and we have seen that it is from such propositions that all science must start.

¹ The fault of the dialectic method as employed by Plato is just that it represents mediate truth in a form which is only right for immediate. Cf. An. Pr.

46 a, 31 ὅτι δ' ἡ διὰ τῶν γενῶν διαίρεσις (as in Plato's Sophist and Statesman) μικρόν τι μόριόν ἐστι τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου, ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις οἶον ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται, συλλογίζεται δ' αἰεὶ τι τῶν ἄνωθεν.... ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ὅταν δέῃ τι συλλογίσασθαι ὑπάρχειν, δεῖ τὸ μέσον, δι' οὗ γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός, καὶ ἥττον αἰεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ καθόλου τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἄκρων. ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις τοῦναντίον βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ καθόλου λαμβάνει μέσον.

§ 25. Dialectic is the subject of that part of the Organon called the Topics, and it is there that we shall find the theoretical justification of the method employed in the Ethics. The object of the science, we are told, is to enable us to draw conclusions from received beliefs on any subject that may be proposed. The dialectic syllogism differs from the demonstrative syllogism in having for its premisses, not scientific truths but received beliefs. These beliefs are those either of the majority or of the wise. It is useful to cultivate this science, first as an intellectual exercise, secondly as a preparation for discussions with those who do not accept our premisses, and it has a place even in sciences that admit of philosophic treatment. If we are able to raise all the difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily distinguish truth from error. But above all it is of use for the discovery of the first principles or starting-points of the different sciences, since it is impossible for any science to give an account of its own starting-point. That can only be discussed in the light of received beliefs on the subject. This, then, is the proper function of dialectic, which is a method of examination and affords a path to the first principles of all the sciences¹.

We begin, then, by "taking" (λαμβάνειν)² premisses from the beliefs of the many and the wise to serve as premisses (ἔνδοξοι προτάσεις)³. But our attitude towards these beliefs is by no means uncritical. We start from them, indeed, but we at once go on to raise all the difficulties which they suggest. As a general rule, we find that they are contradictory, and when we find such a contradiction between received beliefs, we have what is called an ἀπορία (literally "no thoroughfare"). Our thought is, as it were, fettered and we are obliged to look for some means of freeing it from its

chains. The technical name for a pair of contradictory *ἐνδοξα* is *πρόβλημα* and the solution of it is called the *λύσις*⁴.

Our belief in the possibility of solving the contradictions between *ἐνδοξα* depends upon the conviction that neither the mass of men from ancient times down to the present nor the great thinkers of mankind are likely to be altogether wrong⁵. We usually find that if we develop their beliefs by criticism, if we make them "take a step further" (*μεταβαίνειν*), they come into agreement readily enough. "It is of advantage," we read in the *Metaphysics*, "to advance step by step to what is more known," that is, more known "by nature." "It is thus that all learning takes place, by an advance from what is less known by nature to what is more so. This is our real task, to turn what is more known to us into what is more known by nature, just as in action it is to turn what is good for us into what is good universally. What is first known to a given person is often very feebly known; but for all that it is from things known to oneself, however inadequately, that we must try to apprehend universal knowledge, shifting our ground and advancing step by step, as has been said, through these very things⁶."

The task of the dialectician, then, is to draw on the opposing parties to a consciousness of their real meaning, and thus to make them see their fundamental agreement. It is to lead them on, to use a phrase which has strangely been called "Eudemian," but which is really Platonic, from what is "true but not clear" to what is "true and clear⁷." This he does by assailing these beliefs (*ἐπιχειρεῖν*) from a number of positions or points of vantage (*τόποι*), which are applicable to every kind of subject, the positions of "the more and less," "the essential and the accidental," and so forth, which the skilled dialectician is always ready to occupy. They are in fact a number of ways in which the beliefs under discussion can be qualified so that the contradiction, which only arises from their being stated without qualification, will disappear.

It is sometimes said that the method just described amounts to taking our first principles on trust; but this criticism leaves out of account the other side of the doctrine,

namely that the ἀρχή is really apprehended immediately. To this extent we must always remember that Aristotle is a convinced "intuitionalist" in the true sense of that much abused word. Just as we must simply see by "looking at it" that a figure with three sides will have three angles, so in the long run we must simply "see" the truth of our definition of the Good for Man. But that is no reason for refusing the help of any method that will put us in a position to see more easily what is too complex a thing to be grasped at once like the axioms of geometry. Our belief in the truth of this definition rests on no other ground than our conviction of these axioms, and if any one chooses to deny it, we can have nothing further to say to him. We cannot prove it to him; he can only be converted, as Eudemos says, by the experience of advancing years or by being put under restraint. (EE. 1214 b, 28 sqq.)

¹ Top. 101 a, 25 ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰπεῖν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμος ἢ πραγματεία. ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν καταφανές ἐστι· μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥᾶον περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνησόμεθα. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς, μεταβιβάζοντες (cf. n. 6) ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν ἡμῖν. πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾶον ἐν ἐκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τὰληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἐκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν, ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθείσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀπάντων εἰσὶ, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκείον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστίν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὕσα πρὸς τὰς ἀπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.

² The use of λαμβάνειν as a technical term of dialectics is Platonic, and is derived from the current phrase λόγον λαμβάνειν παρὰ τινος. So we have λαβεῖν προτάσεις παρὰ τῶν ἐρωτωμένων (Top. 154 a, 25), λαβεῖν ὑποθέσεις (An. Pr. 24 a, 24), λαβεῖν ἀρχάς (Top. 153 a, 9). Cf. also λήψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου (An. Pr. 24 b, 11), λήψις τῶν ὅρων (ib. 61 a, 28). The ἐρωτῶν αἰτεῖται παρὰ τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου, the ἀποκρινόμενος ἀποδίδωσι τῷ ἐρωτῶντι, and the ἐρωτῶν in turn λαμβάνει, δέχεται, ἀποδέχεται.

³ Cf. EN. 1098 b, 27. Top. 100 b, 21 ἐνδόξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. The mark of an ἐνδόξος πρότασις is the verb δοκεῖ, "is believed," "is thought," which must always be carefully distinguished from φαίνεται, "seems," "appears." Cf. Bonitz Ind. 203 a, 27 "inde δοκεῖ, δοκοῦντα usurpatur de iis opinionibus quae communi hominum sensu comprobantur, τὰ δοκοῦντα (syn. τὰ ἐνδόξα, τὰ φαινόμενα)."

⁴ For *ἀπορία* cf. EN. 1146 a, 22 sqq. and the notes. A *πρόβλημα* (*προβάλλω*) only differs from a *πρότασις* (*προτείνω*) in form (*τῷ τρόπῳ*), cf. Top. 101 b, 29. The best commentary on the term *λύσις* is *δέδεται ἡ διάνοια* (EN. loc. cit.).

⁵ This conviction of Aristotle's is most strongly expressed in such passages as EN. 1153 b, 32 where all creatures are said to have *θεῖόν τι* in them. This comes from Plato, Laws 950 b *θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὐστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς κ.τ.λ.*

⁶ Met. 1029 b, 3 *πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἡττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθὰ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δ' ἐκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαλόντας ὥσπερ εἴρηται διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν.* For *μεταβαίνειν*, *μεταβιβάζειν* cf. EN. 1097 a, 24 n., EE. 1216 b, 30 (quoted ad loc.), Top. 101 a, 33 (quoted in n. 1).

⁷ For *ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές* cf. EN. 1138 b, 26 n. The formula is technical in Plato's dialectical dialogues. Cf. e.g. Polit. 275 a *τὸ μὲν λεχθὲν ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν... σαφές ἐρρήθη*, 281 c *ἡ λέγοιμεν μὲν ἄν τι ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε*;

§ 26. Once we have got our definition, however, the procedure becomes quite different. Our analysis of it, though it is deliberative and not demonstrative, will proceed through middle terms and can only be expressed adequately in the form of a series of practical syllogisms. But here again the "man of culture" has an important warning for us. There cannot be more in the conclusion than there is in the premisses. We can make deductions from the axioms with absolute precision, because these axioms are eternal and necessary and even the mediate truths which we derive from them are quite free from matter. But the premisses of practical science are not of this kind. They are statements, not of immutable truth, but simply of what holds good "for the most part," and our conclusions will therefore have the same approximate character. It shows total lack of culture to ask for mathematical accuracy¹ in the discussion of human affairs. That is only to be looked for in sciences which deal with simple and primary truths².

It formed no part of Aristotle's programme to justify this distinction in a course on practical science, but it is really based on metaphysical grounds. We must carefully distinguish two classes of facts which may be the objects of science. First we have those that are of necessity and always,

such as the truths of mathematics. Then there are the things that happen "for the most part" or as a general rule. Thirdly, as this implies exceptions to the rule, there are those things that follow no rule, and are said to happen by "chance." These cannot be the objects of science³.

In the Topics, the fact that reason rules over temper and desire is given as an instance of a thing that is true for the most part, and in the Prior Analytics, the fact that men grow gray⁴. The first is an *ἠθικὴ πρότασις*, the second a *φυσικὴ πρότασις*. Most investigations, we are told, have to do with facts of this kind, and this is especially true of the practical sciences. Rhetoric, for instance, deals with actions (*τὰ πρακτά*), and these all have this character. None of them are necessary, and "things which happen for the most part and admit of being otherwise must be inferred from premisses of a like nature⁵." This is just the other side of the proposition with which we started above. Again we are told in another passage of the Prior Analytics that "problems as to what is for the most part must be answered from premisses that are true for the most part. The conclusion of each is similar to its starting-point⁶."

From all this it follows that the starting-point of Politics cannot be anything more than a general truth; we cannot hope to find a universal and necessary axiom such as those from which the geometer starts. And it will be absolutely impossible to lay down universal rules of action. Every act is a particular act and for that reason cannot be brought under a universal rule. As in medicine and navigation, we must always take into account the particular circumstances of the case, and these cannot be formulated or predicted⁷.

¹ The words which express the presence or absence of this precision are all metaphors taken from the arts, and this is the primary application of the adjective *ἀκριβής*, though we can only guess what a *κρίβος* was. The opposite of *ἀκριβῶς* is *τύπῳ*, a word which expresses the outline of a solid as *ὑπογραφή* or *περιγραφή* expresses the outline of a plane. As Muretus says, "quod in picturis *ὑπογραφή*, in statuariorum similiumque artificum operibus *τύπος*." The adverb *παχυλῶς* is used of the thick, rough lines of a sketch in contrast with the fine outline of the *τελεία ἀπεργασία*. Cf. Plato, *Polit.* 294 e, 295 a, where *πῶς οὕτως* *παχύτερον* is opposed to *ἀκριβῶς* and the verb *λεπτουργεῖν*.

² The conditions of ἀκρίβεια are thus given in An. Post. 87 a, 31 ἀκριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα (1) ἢ τοῦ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ διότι ἢ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ (2) ἢ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ὅλον ἀριθμητικὴ ἀρμονικῆς, καὶ (3) ἢ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως, ὅλον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικῆς. The "abstraction" (ἀφαίρεσις) of arithmetic is that of "position" (θέσις). Met. 982 a, 26 ἀκριβέσταται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λαμβανομένων, ὅλον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας. Met. 1078 a, 9 καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλουστέρων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τάκριβες.

³ Met. 1065 a, 4 ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ αἰεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τούτων ἐστίν. ib. 1026 b, 3 πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρία.

⁴ Top. 129 a, 10 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, καθάπερ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον πρὸς ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν τῷ τὸ μὲν προστάττειν τὸ δ' ὑπηρετεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λογιστικὸν πάντοτε προστάττει, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ προστάττεται, οὔτε τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν αἰεὶ προστάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστάττει ποτέ, ὅταν ἡ μοχθηρὰ ἢ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. (Note here the dialectical use of Plato's psychology.) An. Pr. 32 b, 4 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων πάλιν λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ δύο λέγεται τρόπους, ἓνα μὲν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαι καὶ διαλείπειν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ὅλον τὸ πολιούσθαι ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ πεφυκὸς ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ συνεχές μὲν ἔχει τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὄντος μέντοι ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστίν. ἄλλον δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον, ὃ καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ οὕτως δυνατόν, ὅλον τὸ βαδίζειν ζῶον ἢ τὸ βαδίζοντος γενέσθαι σεισμόν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὕτως πέφυκεν ἢ ἐναντίως.... ἐπιστήμη δὲ καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν μὲν ἀορίστων οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι τὸ μέσον. τῶν δὲ πεφυκόντων ἔστι, καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ σκέψεις γίνονται περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων· ἐκείνων δ' ἐγχεῖ μὲν γενέσθαι συλλογισμόν, οὐ μὴν εἰσθῆ γέ ζητεῖσθαι.

⁵ Rhet. 1357 a, 22 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι βουλευόνται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἐτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

⁶ An. Pr. 43 b, 33 τῶν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προβλημάτων καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προτάσεων, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τινῶν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐκάστου τὸ συμπέρασμα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.

⁷ Professor Stewart quotes Hippokrates περὶ ἀρχαίας ἱατρικῆς § 9, a passage of which we seem to have more than one echo in the Ethics. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ ὑφηγέεται, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἰσχυρότερα ἔβλαπτεν, ὅσα δ' ἦν ἀσθενέστερα ὠφέλειε τε καὶ ἔτρεφε τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, εὐπετὲς ἂν ἦν τὸ πρῆγμα· πολλὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀσφαλέος ἂν ἔδει περιλαμβάνοντας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσθενέστατον. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἀμάρτημα, οὐδὲ ἦσσαν λυμαινεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἦν ἐλάσσονα καὶ ἐνδεέστερα τῶν ἱκανῶν προσφέρηται· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ λιμοῦ μέρος δύναται ἰσχυρῶς ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ γινῶσαι καὶ ἀσθενέα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἐτεροῖα μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ πληρώσιος, οὐχ ἦσσαν δὲ ἅμα δεινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ κενώσιος· δι' ὧν πολλὸν ποικιλώτερά τε καὶ διὰ πλέονος ἀκριβίης ἐστί. δεῖ γὰρ μέτρον τινὸς στοχασασθαι. μέτρον δέ, οὐδὲ σταθμόν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμόν οὐδένα ἄλλον, πρὸς ὃ ἀναφέρων εἴσῃ τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἂν εὐροίης ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἴσθησιν· διὸ ἔργον οὕτω καταμαθεῖν ἀκριβέως, ὥστε σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνειν ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα· κἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτον τὸν ἱητρὸν ἰσχυρῶς

ἐπαινέοιμι τὸν σμικρὰ ἁμαρτάνοντα· τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς ὀλιγάκις ἔστι κατιδεῖν· ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ γε τῶν λητρῶν ταυτὰ μοι δοκέουσι τοῖσι κακοῖσι κυβερνήτησι πάσχειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν ἐν γαλήνῃ κυβερνῶντες ἁμαρτάνωσιν, οὐ καταφανέες εἰσίν· ὅταν δὲ αὐτοὺς κατάσχη χειμῶν τε μέγας καὶ ἄνεμος ἐξώσσης, φανερώς ἤδη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι δι' ἀγνοσίην καὶ ἁμαρτίην δῆλοί εἰσιν ἀπολέσαντες τὴν ναῦν.

IX.

§ 27. We have assumed that man has an "end," and it is desirable to say something at this stage about the conception of the Final Cause which is the ruling conception of our study. It is in accordance with the whole character of this treatise that Aristotle does not include in it any account of his teleological views, but it is necessary for us to refer to them briefly in order that their true bearing may be understood.

The existence of an "end," or more exactly a "completion" (τέλος)¹, is due to the fact that nature and man have not only a source of motion in themselves, but also a source of rest². No animal or plant grows indefinitely; there is a point at which each is "complete" or full-grown. Still more will it be the case that for the human soul there is a point at which it has nothing further to attain, and this will be the perfection or completion or "end" of man.

To Aristotle's mind the existence of such a point is proved by the fact that otherwise we should be face to face with that most irrational of things an infinite progression³. It is one of his fundamental doctrines that the infinite exists potentially but not actually. We can always get a finite as large as we please, and that gives rise in our minds to the fiction of an actual infinite; but this is quite inconsistent with the idea of the "complete" (τέλειον), which is defined as that outside of which there is nothing (οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω), that which requires nothing more to make its form complete⁴. The actual infinite if it existed would destroy the possibility of human action by destroying the Good or Final Cause. "We cannot desire to walk for the sake of health and to be healthy for the sake of happiness, and that again for the sake

of something else and so on *ad infinitum*.....Those who set up an infinite do not see that they are destroying the Good. Surely no one would ever set about doing anything if he were never to reach any final result. There would be no sense in such action; for all men of sense act for the sake of something, and that something is a limit; for the end is a limit⁵." In other words, we should never desire anything at all, unless there were something which we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. However long the chain may be, it must have its last link firmly attached somewhere.

¹ The Greek word τέλος has quite different associations from the English "end." We may see from its use in common speech (τέλος ἔχειν, λαβεῖν, ἐπιθεῖναι) that it implies the idea of completion. We must always think of it as the τελείωσις of an εἶδος.

² Phys. 192 b, 13 τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως. Met. 1013 a, 29 ἔτι (αἰτίον) ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως. Gen. An. 776 a, 35 ὥσπερ ἐστηκὸς ἤδη διὰ τὸ τέλος ἔχειν τὸ ἔμβρυον.

³ Cf. 1094 a, 20 πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, a phrase which is regularly opposed to ἵσταται, στήσεται. This is derived from the "quasi-impersonal" use described in Riddell's Digest § 97. Cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 28 b οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή, "there is no fear of my being the last." So An. Post. 82 b, 11 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ἵσταται ὁδός, καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω στήσεται. An. Pr. 43 a, 36 ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω πορευομένοις ἵσταται ποτε, πάλιν ἐρούμεν. An. Post. 72 b, 11 εἴ τε ἵσταται καὶ εἰσὶν ἀρχαί. Gen. Corr. 332 b, 12 δεῖ μὲν γὰρ στήναι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον τοῦτο ἵεναι. Met. 1000 b, 28 καὶ εἰ ἵσταται καὶ εἰ βαδίζει εἰς ἄπειρον.

⁴ Met. 1021 b, 21 ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μὴδὲν ἐλλείπη μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους. 1055 a, 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέγιστον ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει τέλειον· μέγιστόν τε γὰρ οὐ μὴ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ τέλειον οὐ μὴ ἐστὶν ἔξω λαβεῖν τι δυνατόν. Phys. 207 a, 9 ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω· οὐ δὲ μὴδὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον...τέλειον δ' οὐδὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος. For a fuller account of τελείωσις, see Introductory Note to Book II, p. 70, n. 10.

⁵ Met. 994 a, 1 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τις καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρα τὰ αἷτια τῶν ὄντων,...δῆλον.... οὐδὲ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα εἰς ἄπειρον οἶόν τ' ἵεναι, βάδισιν μὲν ὑγείας ἔνεκεν, ταύτην δ' εὐδαιμονίας, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ἄλλου, καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἄλλου ἔνεκεν εἶναι. ib. 994 b, 9 ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τέλος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὁ μὴ ἄλλου ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου· ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτόν τι ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον· εἰ δὲ μὴδὲν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' οἱ τὸ ἄπειρον ποιῶντες λανθάνουσιν ἐξαιροῦντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. καίτοι οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειεν οὐδὲν πράττειν μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἥξειν. οὐδ' ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις· ἔνεκα γὰρ τινος αἰεὶ πράττει ὁ γε νοῦς ἔχων· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ πέρας· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστίν.

X.

§ 28. There is nothing, however, in the conception of the Final Cause to justify us in saying that there is only one end of all existence, a universal good to which all others lead up. On the contrary, we seem rather to see that there are very many different forms, each of which has its own completion, a stage at which it is full-grown. A plant is complete when it flowers, an animal when it has reached the full stature of its kind, and we do not see that in this they are contributing to the completion of any universal form. There appear to be as many final causes as there are forms capable of completion, and if this is so, we can hardly agree with Plato who held that the Good for Man could not be studied apart from the good for all creatures and of the world as a whole. It follows at once from Aristotle's teleology that the good of each form must be studied by itself.

It must, however, be admitted that this is not exactly the ground on which Plato's universal good is rejected in the Ethics. We have instead a number of subtle arguments based on the doctrine of the "Categories" and a few remarks which look like appeals to the prejudices of "common sense." The latter we can understand at once; for it is in accordance with the method of the Ethics to go for premisses to the beliefs of the many. But what are we to make of the arguments drawn from the priority of one category to the others and the impossibility of anything being a common predicate in all the figures of predication? Are we to say that Aristotle for once has violated the rules of his own method and argued directly from his own scientific premisses, and then not even from those that really determined his views?

To understand this point, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what these "categories" are, a subject upon which much new light has recently been thrown. There are various names for the categories, but the most correct and technical is *σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας*, "figures of predication." The most obvious way of interpreting this term is to look at it in

the light of the analogous phrase *σχήματα τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ* or "figures of inference." Now what the figures of the syllogism really give us is the different relations in which two terms can stand to a third or "middle" term, and it would therefore seem natural that the figures of predication should give us the various relations that can exist between a subject and a predicate. The analogy is not quite perfect, however; for we should rather expect in that case to find the categories or "predicaments" identical with the "predicables," namely genus, species, property and accident, whereas they are really such things as quality, quantity and relation. This little discrepancy, we may note at once, is suggestive of a non-Aristotelian origin for the doctrine.

The whole theory, as Apelt has shown¹, is intended to solve the difficulties about predication which had caused so much trouble to "the more recent of the ancients," as Aristotle calls them. They were disturbed by the thought that a thing might turn out to be both a one and a many, and resorted to various devices to avoid this. Some, like Lykophron, abolished the "is" (the copula), some altered the form of speech and said *ἄνθρωπος λελεύκωται*, to avoid having to admit the proposition *ἄνθρωπός ἐστι λευκός*, which seems to violate the principle of contradiction. Man is man and white is white, and we must not say that man is white². Now all these difficulties arise from a confusion between what we may call the substantial, the qualitative, the quantitative judgment and the rest. When we say that Koriskos is musical, we are not making the same kind of judgment as we make when we say that Koriskos is in the Lykeion or that Koriskos is sitting. We can quite well ask what Koriskos *is*, what he *is* like, how tall he *is*, and what he *is* doing, without implying that he "is" anything else than Koriskos. In this sense, then, Koriskos is a "one and a many," and the difficulties about predication disappear as soon as we recognise that it has many forms.

All these difficulties, however, were very ancient history indeed by Aristotle's time, and we can hardly suppose that he invented a theory of categories in order to meet them,

especially as that theory is something of an excrescence alongside of his own characteristic theory of the predicables. Not only so, but by the time Plato wrote the *Philebos*, this particular spectre had been finally laid to rest. This is what Plato himself said about it:—

So.—To say that the many is one and the one many sounds a strange statement, and it is easy to raise objections against anyone who lays down either of these propositions.

Protarchos.—Do you mean when anyone says that I Protarchos, who am one by nature, am again quite a number of “me’s” and opposite to one another, and puts me down as tall and small and heavy and light and countless other things?

So.—What you mention, Protarchos, are only the vulgar marvels of the one and the many, and practically everyone is agreed now-a-days that it is better not to meddle with them. They are childish and easy and stand in the way of all reasonable argument³.

Now, if once we realise the full meaning of this, we shall have no hesitation in admitting with Rose and Gercke⁴ that the table of the categories is not Aristotle’s at all, but simply part of his heritage from the Academy, and we shall have no difficulty in accepting the positive statement that Xenokrates reduced the categories to two only, Substance and Relation⁵. If that is so, we shall see that, in accordance with his method, Aristotle was bound to argue against the Platonic view from some position admitted by the Academy, and that it is this which has prevented him from doing what would doubtless have been more interesting to us, namely, from contrasting his own view of teleology with that of Plato.

Now that we can look at them in this light, the arguments themselves are not nearly so captious and unreal as they might appear at first sight. Aristotle is pointing out a real inconsistency in the Academic position, namely that the theory of the “one and many” is quite inconsistent with the doctrine of “forms,” at least in its original shape.

All these arguments depend upon the fundamental position that the categories cannot be reduced either to one another or to any common genus⁶. It may be possible with Xenokrates to reduce all but Substance to the single category of Relation, it may be possible to class them all as accidents of

substance; but there is no common measure of a substance and of a relation or accident. Now the Platonic forms are substances, if they are anything, and cannot have any application beyond the first of the categories. A thing which could be predicated in all the categories can for that very reason have no substantial existence; it can form no true genus. But the Form of the Good professes to be just such a common predicate; we say that a thing is good in any category we please, and therefore good is no true universal. In particular it is impossible that the same universal should be predicated of two things, one of which is posterior to the other; for species are never prior or posterior to one another. Now all the other categories are clearly posterior to substance and they cannot therefore be coordinate species of the same genus. This is an *argumentum ad hominem*, certainly, but it goes to the root of the difference between Plato and Aristotle.

¹ O. Apelt, Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, pp. 201 sqq.

² Phys. 185 b, 29 ἐθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἅμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφείλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μὴ ποτε τὸ ἔστι προσάπτοντες πολλά εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἐν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος. The phrase μοναχῶς λεγόμενον (opp. πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον) is exactly equivalent to ἐν μιᾷ κατηγορίᾳ κατηγορούμενον. The doctrine in question was maintained by Antisthenes and the schools of Megara and Eretria.

³ Phileb. 14 c ΣΩ. ...ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλά εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλά θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ. ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἓνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία; ΣΩ. Σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἄπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβάνόντων γίγνεσθαι. Plato first published the solution of the problem in Soph. 251 a, sqq., where see Apelt's note. The "category" of πρὸς τι gets rid of this particular difficulty.

⁴ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iv, p. 424.

⁵ Simplicius in Cat., Schol. Br. 47 b, 26 οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσι.

⁶ Phys. 200 b, 34 κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν, ὡς φαμέν, δ' οὔτε τόδε οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐδέν. Met. 1024 b, 10 ἕτερα δὲ τῷ γένει λέγεται...καὶ ὅσα καθ' ἕτερον σχῆμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ ποιόν τι, τὰ δ' ὡς διήρηται πρότερον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναλύεται οὔτ' εἰς ἄλληλα οὔτ' εἰς ἓν τι. ib. 1070 a, 33 ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον εἰ ταῦτά πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ ἡ οὐσία. τί οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας.



BOOK I.

HAPPINESS.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. To find the definition which is to be the starting-point of our science we must discuss the beliefs of the many and the opinions of the wise (Introd. § 25). Now all are agreed that the Good for Man is Happiness, but there is a great divergence between the many and the wise as to what happiness really means. We must therefore discuss their views, whether these are merely implied in the lives they lead, or formulated as theories of the good. This discussion will show us what sides of the truth each has laid hold of, and the definition of happiness will then emerge.

We need not hesitate to translate the word *εὐδαιμονία* by the English "happiness," but we must be careful not to ascribe to Aristotle any theory of "Eudaemonism." If we do, we make the mistake of supposing him to be setting up Happiness as the end of life in opposition to some other theory of that end. Now his whole point is that there is no other. Plato and his followers are quite at one with Sardanapallos as to this, and the only question is what we are to understand by it. In popular Greek *εὐδαιμονία* meant having a good *δαίμων*, and *δαίμων* means fortune or luck. Generally speaking, then, it meant an abundance of worldly goods, and this sense is given in Aristotle's Rhetoric along with others which seem to come from the Academy¹. For the Greek philosophers had long been trying to deepen

¹ Rhet. 1360 b, 14 ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία (1) εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἢ (2) αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἢ (3) ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἡδιστος, ἢ (4) εὐθηνία κτη-

μάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων. These definitions bear the stamp of the Academy. The first is a definition

the significance of the old term. Herakleitos had said "Man's character is his δαίμων," and Demokritos declared that "Happiness lieth not in flocks and herds: the soul is the dwelling-place of the δαίμων." This was of course the view of Plato too, and the final step in the ennoblement of the word was taken by Xenokrates. To him the soul itself was a δαίμων, and the term εὐδαιμονία thus acquired a new shade of meaning².

§ 2. If we look at the lives men lead, we see that they may be reduced to three. First there is the life of pleasure or enjoyment, then there is the life of action, which aims at honour or fame, and there is the life of the spectator, the artistic, scientific or religious life. The first two are easily disposed of, and so is the view which the seeker of honour may readily be made to adopt, that goodness is the real object of his life. A man may be good and never do anything with his goodness; he might as well be asleep or be a vegetable. We are getting nearer the truth, but we have not reached it yet. We are not now in a position to discuss the life of artistic and scientific contemplation, the life of the onlooker, and besides it can hardly be called a popular one; but we shall have to show later on that its aim is not mere amusement. All these views of life, then, are partial; but our definition must do justice to them all. Popular opinion cannot be altogether wide of the mark.

§ 3. Turning next to the opinions of the wise, we are met at once by the Platonic theory of the Good. This we are forced to reject, because it is based upon the impossible idea of a universal good. (Introd. § 28.) But, when we pass on from this, we find that Plato has expressed several views about Happiness which lend themselves to the purposes of our dialectic. For instance, in the Philebos, he has made it quite clear that Happiness must be complete, self-sufficient and more worth having than anything else. It must be something which is desired for itself

by τὸδε μετὰ τοῦδε (cf. 1146 a, 27 n.). The second is to be explained from [Plato] Def. 412 b αὐτάρκεια τελειότης κτήσεως ἀγαθῶν (cf. Plato, Philebos 20 c sqq. and the definitions of Speusippos and Xenokrates in note 3). The third is possibly that of Eudoxos, while the fourth alludes to the ὑπηρετική δύναμις of Xenokrates (see note 3).

² Herakleitos fr. 121 ἡθὸς ἀνθρώπου δαίμων. Demokritos fr. 10, 11 (Natorp) εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ' ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος. Ar. Top. 112 a, 36 εὐδαιμονα, οὐδ' ἂν ὁ δαίμων ἦ σπουδαῖος, καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης φησὶν εὐδαιμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαῖαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἐκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα.

and never as *a means to something else. We cannot ask the question why we desire to be happy, and if that is so, Happiness cannot be identified with any partial form of life, but only with the good life as a whole.

But what is the good life? Here again the views of Plato help us. In the Republic he has shown that the good life and consequently the happiness of anything is identical with the good performance of its own proper task or function. Accordingly if we wish to find in what a good human life consists we must ask what is the proper function of man. Now man is an animal, a living creature, so his function will be life. But life merely as such cannot be his proper function; for a plant lives as well as a man. Nor can it be merely sentient and appetitive life; for every animal shares in that. The only kind of life which is peculiar to man is the life of rational activity, that is the life which knows the ground (λόγος) of its activities and can give an account of them (λόγον ἔχει).

The Good for Man, then, is to perform this function well, but what do we mean by "well"? We can only mean that the function is performed in such a manner as to exhibit the form of goodness proper to it. To be happy we must, then, be in such a condition that we can perform our proper function well.

§ 4. So far, we are in substantial agreement with the Academy. Speusippos defined Happiness as "the complete or perfect condition of beings in a natural state," and Xenokrates says it is the "possession of our proper goodness along with the power that ministers to it³." These definitions are, however, inadequate. If we ask Speusippos whether the good life is best defined as a

³ The Academic definition of εὐδαιμονία as an ἔξις first appears in Plato Phileb. 11 d ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἔξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνα παρέχειν. The definitions of Speusippos and Xenokrates are preserved by Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II, 21 p. 500 (Potter) Σπεύσιππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἔξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, ἢ ἔξιν ἀγαθῶν· ἥς δὲ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὀρεξίν ἔχειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας· εἰεν δ' αὖ αἱ ἀρεταὶ

τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικά. ib. 22 Ξενοκράτης...τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτήσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως· εἰτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς δ' ὑφ' ᾧ τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡς δὲ ἐξ ᾧ ὡς μερῶν τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ (surely ὡς δ' ᾧ οὐκ ἄνευ as Zeller reads) τὰ σωματικά καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. We cannot understand the dialectic by which Aristotle reaches his own definition without keeping all this clearly before us.

condition or as the activity arising from that condition, he must allow that a life is strictly speaking an activity rather than the condition which gives rise to it. And, if we ask Xenokrates whether he means by Happiness the mere "possession" of goodness or rather its exercise and use, he must certainly admit that he really means the latter.

§ 5. After this discussion, the following definition will appear self-evident. In the first place, Happiness is "an activity of the soul," that is, as we have seen, of that part of the soul which "knows what it is doing" (λόγον ἔχει). But not every such activity is related to the function of man, but only good activities. For the purpose of our analysis it will be clearer to express this formally as the differentia, and say "an activity according to goodness." And, if there are more forms of goodness than one, we must say "according to the best and most complete form of goodness." We must add further, since an activity is always something complete, that it must be "in a complete life," meaning by that a life which has developed to its full stature, which has reached the form appointed for it by nature. The body is complete when it has reached the limit which nature fixes for the growth of its species, and the rational soul too is full-grown at a certain stage of its developement. But we must not imagine that when it has reached this completion, its life comes to an end; that was the mistake made by Solon, who confused the "end" of life in the sense of its full developement with the "end" of life in the sense of death. It would be truer to say that life is only beginning when the "end" in the former sense is reached; for now it is a complete or full-grown activity, or, to put the thing in a way which Aristotle is fond of in other connexions, though he does not refer to it here, we are dealing with an activity and therefore we can use the present and the perfect tenses at the same time of the same thing⁴. Seeing is such an activity, and we can say "he sees" and "he has seen" and they may both be true. In like manner, Aristotle might have said, we can say of the man who is active according to goodness both εἶ ζῆν and εἶ βεβίωκε, for the goodness of his life is fully present in every moment of it. And, in spite of Solon, we may say also εἶ βιώσεται, for such activities have an element of permanence in

⁴ On this way of expressing the complete presence in any given moment of an ἐνέργεια, cf. 1174 a, 13 sqq. and the notes.

them, and are not wholly at the mercy of fortune. But we must not push this to an extreme; for an old age like that of Priam or King Lear is possible in a world not wholly independent of chance. The world is such that "on the whole" Happiness once achieved is permanent; but there are exceptions to this just as there are monstrosities and portents in nature.

§ 6. We see, then, that we must allow to a certain extent for chance, and this is precisely what we should expect from the account given above⁵ of the subject-matter of Politics. But that is no reason for identifying happiness with good luck or embodying "external goods" in our definition of it as Xenokrates does. It is, of course, quite clear that Happiness, like everything else in this world, is dependent on certain material conditions, but that is no reason for including those conditions in its definition. It is true that a tragedy, however fine it may be, cannot be produced at all without a chorus and costumes and scenery; but these things are no part of the tragedy itself; they are the province of the choregos and not of the poet. We must admit, then, that Happiness is dependent on something which is not in our power at all, while on the other hand we must refuse to admit that these external conditions are any part of the happiness itself. In this respect the relation of Happiness to external goods is quite different from its relation to pleasure. Pleasure is not something external, but something in the soul itself, and therefore belongs to Happiness not accidentally but essentially. This indeed is the justification of the one-sided popular view that happiness is pleasure, just as the view of men of action that it is honour is fully satisfied by the doctrine that it is an activity according to goodness. For honour implies goodness in the honoured, or the belief in it by those who honour, and is only a secondary end.

We see, then, that the definition we have given meets all the requirements we can fairly make of it, and it can have no other proof than this.

⁵ Introd. § 26.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ

A

1094^a Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφή-

1094 a, 1. MM. 1182 a, 32 sqq. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἰδεῖν δεῖ ὅτι πάσης ἐπιστήμης καὶ δυνάμεώς ἐστὶ τι τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν· οὐδεμία γὰρ οὗτ' ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δύναμις ἔνεκεν κακοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῆς βελτίστης

I. § 1. Πᾶσα τέχνη κ.τ.λ. The passage 1094 a, 1—1095 a, 13 forms a προοίμιον (πεφροϊμιάσθω 1095 a, 13) containing what Alexander calls ἡ πρόθεσις τῆς μεθόδου (τί προτιθέμεθα loc. cit.). The πρόθεσις also contains some remarks on the method of πολιτική (πῶς ἀποδεκτέον loc. cit.) and the student (περὶ ἀκροατοῦ loc. cit.). For the argument of this chapter, see Introd. § 13.

τέχνη...μέθοδος...πράξις...προαίρεσις. The study of πολιτική is all four; for we must take these words here in their ordinary meaning, not in the technical sense given to some of them later on. The term μέθοδος is Platonic (for its origin cf. 1098 b, 4 n.) and signifies either (1) an *investigation* as here and in 1094 b, 11. 1098 a, 29 or (2) the τρόπος τῆς μεθόδου (Plato, Phaid. 97 b), the *method* of investigation as in 1129 a, 6. That πολιτική is also a πράξις follows from the fact that it is a practical science, cf. below

a, 12 πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πράξις. Lastly, προαίρεσις is used of any study which is 'taken up,' as we say, and sometimes approaches closely in meaning to πραγματεία, cf. especially 1179 a, 35 τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; 'are we to consider our task complete?' We may compare with this the use of the word by Demosthenes of the different departments of administration (foreign affairs, etc.) 'taken up' by a politician (De Cor. § 59). The sentence, then, means no more than that every scientific inquiry aims at some good. The argument is given succinctly in Pol. loc. cit. Cf. MM. loc. cit., which gives it according to the tradition of the school.

ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. This is just because no study is a mere δύναμις (τῶν ἐναντίων) but also involves a προαίρεσις (cf. 1127 b, 14 n.). This ἐνδοξον is quoted in opposition to the paradox that, as δυνάμεις (including τέχναι and ἐπιστήμαι) are τῶν ἐναντίων

2 ναντο τὰγαθὸν Οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται
 τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς
 ἔργα τινά, ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τού- 5
 3 τοις βελτίῳ πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ

βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὥστε
 τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη <τὸ βέλτιστον> ἀγαθόν.

Pol. 1282 b, 14 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις
 ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν,
 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις.

a, 3. EE. 1214 a, 8 πολλῶν δ' ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ
 ἑκάστον πρᾶγμα καὶ περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται
 σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γινῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ
 τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει
 φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρὸν
 ὅτιπερ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ. (Cf. 1216 b, 3. Introd. § 12, n. 1.)

(cf. 1129 a, 13), the end of an art or science may be good or bad. Cf. Top. 143 a, 9 ἔτι εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀποδέδωκε...πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δύναμις τοῦ βελτίστου δοκεῖ εἶναι.

δοκεῖ, 'is believed.' The word marks an ἐνδοξος πρότασις. Introd. § 25.

ἀπεφάναντο, not 'defined,' but 'declared,' 'pronounced.' In his commentary on Top. 105 b, 12 sqq. Alexander (p. 93, 8 Wallies) gives τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πᾶσιν ἐφετόν as an instance of a πρότασις which we may pick out ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων. We shall see reason for thinking that it is taken from Eudoxos. Cf. 1172 b, 10 n. In Rhet. 1362 a, 23 it is given as one of the received accounts of the good—ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν...οὐ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν.

§ 2. τῶν τελῶν, i.e. the ends of different arts and sciences. For the difference between the ends of theoretical and practical science, cf. Introd. § 12.

τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι. Cf. Met. 1050 a, 34 ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ἡ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τίς ἐστίν. The word ἐνέργεια, 'activity,' does not occur before Aristotle. It is from ἐνεργής, a by-form of ἐνεργος, which is used of mines etc. that are being 'worked.'

ἔργα τινά. Met. 1050 a, 23 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις (i. q. ἐνέργεια cf. 1098 b, 32 n.), οἷον ὄψεως ἡ ὄρασις, καὶ οὐδὲν γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἔργον, ἀπ' ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεται τι, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν κ.τ.λ.

βελτίῳ πέφυκε κ.τ.λ., i.e. φύσει αἰρετώτερά ἐστιν, 'are naturally more worth having.' Thus a house is 'better' than building and health than medical treatment. The example of ship-building recalls Plato's Philebos 53 b πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν 4
 ἐνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα

πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, πολλὰ γίνεται
καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλούτος. ὅσαι 4
10 δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν—καθάπερ ὑπὸ
τὴν ἵππικὴν χαλινοποικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν
ὀργάνων εἰσὶν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ
τὴν στρατηγικὴν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ'
ἐτέρας—ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάν-
15 των ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν
κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς 5
εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθά-
περ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

II. Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ
βουλόμεθα, τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον
20 αἰρούμεθα—πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι

ἐνεκα ναυπηγίας; So πᾶσα πολεμικὴ
πρᾶξις is from Polit. 304 e στρατηγικὴ
καὶ πᾶσα ἡ πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις. Eudemos
(loc. cit.) adds that the purely theo-
retical problems arising from practical
science are to be treated also so far as
they are relevant. This is Aristotle's
practice too.

§ 4. ὅσαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This sentence
is an anacolouthon; for ὅσαι δὲ is
resumed after an intricate parenthesis
by ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ as if ἐν ὅσαις had
preceded. This form of anacolouthon
is very characteristic of the akroamatic
style. In the parenthesis itself, as
Professor Bywater points out (Contr.
p. 22), κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον
introduces the apodosis to καθάπερ
κ.τ.λ. We might substitute ὥσπερ...
οὕτως to bring out the sense.

τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. πρακτικῶν ἐπι-
στημῶν or τεχνῶν.

δύναμιν, practically equivalent to
τέχνην or πρακτικὴν ἐπιστήμην as in
Plato, Polit. loc. cit. Cf. Introd. § 12.

ἄλλαι...ἐτέρας. The pronouns are
alternated for variety. Cf. 1158 a,
28. 1166 b, 7.

τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν Introd. § 13.
The term is assumed to be familiar
from Plato.

§ 5. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. In
the case of the sciences just mentioned
(ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν) the
end is some ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
But the principle just stated will apply
also in cases where the end is the
ἐνέργεια itself. So, at the beginning
of the Metaphysics it is shown that
σοφία is ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ with regard to
all sciences, and its end is simply an
ἐνέργεια. In the Ethics, too, we shall
find that the end of σοφία is 'better'
than that of any practical science.

II. § 1. τῶν πρακτῶν. By τὰ πρακτά
Aristotle means the objects of πρᾶξις,
the things we do, just as by τὰ αἰσθητά
he means the things we perceive by
the senses. For another sense of
πρακτός, cf. below 1096 b, 34.

πρόεισι, impersonal. 'There will
be a process *ad infinitum*.' Cf. 1097 b,
13. The phrases εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι,
προιέναι, πορεύεσθαι, βαδίζειν are op-
posed to ἵστασθαι, στήναι. Cf. 1142 a,
29n. For the argument, cf. Introd. § 27.

κενήν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν,—δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰ γα-
 2 θὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις
 αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπὴν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν
 3 ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω,
 πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος 25
 4 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης
 5 καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται.

1094 a, 22. EE. 1214 b, 6 ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν,...πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις, ὡς τό γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρὸς τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημείον ἐστίν.

κενήν, 'ineffectual,' like the λυγὴ κενή of Thuc. ii, 49. So often κεναὶ εὐχαί, κεναὶ ἐλπίδες and the adverbial διὰ κενῆς.

ματαίαν, 'in vain.' A thing is μάτην, *frustra*, which does not attain its proper end. So μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα...οὐ μὴ ἐστὶν ὑπόδεσις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν (De Caelo 271 a, 32). We use the word μάτην when a thing which has a final cause does not attain it. Phys. 197 b, 22 σημείον δὲ τὸ 'μάτην,' ὅτι λέγεται ὅταν μὴ γένηται τῷ ἔνεκα ἄλλου ἐκείνο οὐ ἔνεκα...ὡς τοῦτο ὃν τὸ 'μάτην,' τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἔνεκα, ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκείνο οὐ ἔνεκα ἐπεφύκει.

τάγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, 'the good and indeed the best.'

§ 2. ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is one of Aristotle's literary passages and is reminiscent of Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Introd. § 7. Such passages are often introduced by the conversational ἄρ' οὖν, cf. 1163 a, 16. 1166 b, 3. 1171 b, 29. The subjects discussed in this section are, as Diels says, such as we should treat in a preface; but with Aristotle they "form a resting-point after the first fatiguing ascent."

καθάπερ τοξόται κ.τ.λ. This simile is found both in Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Rep. 519 c σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ

βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἓνα οὐ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Ep. ad Iasonis liberos § 10 τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον ζητοῦντες καὶ φιλοσοφούντες, ὥσπερ σκοποῦ κειμένου στοχάσεσθε τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεύξεσθε τοῦ συμφέροντος. It recurs several times in the Ethics. Cf. 1097 a, 3. 1109 b, 26. 1138 b, 22 n.

τοῦ δέοντος, 'the right thing,' what is wanted in given circumstances, not 'our duty' which would rather be τοῦ προσήκοντος. So when Demosthenes urged the Athenians τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν he did not mean they were to 'do their duty,' but that they were to take the steps required by the situation.

§ 3. τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν. A Platonic phrase, cf. Rep. 414 a ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας εἰρήσθαι, 559 a ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς, Laws 718 c οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον ἐν ἐνὶ περιλαβόντι εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ οἷόν τινα τύπῳ. For the terminology of this passage cf. Introd. § 26 with the notes.

§ 4. δόξειε δ' ἂν, 'it will be admitted,' the usual phrase in a dialectical λήψις. By κυριωτάτης Ar. means 'most authoritative' as the context shows. Cf. also Pol. 1282 b, 14 quoted on p. 7.

1094^b τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ 6
 ποίας ἐκάστους μαρθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει·
 ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην
 οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν· χρωμένης 7
 δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ
 5 νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης
 τέλος περιέχει ἀν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη τὰνθρώ-
 πινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστίν ἐν καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν 8
 γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ
 σφύζειν· ἀγαπητόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ
 10 θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων 9
 ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα.

§ 6. τίνας γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Politics is most 'authoritative,' for it regulates what sciences, theoretical or practical, are to exist in the state, what each class of citizens (ἐκάστους) are to learn and up to what point (or up to what age). Ar. is referring to such regulations as those laid down by Plato, Rep. 539 d, sqq. Diels notes χρεὼν as a literary touch.

ὁρῶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is from Plato, Polit. 303 e, sqq. Cf. Introd. § 13.

§ 7. χρωμένης δὲ κ.τ.λ. Politics 'makes use of' the practical sciences, such as strategy and rhetoric; it does not 'make use of' the theoretical sciences, though it regulates them, cf. 1145 a, 6. I believe with Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 23) that πρακτικαῖς is a gloss from Aspasios, but I think it gives the true sense. Politics does not 'use' mathematics or astronomy.

§ 8. εἰ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This is not an apology for 'confusing ethics and politics,' but rather for appearing to separate them (Introd. § 14). The science of the Good is the same whether for one, few, or many, but it is called Politics *a potiori*. To secure the good of one is 'better than no-

thing' (ἀγαπητόν), but it is not the full realisation of the end of our science.

ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν, 'for a people,' such as the Macedonians, or for free Hellenic 'states.' The word ἔθνος is regularly used of peoples who had not developed so far as the city-state.

§ 9. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος κ.τ.λ. 'This' (viz. to secure and preserve the good for man) 'is what our branch of science aims at.' Here we have a clear reference back to the beginning, Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος...ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ, and a confirmation of the view that that passage refers to the ends of sciences alone, and not to ends in general.

ἐφίεται...οὔσα. As Zell points out, the meaning really is 'Now the science which aims at this is Politics.' The Greek idiom allows of the leading idea being expressed by the participle (so regularly with τυγχάνω etc.).

πολιτικὴ τις. The τις is added merely because popular usage confined the word to 'practical politics' and ignored the 'architectonic' art of the lawgiver (cf. 1141 b, 28). We must not translate 'a species of Politics'; for it is the whole of Politics.

III. Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς 2 λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, 15 πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον 3 εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες 4 ἀπώλουντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν

III. § 1. Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. "This discussion of scientific ἀκρίβεια distinguishes itself from the gray uniformity of Aristotle's style by its choice phrases and words (πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, παχυλῶς, χρεῶν, πιθανολογεῖν)" Diels in Archiv I, 495.

κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην, 'so far as the subject-matter allows.' Pol. 1256 a, 8 λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιῶ δὲ χαλκόν. Met. 1029 a, 3 λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην, οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφήν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας, τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων, τὸν ἀνδριάντα, τὸ σύνολον. This is not only an Aristotelian technicality, but a Platonic image and therefore in place here. Cf. Phileb. 54 b φημι δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν κ.τ.λ. Tim. 69 a ὅτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἷα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν παράκειται...ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον δεῖ συνυφανθῆναι (where note the shifting of the metaphor). Aristotle substitutes ὑποκεῖσθαι for the Platonic παρακεῖσθαι (cf. also 1104 a, 29 n.) because ἡ ὕλη ὑπόκειται τῷ εἶδει is a more important aspect of the thing to him than ἡ ὕλη παράκειται τῷ δημιουργῷ. The metaphor is kept up by ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις below. We do not expect the same finish in wood as in marble. It is worth noting that there is no properly attested instance in earlier literature of ὕλη meaning any

other material than wood. That quoted in Liddell and Scott from Sophokles is illusory. The word ὕλη there belongs to Plutarch.

§ 2. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not mean to say that τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια are in themselves liable to variation and fluctuation,—that point is discussed below 1134 b, 18 sqq.—but that they give rise to variation and fluctuation in men's judgments. For the meaning of ἔχει, cf. ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχειν, ἀπορίαν ἔχειν and the like.

ὥστε δοκεῖν, 'that they are believed' by some of the sophists. For the history of the contrast between νόμος and φύσις, see my article in the International Journal of Ethics for April, 1897.

§ 3. καὶ τὰγαθὰ, i.e. the recognised good things of life, described later on (1129 b, 3) as τὰ ἀπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθὰ, τινὲς δ' οὐκ αἰεῖ. For a characteristic Greek list cf. Plato, Rep. 491 c κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει. See too Meno 87 e ὑγεία, φάμεν, καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ, ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα.

διὰ πλοῦτον...δι' ἀνδρείαν. For the first Diels compares Xen. Kyr. i, 6, 44 πολλοὶ τὸν πολύευκτον πλοῦτον κατακτησάμενοι διὰ τοῦτον ἀπώλουντο. Difficulties have been felt about the inclusion of ἀνδρεία among goods that may be bad. But the point is what the popular view is, and certainly it

20 οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ
 τύπῳ τὰληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
 καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγο-
 μένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς
 25 ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος

1094 b, 22. EE. 1216 b, 35 διαφέρουσι δ' οἱ λόγοι περὶ
 ἐκάστην μέθοδον, οἳ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφως.
 διόπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν περίεργον εἶναι τὴν τοι-
 αύτην θεωρίαν δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διὰ
 τί· φιλόσοφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον. δεῖται μέντοι
 τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφου
 εἶναι τὸ μὴθὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου, πολλάκις λανθάνουσι
 λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς. τοῦτο δὲ
 ποιοῦσιν ὅτε μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν, ὅτε δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν, ὅφ' ὧν ἀλίσκεσθαι
 συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν
 μήτ' ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ πρακτικὴν.

admits this. Diels points out that the reference is to Plato's Meno 87 e sqq. After enumerating the ἀγαθά, he says (88 a) ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίστε καὶ βλάπτειν, ...οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἐστι φρόνησις ἢ ἀνδρεία, ἀλλ' οἷον θάρρος τι κ.τ.λ.

§ 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων. For the phrase cf. 1095 a, 3: 1143 b, 10. According to the doctrine of the Analytics there are three things in every proof: (1) περὶ ὃ δείκνυσι, (2) ὃ δὲ δείκνυσι, (3) ἐξ ὧν δείκνυσι (An. Post. 75 a, 39 sqq.). The περὶ ὃ (1) is the ὑποκείμενον γένος or the ὑποκειμένη ὕλη, that about which something is proved. In the present case this is τὰ πρακτά or τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια. The ἐξ ὧν (3) are the ἀξιώματα, the principles from which we argue. In the present case, as neither (1) nor (3) is universal or necessary, it follows that (2) ὃ δὲ δείκνυσι, i.e. the conclusion, τὸ συμπέρασμα, cannot be so either. Tr. 'on such a subject and with such premisses.'

περὶ τῶν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Phys. 196 b, 10 ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα τὰ δὲ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, φανερόν ὅτι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἰτία ἡ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. If chance were the cause, there could be no science of them; ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ αἰεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (Met. 1065 a, 4). Nature and Man are the two causes which act ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ and stand between Necessity and Chance. Cf. Introd. § 26.

τοιαῦτα, sc. ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. The conclusion (συμπέρασμα) must have the same character as the premisses (τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος).

ἀποδέχεσθαι. Correlative to ἀπο-διδόναι. We pass from the lecturer to the student.

πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. On Aristotle's conception of παιδεία, see Introd. § 21.

καθ' ἕκαστον γένος. The clear distinction of γένη is the mark of παιδεία.

φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ
 τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις
 5 ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων
 ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, 1095^a
 ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.

Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκείος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος·
 ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ
 6 τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς
 ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν 5
 7 οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν
 ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ
 διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιού-
 τοις ἀνόνητος ἢ γνώσις γίνεται καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν·
 τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι 10

πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ἕκαστον
 πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τοὺς τ' οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος
 καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.

παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.
 This is taken from Plato, Theait.
 162 e ἀποδείξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ'
 ἡντινοῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε,
 ὃ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν
 γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετεῖν, ἄξιός
 οὐδ' ἐνδὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ
 τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανο-
 λογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων
 λεγομένους λόγους. On the other hand
 we have no right to ask more than τὸ
 πιθανόν from the rhetorician. Rhet.
 1355 b, 10 sqq. (ῥητορικῆς ἔργον) τὸ
 ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον.

ἀποδείξεις. The ἐνθύμημα or rhe-
 torical syllogism from εἰκότα or σημεία
 is sometimes called ῥητορικὴ ἀπόδειξις
 (Rhet. 1355 a, 6), but that is only καθ'
 ὁμοιότητα, 'by analogy.'

§ 5. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα κ.τ.λ.
 The qualification καθ' ἕκαστον does
 double duty. Fully expressed the
 meaning is καθ' ἕκαστον κρίνει καλῶς ὁ
 καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδευμένος. For the

brachylogy cf. Kühner § 597 f, and for
 the distinction between general and
 special παιδεία, Introd. § 21.

ἀπλῶς. The word ἀπλῶς, *simpli-*
citer, means without any πρόσθεσις or
 qualification. The πρόσθεσις which
 is dropped here is καθ' ἕκαστον. For
 the τόπος of πρόσθεσις and ἀφαίρεσις,
 cf. 1140 a 28 n. It is a favourite
 form of ἐπαγωγή.

Διὸ κ.τ.λ. This is because he has
 not the *special* παιδεία required as
 a preliminary training. The logical
 παιδεία is more within his reach.

ἐκ τούτων...περὶ τούτων. Cf. 1094 b,
 20 n.

§ 6. τὸ τέλος, sc. τῆς πολιτικῆς, which
 is a practical science. Cf. 1103 b, 27.

§ 7. καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν. As we
 shall see in Book VII, the ἀκρατής is
 the morally weak man who εἰδὼς ὅτι
 φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος.

κατὰ λόγον, 'by rule,' 'uniformly,'
 'consistently.' In 1169 a, 5 τὸ κατὰ

πολυωφελές ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν 8
ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφρο-
μιάσθω ταῦτα.

IV. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ
15 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν
πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν
ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολο- 2
γεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες

1095 a, 14. EE. 1217 a, 18 πεπροοιμισμένων δὲ τούτων,
λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς
λεγομένων, ζητοῦντες ἐπὶ τὸ σαφῶς <προϊόντες> εὑρεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἡ
εὐδαιμονία. ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν
ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ' ἂν εἴη
καὶ βελτίονος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ
ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα χεῖρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινωνεῖ
ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ'
ἰχθὺς οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει
μετέχει θείου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν
βέλτιον ζῇ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον
ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν
ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ τὰ δ' οὐ πρακτά. τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἔνια
τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (? πράξεων).
καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσως ἄριστα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἔνια δὲ πρακτὰ μὲν, ἀλλὰ
πρακτὰ κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν (καὶ
γὰρ ὧν ἔνεκα πράττομεν καὶ ἃ τούτων ἔνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, οἷον καὶ
τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τούτων
πραττόμενα χάριν, τὰ θ' ὑγιεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ἄριστον θετέον.

λόγον ζῆν is opposed to τὸ κατὰ πάθος. Cf. Plato, Laws 689 d ὁ...κατὰ λόγον ζῶν. Tim. 89 d ἡ τις...μάλιστα ἂν κατὰ λόγον ζῶη. What is meant is that the appetitions must be consistently directed so that they may be counted on; they must not be παράλογοι or such as to defy calculation. The phrase does not mean 'according to reason,' cf. 1100 a, 23 n.

IV. § 1. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλα-

βόντες κ.τ.λ. This shows clearly how we are to understand 1094 a, 1 sqq. As we saw, πολιτικὴ is both a γνῶσις and a προαίρεσις.

§ 2. τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν κ.τ.λ. See Introductory Note. We now find a nominal agreement but a very real disagreement between the beliefs of the many and those of the wise. This ἀπορία must be solved by the dialectic method. The fact that

λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπο-
 λαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τί 20
 ἐστὶν ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς
 3 ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον
 ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ
 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ
 πλοῦτον—συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ 25
 ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' ὥντο παρὰ τὰ

a, 22—26. EE. 1214 b, 7 θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν,
 ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν.

a, 26. EE. 1217 b, 2 φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρῶτον εἶναι
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.
 ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοτέρω τῇ ιδέᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. λέγω δὲ ἀμφοτέρω
 τό τε πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον ἀγαθοῖς τῇ παρουσίᾳ

'most people' regard εὐδαιμονία as the Good for man raises a presumption that it is the ἀρχή we are seeking for. Introd. § 25.

οἱ χαρίεντες. This is the urbane equivalent of οἱ σοφοί, the name which is given to them below. The reference is mainly to the Platonists, who had already adopted the name εὐδαιμονία for man's highest good. See Introductory Note, § 1.

τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν. In the Politics Aristotle more and more tends to substitute this phrase for the name εὐδαιμονία which he had borrowed from the Academy. It emphasises the view that a good life is an ἐνέργεια.

τὸ εὖ πράττειν. In [Plato] Alcib. I, 116 b the ambiguity of this phrase is similarly turned to account. "Ὅστις καλῶς πράττει οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;—Ναί.—Οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαιμονεῖς;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; We must remember that Aristotle is here giving the views of others and is not answerable for the fallacy. He himself gives a very complete proof below 1098 a,

7 sqq. Cf. also the definition of εὐδαιμονία as εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς (Introductory Note, n. 1).

οἱ πολλοί, here opposed to οἱ σοφοί. But cf. 1095 b, 16 n.

§ 3. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is not answered till a, 26 ἔνιοι δ' ὥντο.

νοσήσας κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Rep. 583 c ἄρα οὐ μνημονεύεις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους;...ὥς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει πρὶν κάμνειν ἡδιστον ὄν.

συνειδότες...θαυμάζουσιν. We gather from EE. 1214 b, 7 (θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν) what these regard as happiness. For ὑπὲρ αὐτούς, 'over their heads,' cf. Gen. An. 723 a, 22 λίαν ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τὸ λεγόμενον, Isokr. Paneg. § 11 ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ιδιώτας ἔχουσι.

ἔνιοι δ' ὥντο, sc. the Platonists. The imperfect tense is used because Aristotle is speaking from personal recollection of the school. So ἡπέρει a, 32. He sums up the Platonic view

πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις
 πᾶσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν 4
 τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα
 30 ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω 5

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι. μάλιστα τε γὰρ τὰγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατ' ἐκείνης
 ἀληθῶς (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι),
 καὶ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀναιρεῖσθαι
 καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ιδέας, ἃ λέγεται τῷ μετέχειν ἐκείνης, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον
 τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον. ὥστ' εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ιδέας.

1095 a, 28. EE. 1214 b, 28 πᾶσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκο-
 πεῖν, ὅσας ἔχουσιν τινες περὶ αὐτῆς, περιέργον (πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ
 τοῖς παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονοῦσι, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὐθεὶς
 νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειεν· δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἡλικίας ἐν
 ἧ μεταβαλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κολάσεως ἱατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς· κόλασις γὰρ
 ἢ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐστίν), ὁμοίως δὲ ταύταις οὐδὲ
 τὰς τῶν πολλῶν (cf. 1095 b, 19 sq.) ἐπισκεπτέον (εἰκὴ γὰρ λέγουσι
 σχεδὸν περὶ ἀπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας· ἄτοπον γὰρ
 προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγου μὴτὲν δεομένοις ἀλλὰ πάθους). ἐπεὶ δ'
 εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἐκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ
 βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσὶν. ταύτας οὖν καλῶς
 ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων ἔλεγχοι τῶν
 ἐναντιουμένων αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν. (Cf. Top. 104 b,
 1—105 a, 9.)

thus: 'Over and above the many good things we know there is another Good which is good in itself and the cause of the goodness of all the good things we know.'

καθ' αὐτό. One of the marks of τὸ καθόλου, An. Post. 73 b, 26 sqq.

ὃ καὶ...ἀγαθὰ. This implies κατὰ παντός, the other mark of τὸ καθόλου.

§ 4. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We need not discuss mere θέσεις of the wise (cf. 1096 a, 2 n.), nor contradictions of τὰ δοκοῦντα by ὁ τυχών (cf. Top. 104 b, 23).

τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας, 'the most prevalent' (lit. 'those that come

to the surface'), the common meaning of the word. Cf. προύχοντες, b, 18.

ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον, 'or are thought plausible.' The phrase λόγον ἔχειν regularly means 'to have something to say for themselves,' or 'to admit of something being said for them' and is exactly equivalent to εὐλογον εἶναι. It can have no other meaning here.

§ 5. μὴ λανθανέτω δὲ κ.τ.λ. A note justifying the dialectical method which is here used. This is not a case for syllogistic reasoning from the ἀρχή, but for dialectical search after the ἀρχή.

δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. 1095^b ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ 6 τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμε- 5 7 νον ἱκανῶς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρ-

οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι, sc. οἱ ἀπο-
δεικτικοί.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, sc. οἱ διαλεκτικοί.

εὖ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων κ.τ.λ. The imperfect tense shows that Aristotle is still speaking from personal recollection of the Academy. He means that, before commencing any inquiry, Plato used to ask whether, in the given case, they were in a position to descend from the ἀρχή by διαίρεσις, or whether it was first necessary to ascend to it by συναγωγή. I prefer to omit ὁ with L^b; the article is generally added when Plato in his writings is meant.

ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. This is not to be found in the published works of Plato, but the simile is clearly taken from the δίαυλος. Are we in such a position that we have only κάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν (Aisch. Ag. 345), or have we first to run the first κῶλον? The πέρασ is not the winning-post, but the καμπή.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γάρ. This reading (K^b) is preferable to ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν (L^b). It makes what follows an explanation of the comparison, while μὲν οὖν would set it aside.

ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων. This cannot mean 'from the knowable,' as Muretus and others have thought. In Greek γνώριμος is the opposite of ἄγνωσ and means 'known.'

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς, sc. γνώριμα λέγεται. This is the true Aristotelian

distinction between reasoning *a priori* and *a posteriori*. The ἀρχή is the logical *prius* of all legislation and action, but current moral judgments and existing institutions are 'more known to us.' Cf. Top. 141 b, 5 ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν γνωριμώτερον τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὑστέρον, οἷον στιγμὴ γραμμῆς καὶ γραμμὴ ἐπιπέδου καὶ ἐπίπεδον στερεοῦ ... ἡμῖν δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἐνλοτε συμβαίνει· μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ στερεὸν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν πίπτει.

§ 6. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The man who has been trained in good habits has the ἀρχή implicitly, and it can be made explicit by a dialectical process. For ἡχθαι cf. ἀγωγή 1179 b, 31.

ἡθεσιν, the reading of L^b, seems preferable to ἔθεσιν K^b. We have not settled yet that ἡθος comes from ἔθος.

§ 7. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The word ἀρχή is used in its regular sense, for which see Introd. § 22. Since the starting-point or first principle of Politics is 'the that,' i.e. the fact that the definition of Happiness is whatever we may find it to be, and since any one who has been well brought up either has that definition or can easily get it by a dialectical process, the one thing needful for the intending student is a good up-bringing. He need not know anything of First Philosophy or Physics; for in Politics we treat the definition of Happiness as ultimate

κούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου—

10 οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἔσθλός δ' αὖ κακείνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

V. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
15 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰόκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων
ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· 2
διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν—τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι

1095 b, 14. EE. 1215 a, 26 διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν <οὐδ'> ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἐδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικάς, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ὦν<ας> [ἀγορὰς] καὶ πράσεις καπηλικὰς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων, τριῶν ὄντων

(cf. Introd. § 23). Aristotle uses τὸ ὅτι ('the that') as opposed to τὸ διότι ('the why'—διότι is the indirect form of διὰ τί;) especially of the definitions which form the οἰκείαι ἀρχαί of any science, which assert existence but are not capable of demonstration by that science.

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ. sc. ὁ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἡγμένος καλῶς.

λάβοι ἂν. For λαβεῖν used to express the result of the dialectical process, the λήψις of a πρότασις, see Introd. § 25.

μηδέτερον, sc. τὸ ἔχειν ἢ τὸ λαβεῖν ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. If a man neither sees that the Good for Man is what we shall find it to be, nor can be made to see it dialectically, we can have nothing more to say to him. He is, as it were, morally colour-blind.

τοῦ Ἡσιόδου. Ἔργα 291 sqq.

V. § 1. Ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The dialectical examination of the ἐνδοξα now begins. First we discuss the beliefs of the many.

ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν, 1095 a, 30.

οὐκ ἀλόγως, 'as might be expected' of οἱ πολλοί. The phrase is equivalent to εὐλόγως or εἰκότως.

εἰόκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων, 'appear from their lives,' 'to judge by their lives.'

§ 2. οἱ μὲν πολλοί, resumed by οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοί (b, 19) and opposed by οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες (b, 22).

διὸ καί, 'which is just why.' It can be the only reason, though of course they do not formulate it as a theory of life.

τρεῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This classification of the 'three lives' was current at the time; for we find it both in Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Rep. 581 c Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριπτὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον,

μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς
3 καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός—οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀν-
δραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, 20

τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας, οὓς οἱ ἐπ' ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βούλεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλὰς (αὗται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ δ' ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς σωματικάς. διόπερ ἕτερος ἕτερον τὸν εὐδαίμονα προσαγορεύει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρό-
τερον. Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, Οὐθείς, εἶπεν, ὧν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἂν τίς σοι φανείη. τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπο-
λαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν

φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές... Οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ ἴθελαις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους... ἀνερωτᾶν τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἡδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μά-
λιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; They are then referred to as ὁ χρηματιστικός, ὁ φιλό-
τιμος and ὁ φιλόσοφος. Isokr. Antid. § 217 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡδονῆς ἢ κέρδους ἢ τιμῆς ἕνεκα φημι πάντας πάντα πράτ-
τειν. Iamblichos (V. Pyth. § 58) says of Pythagoras εἰκέναι γὰρ ἔφη τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάροδον τῷ ἐπὶ τὰς πανηγύρεις ἀπαντῶντι ὁμίλῳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖσε παντοδαποὶ φοιτῶντες ἄν-
θρωποι ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλον χρεῖαν ἀφικ-
νεῖται, ὁ μὲν χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ κέρδους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τὸν φόρτον ἐπειγόμε-
νος· ὁ δὲ δόξης ἕνεκα ἐπιδειξόμενος ἦκει τὴν ῥώμην τοῦ σώματος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος καὶ τό γε ἐλευθεριώτατον, συναλιζόμενον τόπων θέας ἕνεκα καὶ δη-
μιουργημάτων καλῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργων καὶ λόγων· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῷ βίῳ παντο-
δαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ταῖς σπουδαῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἀναθροίξεσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρη-
μάτων καὶ τροφῆς αἰρεῖ πόθος, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἕμερος φιλονικίαι τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν· εἰλικρι-

νέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνθρώπου τρό-
πον τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν τῶν καλλίστων θεωρίαν, ὃν καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλοσο-
φίαν. This passage well brings out the metaphor underlying the phrase θεωρητικὸς βίος, 'the life of the spec-
tator.' We know from Cicero (Tusc. v, 3) that the story was told also by Herakleides, and it is not easy to resist the impression that its source is some published work of Aristotle's such as the Προτρεπτικός, on which see Bywater in Journal of Philology, II, 55 and Diels in the Archiv I, 477. This impression is much strengthened when we read in Ar. frag. 58 (from the Προτρεπτικός of Iamblichos) καὶ τὰ Διονύσια δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐχ ὡς ληψό-
μενοί τι παρὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ προσθέντες (the reading is correct, cf. Plato Euthyphro 3d, and it is not neces-
sary to read προσδόντες with Diels).

§ 3. βοσκημάτων βίον. From Plato, Rep. 586 a, βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορ-
ταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες. Cf. also EE. (loc. cit. p. 21) on Apis.

τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις
ὁμοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ 4
τιμήν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαί-

τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως ᾤετο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς
πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον
εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.

περὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐτέρων οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὸ κρίναι καλῶς, μάλιστα
δὲ περὶ οὗ πᾶσι ῥᾶστον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς τὸ γνῶναι, τί τῶν
ἐν τῷ ζῆν αἰρετόν, καὶ λαβὼν ἂν τις ἔχοι πλήρη τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. πολλὰ
γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων <δι' α> προίενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον
νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰρετόν ἦν,
εἴ τις αἴρῃσιν ἐδίδου, διὰ γε ταῦτα τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
<τίς> ὁ βίος ὃν ζῶσιν ἔτι παῖδες ὄντες; καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνακάμψαι
πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν εὖ φρονῶν, ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ τῶν τε μηδεμίαν

τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου, 'they get a
hearing,' the regular meaning of the
phrase. This whole passage is do-
minated by the metaphor of a δια-
δικασία.

τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις, 'those who
are in power,' 'in high positions,' and
therefore able to choose freely. For
the phrase cf. 1158 a, 27; 1159 a, 19.
So in 1176 b, 16 we have τοὺς ἐν
δυναστείαις in a similar connexion.
Isokrates, Peace § 104 τοὺς ἐν πλεί-
σταις ἐξουσίαις γεγεννημένους, Nikokles
§ 18 οἱ ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ὄντες. For
the thought, cf. Herakleides of Pontos
Περὶ ἡδονῆς ap. Athen. 512, a οἱ
τύραννοι καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς πάντων ἀγαθῶν
ὄντες κύριοι καὶ πάντων εἰληφότες πείραν
τὴν ἡδονὴν προκρίνουσιν. This is per-
haps another indication that here
Aristotle is drawing on the Προ-
τρεπτικός.

ὁμοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. This
again can be proved to be an allusion
to one of Aristotle's published works.
Cf. Cic. Tusc. v, 35 (of the epitaph of
Sardanapallos) "quid aliud, inquit
Aristoteles, in bovis non in regis
sepulcro inscriberes?" De Fin. ii, 32,

106 "corporis autem voluptas si etiam
praeterita delectat, non intelligo cur
Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma
tanto opere derideat, in quo ille rex
Syriae gloriatur omnes se secum libi-
dinum voluptates abstulisse." The
epitaph, as we may see from Athenaeus,
was current in many versions and
ascribed to different persons. Chry-
sippos (ap. Athen. 336 a) quotes one
which runs as follows—

Εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν
ἄεξε,

τερπόμενος θαλίῃσι· θανόντι σοι οὔτις
δνησις.

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδὸς εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης
βασιλεύσας·

κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ
σὺν ἔρωτι

τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλβια
πάντα λέλυνται.

§ 4. χαρίεντες, here = ἐπιεικεῖς,
μέτριοι, an urbane equivalent for ἀγαθοί,
not as above (1095 a, 18) for σοφοί.
When χαρίεις = σοφός, practical men
belong to οἱ πολλοί, but here the di-
vision is different.

σχεδόν, 'roughly speaking.' The
word is often used to show that what

νεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν
 τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν δὲ 25
 5 οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι δ' εοί-
 κασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς
 εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ'
 οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ γε
 6 τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις 30
 τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ
 ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν
 ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
 κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα 1096^a
 οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ

ἐχόντων ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονήν, μὴ καλὴν δέ,
 τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ὥστε τὸ μὴ εἶναι κρείττον εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν. ὅλως δ' εἴ τις
 ἅπαντα συναγάγοι ὅσα πράττουσι μὲν καὶ πάσχουσιν ἅπαντες, ἐκόντες
 μέντοι μηθὲν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτοῦ χάριν, καὶ προσθείη χρόνου
 πλήθος ἀπέραντόν τι, οὐ μᾶλλον ἔνεκ' ἂν τις τούτων ἔλοιτο ζῆν ἢ μὴ
 ζῆν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν
 ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεισῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἅς τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ
 βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἂν
 εἰς προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν, μὴ παντελῶς ὦν ἀνδράποδον. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι
 τῷ ταύτην ποιουμένῳ τὴν αἵρεσιν οὐθὲν ἂν διενέγκειε γενέσθαι θηρίον
 ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς, ὃν ὡς Ἀπὶν τιμῶσιν, ἐν πλείοσι
 τῶν τοιούτων ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μονάρχων. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν
 τοῦ καθεύδειν ἡδονήν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει καθεύδειν ἀνέγερτον ὕπνον ἀπὸ
 τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἢ ζῆν ὄντα φυτόν; τὰ γοῦν
 φυτὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἔοικε μετέχειν ζωῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παῖδιά. καὶ γὰρ
 ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρὶ γένεσιν πεφυκότα μὲν διατελεῖ,
 καθεύδοντα δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον. ὥστε φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι δια-
 φεύγει σκοπομένους τί τὸ εὖ καὶ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ζῆν.

is said is accommodated to popular notions. Honour is not the end of the true statesman as Aristotle conceived him, but of those of whom we read below 1141 b, 28, the *πρακτικοὶ καὶ βουλευτικοί*, to whom the name is usually confined. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 23.

ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι, 'dependent on the honourers.'

μαντευόμεθα, 'we divine,' a favourite word of Plato's. Cf. Rep. 349 a, 394 d, 506 a, 523 a, Lys. 216 d etc.

§ 6. θέσιν διαφυλάττων. Top. 104 b, 19 θέσις δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις

περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ 7
5 τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρημα- 8
τιστῆς βία ὅστις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλούτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητού-

τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινα διαπο-
ροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἅττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκ' ἂν τις ἔλοιτο γενέσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, Τοῦ, φάναι, θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ
τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἕνεκα τὴν
αἵρεσιν ᾤετο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μακαρίζοντες
ἢ Σμινδυρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην (Hdt. vi, 127) ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν
ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται
τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἕτεροι δὲ τινες οὗτ' ἂν φρόνησιν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε

παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ
φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέ-
γειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, ἢ ὅτι
πάντα κινεῖται καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι
ἐν τῷ ὄν, καθάπερ Μέλισσός φησιν.
De Caelo, 306 a, 12 εἰκότα τοῖς τὰς
θέσεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διαφυλάττουσι.

ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις. There can be
no doubt that in Aristotle's time
ἐγκύκλιος was a word applied to things
that were a matter of 'routine,' that
belonged to the 'trivial round.' Iso-
krates (De Pace § 87) says that during
the war ἐν ᾗ τούτο τῶν ἐγκυκλίων
ταφὰς ποιεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν.
Aristotle himself speaks of ἐγκύκλια
διακονήματα (Pol. 1255 b, 25) and
ἐγκύκλιοι διακονίαι (ib. 1263 a, 21).
Cf. also the ἐγκύκλιοι λητουργίαι.
With the present use of the word we
may compare De Caelo 279 a, 30 ἐν
τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι. The
meaning will therefore be 'in every-
day discussions or writings,' and will
not be very different from that of
ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, on which see 1102 a,
26 n.

§ 7. ὑπὲρ οὗ. Like Demosthenes,
Aristotle uses ὑπὲρ to avoid the repeti-
tion of περὶ (cf. Sandys on Phil. i, § 1).
We find it so used five times in the
Ethics, viz. here and 1096 b, 30.

1112 a, 20. 1155 b, 16. 1172 a, 26.
According to Eucken, this usage is
commonest in the Topics, Rhetoric
and Ethics, which means that it is an
elegance belonging to Aristotle's more
popular style (Introd. § 7). There is,
therefore, no occasion to doubt the
genuineness of passages where it oc-
curs.

ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις, in the Tenth Book.
The K^b reading ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις may
be based on the notion (strangely re-
vived by Ramsauer) that the discussion
of the Platonic theory which follows
is a discussion of the θεωρητικὸς βίος.
Aristotle can dismiss this Life without
vitiating his argument; for we have
to do just now only with the beliefs of
the many.

§ 8. βία ὅστις ἐστίν. I owe this
emendation to Mr James Watt of
Balliol College, Oxford. The MSS.
have βλαίος τίς ἐστιν, but we may read
BIAIOΣΤΙΣΕΣΤΙΝ as we please. It
has long been seen that the meaning
must be that the money-maker is not
a free agent, and so his opinion does
not count. But can a χρηματιστής, or
even a χρηματιστῆς βίος, be called
βλαίος in this sense? Elsewhere the
word is only used of φορά, κίνησις and
the like; and, though we can say βία

μενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω. 10

VI. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς

τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἔλουντο μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. αἰροῦνται γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἔνιοι δόξης χάριν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλοντες εὐδοκιμήσειν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶ πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἄπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.

ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν.

φέρεται and βία κινεῖται, we can hardly say βία ζῆ. The conjecture is confirmed by a reading of the Vetus Versio, *pecuniosus autem quis violenter est*. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 8. 18.

καταβέβληνται. Cf. Plato Soph. 232 d δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. The metaphor, as Gomperz has pointed out, is that of scattering seed. So Herod. i, 122 φάτιν καταβάλλειν, *rumorem spargere, disseminare*. So the καταβεβλημένοι μαθήσεις of Pol. 1337 b, 22 are the popular subjects of instruction. Of course πρὸς means 'against.' Though the thing is clear, yet diatribes against them like the Προτρεπτικός are widely circulated.

VI. § 1. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου, sc. ἀγαθόν. It has not yet been mentioned by this name, but the two marks of τὸ καθόλου are given above, 1095 a, 27 n. We should now go on to the beliefs of the wise; but first we must apply our dialectic to showing that Plato was wrong in speaking of a universal good. Intro. § 28.

καίπερ προσάντους κ.τ.λ. The word προσάντης literally means 'up hill.' This apology is thoroughly Platonic in tone and even in style. Cf. Rep. 595 b 'Ρητέον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδώς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.

εἰσαγαγεῖν, 'have imported.' The word is commonly used of introducing novelties, and suggests something arbitrary. Cf. De Caelo 271 b, 11 τοῦλάχιστον εἰσαγαγών, 'by importing the notion of a least magnitude into mathematics.'

δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως, 'it will surely be admitted' even by those who think it ungraceful of me to attack Plato. That Aristotle was sensitive to this charge appears from frag. 10, thus quoted by Proclus, καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγὼς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθεῖν κἄν τις αὐτὸν οἴηται διὰ φιλονικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας, another Platonic touch. Cf. Theait. 164 a εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον. So 1104 a, 10 πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.

15 ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους
ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλή-
θειαν.

Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ιδέας ἐν 2
οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν
ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
20 καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ

1096 a, 17. EE. 1218 a, 1 ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ
ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν. εἴη γὰρ
ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ
τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον, οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον

καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν. Aristotle here as elsewhere partly identifies himself with the Platonic school. Cf. Met. 990 b, 8 ἔτι καθ' οὓς τρόπους δείκνυμεν ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἶδη, κατ' οὐθένα φαίνεται τούτων... ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἶδη γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ. 997 b, 3 ὥς μὲν οὖν λέγομεν τὰ εἶδη αἰτιά τε καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι καθ' αὐτάς. Note that ἀναιρεῖν is used of cancelling a will.

ὅσιον προτιμᾶν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rep. 595 c ἀλλ' οὐ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ, and, for ὅσιον, 368 b δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κατηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν, 607 d ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. So in Met. 1073 b, 16 φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέροισι, πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.

§ 2. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες κ.τ.λ. This word has the same associations as εἰσαγαγεῖν above. Cf. Top. 159 b, 30 οἱ κομίσαντες ἀλλοτρίας δόξας, Met. 990 b, 2 ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν (said of the ιδέαι).

ἐποιοῦν. This word also suggests something arbitrarily 'set up.' Cf. Met. 995 b, 16 οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰ εἶδη. So κατεσκεύαζον below. For the tense see note on ὦντο 1095 a, 26.

ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. In a numerical series we have priority and posteriority. For instance 1 is prior

to 2 because if there is 2 there must be 1, but not *vice versa*. For this sense of πρότερον cf. Cat. 14 a, 34 where the second kind of priority is given as τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθύς τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ἐνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἀκολουθήσιν τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν. If there were a 'form' of number, it would be prior to the first number of the series. Which is absurd. Met. 999 a, 6 ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἶόν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυνάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, 'in the category of οὐσία.' For the doctrine of the Categories see Introd. § 28. They too form a series the terms of which are 'not convertible according to sequence of being.' If there is quality there must be substance, but not *vice versa*. Substance is the *prius* of them all; but, if there were a common 'form' of which they all partook, it would be prior to Substance. Which is absurd.

τὸ... καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία, 'the essential, i.e. substance.' τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ

οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι—παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴκει καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος—ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.

- 3 Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ 25 ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἓν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον.

a, 24. EE. 1217 b, 25 πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ὄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διήρηται, σημαίνει τὸ μὲν τί ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πότε, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ κινεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν πτώσεών ἐστι τούτων, ἐν οὐσίᾳ μὲν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρός, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἐν τί ἐστι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

is what a thing is 'in (or rather 'by') itself,' as opposed to its accidents (συμβεβηκότα). Met. 1065 b, 2 οὐδὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός πρότερον τῶν καθ' αὐτό.

πρότερον τῇ φύσει. For the posteriority of the other categories to the τί ἐστί, cf. Met. 1028 a, 13 τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερόν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὄν τὸ τί ἐστί...τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητος εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ποιότητος, τὰ δὲ πάθη κ.τ.λ....τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ (Cat. ποιότητος) ἢ τὸ καθήμενον (Cat. κείσθαι) οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου λέγεται.

τοῦ πρὸς τι. Met. 1088 a, 23 τὸ πρὸς τι πάντων ἥκιστα φύσις τις ἢ οὐσία τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

παραφυάδι—a biological metaphor. Cf. Rhet. 1356 a, 25 συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητο-

ρικὴν οἷον παραφύες τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι.

τοῦ ὄντος, i.e. τοῦ τί ἐστί. The word is used in its narrower sense, not in that which it has in the next sentence.

§ 3. ἰσαχῶς...τῷ ὄντι; "in as many senses as the word 'is'." Τὸ ὄν is here used in a wider sense as the substantive corresponding to the copula ἐστί. In this sense it includes all the categories, which therefore are sometimes called γένη τοῦ ὄντος.

ἐν τῷ τί. The regular term is ἐν τῷ τί ἐστί, cf. supra 19.

τὸ μέτριον...καιρός...δίαίτα. The medical sense of these words is chiefly in Aristotle's mind. Cf. Top. 107 a, 8. There does not seem to be any satisfactory parallel for δίαίτα in the sense of τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγομεν (Schol.).

30 Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ 4
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ
πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ
μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν
τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστικὴ.

35 Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν 5
1096^b αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἦ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος,
οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἦ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν 6

1096 a, 30. EE. 1217 b, 34 οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ
ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μιᾶς
ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα ἕτερον καιρὸν
θεωρεῖ καὶ ἑτέρα ἕτερον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφήν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ
τὸ μέτριον θεωρεῖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς
πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πράξιν, ὥστε σχολῇ
αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς.

a, 35. EE. 1218 a, 10 ἐστὶ τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν. τὸ
οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη
πλὴν ὅτι αἰδίδιον καὶ χωριστόν; ἀλλ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον λευκὸν τὸ πολλὰς
ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστ' οὐδὲ <τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν
τῷ αἰδίδιον εἶναι· οὐδὲ> δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταῦτο τῇ ἰδέᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ
ὑπάρχει τὸ κοινόν.

b, 5. EE. 1218 a, 15 ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ δεικτέον ἦ ὥς νῦν δεικ-
νύουσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀνομολογουμένων ἔχειν

§ 4. καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κ.τ.λ. Eudemus (loc. cit.) calls these τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα.

οἷον καιροῦ. Καιρός is ἀγαθὸν ἐν χρόνῳ. For its use in strategy cf. Thucydides and Demosthenes *passim*, and for its use in medicine cf. Hippocrates Aph. I Ὁ βίος βραχύς ἢ δὲ τέχνη μακρή· ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς, ἢ δὲ πείρα σφαλερὴ, ἢ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή.

τοῦ μετρίου, i.e. τοῦ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ἀγαθοῦ.

ἐν πόνοις. Cf. 1138 b, 28 n.

§ 5. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. We have had three arguments to show that the good is not καθόλου, we now

have two to show that it is not χωριστόν.

τί ποτε καί is impatient. 'Whatever they can mean by adding the prefix αὐτο- to things.' Cf. Met. 1040 b, 32 ποιοῦσιν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ εἶδει (sc. οὐσίας) τοῖς φθαρτοῖς—ταύτας γὰρ ἴσμεν—αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτό-ἵππον, προστιθέντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ αὐτό.

οὐδ' ἦ ἀγαθόν, sc. διοίσει τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν. Mr Bury proposes to read οὐδὲ <τάγαθόν> ἦ ἀγαθόν, but the brachylogy is quite Aristotelian.

οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίῳ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ
 7 λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. πιθανώτερον δ' 5
 εἰκότασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἓν· οἷς δὲ καὶ Σπεύσιππος
 ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ.

τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ὁμολογούμενα εἶναι ἀγαθὰ δεικνύουσιν, ἐξ
 ἀριθμῶν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν· τάξεις γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί,
 ὡς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν
 αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, οἷον ὑγιείας ἰσχύος
 σωφροσύνης, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλόν. πάντα γὰρ
 τάδε τάξεις καὶ ἡρεμία· εἰ ἄρα, ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον· ἐκείνοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει
 ταῦτα μᾶλλον. παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐφίενται λέγουσι φανε-
 ρῶς, ἀλλὰ λίαν ἀπλῶς τοῦτο φασί, καὶ ὅρεξιν εἶναι πῶς ἂν τις
 ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ ὑπάρχει; δεῖ δὲ περὶ τούτου πραγματευθῆναι,
 καὶ μὴ ἀξιοῦν μηθὲν ἀλόγως, ἀ καὶ μετὰ λόγου πιστεῦσαι οὐ ῥάδιον.
 τό τε φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἐνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές·
 ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται, ὁφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγιείας,
 οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου.

§ 7. πιθανώτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eudemos (loc. cit.) is fuller on this, but we do not know enough about it to be quite sure of the interpretation. Speusippos is criticised (1) for trying to prove things to be good because they are numbers instead of showing that number is good because admittedly good things are or imply number; (2) for saying that the One is the good because all numbers aim at unity. At the same time, Aristotle says that, strange as this theory may be, it is more plausible to say the One is the Good than to say the Good is one. But there must also be some reference to the theory of Speusippos that the good is not eternal. Cf. Met. 1072 b, 30 ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι. So ib. 1091 a, 33 we are told that some thought them ὑστερογενῆ and said that προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως

καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι. His superior plausibility consists, then, in this, that, instead of starting from one universal eternal good and deducing all other goods from it, he makes the One the good to which all things tend and places it not in the beginning, but in the end. A universal good seems more conceivable as a yet unrealised ideal than as a first cause.

ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ. Met. 986 a, 22 τὰς ἀρχὰς δέκα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγόμενας—

- | | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 1. πέρας | καὶ ἄπειρον. |
| 2. περιττόν | „ ἄρτιον. |
| 3. ἓν | „ πλῆθος. |
| 4. δεξιόν | „ ἀριστερόν. |
| 5. ἄρρεν | „ θῆλυ. |
| 6. ἡρεμοῦν | „ κινούμενον. |
| 7. εὐθύ | „ καμπύλον. |
| 8. φῶς | „ σκότος. |
| 9. ἀγαθόν | „ κακόν. |
| 10. τετράγωνον | „ ἑτερόμηκες. |

Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ 8
 λεχθείσιν ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ
 10 παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν
 εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ
 τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά διὰ ταῦτα
 λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' 9
 ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.
 15 χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα
 εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν ; 10
 ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ
 ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί ; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώ-
 κομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἂν. ἢ οὐδ'
 20 ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας ; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.
 εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν 11
 ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν
 χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ
 φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτη

§ 8. τοῖς δὲ λεχθείσιν κ.τ.λ., 'We can descry a possible objection to our arguments on the ground that Plato's words do not apply to *every* good.' For ὑποφαίνεσθαι cf. Plato, Soph. 245 e τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα.

καθ' ἐν εἶδος, 'are so called because they are the same in species.' Aristotle opposes τὰ καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα to τὰ πρὸς ἐν which include τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά and τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά. See further b, 27 n. In Rhet. 1362 a, 27 we find among received definitions of the good καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων... καὶ τὰ κωλυτικά τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.

§ 10. καθ' αὐτά δὲ κ.τ.λ. The argument is put in the form of a dilemma, the two horns of which are introduced by ἢ (b, 17 and b, 19). Things good *per se* either include something more than the Form of Good or they do not. If they do not, what is the use of the Form? If they

do, in what does their specific identity consist?

μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. 'The species (of things good *per se*) will be purposeless,' seeing that there are no good things of which it is the εἶδος. It will be a species to which nothing belongs, a form of which nothing partakes, a type which is nowhere realised. This is one horn of the dilemma.

§ 11. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. The other horn. If these too (i.e. ὅσα μονούμενα διώκεται) are good *per se* and καθ' ἐν εἶδος λεγόμενα (b, 10), the definition of good must be the same in all of them, or they will not be a real species at all. Snow and white lead are both 'called white καθ' ἐν εἶδος, and therefore the definition of whiteness (χρῶμα διακριτικὸν ὁψέως Top. 119 a, 30) is the same in both. Is this true of the Good?

τιμῆς...φρονήσεως...ἡδονῆς. These are the ends of the 'three lives.' Of

ἡ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν 25
ιδέαν.

- 12 Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ
τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς
ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γὰρ
ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
13 ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ 30
αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

1096 b, 30. EE. 1217 b, 16 ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ διασκοπεῖν περὶ
ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐτέρας τε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικωτέρας ἐξ

course *φρόνησις* is used in its wide Platonic sense to include 'wisdom' of all kinds.

ταύτη ἡ ἀγαθά. These are the emphatic words. The definitions of snow and white lead are different too, but not *ταύτη ἡ λευκά*, in so far as they are regarded as belonging to the species of white things.

κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. Note the preposition. Cf. § 12 and the notes.

§ 12. **πῶς δὴ λέγεται;** sc. *ἀγαθά*. If they are not *καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα*, in what sense are they all called by one name?

τοῖς...ὁμωνύμοις. *ὁμώνυμα* are defined as *ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος*. Cf. 1129 a, 30. The usage of the term, however, fluctuates somewhat. Here 'chance *ὁμώνυμα*,' where there is absolutely nothing in common but an accidental identity of name, are distinguished from certain other *ὁμώνυμα*, for which see next note.

τῷ ἀφ' ἐνός...πρὸς ἐν. This is the class called *παρώνυμα* in Cat. I 2, 12, a name which merely implies modification of the name by some inflexion or suffix (*πτῶσις*). They form an intermediate class between *ὁμώνυμα* and *συνώνυμα*, the latter of which are also called *καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα*. For example, *τὸ ὑγιεινόν* means 'the healthy' in the sense (1) of what produces and pre-

serves health (*πρὸς ἐν*), e.g. healthy exercise, (2) of what is a sign of health (*ἀφ' ἐνός*), e.g. a healthy complexion, (3) of what is capable (*δεκτικόν*) of health, e.g. a healthy man. Cf. Met. 1003 a, 33. So in Met. 1060 b, 37, we speak of an *ιατρικὸς λόγος* (*ἀφ' ἐνός*) and an *ιατρικὸν μαχαίριον* (*πρὸς ἐν*). As Professor Stewart well says: "A knife and a lecture may both be called 'surgical.' They are both called 'surgical,' not as an ox and a horse are both called 'animals' (*συνωνύμως*), nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called *κλείς* (*ὁμωνύμως*)."

κατ' ἀναλογίαν. This is Aristotle's own view. Things predicated in different categories can only be the same *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*, that is their sameness can be represented as a proportion. This meaning of *ἀναλογία* is illustrated by the example *ὄψις : σῶμα :: νοῦς : ψυχή*. This illustration would at once appeal to Aristotle's audience, as it comes from Plato Rep. vi. To take another illustration from the matter immediately in hand, we may say *καιρός : χρόνος :: τὸ μέτριον : ποσότης*.

§ 13. **ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.** Cf. 1096 a, 4 n.

ἄλλης...φιλοσοφίας, sc. *τῆς πρώτης*. As Ramsauer points out, we have hints of such a treatment in Met. 1078 a, 31 *τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον· τὸ μὲν*

περὶ τῆς ιδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορού-
 μενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
 ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιούτῳ τι
 35 ζητεῖται. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν 14
 1097^a αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ
 παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
 ἀγαθὰ, καὶ εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν 15
 οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν·
 5 πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι
 παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλι-
 κούτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν
 οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ 16
 τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν,

ἀνάγκης (οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναιρετικοί τε καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι κατ' οὐδεμίαν εἰσὶν
 ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην). εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι
 πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ιδέα μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὁτιοῦν
 λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς. ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

1096 b, 32. EE. 1217 b, 23 ἔπειτ' εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰσὶν αἱ
 ιδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα, μή ποτ' οὐδὲ χρήσιμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ
 πρὸς τὰς πράξεις.

γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. 996 a, 27 ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς ἀκι-
 νήτοις οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο ταύτην εἶναι τὴν
 ἀρχήν, οὐδ' εἶναι τι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. But
 we have no full discussion.

ἐν τι τὸ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ. So Bekker
 with L^b. Bywater compares EE.
 1218 a, 7 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον
 τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν.
 See too Top. 179 a, 8 φανερόν οὖν ὅτι
 οὐ δοτέον τόδε τι εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγο-
 ρούμενον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἥτοι ποιὸν ἢ
 πρὸς τι ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι ση-
 μαίνειν. K^b has καὶ for τό.

αὐτό τι καθ' αὐτό. For the order
 Bywater compares EE. 1218 a, 10
 αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν and Met. 1045 a, 16
 αὐτό τι ζῶν.

§ 14. οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα κ.τ.λ. Plato
 often substitutes the type to

which things approximate for the form
 in which they partake. The meaning
 is not really different. Cf. Rep. 505 e,
 519 c, 501 b.

§ 15. ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεμεναι. Cf.
 1094 a, 1 n.

τὸ ἐνδεὲς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1337 a, 1
 πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεί-
 πον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.
 This is only the other side of ἀγαθοῦ
 τινὸς ἐφίεται.

§ 16. ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων. The
 regular Platonic instances. The τέκ-
 των makes the κερκίς for the ὑφάντης
 (Krat. 388 c sqq.), and Plato himself
 had said that he looks to the εἶδος of
 the κερκίς, without bringing in the
 αὐτοαγαθόν, just as the ὑφάντης looks
 to the εἶδος of the ἱμάτιον.

ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέαν 10
αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν
οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ'
ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν
τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

VII. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, 15
τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ
τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς
ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ
πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ
δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν 20
ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα
τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάν-
των ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω,
2 ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὲ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτὸν ἀφίκεται· τοῦτο
3 δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαί- 25

τεθεαμένος, the Platonic word.

οὕτως, sc. καθόλου.

μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε. This is said not of the doctor's art but of its application. Cf. Met. 981 a, 14 μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἔχόντων... a, 17 αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι.

VII. § 1. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν κ.τ.λ. Having disposed of the universal good, we may now consider the beliefs of the wise (i.e. Plato) about the good, restricting it to the single πράξις, τέχνῃ or προαίρεσις of πολιτική.

ἐκάστης, sc. τέχνης. This particularises the question. Even if we reject the universal good, the Platonists will still give answers about the ends of a particular art, of which we may make use.

οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ. Cf. Top. 146 b, 10 οὐ χάριν τὰλλα.

§ 2. μεταβαίνων, 'shifting its ground.' The verb μεταβιβάζειν is technically used of the dialectic process. Cf. Top. 101 a, 33 μεταβιβάζοντες ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν. So EE. 1216 b, 30 μεταβιβαζόμενοι συνομολογήσουσι (Introd. § 25). Adopting the Platonic personification of the λόγος, we can say ὁ λόγος μεταβαίνει in the same sense. The meaning, then, is that, if the Platonists are 'moved on' or forced by criticism to take a fresh step, that is, to limit the good which we are seeking to that of some one art, their account of it comes into agreement with that from which we ourselves started.

διασαφῆσαι. This refers to another formula of dialectics, for which see 1138 b, 26 ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές and the note.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δὲ. So Hel. reads for the ἐπεὶ δὲ of the MSS. Professor Bywater, regarding μεταβαίνων...πειρατέον as

νεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον
 πλούτον αὐλοῦς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι
 πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ
 μὲν ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,
 30 εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν 4
 τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο
 αἰρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν, καὶ
 ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε
 δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· 5
 1097^b ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο,
 τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα
 μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν,
 5 διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμο-
 νίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο.
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ 6
 γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐταρκες
 λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ

“intrusive” (Contr. p. 24), thinks the reading δὴ an “attempt to disguise a structural flaw in the text.”

αὐλοῦς. The soundness of this reading has been suspected, but, it now appears, without reason. Professor Bywater points out that in Plato Rep. 601 d the αὐλός is taken as a typical instance of the ὄργανον.

→ **τέλειόν τι.** The account of the good now given comes from Plato's Philebos (see Appendix G τέλεον, ἱκανόν, αἰρετόν in Bury's edition). We are still discussing τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκοῦντα. Cf. Phileb. 20 c Τὴν τάγαθου μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι; — Πάντων δὴπου τελεώτατον.

§ 4. **καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ**, i.e. without the πρόσθεσις implied by the πτώσις of the comparative degree. For the τόπος of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον here employed cf. Top. 115 b, 3 πάλιν εἴ τι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον λέγεται, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὑπάρχει.

§ 5. **τιμὴν...ἡδονὴν...νοῦν**, again the ends of the ‘three lives.’

§ 6. **αὐταρκες**, cf. Phileb. 20 c Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τάγαθόν; — Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων. ib. 20 e δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἐτι προσδεῖσθαι.

οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, sc. ἀρκοῦν, understood from αὐταρκες. Aristotle is explaining the sense in which he takes the αὐτο- of αὐταρκες.

βίον μονώτην. The word μονώτης is peculiar to Aristotle (cf. 1099 b, 4. 1157 b, 21. 1169 b, 16. 1170 a, 5). It seems to be based on the analogy of ιδιώτης. Cf. Demetr. περὶ ἐρμηνείας 144 καὶ ἐξ ιδιωτικοῦ ὀνόματος γίγνεται (sc. χάρις), ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης “ὅσῳ γάρ,” φησί, “μονώτης εἰμὶ, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα”· καὶ ἐκ πεποιημένου, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ “ὅσῳ γὰρ αὐτίτης καὶ μονώτης εἰμὶ, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ μονώτης ιδιωτικωτέρου ἔθους

γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ 10
 7 πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ
 ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς <τῶν
 γονέων> καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς
 ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθὺς ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ
 δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ 15
 μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἴομεθα εἶναι.
 8 ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην—συναριθ-
 μουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον,

ἤδη ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ αὐτίτης πεποιημένον ἐκ
 τοῦ αὐτός. Cf. Poet. 1458 a, 21 sqq.

φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. Cf.
 Pol. 1253 a, 2 ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει
 πολιτικὸν ζῷον ἐστὶ. I have given
 the reading of L^b: for it seems most
 likely that the K^b reading πολιτικὸν
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος has been accommodated
 to the Politics.

§ 7. τούτων, sc. τῶν φίλων κ.τ.λ.

ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς. This is not con-
 sistent with 10, even if γονεῖς can
 stand for προγόνους. Rassow's γονεῖς
 τῶν γονέων (Forsch. p. 111) is a highly
 probable conjecture.

εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Cf. 1094 a,
 20 n.

εἰσαυθὺς, sc. in the discussion of
 φιλία, 1170 b, 20 sqq.

τὸ δ' αὐταρκες κ.τ.λ. By αὐταρκες
 we do not mean τὸ αὐτῷ ἀρκοῦν but
 τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρκοῦν 'what suffices by
 itself.' The αὐτό is explained by
 μονούμενον. Most MSS. (not K^b) have
 ἄρκιον καὶ αἰρετόν or αἰρετόν καὶ ἄρκιον,
 which points to the true explanation.

§ 8. ἔτι...αἰρετωτάτην. Cf. Phileb.
 20 d πᾶν τὸ γιγνώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ
 ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἐλεῖν κ.τ.λ.

μὴ συναριθμουμένην, 'not included
 in the enumeration' (of good things),
 'not as one good thing among others.'
 It must include all particular good
 things, and therefore cannot be put
 on the same line with or made co-

ordinate with them (σύσστοιχον τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς Hel.). So in the
 Philebos Plato had shown that neither
 φρόνησις nor ἡδονή could be the good
 because φρόνησις + ἡδονή is better
 than either alone. Cf. 1172 b, 28 n.
 The best commentary is Rhet. 1363 b,
 18 ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλείω (sc. ἀγαθὰ) τοῦ
 ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου
 τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μείζον ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δ' ἐνυπάρχον
 ὑπερέχεται. It is only if all other
 goods are contained in it (ἐνυπάρχει),
 that we can be sure no πρόσθεσις is
 possible. If ὑγίεια συναριθμεῖται τῇ
 εὐδαιμονίᾳ, then εὐδαιμονία + ὑγίεια
 will 'exceed' εὐδαιμονία alone. Cf.
 also Top. 117 a, 16 ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ
 τῶν ἐλαττόνων (αἰρετώτερα), ἢ ἀπλῶς,
 ἢ ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις ὑπάρχη,
 τὰ ἐλάττω ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν, to which
 Alexander (p. 247 Wallies) notes as an
 exception ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εὐδαιμονία μετὰ
 τῶν ἀρετῶν αἰρετώτερα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
 μόνης, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ περιέχονται
 καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί...οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς
 περιέχουσιν τινα τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν
 ἐρρέθη, τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὐ συγκρίνεται· διὸ
 δεῖ προσδιορίζεσθαι τὸ ἐν τούτοις εἶναι
 τὰ πλείω καὶ περιέχοντα ἀγαθὰ αἰρετώ-
 τερα τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ περιεχομένων,
 ἐν τοῖς συναριθμεῖσθαι πεφυκόσι.
 This προσδιορισμός is made in Rhet.
 loc. cit.

20 ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεί. τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται
καὶ αὐτάρκες ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμο- 9
λογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστὶν
ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον 10
25 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ
παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξις, ἐν
τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τ' ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ
ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος 11
μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ'
30 οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ
χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται
τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις
ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12
ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ
1098^a ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν.

1097 b, 24. EE. 1219 a, 5 ὥστε καὶ ψυχῆς (sc. ἡ βελτίστη
ἐξὶς ἀρετῇ). ἐστὶ γάρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἕξεως ἔστω
βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον. καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἐξέεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ
τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐχέτω, καὶ τέλος ἐκάστου τὸ
ἔργον.

τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος. Here again the leading statement is expressed by the participle (cf. 1094 b, 11 n.). 'Happiness, then, is complete and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.'

§ 9. τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν. 'To identify Happiness and the Best.' The addition of the article to both terms shows that it is indifferent which is subject and which is predicate.

ἐναργέστερον...ἔτι. Cf. ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές 1138 b, 26 n.

§ 10. ληφθείη. Cf. Introd. § 25. We are still 'taking' ἐνδοξοὶ προτάσεις from 'the wise.'

τὸ ἔργον. The following ἐνδοξον comes from Plato, Rep. 352 d, sqq.,

where the ἔργον of anything is defined as δ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα.

ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is an ἐπαγωγή. Its conclusion is 'If Man has an ἔργον, his good will depend on that ἔργον.'

§ 11. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. Another ἐπαγωγή. We see that (1) every class of men has an ἔργον, (2) that every part of man has an ἔργον. It is therefore εὐλογον that Man as such should have an ἔργον.

§ 12. ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. The 'proper' function of man cannot be something 'common' to him and to vegetables.

τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν. The life of nutrition and growth, the presence of which differentiates the

ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινή
 13 καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. λείπεται δὲ πρακτική τις
 τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· [τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ
 δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.] διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης 5
 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγε-

1098 a, 5. EE. 1219 a, 9 φανερόν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον
 τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἕξεως· τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος
 τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐ ἕνεκα τᾶλλα πάντα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ
 ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, δῆλον· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον
 λέγεται διχῶς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἕτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν,
 οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἰατρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ'
 οὐχ ὑγίανσις, τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψεως ὄρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς
 ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη, ὧν ἔργον ἡ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν
 βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως.

animate from the inanimate, life at its lowest. Cf. De An. 413 b, 7 θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φύόμενα μετέχει. See the whole passage.

αἰσθητική τις, the 'sentient life,' which differentiates animals and plants. Cf. De An. 413 b, 1 τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην (sc. τὸ θρεπτικόν) ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῳῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῶν διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν πρῶτως. The sentient life cannot be the ἔργον of man. The sentient life here includes the life of mere appetite (ὀρεκτικὴ ζωή).

§ 13. πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. The active life of the rational part. Τὸ λόγον ἔχον is that part of the soul which 'can give an account of itself' and is therefore capable of πράξις (including θεωρία) directed to an end. Observe that, though λόγον ἔχον may be translated 'rational,' λόγος does not mean 'reason' here any more than in ordinary Greek.

τούτου δὲ...διανοούμενον. This remark interrupts the argument and destroys the grammar. The language

too is late. The adjective ἐπιπειθής can hardly have been used by Aristotle. The interpolation refers to the distinction made at the end of Book I, and is quite irrelevant here.

διττῶς...λεγομένης. It may be either a ἕξις or an ἐνέργεια (in the language of the Academy a χρῆσις). The distinction between the two is the same as that laid down in the De An. 414 a, 4 sqq. See especially 417 a, 21 sqq. where the distinction is illustrated by the contrast of τὸ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην and τὸ θεωρεῖν.

κυριώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reason is that the ἔργον is the end of the ἕξις and therefore better. Where there is an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν that is better than the ἐνέργεια (1094 a, 5); but, when the end is the ἐνέργεια itself, it is the final cause, and the ἕξις is only a δύναμις in relation to it. Now the δύναμις is referable to the ἐνέργεια (1170 a, 16 sqq.) as that which determines it and makes it what it is (τὸ κύριον). Cf. Met. 1050 b, 6—34.

σθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον 14
ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει
τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου
10 κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης
τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ
μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως,—ἀνθρώ-
που δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν

1098 a, 7. EE. 1219 a, 18 τούτων δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διω-
ρισμένων, λέγομεν ὅτι ταῦτὸ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως. οἷον σκυτοτομικῆς καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δὴ
(1. δέ) τίς ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ σκυτικῆς καὶ σπουδαίου σκυτέως, τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ
σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

a, 12. EE. 1219 a, 23 ἔτι ἔστω ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν,
τοῦ δὲ χρήσις καὶ ἐγρήγορσις· ὁ γὰρ ὕπνος ἀργία τις καὶ ἡσυχία
(1099 a, 2). ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἐν καὶ ταῦτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς

§ 14. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. The defi-
nition of Happiness now emerges from
the dialectic process.

κατὰ λόγον. This follows from
its being ἐνέργεια τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.
The activity of that part of the soul
which 'has a ground' for its activity,
will be explicable from that ground,
and therefore 'according to rule.'

ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου. The phrase λόγον
ἔχειν may mean 'to be able to give an
account of oneself,' but it may also
mean 'to admit of an account being
given,' 'to be explicable.' If the
λόγον ἔχον is only so in the latter
sense, κατὰ λόγον may be too strong
an expression; but, even in that case,
a λόγος or 'ground' is implied, though
it may not be explicit.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ...τῷ γένει, 'generically
the same.' Aristotle is meeting the
objection that to pass from the function
of an individual of a given class (τοῦδε)
to that of a good individual of the
class (τοῦδε σπουδαίου), from the ἔργον
of Man to the ἔργον of the good
man, is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος.
Eudemos takes the Socratic example

of the shoemaker. If σκυτοτομική
(the ἔξις) and σκυτεύσις (the ἐνέργεια)
have an ἀρετή, then (the ἔργον of the
shoemaker being a shoe) the ἔργον
of a good shoemaker will be a good
shoe.

καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ κ.τ.λ. These words
mark the ἐπαγωγή, like καὶ ὅλως
1097 b, 26. The only difference is
that καὶ ἀπλῶς lays stress upon the
elimination (ἀφαίρεσις) of the particular
instances, while καὶ ὅλως lays stress on
the inclusion of all other particulars.

προστιθεμένης κ.τ.λ., 'the excess
in goodness (of the good individual
over the individual simply) being
added to the function.' We must
make the same πρόσθεσις in both
cases. If we say 'good shoemaker,'
we must say 'good shoe.' Here
ὑπεροχή is used in its usual mathe-
matical sense of 'excess' or 'differ-
ence.' Cf. Index s.v.

ἀνθρώπου δέ...εἰ δ' οὕτω. Pro-
fessor Bywater (Contr. p. 24) thinks
this is clearly a duplicate of what
precedes. I confess that I hardly like
to put a limit to the capacity of Aris-

καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ
 15 καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται 15
 —εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται
 κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ
 16 τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ
 ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα
 μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

20

καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἐστὶ
 τὸ τέλεον ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων
 (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄριστα
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν, * * * αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια), ἐπεὶ βέλτιον ἢ ἐνέργεια
 τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίστης ἕξεως ἢ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ'
 ἀρετὴ βελτίστη ἕξις, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι.
 ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον. ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς
 ἀγαθῆς ἐνέργεια.

a, 18. EE. 1219 a, 35 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλεόν τι,
 καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μόνιον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία
 ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

totle for long and complicated protases even when they involve repetitions and grammatical awkwardnesses. He never seems to be sure that he has said all he meant to say and constantly 'tries back.' Cf. Zell's note.

μετὰ λόγου. Like κατὰ λόγον (1095 a, 10 n.), this phrase belongs to ordinary Greek speech, where it means almost the same thing. It implies, however, that the agent is conscious of the rule he follows, that he acts not merely 'by rule' but 'with a rule,' and we shall see later (1144 b, 25 sqq.) that Aristotle insists on this distinction. For the phrase itself cf. Plato, Protag. 324 b where μετὰ λόγου κολλάζειν is opposed to ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται to express punishment deliberately inflicted for a certain purpose clearly realised.

§ 16. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ, 'in a complete

life.' The authoritative commentary on this is EE. 1219 b, 5 τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μήθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν ('any')...ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον, οὐ γὰρ ὅλον. (The parenthesis about Solon has obscured the meaning of this, cf. p. 48.) Cf. also 1101 a, 13 ἐν πολλῷ τινι καὶ τελείῳ (sc. χρόνῳ), ib. 16 μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον, 1177 b, 25 λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τελείου. It certainly refers, then, to duration, and the later Peripatetic way of putting it (cf. MM. 1185 a, 5 τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ, Stob. Ecl. ii, p. 132, Wachsmuth τέλειον δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ὅσον ὥρισεν ἡμῖν <τὸ> πλεῖστον ὃ θεός) is not really wrong. For, if we bear in mind that nature as a rule (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) fulfils her ends, it will not seem amiss to describe a 'complete' life-time, one in

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17
 ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν
 παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα
 τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς ἢ συνεργὸς
 25 ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις·
 παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν 18
 προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν
 ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ
 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων 19
 30 καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι·

which the end of human life is attained, as the average life-time of man. If the *θρεπτικὴ καὶ αὐξητικὴ* *ζωή* were the truly human life, a *blos τέλειος* would be one in which we had time to grow nearly six feet.

§ 17. Περιγεγράφθω μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Gen. An. 743 b, 20 ἅπαντα δὲ ταῖς περιγραφαῖς διορίζεται πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἂν ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῶον.

ὑποτυπῶσαι.....ἀναγράψαι. The first word is a metaphor from sculpture, the second from painting. Introd. § 26.

προαγαγεῖν, 'to carry out,' 'advance.' Cf. Met. 985 b, 23 οἱ καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀψάμενοι πρῶτον ταῦτα προήγαγον. Soph. El. 183 b, 28 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς (τῶν τεχνῶν) εὐρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγόντων οὕτως ἠύξήκασιν. Poet. 1449 a, 13 κατὰ μικρὸν ἠύξθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγένετο φανερόν αὐτῆς. ib. 1448 b, 23 κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων.

In fact προαγαγεῖν is the transitive verb corresponding to ἐπιδοῦναι.

διαρθρῶσαι, i. q. διακριβῶσαι.

τὰ...τῇ περιγραφῇ, 'what is well outlined.' For the dative with καλῶς ἔχειν, cf. Kühner-Gerth § 419.

παντὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 183 b, 17 τῶν γὰρ εὐρισκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσοῦτ' μικρότατον ὃν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατον ἐστὶν ὀφθῆναι. ταύτης δ' εὐρημένης ῥᾶον τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστὶν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πᾶσας τέχνας.

§ 18. μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Rassow brackets from here to the end of the chapter. But see Introd. § 6.

§ 19. τὴν ὀρθήν, sc. γωνίαν. The verb ἐπιζητεῖν seems to be ambiguously used here. With ὁ τέκτων it means *desiderat*, with ὁ γεωμέτρης, *considerat*.

θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω
 20 γίνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν
 ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ 1098^b
 21 περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ'
 αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινι,
 22 καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἥ πεφύ-
 23 κασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην 5

1098 a, 33. EE. 1218 b, 17 ὀρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τᾶλλα
 δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. οἷον
 ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοδί, ἀνάγκη τόδε εἶναι τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν·
 τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν ὑγείας αἴτιον ὡς κινήσαν, καὶ τότε τοῦ εἶναι ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦ
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεὶς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ
 ὑγεία, ἂν μὴ σοφιστῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ ἱατρός (οὗτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις
 λόγοις σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν.

θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθοῦς, from Plato, Rep. 475 e τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας...φιλοθεάμονας.

ὅπως μὴ κ.τ.λ., from Plato, Theait. 177 b περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον, and Laws 807 c πάρεργον γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων διακώλυμα γίγνεσθαι. Cf. Agathon fr. 11 Nauck—

τὸ μὲν πάρεργον ἔργον ὡς ποιούμεθα, τὸ δ' ἔργον ὡς πάρεργον ἐκπονούμεθα.

§ 20. τὴν αἰτίαν, i.q. τὸ διότι (1095 b, 7). We should not ask to have the definition of Happiness, which is the ἀρχή of Politics, deduced from anything higher. We must only expect to have τὸ ὅτι, the fact that it is so, exhibited to us (δειχθῆναι here opp. to ἀποδειχθῆναι) dialectically.

τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Cf. 1095 b, 6 ἀρχή γὰρ τὸ ὅτι. We cannot demonstrate the definition of εὐδαιμονία, we cannot show *why* the Good for Man is what it is. All we can do is to make clear *what* it is by a dialectical treatment of the beliefs

of those who have been trained in good habits.

§ 21. ἐπαγωγῇ, 'by induction.' See Introd. § 23. The ἀρχαί of physical science are apprehended by induction.

αἰσθήσει, 'by intuition.' See Introd. § 23. The ἀρχαί of mathematics are apprehended by intuition.

ἐθισμῶ τινι, 'by habituation.' The ἀρχή of Politics must be apprehended by habituation. The citizen whose character has been formed by habitual obedience to the laws of his state is the man who can apprehend it. Ἐθισμός, then, is a sort of practical ἐπαγωγή.

§ 22. μετιέναι, 'to go in the track of,' 'in quest of,' 'to investigate,' a Platonic metaphor taken from hunting, cf. Theait. 187 e πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχθυος μετελθεῖν, Polit. 263 b καθάπερ ἱχθυεῖντες μέτιμεν. So *indagare*, *investigare*. Hence the noun μέθοδος 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 23. μεγάλην γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. De Caelo 271 b, 8 τὸ μικρὸν παραβῆναι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφισταμένοις γίγνεται

γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμισυ τοῦ παντός εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῇ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

VIII. Σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμ-
10 περάσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων
περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,
τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές. νενεμημένων δὲ τῶν 2

1098 b, 11. EE. 1216 b, 26 πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων
ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον
τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι
συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας,
ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν
ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς,
μεταλαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγ-
κεχυμένως..... 1217 a, 10 καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν
τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διὰ τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὅτι
προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον
τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δ' ὅπότ' ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀναγκάζονται
πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου
δεδείχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθές μὲν ἔστιν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν
δι' ἣν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθές δεῖξαι· δῆλον
δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

b, 12. EE. 1218 b, 32 πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ,
καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.

πόρρω μυριοπλάσιον...τούτου δ' αἴτιον
ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει,
διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ
γίνεται παμμέγεθες.

VIII. § 1. περὶ αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς
ἀρχῆς, i.e. the definition of the Good
for Man. The next step in the dia-
lectical process is to show that the
definition will explain all the λεγόμενα.

ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος κ.τ.λ. The
συμπέρασμα is the conclusion (i.e.
the definition of εὐδαιμονία), the ἐξ ὧν
ὁ λόγος are the premisses. We have

reached our ἀρχή by inductive syl-
logism. There is no inconsistency
between this and the statement that
we must not ask for the διότι. The
inductive syllogism συλλογίζεται τὸ
ὅτι not τὸ διότι. Its premisses are not
αἷτια τοῦ συμπεράσματος.

τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 'the data.' Here
τὰ λεγόμενα, current moral judgments,
are the data we have to deal with.

§ 2. νενεμημένων...τριχῇ. Plato,
Laws 743 e ὄντων γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἀπάν-
των περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων σπουδάζει,

ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ
 ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ
 μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς 15
 ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ
 γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ
 3 τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγον-
 ται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγα-
 4 θῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτὸς. συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ 20
 εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαιμόνα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία
 5 τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα
 6 τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· 25

b, 18. EE. 1219 a, 40 ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς
 λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τό τε γὰρ εὖ
 πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὧν ἕκαστον χρήσις
 ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πράξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ
 χρηστικὴ ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεὺς ποιεῖ χαλινόν, χρήται δ' ὁ
 ἵππικός). Cf. Introd. § 13.

b, 23. EE. 1214 a, 30 τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως
 καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἰρετωτάτοις.
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθόν, οἱ δὲ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι περὶ τοῦ
 μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι, συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον
 θατέρου μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὖσαν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν
 φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρων
 τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δ' ἐκ
 δυοῖν, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἐνὶ τινὶ τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.

τελευταῖον καὶ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρη-
 μάτων ὀρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδὴ,
 σώματος δὲ πέρι μέση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ τῆς
 ψυχῆς. A similar division is implied
 in Euthyd. 279 b and Phileb. 48 e.

κυριώτατα. Cf. 1098 a, 6 n.

καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο, 'our definition
 will be right.'

§ 4. τὸ εὖ ζῆν κ.τ.λ., 'the belief
 that the happy man lives well and

fares well,' which was referred to
 above 1095 a, 19.

§ 5. τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα, 'the *deside-
 rata*.'

§ 6. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ.
 Here again the reference is mainly to
 the Philebos. ἕτεροι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This
 refers to Xenokrates who included
 ὑπηρετικὴ δύναμις in his definition (cf.
 Introductory Note, n. 3).

ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν.
 τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι 7
 καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτά-
 νειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἔν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν.
 30 τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνωδός ἐστιν 8
 ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει 9
 δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάν-
 νειν, καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται
 1099^a μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ
 καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον τε.
 πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμ-
 πίαςιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ'
 5 οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι—τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν—οὕτω καὶ τῶν
 ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι
 γίνονται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ 10
 μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ

1098 b, 31. EE. 1215 a, 20 ἔσται δὲ φανερά τὰ πλείστα τῶν
 ἀμφισβητουμένων καὶ διαπορουμένων, ἂν καλῶς ὀρισθῇ τί χρὴ νομίζειν
 εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποίῳ τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν,
 καθάπερ τινὲς ᾤκησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ δεῖ μὲν καὶ
 ποίῳ τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ποίας τινάς.

1099 a, 3. EE. 1219 b, 9 καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ'
 οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ.

εὐετηρίαν. Aristotle affects pastoral
 and agricultural words in this con-
 nexion. For εὐετηρία (from εὖ and
 ἔτος) cf. 1155 a, 8. So εὐήμερία 1099 b,
 7 and εὐθενεῖν 1100 a, 7.

§ 7. πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοί...ὀλίγοι
 καὶ ἔνδοξοι. Introd. § 25.

§ 8. συνωδός. Cf. συνάδει 1098 b,
 20. On the reading see Bywater,
 Contr. p. 25.

§ 9. διαφέρει δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. This
 is where Aristotle parts company with
 Speusippos who defined εὐδαιμονία as
 ἔξις τελεία and Xenokrates who defined
 it as κτήσις τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς (Intro-
 ductory Note, n. 3). His advance

on the Academy consisted in the sub-
 stitution of ἐνέργεια for ἔξις, or what
 comes to the same thing, χρήσις
 for κτήσις. Cf. 1120 a, 8. 1129 b,
 31.

πράξει γάρ, sc. ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνε-
 γῶν.

§ 10. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν
 ψυχικῶν, 'Pleasure belongs to the
 class of psychical states.' The point
 is as follows. All pleasure is a state
 of the soul, whether it arises from
 things external or from the activities
 of the soul itself. But pleasure, being
 a state of the soul, is more closely
 bound up with the activities of the

- λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα
 δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ 10
 11 φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς
 μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ'
 εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται
 δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ
 12 καθ' αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν 15
 ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
 πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς
 καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ
 χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα
 ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 20
 13 εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτάς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων
 ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει
 14 δ' ὡς εἵπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ

a, 24–30. EE. *init.* Ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ
 γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητώου,

soul which feels it, than with anything
 external. The life of the good man
 is therefore pleasant 'in itself' (καθ'
 αὐτόν), not accidentally (κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκός). Goodness is pleasant to him
 because he is a man, whereas horses
 are not pleasant to the φιλίππος *qua*
 man, but ἡ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ φιλίππῳ
 εἶναι.

φιλοτοιοῦτος, 'φιλο-so-and-so.' This
 generic name for all compounds be-
 ginning with φιλο- occurs below 1118 b,
 22. 1125 b, 14. It has been restored
 by Vahlen in Rhet. 1363 b, 1.

οἷον...καὶ ὅλως, an ἐπαγωγή. Cf.
 1098 a, 10 n.

§ 11. τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται. Cf. 1166 b,
 19 στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ
 μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν
 τινων, τὸ δὲ ἡδεταί. See the whole
 chapter. As the pleasures are κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός they may be in conflict, οὐ

γὰρ πάνυ συνδύζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκός (1157 a, 35).

τοιαῦτα, sc. ἡδέα.

τοιαῦται, sc. φύσει ἡδεῖαι.

§ 12. περιάπτου. Camerarius quotes
 the Peripatetic Kritolaos (ap. Philon.
 2, 492) καταγοητεύουσιν ὀφθαλμοὺς αἱ
 ἄμορφοι καὶ εἰδεχθεῖς ἐταῖραι περιάπτοις
 καὶ νόθῳ κόσμῳ, χηρεῖα γνησίου. The
 idea here is surely rather that of a
postiche than that of an amulet (for
 which sense cf. 1100 b, 29 n.).

πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. This com-
 pletes the proof of the essential plea-
 santness of good activities. Not only
 (1) does the good man take pleasure in
 them, but (2) he is not good unless he
 does so.

§ 13. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. They fulfil
 the requirements not only of τὸ ἡδύ,
 but also of τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ καλόν, and
 each of these in the highest degree.

25 εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπί-
γραμμα—

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·

ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας
30 δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, 15
καθάπερ εἶπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὰ καλὰ
πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται,

διελὼν οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ
τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·

πάντων ἥδιστον δ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον
ἀπάντων οὔσα ἥδιστον ἐστίν.

§ 14. κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπί-
γραμμα. Eudemos makes this the be-
ginning of his Ethics with good literary
effect. The γνώμη is also found in
Theognis, 225, where, however, the
pentameter runs πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνό-
τατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ, τὸ τυχεῖν. Sopho-
kles in his Kreousa (fr. 326) worked
it up in his own way—

Κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοῦνδικον πεφυκέναι,
λῶστον δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἄνοσον· ἥδιστον δ'
ὄτῳ

πάρεστι λήψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ' ἡμέραν.

The authority of Aristotle is sufficient
to prove that it was really inscribed
on Leto's temple at Delos in the same
way as the γνώμαι of the 'Seven Wise
Men' were set up at Delphoi. Cf.
Preger, Inscr. Metr. p. 165.

§ 15. Φαίνεται...προσδεομένη. We
now turn to the question of 'external
goods.' In spite of its being an
ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, the good life evidently
stands in need of something over and
above τὰ ψυχικά. The word προσ-
δεομένη is appropriate because external
goods cannot be said to inhere (ὑπάρ-

χειν) essentially (καθ' αὐτά) in the good
life as pleasure does. Contrast 1099 a,
15 οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς.

καθάπερ εἶπομεν. No such state-
ment has been explicitly made, but we
have seen (1098 b, 26) that some τὴν
ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν,
and that they are not likely to be
wholly wrong. We are still testing
our definition by τὰ λεγόμενα.

ἀχορήγητον ὄντα, just as a tragedy
cannot be produced unless its cost is
defrayed by a χορηγός, though all he
can do is really external to it and in
no way affects its excellence as a
tragedy (Poet. 1453 b, 7 τὸ διὰ τῆς
δψεως ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεό-
μενόν ἐστι). The metaphor is a fa-
vourite one with Aristotle. Cf. 1101 a,
15. 1177 a, 30. 1178 a, 24. 1179 a,
11. Pol. 1288 b, 32 ἀχορήγητον τῶν
ἀναγκαίων, 1295 a, 28 φύσεως δεῖται
καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς. In the κοινή it
was no longer felt as a metaphor.
Polybius uses χορηγία for material of
war, what Thucydides and Demo-
sthenes call παρασκευή.

καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς 1099^b
 16 δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον
 εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ
 τὴν ιδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος,
 ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ 5
 17 ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖ-
 σθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν
 ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

1099 b, 7. EE. 1214 a, 24 πολλοὶ γὰρ ταῦτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν
 εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. b, 11 μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ
 διορίσασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ῥαθύμως, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ
 ζῆν εὔ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν.
 οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν, ὦν τ' ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν·
 ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς
 καὶ ὦν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς (ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ
 ἴδια τῆς ὑγείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν
 ἕξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἷον ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν ἢ ἐργηγορέναι ἢ
 κινήσεως μετέχειν οὐθὲν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν ἡμῖν οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν,
 τὰ δ' ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν· ἃ δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ
 ὁμοίως οἰκείον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις κρεωφαγία καὶ τῶν περι-
 πάτων οἱ μετὰ δεῖπνον). ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἷτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως
 περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὦν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ
 οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσι.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first class of external goods consist of the instruments (ὄργανα) of happiness.

§ 16. ἐνίων δὲ κ.τ.λ. The second class of external goods are the necessary conditions (ὦν οὐκ ἄνευ) of happiness. The same division occurs below 1099 b, 27.

τητῶμενοι. A tragic word occurring nowhere else in Aristotle. The use of such words in passages like this is characteristic of his style. So we have it in Plato's Laws 810 b τητῶμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας.

ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον. Another poetical touch. Cf. 1100 b, 28 θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον.

οἷον εὐγενείας κ.τ.λ. Cf. the list of

what are called, in a popular sense, μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας in Rhet. 1360 b, 18 εὐγένεια, πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, πλοῦτος, εὐτεκνία, εὐγηρία, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, μέγεθος, δύναμις ἀγωνιστική, δόξα, τιμή, εὐτυχία, ἀρετή. It is from such lists we may best gather the Hellenic ideal of life.

μονώτης. Cf. 1097 b, 9 n. Here it is contrasted with πολυφιλία etc. in the Rhetoric (see last note). Aristotle has a strong sense of the pain of the μονώτης βίος. Cf. 1169 b, 16 sq.

§ 17. εὐημερίας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n. The word became hackneyed in the κοινή.

τὴν εὐτυχίαν. The proper word in connexion with external goods.

IX. "Οθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθισ-
 10 τὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ
 καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι 2
 θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὖλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεός-
 δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον.
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, 3
 15 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν

1099 b, 9. EE. 1214 a, 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν
 καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχά-
 νοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιάν
 διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὔσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας,
 ἢ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ'
 ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι,
 χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν
 δὲ θάτερον, ἥτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
 ἐπιπνοία δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην... ὅτι
 μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἄδηλον (ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς
 ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ
 ἐπιστήμης ἂν τις συναγάγοι πράξεις).

Cf. Rhet. 1362 a, 5 ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ' οἷς
 ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος.

ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν. These words
 depend very loosely on ὅθεν, but that
 is no reason for expunging them. The
 meaning is 'while others identify it
 with goodness.' The remark is rele-
 vant as giving the two extreme views.
 And it is necessary to connect the
 argument with the next section.

IX. § 1. "Οθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'It is
 just this (viz. the fact that some
 identify Happiness with εὐτυχία, others
 with ἀρετή) which gives rise to the
 difficulty.'

πότερον...ἀσκητόν. These are the
 views of those who identify Happiness
 with goodness. Cf. EE. loc. cit.

ἢ...παραγίνεται. These are the

views of those who identify it with
 εὐτυχία. Cf. EE. loc. cit. For
 the two views cf. Archilochos fr. 15
 Πάντα τύχη καὶ μοῖρα, Περικλεῆς, ἀνδρὶ
 δίδωσιν, and fr. 16 Πάντα πόνος τεύχει
 θνητοῖς μελέτη τε βροτεῖη.

§ 2. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle
 admits the *prima facie* plausibility of
 the naive religious view that εὐδαιμονία
 is good fortune sent by dispensation
 of divine providence. Θεία μοῖρα is
 the religious equivalent of τύχη, and
 is commonly so used by Plato.

§ 3. ἄλλης...σκέψεως, sc. τῆς θεολο-
 γικῆς. "Haec magis sunt declinantis
 quam pollicentis. Ubi enim ad dei
 deorumque vel naturam vel volun-
 tatem perventum est, Aristotelem
 constat plerumque ἐπέχειν." Ram-
 sauer.

καί τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων
 εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι
 4 φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολὺ-
 κοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις
 5 πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν
 οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν 20
 οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν οὕτω
 6 πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν,
 καὶ μάλιστα <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ
 7 κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς

b, 18. EE. 1215 a, 8 ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ
 λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς ἃ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων
 ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἴ τῳ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώ-
 τερον εἰπεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν
 ἐπιεικῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ
 καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γὰρ ἐστι δι' ἐπιμελείας
 ἢ κτῆσις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας). εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν
 ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν,
 θειότερον δὲ τῷ κείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζουσι
 ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

§ 4. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'But, at the same time, it must be—.' This is not an argument, but a reservation. Aristotle wishes to guard against a common and easy perversion of the religious view. We may call Happiness *θεῖον* and the like; but we must regard it as in the reach of all, not as confined to the favourites of heaven, a Polykrates or Croesus, as Stewart well says.

τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις. Nature aims at the best, but is sometimes forced by Matter to remain at a lower stage of perfection. This Aristotle calls *πήρωσις*. Cf. Zeller (Eng. Trans.) vol. I, p. 466.

§ 5. εὐλογον. Aristotle simply opposes one plausibility to another

in accordance with the dialectical character of the passage.

§ 5. εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν κ.τ.λ. The higher we ascend in the scale of causes, the more evidence do we find of teleology. The four chief causes are Chance, Nature, Mind (Man) and Necessity (1112 a, 31). The works of Nature are as good as they can be (cf. Phys. 260 b, 22 τὸ δὲ βέλτιον αἰεὶ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν, ἂν ἢ δυνατόν). Much more will this be true of the works of Man.

§ 6. <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην, sc. αἰτίαν, i.e. διάνοιαν, Intelligence or Man.

πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. This is a simple appeal to cultivated feeling. The word is Platonic.

25 δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς
 ἐνέργεια [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ποιά τις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ
 μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν
 ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· 8
 τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ
 30 πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς
 τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως 9
 οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον
 1100^a λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἶόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνερ-
 γείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· 10
 οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, οἱ δὲ
 λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ
 5 εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλὰ γὰρ 11
 μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ
 ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περι-
 πεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου

1100 a, 1. EE. 1219 b, 5 καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι
 εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μήθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει
 καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν), ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ
 ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον.

§ 7. καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, 'as a consequence of the definition,' as well as dialectically. Note how the style changes at once from the literary to the scientific. Introd. § 7.

ποιά τις, i.e. κατ' ἀρετὴν, which I take to be a gloss.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, sc. τῶν ἐκτός.

τὰ μὲν...ὀργανικῶς. A scientific description of the two classes of goods described in a literary way above, 1099 b, 1 sqq. They are (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖα (1) as ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, (2) as ὄργανα.

§ 8. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ. 1094 a, 27 sqq.

αὕτη δὲ κ.τ.λ. As an ἐπιστήμη, Politics must know the best way of attaining its own end. We may therefore draw inferences from the actual

practice of lawgivers. As they try to make the citizens good, it is evident that they think it possible to produce Happiness thus.

ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς, 'of a certain quality, i.e. good.'

§ 9. εἰκότως οὖν κ.τ.λ. Some additions of a dialectical character loosely appended.

τοιαύτης, sc. πρακτικῆς τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος.

§ 10. ἀρετῆς τελείας, goodness fully developed in a complete life.

§ 11. πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The question of τύχη brings us back naturally to that of the βίος τέλειος.

εὐθηνοῦντα. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n. Theophrastos, Hist. Plant. 2, 5, 7 (of trees) τότε γὰρ εὐθενεῖ μάλιστα.

μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

X. Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμο- 10
2 νιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεῶν τέλος ὁρᾶν; εἰ δὲ
δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἄρα γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν
ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς
3 λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ
λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, 15
ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον
ὥς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει
μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ
τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ
αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ 20
4 ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ

X. § 1. Πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The best way of bringing out the relation of *τύχη* and external goods to the good life is by discussing Solon's dictum. We shall find that the true solution of it is that, though we must have a *τέλειος βίος*, we are only bound to accept Solon's view in its extreme form if we identify *εὐδαιμονία* with *εὐτυχία*.

οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, 'not even any one else,' though he may not meet with *Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι*.

κατὰ Σόλωνα. Hdt. i, 32 σκοπέειν δὲ χρή παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτήν κῆ ἀποβήσεται. The dictum was a commonplace of the Age of the Seven Wise Men, and passed into Athenian tragedy, like so many other *γνώμαι*. Soph. Trach. i calls it *λόγος...ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς*.

§ 2. ἄτοπον. The word marks the dialectical character of the argument. It is the opposite of *εὐλογον*. Popular opinion would at once reject the idea that a man is happy after he has died.

§ 3. τηνικαῦτα, 'then and not till then.' Usually *τηνικαῦτα ἤδη* or *τότε*

δῆ, *tum demum*.

ἔχει ... ἀμφισβήτησιν, 'admits of dispute.' Cf. Index s.v. *ἔχειν*.

δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There is no question here as to the departed being aware of what goes on in this world. On the contrary, the point is that what happens after a man's death may affect our estimate of his life in just the same way as what happens in his lifetime without his being aware of it. Neither makes any difference to the man himself, but the popular belief is (*δοκεῖ*) that it must affect our estimate of it. We cannot call that life a success which leads to failure, even though the man himself may never know of his failure, or may die in time to escape it. So with the fortunes of children. Even now we say 'what would his poor father think, if he were alive?'

εἴπερ καί, 'just as much and just as little.' If Happiness consists in external goods, a man may very well lose it without being aware of his loss δι' ἀποδημίαν ἴσως ἢ διὰ χρόνιον καὶ σφοδρὰν ἀσχολίαν πρὸς ἕτερα (Eustratios).

καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι
 γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μετα-
 βολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν
 25 ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐν-
 αντιᾶς· δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς
 παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν
 εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων
 πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον 5
 30 συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον 6
 ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ
 νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ 7
 τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι
 πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων μὴ
 35 ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι
 1100^b τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ
 μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐ-

§ 4. κατὰ λόγον, 'accordingly,' 'consistently with his life.' The editors as a rule see that 'according to reason' will not do here, but it has not always been seen that this use of the phrase determines its meaning in such passages as 1095 a, 10. The original sense of the phrase is 'in proportion' and hence it is used of anything that, being 'according to rule,' can be calculated upon and is uniform or consistent. The opposite of τὸ κατὰ λόγον is τὸ παράλογον, that which violates all rules of probability and is therefore incalculable. Cf. Plato, Polit. 283 c ἵνα κατὰ λόγον ἐπαινώμεν κ.τ.λ. Rep. 500 c κόσμῳ... πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα.

τοῖς ἀποστήμασι, the different degrees in which the descendants are 'removed' from their ancestor.

ἄτοπον. Cf. 1100 a, 13 n. This sentence shows clearly that there is no question of the dead man being aware of what takes place. If he were, there would be no absurdity in

his being at one time happy, at another wretched. What is absurd is that our estimate of the success or failure of his life as a whole should be indefinitely subject to revision.

§ 5. συνικνεῖσθαι. The use of this word is, of course, flatly inconsistent with the view that the dead man οὐκ αἰσθάνεται. The inconsistency, however, is not Aristotle's. We may learn from Rohde's 'Psyche' how very inconsistent and illogical popular views on this subject were. Cf. e.g. Isokr. Aigin. § 42 εἰ τίς ἐστιν αἰσθησις τοῖς τεθνεῶσι τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων.

§ 6. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον κ.τ.λ. The λύσις of the first ἀπορία, viz. πότερον οὐδένα εὐδαιμονιστέον ἔως ἂν ζῇ; (1100 a, 31...1101 a, 21).

τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, sc. the ἀπορία raised in § 3. Cf. § 4 ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει.

§ 7. ἀληθεύσεται, passive. Cf. Bonitz, Index s.v. ἀληθεύω.

τὸ ὑπάρχον, 'the fact.'

μετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλείσθαι περὶ τοὺς
 8 αὐτούς; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις,
 τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, 5
 “χαμαιλέοντά” τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες “καὶ
 9 σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον.” ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν
 οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ
 προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν,
 κύριαι δ’ εἰσὶν αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ 10
 10 δ’ ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν
 διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπί-
 νων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ’ ἀρετὴν.
 μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
 τούτων δ’ αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ μάλι- 15
 στα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους.
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.
 11 ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου
 τοιοῦτος· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει
 τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ 20
 πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὃ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ “τετράγωνος
 12 ἄνευ ψόγου.” πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφε-
 ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχη-
 μάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ

§ 8. χαμαιλέοντα κ.τ.λ., changing colour with the changing ground of external circumstances. The words χαμαιλέοντα καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον seem to come from some poet.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ, viz. that activities according to goodness and not fortune determine happiness. The difficulty just discussed (τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν) confirms this; for it has arisen διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι. Now fortune does not abide; goodness does.

καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Cf. 1140 b, 28.

αἱ τιμιώταται, sc. αἱ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, as we shall learn later on.

συνεχέστατα. Cf. 1177 a, 21.

§ 11. τὸ ζητούμενον, sc. ἡ βεβαιότης.

τοιοῦτος, sc. εὐδαίμων.

πάντων. Masculine. The reservation is made because τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.

καὶ θεωρήσει. All through this passage, Aristotle has the θεωρητικὸς βίος distinctly in view.

ὃ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς κ.τ.λ., from Simonides. The passage is quoted and discussed in Plato, Protag. 339 b.

“Ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν

χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ

τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τε-

τυγμένον.

25 ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν
 εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσῃ—καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπι-
 κοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία
 γίνεται—ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται
 τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς
 30 ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν,
 ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας,
 μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.
 εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, 13
 οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ
 35 πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 1101^a ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως
 φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν,
 καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ
 χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων
 5 σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν 14
 οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὲν μακαρίος γε, ἂν
 Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ
 εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥα-
 10 δίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγά-
 λων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν

§ 12. **λύπας τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** A frag-
 ment of Theophrastos preserved by
 Plutarch seems to belong to this dis-
 cussion. Cf. V. Per. c. 38 ὁ γοῦν
 Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς διαπορήσας
 εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἥθη καὶ
 κινούμενα τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξ-
 ἱσταται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἱστόρηκεν ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ
 Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπούμενῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων
 δείξειε περίαπτον ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν
 τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρημένον, ὡς σφόδρα
 κακῶς ἔχων ὁπότε καὶ ταύτην ὑπομένοι
 τὴν ἀβελτερίαν. Cf. Usener, *Analecta*
Theophrastea, p. 23 and 1153 b, 19 n.

μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν. The ἀνάλγητος
 (1115 b, 26) is the man of stupid in-
 sensibility, insensibility to pain being

regarded as the mark of a coarse
 nature. He is closely akin to the
 ἀναίσθητος (1104 a, 24 n.), but the
 insensibility of the latter is intellectual
 rather than moral. Kleon bids the
 Athenians not to show themselves
 ἀναλγητότεροι than the Mityleneans
 (Thuc. iii, 40), and Demosthenes (De
 Cor. 35) quotes Aischines as speaking
 of the ἀναλγησία of the Theban power.
 See also 1126 a, 3 n.

§ 13. **οὐδέποτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** His
 ἐνεργεῖαι will never be of the kind
 called αἱ ἐναντίαι supra 1100 b, 11,
 and it is these alone which can make
 a man positively ἄθλιος.

εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ
τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.
15 τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν
ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον 15
μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον
καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσουντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ
τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν ἐστίν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ
16 τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως; εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν
τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους 20
δ' ἀνθρώπους. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.

XI. Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων
τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ
2 ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων δια-
φορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνου- 25
μένων τῶν δ' ἥττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ
ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν
3 ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχη-
μάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ
δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως 30

§ 15. ἢ προσθετέον κ.τ.λ. Rasso thought this a later Peripatetic addition, inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle's criticism, though in harmony with the view of MM 1185 a, 5 that a τέλειος βίος is ὅσον ἀνθρώπος βιοῖ. If we make this addition, it seems we might as well accept Solon's dictum at once, as Eudemos appears to do (1219 b, 6). But the difficulty disappears if we keep what is said about Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι clearly in view. These are first mentioned (1100 a, 5 sqq.) before the discussion of Solon's dictum has begun, and that discussion itself is limited to the question whether we may or may not call any *other* man—other than the man who meets with Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι—happy so long as he lives. We must, then, make this particular reservation whatever

conclusion we come to on the main question.

κατὰ λόγον. Cf. 1100 a, 23 n.

§ 16. μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους, another reservation. Happiness is an ἐνέργεια and therefore complete at any moment or in the whole (1174 a, 13 sqq.), but τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.

XI. § 1. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων κ.τ.λ. The λύσις of the second ἀπορία, viz. πότερον συμβάλλονται αἱ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχαι; (1101 a, 22...b, 9).

συμβάλλεσθαι, sc. πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἢ μὴ.

§ 3. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. A complex protasis, the two members of which are καθάπερ...ἅπαντας and διαφέρει...πράττεσθαι. The apodosis begins at συλλογιστέον δὴ. The answer to this question is made to depend upon

ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ 4
 τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα
 καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι,
 συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως 5
 35 τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινω-
 1101^b νοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γοῦν ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖ-
 ται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τούναντίον, ἀφανρόν
 τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν
 γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
 5 μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι 6
 μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φί-
 λων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα
 ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο
 τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

10 XII. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς
 εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν

1101 b, 10. EE. 1219 b, 11 ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινέ-
 ται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τᾶλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόρια
 εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον.

what is laid down above 1100 b,
 23—25.

§ 4. ἕκαστον, accusative with συμ-
 βαίνειν.

προϋπάρχειν, 'to be assumed' ἔξω
 τοῦ δράματος (Poet. 1460 a, 29 sqq.).
 To take place 'behind the scenes' or
 'before the curtain rises.' The
 murder of Laios, for instance, does
 not affect us as it would do if it
 formed part of the action. The
 regular word for 'action' in this sense
 is πράττεσθαι.

§ 5. συλλογιστέον. 'We must
 estimate' or 'allow for this differ-
 ence too.' The word is not used
 in its technical sense. L^b and the
 Vetus Versio (*ita*) read ταύτην for
 ταύτην, which would mean 'we must
 allow for the difference in this way
 too.'

τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι, sc. συλλογιστέον.
 'We must allow for the fact that
 a difficulty is felt.' Lambinus con-
 jectured τόδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι, Rassow
 τόδε δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι. But the difficulty
 has been already alluded to above
 1100 a, 11.

γοῦν. This seems to be implied by
 the γὰρ of K^b and the οὖν of L^b.

ἐκ τούτων, sc. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ἀφανρόν. Professor Bywater (Contr.
 p. 26) points out that this is a poetic
 word and suggests ἀμανρόν, 'obscure,'
 cf. De An. 403 a, 19.

ἢ ἐκείνοις, sc. ἢ κεκμηκόσιν.

εἰ δὲ μή, sc. διικνεῖται. This shows
 clearly that the question is not mainly
 one of the dead man's own feelings,
 but only of our estimate of his life.

XII. § 1. ἐπισκεψώμεθα κ.τ.λ.
 Happiness is not a mere δύναμις. Is

2 τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται
 δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποίον τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν
 ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅλως τὸν
 ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ 15
 ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστον τῷ ποίον τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγα-
 3 θόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς
 θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερό-
 μενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' 20
 4 ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν. εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιού-
 των, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μείζον
 τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς
 μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειο-
 τάτους [μακαρίζομεν]. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς 25
 γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὥς

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου· ὁ δ' ἔπαινος
 <τοῦ> τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου· ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

it ἐπαινετὸν or τίμιον, i.e. has it a relative or an absolute value?

τιμίων, 'precious.' Cf. MM. 1183 b, 20 sqq. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ψυχὴ, νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιότερον... τὰ δ' ἐπαινετὰ οἷον ἀρετά... τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις οἷον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχυρὸς κάλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εὖ ἂν δύνηται χρήσασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῦλος κακῶς, διὸ δυνάμει τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦνται ἀγαθὰ. If this is correct, the δυνάμεις here are identical with τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Cf. also Topics 126 b, 4 καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ τιμίων ἢ ἀρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατόν ἢ ποιητικὸν (cf. 1096 b, 11) ἔθηκεν.

§ 2. τῷ ποίον τι εἶναι κ.τ.λ., 'in virtue of some quality and relation.'

§ 3. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων, 'from the praises of the gods.' Here we see περί c. acc., used as in 1098 b,

14 περὶ ψυχὴν and 1101 a, 28 περὶ αὐτόν, develop into a regular genitive equivalent, just like the Latin *de*. Though barely noticed in the grammars, this construction is quite common in Plato, being used chiefly to avoid a cumulation of genitives. For other examples see Index s.v. περί.

γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται, sc. οἱ θεοί. 'It strikes us as absurd that the gods should be referred to our standard' (personal construction). The goodness of the gods is independent of their relation to us, and so praise of them based on a reference (ἀναφορά) to human needs and desires is absurd.

§ 4. τῶν τοιούτων, sc. τῶν πρὸς τί πως ἐχόντων, the 'relative.'

[μακαρίζομεν], suspected by Susemihl and bracketed by Bywater.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν, sc. τὰ θεϊκότατα μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν.

θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος 5
καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ
ἐπαινέεισθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν ὥς εἶτο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι
30 τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τ' ἀγαθόν· πρὸς
ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τ' ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος 6
τῆς ἀρετῆς, πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης, τὰ δ'
ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν
ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν 7
35 τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
1102^a εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων.
ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ 8
χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ
καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.
5 XIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις
κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα
γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα 2
πεπονηῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ

1101 b, 31. EE. 1219 b, 8 ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ
ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων.

§ 5. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος κ.τ.λ. 'And Eudoxos is thought to have pleaded ably the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence.' On Eudoxos see 1172 b, 9 n. This reference probably indicates the real motive of the paragraph.

§ 6. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος κ.τ.λ. Rhet. 1367 b, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν... ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται· τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστὶ... διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας· τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεία τῆς ἑξέως εἰσιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. EE. 1219 b, 14.

§ 8. ἀρχή, sc. πράξεως, for it is τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, the Final Cause of human activity.

τίθεμεν. *Hoc loco clausulam imponere debebant libro primo*, Susemihl.

XIII. § 1. τελείαν. Cf. 1100 a, 4 n.

περὶ ἀρετῆς. The first step in the analysis will be to deliberate about the production of goodness. See Introductory Note to Book II. The first point to note is the distinction between the two kinds of goodness.

§ 2. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. A confirmation of our view from the practice of the masters of our science. If πολιτική is a science, the true πολιτικός must know how to secure its end. Cf. 1099 b, 29 n.

3 τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς 10
 Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι
 4 τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηνται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις
 αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γίνονται ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 5 προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον
 ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαι- 15
 6 μονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν
 τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ
 7 ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι
 δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν
 ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύουσιν καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον 20
 ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δ'

1102 a, 18. EE. 1219 b, 26 μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον·
 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην
 ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγου μετέχοντα,
 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ
 ἐπιτάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι. εἰ δέ τί
 ἐστὶν ἐτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μόνιον. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν
 οὗτ' εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὗτ' εἰ ἀμερής, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους

§ 3. τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαι-
 μονίων νομοθέτας. In his Laws, Plato
 had already introduced a Spartan and
 a Cretan to discuss legislation with an
 Athenian. Spartan and Cretan insti-
 tutions alone seemed to be deliberately
 designed with reference to an end, and
 therefore seemed to be alone scientific.
 Plato and Aristotle were both aware
 that the end they strove to realise was
 but a partial one and that they were
 therefore onesided. But that did not
 alter the fact that they alone set an
 end consciously before them.

§ 4. ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, sc. ὅπως τοὺς
 πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσει.

ἡ ζήτησις, sc. ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

τὴν...προαίρεσιν. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n.
 Here προαίρεσις is almost equivalent
 to πρόθεσις.

§ 7. εἰδέναι πῶς, sc. ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκανῶς
 ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα (infra 24).

τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύουσιν. Sug-
 gested by Plato, Charm. 156 b ἀλλ'
 ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδὴν τις προσέλθῃ
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσὶ πού
 ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον
 εἶναι ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ
 μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἔχειν,
 καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἰεσθαι ἂν ποτε
 θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἄνευ ὅλου
 τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι· ἐκ
 δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν
 τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ
 μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν.

καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, sc. δεῖ εἰδέναι
 πῶς. Ramsauer's insertion of the
 article is generally accepted, see Byw.
 Contr. p. 26. The phrase comes from
 the passage of the Charmides quoted
 above.

ιατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, 8 θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ 25 ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς 9 ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἶον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πό- 10 τερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ 30 μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει

καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

οἱ χαρίεντες, i.e. οἱ σοφοί (cf. 1095 a, 18), scientific physicians as opposed to mere practitioners.

τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν, i.e. the 'theory' of the body, or physiology, as opposed to practical therapeutics.

§ 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις, 'in extraneous discourses.' The only question that can arise is 'extraneous to what?' The different views which have been maintained are conveniently summarised in Susemihl-Hicks, *Politics* p. 561. There can be no doubt, I think, that Diels has given the right answer, and that the meaning is 'extraneous to the Aristotelian school.' I believe, further, that this is in almost all cases merely another way of saying 'in the writings of the Academic school.' That is certainly the meaning here.

τὸ μὲν ἄλογον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle himself did not believe in 'parts of the soul' at all: Plato did, but this is not his division, for it is practically certain that it was first formulated in this way by Xenokrates. There is a part of the soul which 'knows what it

is doing' and a part that does not. Cf. 1098 a, 3 n.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ δύο, 'verbally two.' This phrase is often opposed to ἀριθμῷ ἓν (cf. 1131 b, 16 n.). Cf. *Phys.* 262 a, 21 τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀρχῆς μέσον τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ἀμφω ἐστί, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἓν, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ δύο. 263 b, 12 τὸ σημεῖον μὲν οὖν ἀμφοῖν κοινόν, καὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου, καὶ ταύτων καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐ ταύτων· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τελευτῆς, τοῦ δ' ἀρχῆς. *Gen. Corr.* 320 b, 12 βέλτιον τοῖνυν ποιεῖν πᾶσιν ἀχώριστον τὴν ὕλην ὥς οὔσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μίαν.

ἀχώριστα. Cf. *De An.* 413 b, 14 καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ. 429 a, 10 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς... εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον. 432 a, 19 πότερον ἓν τι μόριον αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ὃν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ.

πεφυκότα, i.q. φύσει. The distinction, then, is between the dialectical and the physical account of the soul. Cf. below 1147 a, 24 n. for λογικῶς and φυσικῶς.

- 11 πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῶ καὶ φυ-
 τικῶ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν
 τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις
 θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ 1102^b
 12 ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης
 μὲν οὖν κοινὴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ
 ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' 5

1102 a, 32. EE. 1219 b, 36 ἀφήρηται δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ
 μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικόν. ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα
 μόρια ἴδια· διὸ οὐδ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ αἱ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αὔξητικοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἢ ἄνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἀρχὴν
 καὶ πρᾶξιν· ἄρχει δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ
 παθημάτων, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία
 σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ
 ἢ τέλος.

b, 5. EE. 1219 b, 16 καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δ' ἐνίοτε δῆλον ἐκ
 τούτων, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐθὲν βελτίους οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τὸν
 ἥμισυν τοῦ βίου· ὅμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες. αἷτιον δ' ὅτι ἀργία
 ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μόριόν ἐστι
 ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἢ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι μόριον τῆς ὅλης
 ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ
 τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελεῖ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ. ὅσον
 δὲ τοῦ μὴ (πῃ Casaubon) κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσιν, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι
 βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ νόσον ἢ πῆρωσιν.

πρὸς τὸ παρόν. For our purposes
 the λογικὴ πρότασις furnished by the
 theories of the Academy will be suffi-
 cient. It is not necessary to base
 πολιτικὴ on φυσική.

§ 11. κοινῶ καὶ φυτικῶ. Cf.
 supra 1097 b, 33 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
 κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς,
 ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. The argu-
 ment is that the sort of soul we find
 in all organisms kept up by nutrition
 (including plants), and in the embryos
 (of animals) where there is nothing

besides, we may reasonably assume
 to exist also in developed animals,
 though in them there is something
 besides.

εὐλογώτερον. Cf. 1100a, 13 n. The
 word shows that this is purely a λογικὴ
 σκέψις.

§ 12. ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. Cf. De Somno
 454 b, 32 τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ
 θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον
 ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ
 αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὥς οὐδὲν προσ-
 δεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

ὕπνον—ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἡμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς
 εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία 13
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἣ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη
 —πλὴν εἴ πη κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνουῦνται τινες τῶν κινήσεων,
 10 καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν
 τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν 14
 ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν.
 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, με- 15
 τέχουσα μέντοι πη λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς
 15 τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν—ὀρθῶς
 γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ—φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς
 καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ
 ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυ-
 μένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινήσαι
 20 τοῦναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς

ὅθεν φασὶν κ.τ.λ. This is prob-
 ably a free quotation from some comic
 poet.

§ 13. πλὴν εἴ πη, to be taken
 closely with ἥκιστα διάδηλοι above.
 Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 26) reads
 πλὴν εἰ μὴ with Aspasios and M^b.
 In EE. 1219 b, 24 (p. 59) we have
 ὅσον δὲ τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσιν,
 καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι βελτίους αἱ τῶν
 σπουδαίων. Here μὴ gives no sense,
 and Casaubon was surely right in
 reading πη. But, if so, πη must
 surely be right here too. It should
 be noted also that the reading of M^b
 may be simply an instance of the
 tendency of scribes to substitute the
 vulgar πλὴν εἰ μὴ for the more correct
 πλὴν εἰ.

τινὲς τῶν κινήσεων, i.e. the 'motions'
 of the senses ('impressions'). Cf. Περὶ
 ἐνυπνίων 462 a, 29 τὸ φάντασμα τὸ
 ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων,
 ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ᾗ, ᾗ καθεύδει, τοῦτ'
 ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον.

ἐπιεικῶν...τυχόντων. Attic 'litotes'
 for ἀγαθῶν and κακῶν. For ἐπιεικῆς
 cf. 1137 a, 35 n. For the difference

between the dreams of good and bad
 men, see Probl. 957 a, 25.

§ 15. φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς. Aristotle
 in his Platonic passages uses φύσις
 with the genitive in a somewhat
 vague sense. Often it seems merely
 periphrastic. See Ind. Ar. 838 a, 8
 sqq. Here it is equivalent to μόριον
 or δύναμις.

τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς.
 The meaning of these terms is fully
 discussed in Book VII. Both the
 'continent' and the 'incontinent'
 man have a right λόγος or rule of
 action, though the one follows it and
 the other does not. The fault of the
 ἀκρατής does not lie in the λόγον
 ἔχον, there must therefore be some-
 thing else.

ἐν αὐτοῖς, i.e. in the ἐγκρατής as
 well as in the ἀκρατής. The ἐγκρατής
 does not follow his λόγος or rule with-
 out a struggle. It is in this that he
 differs from the σώφρων whose desires
 are in complete harmony with his
 principles. See infra § 17.

ἀντιτείνει, a Platonic word. Cf.
 Phaidr. 254 a.

16 οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν
 τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυ-
 χῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομι-
 στέον εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντι-
 17 βαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 25
 φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ
 τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώ-
 18 φρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται
 δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινω-
 νεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει 30
 πῶς, ἣ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ
 τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φάμεν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ
 ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πῶς ὑπὸ λόγου
 τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νοουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε
 19 καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρή καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, 1103^a

ἐπὶ τὰναντία κ.τ.λ., sc. τῷ λόγῳ.
 The argument is the same as that by
 which Plato proves that θυμός and
 ἐπιθυμία are distinct.

§ 17. πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν κ.τ.λ. As the
 fact of ἀκρασία showed it to be ἄλογον,
 so the fact of ἐγκράτεια shows that it
 μετέχει πῃ λόγου. We have now
 proved the existence of a higher part
 of τὸ ἄλογον, which is simply the
 ὀρεκτικόν of Aristotle's own system.

τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου, i.e.
 the irrational part of the man who has
 the ἀρεταί of the irrational part, i.e.
 the σώφρων who has the ἀρετή of
 ἐπιθυμία and the ἀνδρεῖος who has the
 ἀρετή of θυμός. See below 1117 b,
 24. The fact that the irrational part
 may not only 'obey' the rational, but
 may even be 'in harmony with' it,
 shows that it μετέχει λόγου.

πάντα...ὁμοφωνεῖ, 'it is in complete
 harmony with—.'

§ 18. καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν. This is
 a hint for those who know the De
 Anima. The force of ὅλως is to
 include θυμός and βούλησις as well
 as ἐπιθυμία.

οὕτω δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς κ.τ.λ. Theon
 of Smyrna, p. 72, 21 (Hiller) sqq.,
 quotes an interesting Peripatetic
 enumeration of the various senses
 of λόγος which mentions *inter alia*
 ὁ τῶν τιμώντων καὶ τιμωμένων, καθ'
 ὃν φάμεν λόγον τινὸς ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν.
 This is clearly the sense referred
 to here. The ὀρεκτικόν may be
 called λόγον ἔχον inasmuch as it λόγον
 ἔχει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος,
 'pays heed to the λόγος of the λόγον
 ἔχον.'

οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, 'not
 in the mathematical sense,' in which
 λόγον ἔχειν means to be 'rational' in
 the sense of commensurable. For the
 idiom cf. Riddell, Digest § 25. We
 must not 'understand' any definite
 word to 'govern' τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

§ 19. εἰ δὲ χρή κ.τ.λ. The in-
 sufficiency of the twofold division is
 now brought out from the other side.
 If, to save the unity of τὸ ἄλογον, we
 say that τὸ ὀρεκτικόν belongs to τὸ
 λόγον ἔχον, then that in turn will
 split up into two 'parts.'

διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ,
τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ 20
ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς
5 μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν
καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην
ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἡ
συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἡ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν
σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς
10 λέγομεν.

1103 a, 3. EE. 1220 a, 5 ἀρετῆς δ' εἶδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ
διανοητικὴ. ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς· ἐπαινετὸν γὰρ ὑπέκειτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ ἔργον,
ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἐνέργειαι. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ διανοητικαὶ
μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦται τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, ὃ ἐπιτακτικόν ἐστι τῆς
ψυχῆς ἢ λόγον ἔχει, αἱ δ' ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν, ἀκολουθητικοῦ δὲ
κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ποῖός τις τὸ ἥθος, ὅτι
σοφὸς ἢ δεινός, ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ θρασύς.

§ 20. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.
The whole discussion leads up to
this. See Introductory Note to
Book II.

κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην, sc. τῷ

μετὰ λόγου and τῷ κατὰ λόγον as it is
expressed later on.

ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ., a short
proof that σοφία really is an ἀρετή.
The middle term is ἐπαινετὴ ἕξις.

BOOK II.

GOODNESS.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We have seen that Happiness is an activity of the soul according to goodness, and this definition is the starting-point of Politics. But before we can analyse it into its conditions we must know something of the soul itself, just as the doctor must know something of the human body before he can deliberate how to produce health. It is not necessary, however, for the lawgiver to be a specialist in psychology any more than it is necessary for the medical practitioner to be a specialist in physiology. It will be sufficient for our purpose, which is not theory but practice, if we take those accounts of the soul which are commonly accepted, in other words, the psychology of the Academy. They cannot be wholly wrong, though they may require a little dialectical treatment to fit them for our use.

First of all, then, we find a generally received distinction between a "rational" and an "irrational" part of the soul¹, that is to say between a part of the soul which can give an account of

¹ It is true that this distinction is ascribed to Plato by the writer of MM. 1182 a, 24, but it is not to be found in any of his writings. Plato does, indeed, speak of a twofold division of the soul in his later works, but the division is not the same. It is rather a distinction of the everlasting, immortal soul from the animal and mortal soul (see Polit. 309 c. Tim. 69 c. 72 d). And in the De

Anima 432 a, 22 Aristotle distinctly implies that the present division was due to some one other than Plato. He says ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα· τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἃ τινες (i.e. Plato) λέγουσι διορίζοντες λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον.

itself and a part of the soul which can not. This distinction has been adopted by Xenokrates, the present head of the Academy, and will therefore make a good starting-point².

We must, however, note at once that the part of the soul which is strictly speaking "irrational," the part which has to do with nutrition and growth, cannot be the seat of the goodness or badness of man as such. And yet there is a case where a part which we must call irrational does affect human conduct. If we consider what happens in the case of the man who does what he knows to be wrong, we are forced to admit that the judgment (λόγος) which he forms is right, and therefore that the rational part of his soul is in just the same state as if he resisted the temptation. His weakness must accordingly be attributed to the irrational part. On the other hand, if we look at the case of the man who does not yield to the temptation, we see that this part of the soul cannot be wholly irrational either, seeing that it is capable of understanding and obeying a judgment.

Perhaps, then, it will be thought better to call this part of the soul "rational," and there can be no objection to that, provided we remember the cases of moral weakness and moral strength, and do not confuse it with the rational part in the strict sense of the word. We must say in that case that the rational part has two parts, one rational in the strict sense, and the other in the sense that it is able to understand and follow a rule given it from without. We have, then, by means of dialectic, discovered the existence of a part of the soul which we may call either the higher part of the irrational soul or the lower part of the rational, as we please.

This discussion is an admirable example of what Aristotle means by the dialectic method. All he wishes to bring out is the existence of what in his own psychology is called the "sentient and appetitive soul,"³ and it might seem to us that a reference to

² Heinze, Xenokrates p. 140 sqq., makes it extremely probable that the division was due to Xenokrates himself.

³ See R.P. 336 and Zeller, Aristotle, II, pp. 21 sqq., for the relevant references. Aristotle's own psychological division crosses that of the Academy chiefly in this respect, that, while he assigns Desire, Temper and Wish alike

to the appetitive soul, the Academy had to refer the latter to the "rational," and thus to separate it in an arbitrary way from the other forms of Appetition. Aristotle's advance upon the earlier theory was his recognition of the appetitive character of goodness as well as of badness. Here, however, he does not care to insist. So long as we recognise the existence of this

the *De Anima* would have been more satisfactory than an attempt to twist the doctrines of Xenokrates into a new form. But Aristotle does not wish to assume a knowledge of his own system in the course on Politics, and he therefore tries as best he may to make the popular psychology of the Academy the basis of his argument. The way in which he does this is most ingenious, though to our minds much less convincing than a brief exposition of his own psychological views would have been. The use which he makes of the Platonic term *μετέχειν* and the way in which he takes advantage of the different senses of the phrase *λόγον ἔχειν* are particularly instructive.

§ 2. These two parts of the soul will each have its proper form of goodness, and this distinction will correspond to that drawn in ordinary speech between goodness of character and goodness of intellect. For the present it is with the latter, the goodness of the sentient and appetitive soul, that we have to do.

The recognition of a form of goodness which was not in the strict sense of the word intellectual and reflective had already been forced upon Plato as a result of his criticism of the Socratic paradox that "Goodness is knowledge." In his earlier dialogues⁴ Plato had taken the various recognised forms of goodness one by one and had discussed the question whether they were knowledge or not. The result of all these dialogues is practically the same. The recognised forms of goodness are not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word; for as soon as we draw all the conclusions which follow from the assumption that they are, we find ourselves unable to hold fast the distinctions between them. Any single form of goodness, if regarded as knowledge, turns out to be knowledge of the good, and therefore identical with goodness as a whole.

Now it is evident that this view will prevent us from giving the name of goodness to almost everything that commonly goes by that name. By working out to its logical result the doctrine that goodness is knowledge we have really proved at the same

appetitive soul, and distinguish it clearly from the principle of nutrition and growth on the one hand and from the thinking soul on the other hand, we may call it "rational" or "irrational" or what we please. Nor does he insist upon its identity with

the "sentient" soul, though that also, as we shall see, is of fundamental importance for the psychological groundwork of his Ethics.

⁴ See especially the *Laches*, *Charmides* and *Protagoras*.

time the existence of another kind of goodness which is not knowledge. In the *Phaedo*⁵ this distinction between two kinds of goodness appears already, though there "popular goodness" is rated very low, and the only true goodness is still wisdom or "philosophic goodness." But if we follow the course of Plato's ethical thought we find that the reality and worth of this secondary form of goodness is more and more fully recognised. The "first education" in the *Republic* aims solely at the training of character (*ἡθος*), and the whole of the *Laws* is practically directed to the same end.

§ 3. The distinction between goodness of character and goodness of intellect does not correspond, then, to that between knowledge and conduct, which the traditional rendering "moral and intellectual virtues" is apt to suggest to us. As a matter of fact, Aristotle held that conduct depended upon intellectual goodness just as much as knowledge did, while on the other hand he admitted the existence of a kind of art and a kind of knowledge which were not strictly speaking intellectual, but depended on something more closely resembling character⁶. There is conduct which is intellectual and art which is not.

Though it is beside Aristotle's purpose in the *Ethics* to insist upon the point, we know that the soul with which we are now concerned is not only appetitive, but also sensitive, and we shall therefore expect to find an analogy between the developement of goodness from appetite and the developement of knowledge from sense. It is worth while to point out in what this consists.

The object of sensation⁷, though it is always individual, "a this" (*τόδε τι*), necessarily implies a universal element. What we perceive is not strictly speaking the "this" which is the object of sensation, but always "a such" (*τοιόνδε τι*). We perceive Kallias, indeed, but our perception is of certain things which "mean" Kallias, that is of a man having certain qualities which enable us to identify him as Kallias. The whole content of our perception

⁵ *Phaedo* 68 d sqq.

⁶ Cf. *Rhet.* 1354 a, 7 where we are told that many orators succeed *διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἑξέως*. The chief example is, of course, the medical *ἐμπειρος*.

⁷ On all this see Zeller, vol. II, pp. 58 sqq. It seems necessary to draw attention to the fact that *τόδε τι* means "a this." The Greek for "this somewhat" would be *τὸ τι τόδε*.

is therefore universal in character, and the function of sense-perception is just the discrimination of those universal qualities.

In the case of creatures endowed with memory, these sense-perceptions remain in imagination (*φαντασία*), and a number of such memories make up an experience (*ἐμπειρία*). For instance, we say that a man has experience when he has an idea that this or that was good for Kallias when he had this or that disease, and for Sokrates, and so on for other individuals. Aristotle rates experience very high indeed for practical purposes, and he is never tired of citing its value in the practice of medicine. Practice has to do entirely with particulars and is therefore the peculiar province of experience.

But nevertheless experience does not reach the level of Art or Science. These do not arise till the universal implicit in experience is made explicit, till we pass from "This was good for Kallias and Sokrates and so-and-so when they were too hot" to "This is good for the human body in a fever."

The developement of goodness is precisely parallel to this. The object of appetite is individual like that of sense, but it too implies a universal. For, though we desire or wish for a particular thing, we really desire it because it is "a such." For instance, we desire this food or that honour, but only because they are pleasant or beautiful, and these are universals. These are the qualities which appear in imagination (*φαντασία*) and so move appetite.

Now the retention in memory of a number of such images of the pleasant or beautiful produces an *ἦθος*, that is a tendency to desire or wish for similar things as pleasant or beautiful, and this is precisely parallel to experience. And it is of the utmost value in practice; for it is with particulars that practice has to do.

At the same time, this is not human goodness in the full sense any more than experience is science or art. We do not reach the stage of intellect till the implicit universal has been made explicit, till we pass from "This, that and the other thing is pleasant or beautiful" to "This kind of feeling or action is good for the human soul."

§ 4. Closely connected with the question of the two kinds of goodness was the question "Can goodness be taught?" or does it come by nature or the grace of heaven, as was believed in early times? Clearly, if goodness is knowledge, it can be taught: but

the criticism of Plato's earlier dialogues⁸ is largely directed to showing that there are no teachers of goodness in the ordinary sense of that word. In Aristotle we find the solution of the problem taken for granted. It is impossible to teach goodness of character; that can only be acquired by habituation. But goodness of intellect can be taught, with this reservation, however, that the intellectual capacity is presupposed, and that a good character has already been formed. You cannot make any one good by teaching; but, if a man has the gift, his goodness of character may be raised into an intellectual form and become the practical wisdom of the lawgiver.

Aristotle does not even tell us in the *Ethics* what habituation is, and we have to turn to Eudemos for a definition of it⁹. The main point about it is that habituation must be in acts of the same quality as the acts which issue from the character when formed. It is this which makes it necessary for us after all to discuss the nature of goodness; for it is only if we know what goodness is that we shall be able to stamp the actions of those for whom we are legislating with the right quality. Before, however, we go on to discuss the definition of goodness, it may be well to sketch briefly the ideas which underlie Aristotle's doctrine of habituation as we may gather them from the *Physics* and elsewhere.

The sentient soul has the natural capacity of being moved by the imagination of pleasure and pain. These imaginations are constantly being presented to it; for every act of sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain, and the images of these feelings are stored up in memory. But the capacity of the soul to feel pleasure and pain is a rational capacity which may become active in two opposite ways. The capacity of taking pleasure in a good act is also the capacity of taking pleasure in a bad act. The capacity will therefore remain dormant unless there is something to determine it in the one direction or the other. This something is to be found in appetite, which converts the mere capacity of pleasure and pain into a desire to have the pleasure and avoid the pain.

But the soul is not in a perfectly neutral state as regards the pleasures and pains which it feels. Its life is a process, and it has

⁸ On this point see especially the *Gorgias* and *Meno*.

⁹ Cf. 1103a, 17 n.

its source of motion and rest in itself. Now every continuous process implies an end to which it is directed, and the qualitative changes in the soul which we call feelings are only the incomplete processes which mark its growth. They are all really directed to the soul's completion, to its attaining the true nature or true form of the human soul. Hence the need of guidance from one who knows this form, and can decide in the light of it which of two alternative possibilities of feeling to actualise.

§ 5. We have asked how goodness is to be produced and we have seen that it is produced by habituation, and by habituation in the same acts which result from goodness when it has been produced. We must, then, ask what goodness is, and first of all we must find its genus.

If Aristotle had been basing his account of goodness on his own philosophical system, there would have been no difficulty about this. We have seen that goodness is a "completion" (τελείωσις) of a thing which is by nature capable of such a completion, and we know that such completions are called *ἑξεις* or conditions, a word taken from medicine and gymnastics. The acquisition of such a *ἥξις* is no mere motion (κίνησις) or alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) like the feelings which are its matter; it is a "form," and displays all the characteristics of forms. But the fact is that we must go to the *Physics* for Aristotle's moral philosophy; here we only arrive at the knowledge that the genus of goodness is ἥξις by a dialectical argument from the "division" of the category of quality. Here is another instance where the doctrine of the categories is assumed as familiar to Aristotle's hearers. (Cf. *Intro.* § 28.)

The differentia of goodness, the "Mean," is more scientifically arrived at, doubtless because both the doctrine itself and the metaphysical groundwork on which it rests were quite familiar in the Academy from the days of Plato's *Philebos* onwards at least. Quality is a category that admits of quantitative determination or degree, "the more and less" as the Academy called it: it is continuous and therefore infinitely divisible, at least potentially. Now, feelings and acts, which are the matter of goodness, being qualitative motions, are continuous, and the degree of feeling which is right for a given person in given circumstances may therefore be quantitatively expressed. This is all that is meant by the doctrine of the mean; for the Greek word *μεσότης* does

not mean only or even primarily the arithmetical mean: it is the oldest word for a proportion of any kind and however determined. We must admit that a feeling like fear is capable of such determination; for we must fear either more or less or equally. And the same is true of an act like giving away money; for we must give away either more or less or an equal sum. But to say that Aristotle makes only a quantitative distinction between goodness and badness is to miss the whole point. Aristotle has expressly refused to identify goodness either with the feeling or the outward act. It is the permanent condition of soul, and conditions of soul do not differ quantitatively, nor are they motions. They do not come into being or cease to be by motion or alteration, though they are and are not in virtue of an alteration in something else, that is, in the soul¹⁰.

¹⁰ The locus classicus on this subject is Phys. 245 b, 3 sqq. "Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον ἅπαν ἀλλοιοῦται ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ἐν μόνοις ὑπάρχει τούτοις ἀλλοιώσεις ὅσα καθ' αὐτὰ λέγεται πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μάλιστ' ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἐν τε τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἔξεσι καὶ ταῖς τούτων λήψεσι καὶ ἀποβολαῖς ἀλλοίωσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἐν οὐδετέροις δ' ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σχηματιζόμενον καὶ ῥυθμιζόμενον ὅταν ἐπιτελεσθῇ (i.e. τελειωθῇ, τέλος λάβῃ), οὐ λέγομεν ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἔστιν, οἷον τὸν ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸν ἢ τὴν πυραμίδα κηρὸν ἢ τὴν κλίνην ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παρωνυμιάζοντες τὸ μὲν χαλκοῦν, τὸ δὲ κήρινον, τὸ δὲ ξύλινον. τὸ δὲ πεπονηθὸς (sc. ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν) καὶ ἡλλοιωμένον προσαγορεύομεν (sc. ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἔστιν)· ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ θερμὸν καὶ σκληρὸν τὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν καὶ τὸν κηρὸν. καὶ οὐ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν, ὁμωνύμως τῷ πάθει προσαγορεύοντες τὴν ὕλην. ὥστ' εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν μορφήν οὐ λέγεται τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν ᾧ (i.e. the ὕλη) ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἀλλοιώσεις λέγεται, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶεν αἱ γενέσεις αὗται ἀλλοιώσεις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν,

ἡλλοιωσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν γεγεννημένων· ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τινός, οἷον τῆς ὕλης πυκνουμένης ἢ μανουμένης ἢ θερμαινομένης ἢ ψυχομένης, οὐ μέντοι τὰ γινόμενά γε ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐδ' ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἀλλοιώσις ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἱ ἔξεις οὐθ' αἱ τοῦ σώματος οὐθ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλοιώσεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρεταὶ αἱ δὲ κακίαι τῶν ἔξεων· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ ἀρετὴ οὔτε ἡ κακία ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσις τις (ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετὴν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον· τότε γὰρ μάλιστά ἐστι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ κύκλος τέλειος, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται κύκλος καὶ ὅταν βέλτιστος), ἡ δὲ κακία φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἔκστασις. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκίας τελείωμα λέγομεν ἀλλοίωσιν (ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὁ θριγκὸς καὶ ὁ κέραμος ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ εἰ θριγκουμένη καὶ κεραμουμένη ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ μὴ τελειοῦται ἢ οἰκία), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων ἢ λαμβανόντων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ τελειώσεις αἱ δ' ἐκστάσεις εἰσὶν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἀλλοιώσεις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαμεν ἀπάσας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν, ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν, ἢ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτὰ τῶν

§ 6. It is important to remember that the theory of goodness as a "mean" or ratio between opposites is only one case among others of a principle which served to explain all the difficulties which earlier thinkers had felt about becoming, the difficulties which Plato had expressed in the *Phaedo*, and which he finally settled in the *Philebos* by his doctrine of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*. Matter to Aristotle is that which is potentially, and it comes to be actually under the influence of that which is already actual. This is just because it is a *στέρησις*, and only attains its own *ἕξις* when it reaches its proper form or *τέλος*. By its very nature it is that which is capable of receiving opposites; it is the substratum in which opposites inhere. Such a substratum we must assume because it is impossible that the one opposite can become or approximate to the other. Cold iron may become hot iron, but cold can never become heat. Now the form which is the cause of all becoming is always a ratio (*λόγος*) or mean (*μεσότης*) between the two opposites, it is a definite "interval" as musicians call it, a fixed proportion in which the opposites neutralise one another and give rise to a new product. If Aristotle had only known the theories of modern chemistry, they would have seemed to him a most perfect exemplification of the principle; for what the modern chemist calls atomic weights are just of this nature, and a chemical formula like H_2O is the most typical instance of

ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετας καὶ κακίας. ἐκάστη γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰ οἰκεία πάθη εὖ ἢ κακῶς διατίθῃσι τὸ ἔχον· οἰκεία δ' ὑφ' ὧν γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ πρὸς τι οὔτε αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις, οὔτε αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδ' ὅλως μεταβολὴ οὐδεμία, φανερόν ὅτι οὐθ' αἱ ἕξεις οὐθ' αἱ τῶν ἕξεων ἀποβολαὶ καὶ λήψεις ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως αὐτὰς καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν ἀνάγκη, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν ἢ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, ἢ ἐν οἷς τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πρώτοις. περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκάστη λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑφ' ὧν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἔχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὡς δεῖ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικόν ἢ ἐναντίως (i.e. μὴ ὡς

δεῖ) ἀπαθές. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεων· ἅπασαι γὰρ καὶ αὗται τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ τελειώσεις, αἱ δὲ κακαὶ ἐκστάσεις· ἐτι ἢ μὲν ἀρετὴ εὖ διατίθῃσι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεία πάθη, ἢ δὲ κακία κακῶς. ὥστ' οὐδ' αὗται ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποβολαὶ καὶ αἱ λήψεις αὐτῶν. γίνεσθαι δ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους. ἀλλοιοῦται δ' ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικὰςἐπεὶ δ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἐγγιγνομένης καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίνεται (περὶ ταύτας γὰρ εἰσιν), αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λύπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, φανερόν ὅτι ἀλλοιουμένου τινὸς ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀποβάλλειν καὶ λαμβάνειν. ὥστ' ἡ μὲν γένεσις αὐτῶν μετ' ἀλλοιώσεως, αὗται δ' οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀλλοιώσεις.

what he calls a λόγος or μεσότης. Unfortunately he did not know this remarkable confirmation of the theory he had inherited from Plato, and we can only quote examples which seem less striking because biology has not yet been reduced to organic chemistry.

Health had been regarded since the times of the Pythagoreans as a sort of ἀρμονία ("tuning" or "pitch," not "harmony") of the opposites warm and cold, dry and moist, in the human body. The formula or ratio of this proportion exists in the soul of the doctor, and its presence there is the efficient cause of health in the human body as well as its formal and final cause. It is exactly in the same way that the lawgiver has in his soul the formula or λόγος of goodness, and it is the efficient cause of goodness in others.

Again, in discussing the fact of growth, Aristotle is met by some old difficulties which were raised for the first time, so far as we know, by Empedokles and Anaxagoras. As the latter put it "How can flesh arise from what is not flesh, or bone from what is not bone?"¹¹ How, in fact, do the opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry, become organic tissues (ὁμοιομερῆ)? Aristotle says "If flesh arises from both of them but is neither of them, nor yet a compound in which both are preserved, what remains but that the product of them should be matter? The destruction of one opposite either produces the other opposite or matter. Surely then, since there are degrees of heat and cold, when the one is in actuality it will be potentially the other; but when it is not completely actual, but cold as compared to heat, and hot as compared to cold, since things that are mixed destroy one another's excesses, then neither will the matter nor either of the opposites be completely actual, but something intermediate. In so far as it is potentially more hot than cold or the opposite, in that ratio it will be three times as hot potentially as cold, or twice, or whatever the ratio may be.....That which is actually hot is potentially cold, and what is actually cold is potentially hot, so that if they are not equal they change into one another—and so with the other opposites—the elements first change in this way, and after these flesh and bones and the like, the hot becoming cold and the cold hot, when they have reached the mean (τὸ μέσον)."¹²

¹¹ Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 286, sqq.

¹² I have selected this passage from many others which might have been

It is in this sense, then, that goodness is a mean; it is the form which is the true nature of the human soul when fully developed. To say that Aristotle makes the distinction between goodness and badness a quantitative one is like saying that music is merely mathematics, or that the distinction between the different compounds of an acid and a base is only one of degree.

quoted as being, perhaps, specially instructive; but the main thing to remember is that "the Mean" is no isolated ethical doctrine, but the regular Platonic and Aristotelian way of explaining the Formal Cause. The misleading view of it as a mere *mediotutissimus ibis* is due to the unfortunate isolation in which Aristotle's ethical doctrines are commonly studied; and this in turn is due to the peculiarities of Aristotle's own method. The passage is as follows:—

Gen. Corr. 334 b, 2 sqq. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιούσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὕλην ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν πῶς ἔσται τι ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οἷον ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ ἢ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ σὰρξ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδέτερον ἐκείνων, μηδ' αὖ σύνθεσις σφζομένων, τί λείπεται πλὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνων; ἢ γὰρ θατέρου φθορὰ ἢ θάτερον ποιεῖ ἢ τὴν ὕλην. ἄρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπλῶς ἢ θάτερον ἐντελεχεία, δυνάμει θάτερον ἔσται· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ' ὥς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ὥς δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν (διὰ τὸ μιγνύμενα φθείρειν τὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλή-

λων), τότε οὐθ' ἢ ὕλη ἔσται οὔτε ἐκείνων τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκάτερον ἐντελεχεία ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τοῦναντίον, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ τριπλασίως, ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον. ἔσται δὲ μυχθέντων τᾶλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἐκείνων δυνάμει πῶς ὄντων, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥς ἢ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον· καὶ ἔστιν οὕτω μὲν μίξις, ἐκείνως δὲ ὕλη τὸ γινόμενον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τάναντία κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις διορισμόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ψυχρὸν δυνάμει θερμόν, ὥστε εἰ μὴ ἰσάζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων) καὶ πρῶτον οὕτω τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὴ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γιγνομένου ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέτερον—τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον—ὁμοίως δὴ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιούσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τᾶλλα.

B

Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς
 15 δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἣ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει
 καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ
 χρόνου· ἣ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα
 ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεγκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

1103 a, 17. EE. 1220 a, 39 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
 ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ'
 ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πῶς οὕτως ἤδη [τὸ]
 ἐνεργητικόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ ὀρώμεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις
 ῥίψης ἄνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βία), διὸ ἔστω τὸ
 ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον <τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν> δυνα-
 μένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.

I. § 1. Διττῆς...τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, as shown above 1103 a, 3 sqq. We take up the question of how goodness is produced without asking what it is; for this is a practical investigation. We shall, nevertheless, be forced to ask what it is later on.

τὸ πλεῖον. This is a necessary reservation; for we shall see that besides teaching goodness of intellect implies (1) cleverness, which comes by nature, and (2) goodness of character, which comes by habit. Cf. 1144 a, 20 sqq.

ἣ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. Aristotle simply assumes the solution of this old problem (cf. Introductory Note) to which Plato finally came. Cf. Laws 729 e

πάν ἦθος διὰ ἔθος. We have to go to Eudemos (loc. cit.) for a definition of habit. That is habituated which "from being often moved in a certain way under guidance which is not innate, is now active in that way."

περιγίνεται, 'is gained,' 'is the result of.' Contrast φύσει ἐγγίνεται, παραγίνεται below, which imply no previous process.

παρεγκλῖνον. This is the reading of K^b and Hel. There seems to be no instance of παρεκκλῖνον, the usual reading, in the present sense, while παρεγκλῖνω is used transitively in Athenaeus 701 b and the scholiast on Ar. Knights 956, where it refers as here to a change in προσωδία. The

- 2 Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, 20 οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως

a, 20. Met. 1046 a, 36 ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐννύπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾧ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἐνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἢ δ' ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν, ἔστι δ' ὡς τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτό, τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορᾷ δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δ' ἀποφορὰ θατέρου. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω. λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν μὲν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δέ, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν· ὥστ' ἄμφω ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς κινήσει πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συνάψασα. διὸ τὰ κατὰ λόγον δυνατὰ τοῖς ἄνευ λόγου δυνατοῖς ποιεῖ τὰναντία· μιᾷ γὰρ ἀρχῇ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῇ μὲν τοῦ εὖ δυνάμει ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν δύναμις, ταύτῃ δ' ἐκείνη οὐκ αἰεῖ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα καὶ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ μόνον ποιοῦντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν.

intransitive use, though not found elsewhere, presents no difficulty. Observe the etymological theory implied by the use of παρά (ἦθος παρά τὸ ἔθος). The Greeks did not think of words as 'derived' from other words, but as deflexions or declensions (πτῶσεις, ἐγκλίσεις, παραγωγαί) from a normal form. Cf. Plato, Crat. 400 b ἂν μὲν καὶ μικρὸν τις παρακλίνῃ, 410 a

σ μικρὸν τι παρακλίνοντες, 398 d μικρὸν παρηγμένον. So παρώνυμος cf. 1096 b, 27 n.

§ 2. Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον κ.τ.λ. That ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ comes ἐθισμῷ is assumed, but Aristotle digresses a little to show the inconsistency of this with the view that it comes φύσει.

οὐθὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first argument is that τὰ φύσει are not affected

ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ 3
25 ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις
δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς 4
δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ

1103 a, 26. Met. 1047 b, 31 ἀπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δ' ἔθει οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν τι δυνατόν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον δύναται

by habituation, goodness is, therefore goodness does not come by nature. This really depends on the distinction between *ἄλογοι δυνάμεις* and *δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου*, for which see Met. loc. cit. Every *λόγος* expresses both the thing and its negation (the first essentially and the second accidentally), and therefore every *δύναμις* of the *λόγον ἔχον*, the part of the soul that can give an account of itself, is also a *δύναμις* of its opposite. But where there is no *λόγος* the *δύναμις* can only become actual in one way.

§ 3. *πεφυκόσι...δέξασθαι*, i.e. *φύσει δεκτικοῖς οὖσιν αὐτῶν*.

τελειουμένοις. Though stated almost parenthetically, this is meant as a hint to those hearers who are acquainted with Aristotle's system. Cf. Met. 1021 b, 20 *καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τελείωσις τις· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπη μόνον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους*. Nature has not only its *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* in itself, but also its *ἀρχὴ στάσεως* (Introd. § 27). The process of growth stops when the form is fully embodied in the matter. The *ὑποκείμενον* is then said to be complete (*τέλειον εἶναι*, *τέλος ἔχειν*) or to have attained its true nature (*ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν* 1152 b, 13 n.). It is for this

reason that the *γένεσις* of *ἀρετὴ* is not an *ἀλλοίωσις*—the *εἶδος* is not capable of alteration—but takes place *ἀλλοιούμενου τινός*, in this case by alteration of the soul. Cf. Phys. 246 a, 10 Introductory Note n. 10.

§ 4. *ἔτι ὅσα κ.τ.λ.* In things that come by nature, the capacity precedes the act, in things that come by habit the act precedes the capacity. For the full explanation of this we must refer once more to the *Metaphysics* (loc. cit.). Capacities are either congenital (*συγγενεῖς*) or acquired, whether by habit or teaching. The reason why, in the case of the latter, the act precedes the capacity is just that they are *μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις*, and accordingly of opposites. They will not, therefore, become active as soon as they are brought into contact with the appropriate object. They cannot act in two opposite ways at once, so they will not act at all till something else determines in which way they are to be active. As we are dealing with the *δυνάμεις* of *τὸ ὁρεκτικόν*, this something will be some form of *ὄρεξις*, or at least something which has an appetitive element in it (*προαίρεσις*).

ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. Cf. Met. (loc. cit.), but we see from Met. 1049 b, 10 and De An. 415 a, 16 that *πρότερον*

ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι 30 ἔσχομεν). τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαυθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 1103^b σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

5 Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ

κινεῖν καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγον, τὰ δ' ἄλογα καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, κακεῖνας μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐμψύχῳ εἶναι ταύτας δ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὡς δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν πλησιάζωσι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκεῖνας δ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη. αὗται μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαι μία ἐνὸς ποιητική, ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσῃ τὰναντία. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὁρεξίν ἢ προαίρεσιν. ὁποτέρου γὰρ ἂν ὁρέγηται κυρίως, τοῦτο ποιήσῃ, ὅταν ὡς δύναται ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πλησιάζῃ τῷ παθητικῷ. ὥστε τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὁρέγηται, οὐ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὡδὶ ἔχοντος [ποιεῖν]. εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται. τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἔξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεσθαι οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ. τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἔστι δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἔστι δ' οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ἐχόντων πως, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἔξω κωλύοντα. ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἔνια. διὸ οὐδ' εἰ ἅμα βούληται ἢ ἐπιθυμῇ ποιεῖν δύο ἢ τὰναντία, οὐ ποιήσῃ. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦ ἅμα ποιεῖν ἢ δύναμις, ἐπεὶ ὧν ἔστιν οὕτως ποιήσῃ.

here is only χρόνῳ πρότερον. In another sense πρότερόν εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις (sc. τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι) κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, 'in the case of the arts as well,' e.g. ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐλεῖν (Met. loc. cit.). This is the point in which teaching and habituation resemble one another.

οὕτω δὲ is the apodosis to ὥσπερ

καὶ above. "The clause of comparison ὥσπερ κτέ. does duty twice over." Bywater, Contr. p. 27, referring to Riddell, Dig. § 209.

§ 5. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This is not a third argument to show that goodness does not come φύσει, but a reinforcement of the original statement that it comes ἐθισμῷ. For the appeal to the practice of νομοθέται, cf. 1099 b, 29. 1102 a, 7.

5 μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιούσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα 6 ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. 10 ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, 7 ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι 15 τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀρ- 20 γίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιάς ἀποδιδόναι· 8

§ 6. Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. This is summed up 1105 a, 14 by the words *ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων*. There is no real difference of meaning between *ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν* and *διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν*, and the same idea is expressed below (1104 a, 28) by *ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν*. Aristotle might have said that the *ποιητικὰ ἀρετῆς* and the *φθαρτικὰ ἀρετῆς* were the same.

καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ κ.τ.λ. I have bracketed *οἱ* as suggested by Professor Bywater. Tr. 'people become—.'

§ 7. τοῦ διδάξοντος. We are still speaking of *τέχνη*.

ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ, 'in short,' a Platonic phrase, apparently only here in Aristotle. Cf. Sandys on Dem. 3, 18. 'Like dispositions arise from like activities.' The attribute has to be understood with both members of the phrase, as often, cf. 1094 b, 28 n.

§ 8. ποιάς ἀποδιδόναι, i.e. ἀποδεικνύναι. This use of the verb is derived from that which we see in 1103 a, 27. 'We must qualify our activities.' For the use of terms here cf. Met. 1020 b, 17, where the two meanings of quality are given as (1) *διαφορὰ οὐσίας*, and (2) *διαφορὰ κινήσεως*. The latter meaning is thus explained: *τὰ δὲ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων ἢ κινούμενα καὶ τῶν κινήσεων διαφοραί· ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι· διαφορὰς γὰρ δηλοῦσι τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καθ' ἃς ποιούσιν ἢ πάσχουσι καλῶς ἢ φαύλως τὰ ἐν κινήσει ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡδὶ δυνάμενον κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἐνεργεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ὡδὶ καὶ ἐναντίως μοχθηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν*. The meaning, then, is that we must 'give our activities a certain quality.' It is

κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

25

II. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἔνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ 30 τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω [ρήθή-

1103 b, 26. EE. 1216 b, 20 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμωτάτον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδὲ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

important to notice the introduction of this category.

II. § 1. Ἐπεὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ. The genuineness of this passage has been suspected, and it is certainly true that (1) it says over again much that has been said already, and (2) that it anticipates much—especially the doctrine of the Mean—that will find its proper place later on. It is also true (3) that § 8 is continuous not with this but the preceding passage, and (4) that this passage is not referred to in the recapitulation 1105 a, 13. But these are all characteristics of the akroamatic style. It is to be noted also that there is a great difference between the discussion of the Mean here and later on. Here it is explained dialectically by a mere analogy; later on it is discussed φυσικῶς. Now this is a very characteristic procedure, as we shall see.

πραγματεία, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἡθικὰ πραγματεία, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν (Rhet. 1356 a, 26). In this sense of a 'branch' of philosophy the

word is a synonym of μέθοδος. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n.

οὐ θεωρίας ἔνεκα. Contrast Phys. 194 b, 17 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία. The statement that a theoretical study of goodness would be of no use will not seem too strong if we remember that in a practical science the product is 'better' than the activity. From this it follows that such a study would not completely attain its end.

§ 2. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. The least misleading translation is 'according to the right rule.' The phrase comes from the Academy (see next note), and was too familiar to need explanation.

κοινόν, 'is common ground,' i.e. common to us and other schools, especially the Academy. That this is the meaning appears clearly from 1144 b, 21 sqq. For the meaning given to κοινός cf. κοινὰ γινώμαι, δόξαι, κοινὰ ὀνόματα, 'received beliefs,' 'accepted names.'

ὑποκείσθω. Cf. 1129 a, 11 ὡς ἐν

σεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς].

1104^a Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομοιογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν 3
πρακτέων λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι,
ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι
ἀπαιτητέοι, τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν
5 ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ 4
καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ
ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν
οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς αἰετὸς τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς
τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς
10 κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος 5
λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.] πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι 6
τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρε-
σθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίαις

τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. 'Let it be assumed as the basis of our discussion.' Hel. and some inferior MSS. read ὑπερκεῖσθω, but no parallel to this expression can be found in Aristotle. The words which follow in brackets are justly suspected by Professor Bywater. They imply the identification of the ὀρθὸς λόγος with φρόνησις, which in this bald form is post-Aristotelian. See, however, 1144 b, 27 n.

§ 3. περὶ τῶν πρακτέων. περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν Bekk. Sus. Byw. with Hel. I have reverted to the reading of all the best MSS. Aristotle is not here speaking of the difficulty of practical science in general, but of the difficulty of laying down rules as to how we should 'qualify our activities.'

τύπῳ ... ἀκριβῶς ... κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Cf. 1094 b, 11 sqq. The comparison goes down to τὰ ὑγιεινά, which are here substituted for the products of the arts in the former passage. This is because an example of τὰ ποιητικά is wanted, and ὑγιεινόν has for one of its meanings ὑγιείας ποιητικόν (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.).

§ 4. περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. General rules of conduct are hard to give: a system of casuistry is still less capable of exactness.

ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, 'it comes under no professional tradition,' as medical treatment, for instance, does. Cp. Probl. 885 b, 27 οἱ ἰατροὶ παραγγέλλουσι, Rhet. ad Alex. 1421 b, 4 παραγγέλματα πολιτικά, δίκανικά. For πίπτει cf. ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίπτει (Top. 102 a, 37).

It is curious to note that, in the hands of the Church, casuistry became just such a professional tradition.

ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Mr Stewart is doubtless right in supposing that Aristotle had in mind the passage of Hippocrates quoted in the Introduction, § 26.

§ 5. πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. A Platonic touch. Cf. 1096 a, 14 n.

§ 6. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'things like goodness.' There is no need to seek a definite reference for the pronoun. Aristotle is here employing the dialectical method of σκέψις ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων.

δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Isokr. Dem. § 34 τὸ γὰρ ἀφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ

χρησθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν·
 τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα 15
 φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία
 πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ
 7 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σῶζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ
 ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.
 ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπο- 20
 μένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὁ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πά-
 σης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλα-
 στος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός
 τις. φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς 25
 ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σῶ-
 8 ζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ
 φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· 30

1104 a, 27. EE. 1220 a, 22 ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἡ βελτίστη
 διάθεσις ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ
 ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου ἀρετῆς, οἷον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφή ἀφ'

ταχίστην ἔχει τὴν διάγνωσιν. The
 parenthetical clause introduces the
 reason for what follows (i.e. the
 choice of health and strength as
 instances) according to the common
 idiom. The dialectical method here
 employed consists in finding the things
 that are 'productive and destructive'
 of goodness by finding what is pro-
 ductive and destructive of things simi-
 lar. This is quite without prejudice to
 the more 'physical' account of the
 matter later on.

§ 7. ἀναίσθητός τις. Here and in
 some other places (1107 b, 8. 1108 b,
 21. 1109 a, 4. 1119 a, 7) Aristotle
 uses this word, though with some
 hesitation, in the special sense of
 'insensible' to pleasure. In this sense
 it is contrasted with ἀνάληγτος, of

which it is more commonly a synonym.
 Cf. 1114 a, 10 n.

φθείρεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For the reading
 see Bywater, Contr. p. 27. The par-
 ticle δὴ is here inferential. Tr. 'then.'

§§ 8—9. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.
 "Ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα
 καὶ ἐνεργεῖ (1105 a, 16). This section
 is continuous with c. i, §§ 6—8, cf.
 c. ii, § 1 n. Note that ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
 is substituted for διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν with
 no difference of meaning, γίνεσθαι
 being treated as the passive of ποιεῖν.
 Bekker has καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις, but the
 article is omitted in K^b and obscures
 the sense. The γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις
 on the one hand are opposed to the
 φθοραὶ on the other.

καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, sc. αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 ἕξεως, i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ' αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ 9 τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι 35 μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ 1104^b καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

III. Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινόμενὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος

ὧν γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας πονοῦσιν ἄριστα· ἔτι πᾶσαν διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πὺς προσφερομένων, ὥσπερ ὑγία ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ὥρας. ταῦτα δὲ δῆλα ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐστὶν ἢ γίνεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχὴν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πὺς μὲν γίνεται, πὺς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἢ χρήσις αὐτῆς ὑφ' ὧν καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθείρεται, πρὸς ἃ βέλτιστα διατίθῃσιν.

1104 b, 4. EE. 1220 a, 34 σημεῖον δ' ὅτι περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρά καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἱατρεῖαι οὔσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν...ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται, 'will be *in pari materia*.' This way of expressing the ὅλη is Platonic. Cf. Polit. 288 d ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν, Phileb. 59 d τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ....εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῶν ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι παρακεῖσθαι (cf. 1094 b, 12 n.), καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι. "Bricks are made *out of* clay, while a potter works *in* clay" (Bury in loc.). Among the senses of ἐν given in Phys. 210 a, 14 sqq. we find *inter alia* ὡς ἡ ὑγία ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ. Here the particular meaning of ἐν ᾧ is ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις, which may be space, quantity or quality. Cf. Phys. 227 b, 25 καὶ ἐν τινι τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν πάθει. The ἐνέργειαι here described are (fully-

developed) κινήσεις ἐν τῷ ποιῶ (ἀλλοιώσεις) and in particular, κινήσεις ἐν πάθει. For πάθος is the ὅλη alike of the γένεσις and φθορά of goodness and also the ἐν ᾧ of good activities. Note that ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς is replaced in the summary by περὶ ταῦτα, and that Eudemos says πρὸς ταῦτα ἢ χρήσις (i. q. ἐνέργεια) αὐτῆς.

III. § 1. Σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. "Ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας (1105 a, 13).

σημεῖον...ποιεῖσθαι. It is in accordance with the practical character of this discussion that the theory of the relation of goodness to feeling should apparently be introduced only to justify a practical rule for diagnosing ἔξεις by their symptoms. For σημεῖον ποιεῖσθαι, 'to take as a

τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρείος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν 10
2 καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθύς ἐκ νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ·
3 ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τούτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ 15
4 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμε-

symptom,' cf. Isokr. Nikokles § 28 τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὥς δεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ μέγιστον σημεῖον ποιούμεθα.

ἡ μὴ λυπούμενός γε. The reason for this reservation appears from the discussion of Courage below. Cf. esp. 1117 b, 15.

περὶ ἡδονάς. For the preposition cf. περὶ ταῦτα 1105 a, 16.

διὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Eight arguments in favour of the position advanced. The important argument is the fourth (§ 5). The first three lead up to this, while the remaining four are supplementary and illustrative of it.

§ 2. ἡχθαί. Cf. 1095 b, 4 and ἀγωγή in 1179 b, 31.

ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν. The article and the present tense show that Plato in his writings is meant. The idea is found already in Rep. 401 e ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων...καὶ χαίρων, but Aristotle is no doubt alluding to Laws, 653 a Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρῶτην αἰσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι· φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους, εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τέλεος δ' οὖν ἔστ' ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθὰ. παιδεῖαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν, ἡδονὴν δὲ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὁρθῶς ἐν

ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὁρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς θ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὁρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ προσαγορεύων κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ὁρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις. So Ar. Pol. 1340 a, 15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν (συμβέβηκε) περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὁρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν.

§ 3. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supplementary proofs that ἀρετὴ is περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη. That ἀρετὴ has to do with πράξεις is clear from the account of it given above (1103 b, 13 sqq.); that ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ has to do with πάθη is clear from the fact that it belongs to τὸ ὁρεκτικόν.

ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη. This important doctrine is assumed throughout. Every feeling can be reduced to pleasure or pain, and the difference between feelings is due solely to the differences of the φαντασμοὶ which give rise to them. The relation of pleasure to πράξεις or ἐνέργεια is discussed in the Tenth Book.

§ 4. μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. In medicine cures are effected by op-

ναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι
 διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὥς καὶ πρῶην 5
 εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι
 20 χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύ-
 σιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ
 διώκειν τούτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἂς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ
 ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ
 τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς

1104 b, 18. EE. 1221 b, 27 εἰλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα
 λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα
 διήρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικαί, ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια,
 ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἢ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ'
 ὄρεξιν (οὐ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς ὄρεξιν, εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν),
 ἀνάγκη δὴ φαῦλον τὸ ἦθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν
 ἡδονὰς τινὰς καὶ λύπας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ
 τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ
 ἕξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ διώριστα· ὥστε
 διὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἠθικὴν
 ἀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας. πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς ὑφ' οἷων
 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν

posites (e.g. fever is cured by a cold remedy). If the remedy is pain, then pleasure must be the cause of the disease. The medical παράγγελμα expressed in such phrases as βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν etc. is often discussed in medical writers. See Mr Stewart's note.

§ 5. πρῶην. This is the reading of K^b and is not likely to be an invention. The other mss. have the more commonplace πρότερον. The reference is to 1104 a, 27 sqq., and the principle there laid down, ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ. This shows that pleasure and pain are the οἰκεία πάθη of ἀρετῆς. Cf. Phys. 246 b, 10 οἰκεία δὲ (πάθη) ὑφ' ὧν γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν.

πρὸς ταῦτα. Another variation of the phrase expressing the object to which the activity is relative. Cf.

the note on p. 82 and Eudemos there referred to.

τὴν φύσιν ἔχει. A variation of ἐνεργεῖ which is easily explained if we remember that the οἰκεία φύσις or τελείωσις of any ἕξις is its ἐνέργεια. Things are said ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν, εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει (opp. ἐξίστασθαι) when they are complete. Translate 'shows its true nature.'

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, 'by the rule.'

διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται κ.τ.λ. Comm. Anon. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν Στωικῶν ἦν ἡ δόξα αὕτη. The word ἀπάθεια is found once only in what remains to us of Greek philosophy before the Stoics; but we can hardly be wrong in supposing that the reference here is to Speusippos. Cf. Clem. Strom. ii, 21 (Σπεύσιππος φησι) στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας. Eudemos (l. c.) refers the definition to πάντες,

καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ 25
 ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.
 6 ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
 λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῇ, ἡ δὲ κακία τοῦναντίον.
 7 γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἔτι περὶ τῶν
 αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν 30
 τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγὰς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν]
 τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα
 μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρ-
 τητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη
 τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· 35
 8 καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἔτι 1105^a
 δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀπο-

ἡ ἡδονή (l. ἔξις Bonitz). δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους εἶναι
 φαμέν, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὥς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ
 διορίζονται πάντες προχείρως ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἡρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
 λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

and this must mean the Academy
 (cf. 1144 b, 21). It is noteworthy,
 then, that ἀπάθεια τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς
 occurs in [Plato] Def. 413 a.⁷

ἀπλῶς, ἄνευ προσθήκης Hel., 'with-
 out addition' or 'qualification.' Cf.
 ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται below. Cf. also
 Phys. 246 b, 17 περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκάστη
 λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή, ὑφ' ὧν ἄλλοι-
 οὔσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἔχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὥς δεῖ παθητι-
 κόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ἐναντίως
 ἀπαθές.

§ 6. ἡ τοιαύτη, sc. ἠθικῇ. Mr
 Stewart follows Hel. in understanding
 ἡ τοιαύτη as ἡ οὕτως ἔχουσα and taking
 it closely with περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.
 In that case I should regard τῶν
 βελτίστων πρακτικῇ as an adscript.

§ 7. ἔτι. K^b has ὅτι which Pro-
 fessor Bywater adopts. But would
 not ὅτι require περὶ τὰ αὐτά as Mr
 Stewart suggests? Hel. read ἔτι.

τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις, a prepositional

equivalent of τῶν αἱρετῶν. So just
 below we have τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν
 in the same sense.

καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος. This is
 an ἐνδοξον. Cf. Top. 105 a, 27 and
 118 b, 27 ποσαχῶς τὸ αἰρετὸν λέγεται
 καὶ τίνων χάριν, ὅλον τοῦ συμφέροντος
 ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος. It is
 used later in the discussion of φιλία.
 Often τὸ συμφέρον or χρήσιμον is
 dropped (e.g. 1110 b, 9). In that
 case it is regarded merely as a means
 towards the other two.

κατορθωτικός. A word coined to
 form an opposite to ἀμαρτητικός. The
 verb κατορθοῦν means 'to succeed.'

κοινὴ...τοῖς ζώοις. The point is
 that pleasure is possible to all crea-
 tures, even though they may not
 understand beauty or use.

§ 8. συντέθραπται, i.e. σύντροφός
 ἐστι, 'has grown up with us.' Hip-
 pokrates (p. 306, 24) κίνδυνος δὲ
 συντραφῆναι καὶ συναυξηθῆναι, ἣν μὴ

τρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κα-
 νονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἦττον,
 5 ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα 9
 τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις
 εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον 10
 ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ
 δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή·
 10 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ
 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
 τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται,
 ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ 11
 15 ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ
 ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
 ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

IV. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν
 δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
 σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα,
 20 ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ
 καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ 2
 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι

θεραπευθῶσι τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις, (p. 307,
 23) ὧ δὲ ἀπὸ παιδίου συνηύξεται καὶ
 συντέτροφεν (of diseases).

ἀποτρίψασθαι ἐγκεχρωσμένον.
 The metaphor is taken from washing
 out stains. The figurative use of
 ἀποτρίψασθαι occurs more than once
 in Demosthenes, and is worked out at
 length by Plato, Rep. 429 d sqq.

κανονίζομεν. The verb occurs only
 here in Aristotle, but the metaphor of
 the 'rule' occurs several times and is
 still felt as a metaphor (cf. 1113 a,
 33). The word κανὼν did not become
 technical till a later date.

§ 10. καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος.
 Fr. 105 (Byw.) Θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χα-
 λεπόν· ὅτι γὰρ ἂν χρηίστη γίνεσθαι
 ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται (Early Greek Philo-

sophy, p. 140). No doubt θυμός was
 here used in the Ionic sense in which
 it is equivalent to ἐπιθυμία.

περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον κ.τ.λ. For
 this test cf. 1109 a, 12 sqq.

§ 11. ὅτι...λύπας, 1104 b, 4—
 1105 a, 13. καὶ ὅτι...γινομένων
 1103 b, 6—25 and 1104 a, 10—26.
 καὶ ὅτι...ἐνεργεῖ 1104 a, 27—b, 9.
 The section on the Mean (1104 a,
 11—27) is not specially referred to.
 Cf. 1103 b, 26 n.

IV. § 1. πῶς λέγομεν. 1103 a,
 31, 34. b, 2. This ἀπορία serves to
 bring out more fully the character of
 ἐθισμός. It falls under the general
 principle that what exists δυνάμει can
 only be made to exist ἐνεργείᾳ by
 something already actual. The form

ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν
 ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ
 γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμ- 25
 3 ματικήν. ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν
 ἀρετῶν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
 ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ
 κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δι-
 καίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων 30
 πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαι-
 ρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ
 βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς
 μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν 1105^b
 αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν
 ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν
 δύναται, εἴπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ
 4 σῶφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώ- 5
 φρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώ-
 φρων πράξῃεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σῶφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα
 πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώ-

of goodness existing in the soul of the lawgiver tends to reproduce itself as *ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*.

§ 2. *κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικήν*, i.e. by realising the form (*εἶδος*, *λόγος*) of *γραμματική* in his own soul. If he acts *ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου* he is realising the *λόγος* or form which exists in that other's soul.

§ 3. *ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν...κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς*. Note the change of the prepositions, which correspond to the distinction between *ποιεῖν* and *πράττειν*, *ἔργον* and *πρᾶξις*.

εἰδώς. It is essential that he should know what he is doing. The conditions of this knowledge are analysed below 1110 b, 18 sqq.

προαιρούμενος. The act must be willed or intended. *Προαίρεσις* is analysed below 1111 b, 4 sqq.

δι' αὐτά, i.e. *ὅτι καλόν*, as we shall

see later on. We should not praise an act if it was willed not for itself, but to win our praise.

βεβαίως...ἔχων, if the act is *ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως*, the outcome of a constant character, not an isolated effort.

τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. The idiomatic use of *ἄλλος*.

τὸ εἰδέναι. In the sense of theory (*γνώσις*) knowledge is not essential to goodness, though of course it is essential if we mean simply knowing what we are doing. This is discussed fully in Book III.

τὰ δ' ἄλλα, sc. *προαίρεσις* and *ἔξις*.

εἴπερ. I have adopted Professor Bywater's correction of MS. *ἄπερ*. The subject of *περιγίνεται* is *τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν* (Contr. p. 29).

§ 4. *οὐχ...ἀλλὰ καί*. Cf. 1130 a, 7. For the reading see Bywater (Contr. p. 29).

φρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράτ- 5
 10 τειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων.
 ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε
 γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττου- 6
 σιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν
 καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς
 15 κάμνουσιν οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι
 δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ
 ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυ-
 χὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφούντες.

V. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν
 20 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις,
 τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν 2

1105 b, 19. EE. 1220 b, 7 λεκτέον δὴ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς
 ποιότης τὰ ἦθη. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ'
 ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη
 ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πως ἢ ἀπαθείς εἶναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ
 διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων
 καὶ τῶν ἔξεων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ

§ 6. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. This practical exhortation brings the discussion of how goodness is produced to an appropriate conclusion. There is no Royal Road to goodness. We cannot become good by studying moral philosophy or listening to sermons.

V. § 1. τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή. The connexion of thought is left to be inferred as usual, but it is quite plain. We found (1103 b, 22) that δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποῖας ἀποδιδόναι, seeing that they are κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποῖας γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις (ib. 31). And that means further that the acts which are to produce goodness must be τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ ἀγαθὸς πράττοι (1105 b, 6). We cannot therefore know what sort of acts make a good ἐθισμός till we have defined this ποιότης of the appetitive soul which we call goodness.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα, sc. ἐν τῇ ὁρεκτικῇ. The explanation given of πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις would be too narrow without this restriction which is easily supplied from the context. The vague expression τὰ γινόμενα is used because τὰ πάθη in the sense here explained are not ποιότητες, as Eudemos rightly points out. At the same time, the διαίρεσις is certainly derived from that of ποιότης, which is said in Cat. 8 b, 25 sqq. to comprise (1) ἔξεις καὶ διάθεσις, (2) ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν, (3) παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, (4) σχῆμα καὶ μορφή.

§ 2. πάθη. The word πάθος is very ambiguous. It may be used of almost all συμβεβηκότα, and especially of qualities, so that it is often equivalent to ποιότης. But even in ordinary Greek it had a more restricted application to what we call 'feelings,'

ὀργήν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον
ζήλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις

ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν ἢ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη
καθ' αὐτά. καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης ἀλλὰ πάσχει, κατὰ
δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς λέγονται κατὰ τὰ

and this is the sense in which we are using the word here. Now in this sense a πάθος is not a ποιότης, but a κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποιόν or ἀλλοίωσις. We can see the distinction well from Met. 1020 a, 33 sqq., where the two senses of τὸ ποιόν are given as (1) ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας (cf. 1106 a, 14 n.), and (2) τὰ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων. As goodness and badness are said to be πάθη in this sense (b, 19 ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι), this is clearly not the meaning of the word here. Nor can the πάθη here mentioned be identified with the παθητικαὶ ποιότητες of the Categories, which are temporary qualitative affections (such as tastes and colours) accompanying a πάθος, but not the πάθος itself. The latter is there described thus. "Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενός τις ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὢν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ' οὐ.

ἐπιθυμίαν, i.e. ὄρεξιν τοῦ ἡδέος (Top. 140 b, 27 etc.) μετὰ λύπης (1119 a, 4). This is one of the three main forms of ὄρεξις.

ὀργήν φόβον θάρσος. Following the Platonic division, these are all ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ (Top. 126 a, 8 sqq.). The dialectical definition of ὀργή is ὄρεξις τιμωρίας (Rhet. 1378 a, 31) or ἀντιλυπήσεως (De An. 403 a, 30) arising from a feeling of pain caused by the idea of a slight (μετὰ λύπης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν). Cf. also Top. 127 b, 30. 151 a, 15. 156 a, 32. The popular definition of φόβος is προσ-

δοκία κακοῦ (1115 a, 9), but we ought rather to say it is the ὄρεξις of self-preservation accompanying a λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. The opposite of φόβος is θάρσος, which therefore involves a feeling of pleasure arising from a φαντασία of the opposite kind.

φθόνον χαράν. The latter seems to be used here in a special sense as the opposite of φθόνος, which is λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένη εὐπραγία τῶν ἐπιεικῶν τινός (Top. 109 b, 36).

φιλίαν μῖσος. As βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ (cf. 1155 b, 29) φιλία is ἐν τῇ βουλήσει (Top. 126 a, 13), and so we should understand the classification of all seven from φθόνος onwards. They are all κινήσεις produced by the φαντασία of something good or bad, and therefore belong to βούλησις. As a πάθος, φιλία is more correctly called φιλῆσις (1157 b, 28). It is a disinterested feeling of pleasure when good happens to another or pain when ill befalls him (Rhet. 1381 a, 4), and μῖσος the opposite.

πόθος, intense feeling of the pleasantness of the absent and pain of the present.

ζήλος is the pain a man feels at seeing good things in the possession of another like himself, not because the other has them but because he himself has not (Rhet. 1388 b, 30), while ἔλεος is pain at the φαντασία of evil happening to another like oneself (ib. 1385 b, 13).

οἷς ἔπεται κ.τ.λ., i.e. κινήσεις or ἀλλοιώσεις which are necessarily either μεθ' ἡδονῆς or μετὰ λύπης (see the foregoing notes).

δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυ-
 25 νατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἔξεις δὲ καθ'
 ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργι-
 σθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ
 μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν 3
 οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα
 30 κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς
 καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
 οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φο-
 βούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργι-
 1106^a ζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς—κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
 ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβού- 4
 μεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ
 ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
 5 κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
 οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ 5

πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον ὀργίλος ἀνάλγητος ἐρωτικὸς αἰσχυνηλὸς
 ἀναίσχυντος. ἔξεις δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσαι αἰτιαὶ εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ λόγον
 ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως, οἷον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη δειλία ἀκολασία.

δυνάμεις. In the present context, these are φυσικαί, and therefore ἄλογοι, δυνάμεις. Cf. Cat. 9 a, 16 ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγονται. They are susceptibilities or insusceptibilities to feeling.

ἔξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note that ἔξεις here are not only qualities, but also relations. Cf. Cat. 11 a, 20 οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταραττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι ἐλέγομεν. The γένος is ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, for we say ἐπιστήμη (or ἀρετή) τινός, but the particular is not. We do not say γραμματική (or ἀνδρεία) τινός.

σφοδρῶς, sc. ἔχομεν, a natural brachylogy for ἔχομεν ὥστε σφοδρῶς ὀργισθῆναι.

§ 3. **πάθη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Three

arguments to show that goodness is not a πάθος, (1) feeling is not in itself good or bad, (2) feeling does not imply will, (3) feeling is a motion (or process), while goodness is a state or disposition. All this comes simply to saying that πάθη are not ποιότητες.

§ 4. **προαιρέσεις.** The meaning of προαίρεσις is explained in Book III. Cf. for the present Met. 1020 b, 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποῖον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.

κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Met. 1022 b, 15 πάθος λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ποιότης καθ' ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται. In Phys. 226 a, 26 ἀλλοίωσις is defined as *qualitative motion* (κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποῖον).

διακεῖσθαι is synonymous with ἔχειν in the Ethics, though in the

δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι
 πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, [οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα·] ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ
 6 οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ 10
 οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται
 ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή,
 εἴρηται.

VI. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 2 ποῖα τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἀρετή, 15
 αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδί-
 δωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπου-
 δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ
 ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε
 σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπι- 20

Categories 9 a, 8 *ἕξεις* is distinguished from *διάθεσις* as being more permanent. Knowledge and goodness are *ἕξεις*, health and disease are *διάθεσις*. Both are originally medical terms.

§ 5. *διὰ ταῦτα δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Two arguments to show that goodness is not a *δύναμις*, (1) a capacity is not in itself good or bad, (2) capacities are purely natural.

ἀπλῶς. Before we can give praise, we must make a *πρόσθεσις*, viz. *ὡς δεῖ*. Cf. 1104 b, 25 n.

οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. As Professor Bywater says, these words have no conjunction to connect them with what precedes, and seem to be an otiose repetition of 1105 b, 32.

πρότερον, supra 1103 a, 18 sqq.

§ 6. *λείπεται*. This assumes that the enumeration is exhaustive which implies (1) that the *ὑποκείμενον* is the appetitive soul, (2) that we are considering it *κατὰ τὸ ποῖόν*.

VI. § 1. *ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα τις*, i.e. to define Goodness we must give its *differentia* as well as its *genus*. The *διαφορὰ ποῖόν τι σημαίνει*.

§ 2. *ῥητέον οὖν κ.τ.λ.* The argument is that the differentia of goodness will be the same as the differentia of the activities which (1) produce goodness, and (2) result from goodness. Now we have seen above (1104 a, 11 sqq.) that the *ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ* of goodness are activities in a mean, and also (1104 a, 27 sqq.) that activities in a mean are the result of goodness. They are both *πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν* and *ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*. Therefore goodness will be a *ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι*. So far, then, the differentia *ἐν μεσότητι* has been reached in a purely dialectical way. That it was the differentia of good acts was found by *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων* (cf. 1104 a, 12 n.), and that it is the differentia of goodness is shown *ἐπὶ τῶν συστοιχῶν* (cf. Ind. s.v.).

ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετή. The illustration is from Plato, Rep. 353 b, *ἂρ' ἂν ποτε ὄμματα τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν κ.τ.λ.*

ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετή. The illustration is suggested by Plato, Rep. 335 b.

βάτην καὶ μείναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων 3
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ'
ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔρ-
γον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι 4
25 δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστίν
ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὲ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἐστι
λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα
ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον
τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πρᾶγμα- 5
30 τος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ
ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν πασιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονά-

1106 a, 26. EE. 1220 b, 21 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, ληπτέον ὅτι
ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον,
καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἱατρικῇ,
ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὅποιουν πράξει, καὶ ἐπιστη-
μονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
κίνησις συνεχές, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.
πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἕξιν· καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον διὰ
τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθείρει ἄλληλα, τὰ δ'
ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῶ μέσῳ ἐναντία. τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐκάτερον πρὸς
ἐκάτερον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μείζον, τοῦ μείζονος δὲ

§ 4. ἤδη, supra 1104 a, 10 sqq.

ἡ φύσις. We now show φυσικῶς
that the differentia of ἀρετὴ is ἐν
μεσότητι. Cf. Introductory Note.
With the change of method, the
Platonic reminiscences disappear. In-
trod. § 7.

συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ, 'continuous
and (infinitely) divisible.' The current
rendering of διαιρετόν by 'discrete' is
a mere blunder and makes nonsense
of the argument. The word for 'dis-
crete' is διωρισμένον. Everything
which is continuous is also potentially
divisible *ad infinitum*, and the point
is that πάθη καὶ πράξεις which are the
'matter' of goodness are just such
infinitely divisible *continua*; for, re-

garded as κινήσεις, both πάθη and
πράξεις are συνεχῇ. We shall best
understand the doctrine of the mean
by thinking of a scale which is capable
of infinite graduation. There is one
right degree, and all below it down
to zero are ἐλλείψεις, all above it up
to boiling-point ὑπερβολαί.

ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς. This distinction entirely re-
moves the objection that Aristotle
makes the difference between right
and wrong a quantitative one. The
bad man feels and acts more or less,
as the case may be, than the good
man, but this does not imply that the
good man's feelings are always 50°
centigrade and his conduct middling.

ζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταῦτόν παῖσιν.
 6 οἶον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ μέσα
 λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ
 ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 35
 7 ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ
 εἴ τῳ δέκα μναὶ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλεί- 1106^b
 πτης ἕξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ
 τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ
 ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ
 8 πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ 5
 τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖ-
 ται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πάγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
 9 εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ
 μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώ-
 θασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν 10
 ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλ-
 λείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης,
 οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες
 ἐργάζονται), ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
 ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στο- 15
 10 χαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη
 καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις
 καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἶον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπι-

ἐλαττον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἅττα εἶναι καὶ
 μεσότητά τινα. ληπτέον ἄρα ἢ ποία μεσότης ἀρετὴ, καὶ περὶ ποία
 μέσα.

§ 6. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνα-
 λογίαν. Theon of Smyrna p. 85, 10
 quotes from Thrasyllus the definition
 τὴν ταύτῳ ἀριθμῷ ὑπερέχουσιν καὶ
 ὑπερεχομένην. This is not what we
 call a 'proportion,' but a series in
 arithmetical progression. Cf. ib. p.
 106, 15 τούτων δὲ φησιν ὁ Ἀδραστος
 μίαν τὴν γεωμετρικὴν κυρίως λέγεσθαι
 ἀναλογίαν καὶ πρώτην...κοινότερον δὲ
 φησι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας μεσότητας ὑπ' ἐνίων

καλεῖσθαι μεσότητας.

§ 9. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις. Cf. Part.
 An. 639 b, 19 μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα
 καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. If we find that
 the excellence of a work of art con-
 sists in this, that you cannot add to it
 or take anything from it, then *a*
fortiori this will be true of goodness
 as it is of nature.

θυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι
 20 καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα
 οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὖ 11
 ἔνεκα καὶ ὥς δεῖ μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ 12
 καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ
 25 πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
 ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦ-
 ται· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν 13
 ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρ- 14
 τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὥς οἱ
 30 Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ
 δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χα-
 λεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
 δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ
 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

35 ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα 15

1106 a, 36. EE. 1227 b, 5 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ
 ἠθικὴ αὕτη τε μεσότης τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ

§ 12. ψέγεται. Cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 29.

§ 14. τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου. Aristotle here makes an ingenious use of a Pythagorean idea which had at first a cosmological rather than an ethical signification. According to the Pythagoreans, the world was built up of geometrical figures, and these arose from the limitation of the unlimited (space). The unlimited once limited was a point, twice limited a line and so forth (Early Greek Philosophy, p. 312). The limit was thus the principle of order. Just in the same way the infinitely divisible continuum of feeling and action requires to be determined according to the ὀρθὸς λόγος. There are infinite possibilities of wrong in it,

but there is a certain degree in it which is right, and that is the limit, the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

ἀποτυχεῖν ... σκοποῦ ... ἐπιτυχεῖν. For the metaphor of the σκοπός cf. 1094 a, 22 n. Goodness is στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου and we may think of the μεσότης as the bull's eye in the target. The possibilities of missing are infinite, there is one right place to hit.

ἐσθλοὶ κ.τ.λ. The authorship of this verse is unknown.

§ 15. ἕξις προαιρετικὴ. We have seen that the *genus* of Goodness is ἕξις (1105 b, 19), that is, a habitual attitude towards feeling, developed by habituation from a neutral δύναμις. We have seen too that we cannot say

τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος 1107^a
 ὀρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβο-
 16 λὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν
 τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὕρισκεν καὶ 5
 17 αἰρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ
 τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ

κακία ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν
 εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἔξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ
 λυπηροῖς, καθ' ὅσα ποῖός τις λέγεται τὸ ἦθος, ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος·
 ὁ γὰρ φιλόγλυκός ἢ φιλόπικρός οὐ λέγεται ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος.

a man is good unless he acts *προαιρού-
 μενος*, 'with purpose' and *βεβαίως καὶ
 ἀμετακινήτως* ἔχων (1105 a, 31). This
 gives us ἔξιν προαιρετικὴ, 'a condition
 of the will.'

ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
 The *differentia* of this ἔξιν προαιρετικὴ
 is that it aims at the mean relative to
 ourselves (1106 a, 14 sqq.). The word
 οὖσα implies that τὸ εἶναι of the ἔξιν is
 ἐν μεσότητι, so Eudemos is quite right
 (loc. cit.) in saying προαιρετικὴ μεσό-
 τητος.

ὠρισμένη λόγῳ. We took as the
 basis of our discussion that we must
 act κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (1103 b, 32).
 It is now indicated that this is what
 determines the Mean. The Mean is,
 in fact, a provisional formula. We
 cannot yet say what determines the
 proportion. There is still an unknown
 quantity in our "Rule of Three" pro-
 blem. See the beginning of Book VI.

καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. This
 is added as a hint of the direction in
 which we are to look for our standard.
 We know already that φρόνησις is a
 διανοητικὴ ἀρετή (1103 a, 6), and now
 we are told that the Mean is deter-
 mined 'by what the wise man would
 determine it by,' a sufficient *ἐνδοξον*.
 We must, then, be content for the
 present with our provisional formula,

the Mean. We shall learn more
 when we come to Goodness of In-
 tellect.

§ 16. καὶ ἔτι sc. μεσότης ἐστὶ. τὰς
 μὲν...τὰς δὲ sc. κακίας.

τοῦ δέοντος. See 1094 a, 24 n.

§ 17. διὸ κ.τ.λ. We have seen
 that Goodness is a Mean in its
 essential nature (οὐσία) and by its
 definition (τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν
 εἶναι λέγοντα), but from the point of
 view of what is best it is an extreme.
 When we go beyond the Mean,
 though we are ascending towards the
 upper extreme of our scale of feeling,
 we are yet descending in the scale of
 excellence. The explanation of this
 is to be found in the fact that goodness
 is a *τελείωσις*, and that therefore all
 badness, whether of excess or defect,
 is opposed to it as *στέρησις* to *εἶδος*.

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This curious phrase
 means the real nature (οὐσία) of a
 thing as expressed in its definition by
genus and specific difference. Its
 origin is easily understood if we take
 such a phrase as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀν-
 θρώπῳ lit. 'what it was for him to be
 a man,' 'what his being a man was.'
 The imperfect is to be explained as
 a "philosophical" imperfect (Good-
 win, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 40),
 and represents the definition in a

ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πράξεις 18
οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται
10 συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία
ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ
ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται
τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν
οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατ-
15 ορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς μοιχεύειν,
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν.
ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν 19
καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλ-
20 λειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως με-
σότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως.
ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ 20
ἐλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ'
ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν
25 πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλειψις.

VII. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ

1107 a, 8. EE. 1221 b, 18 οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἔνια τῶν λεγο-
μένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἂν πῶς λαμβάνηται τῷ μᾶλλον
πάσχειν. οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς
πλησιάζειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ μοχθηρία τις αὐτῇ δὴ ἐστίν.
συνειλημμένον γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕβρις. διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, συγγενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες,
ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι—ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι—καὶ πατάξαι μὲν,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. (Cf. Rhet.
1374 a, 3.)

living way as the result of a process, not as a dead formula. This is characteristic of Greek philosophy all through, based as it was on discussion and debate.

§ 18. εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται κ.τ.λ., 'have names which at once involve

badness.' For συνειλημμένα cf. EE. 1. c., Met. 1025 b, 32 τὸ μὲν σιμὸν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.

VII. § 1. Δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The definition must now be tested by its applicability to particulars, i.e. particular forms of goodness. So the

καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ 30 μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν * * * ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς 2 διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν <ἐν> τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος 1107^b (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων

a, 32. EE. 1220 b, 36 εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρεῖσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς.

ὀργιλότης

ἀναλγησία

πρᾶότης

θρασύτης

δειλία

ἀνδρεία

ἀναισχυντία

κατάπληξις

αἰδώς

definition of εὐδαιμονία was tested by its applicability to the relevant facts. Cf. 1098 b, 9 sqq. and De Mot. An. 698 a, 11.

κοινότεροι, 'of wider application.' This is the reading of the best MSS. and the Greek commentators (πλείοσιν ἐφαρμόζουσι Par.). Cf. e.g. De An. 414 b, 23 γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, δε ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος. The reading of the Vetus Versio and inferior MSS., κενώτεροι, is not so appropriate; for, as will be seen from the references in Eucken, Methode pp. 46—47, κενός and κενολογεῖν (De An. 403 a, 2 διαλεκτικῶς εἰρηνται καὶ κενῶς) refer chiefly, if not solely, to arguments not based on the οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί of the science. Here Aristotle is pointing out the respective advantages of both universal and particular.

δέον can hardly be anything else but an accusative absolute: it cannot stand for δέον ἐστὶ. Bonitz would therefore delete οὖν in the next clause. There may be a lacuna in the text. Cf. 1145 b, 28.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. In EE. 1220 b, 37 it is called a ὑπογραφῆ, though we have διαγραφῆ 1228 a, 28. Cf. διά-

γραμμα. We have references to a ὑπογραφῆ in De Interpr. 22 a, 22: Hist. An. 510 a, 30 and elsewhere. It seems, then, that Aristotle's ἀκροάσεις were illustrated by a sort of syllabus. In the case of the Analytics this must have been quite necessary, and there are other parts of the Ethics that are not intelligible unless we assume a διαγραφῆ.

§ 2. περὶ...φόβους καὶ θάρρη. Both fear and its opposite are mentioned because they form a single continuum. It is possible for the soul to pass by continuous ἀλλοίωσις from the one to the other. We may therefore look at the Mean from two points of view, and there are thus two excesses and two defects. For it does not follow that ὁ ἐν τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ἐλλείπων (which is what Aristotle means by ὁ ἐν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ὑπερβάλλων) will be the same as ὁ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων. They are different ἕξεις altogether; for we are not dealing with the mere ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές. It may well be, however, that one or other of the ἕξεις has no special name, or that the same name is given to both; but this must not blind us to the qualitative distinction between them.

θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν
 ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσας, 3
 5 ἦττον δὲ καὶ <οὐχ ὁμοίως> περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότης μὲν
 σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς
 ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχή-
 κασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δό- 4
 σιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερ-
 10 βολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως
 δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει,
 ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει
 ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, 5
 15 ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐ-

ἀκολασία

φθόνος

κέρδος

ἀσωτία

ἀλαζονεία

κολακεία

ἀρέσκεια

τρυφερότης

χαυνότης

δαπανηρία

πανουργία

ἀναισθησία

ἀνώνυμον

ζημία

ἀνελευθερία

εἰρωνεία

ἀπέχθεια

αὐθάδεια

κακοπάθεια

μικροψυχία

μικροπρέπεια

εὐήθεια

σωφροσύνη

νέμεσις

δίκαιον

ἐλευθεριότης

ἀλήθεια

φιλία

σεμνότης —

καρτερία ✓

μεγαλοψυχία

μεγαλοπρέπεια

φρόνησις —

τὰ μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ
 λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν. ὀργίλος μὲν γάρ
 ἔστιν ὁ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος καὶ θᾶττον καὶ πλείοσιν ἢ οἷς δεῖ,
 ἀνάλγητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς· καὶ θρασύς μὲν ὁ

§ 3. οὐ πάσας. We shall see which later on.

καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως. I have adopted Mr Bywater's suggestion to insert οὐχ ὁμοίως from 1117 b, 26. The καὶ in the common text has no meaning. Here is another determination which shows we are not dealing with mere quantity.

οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, 'cannot be said to be common.' Cf. Ind. s.v. οὐ πάνυ.

ἀναίσθητοι. This is not the usual meaning of the word. Cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

§ 4. περὶ δὲ δόσιν κ.τ.λ. We pass now from μεσότητες ἐν πάθεσι to μεσότητες ἐν πράξεσι.

ἐν αὐταῖς. See Byw. Contr. p. 30.

6 τῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις
 εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
 διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ
 μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλει-
 ψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν 20
 7 ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ
 δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερ-
 βολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·
 8 ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευ-
 θεριότητα, <τῷ> περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ 25
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὕσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ
 περὶ μικρὰν οὕσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων
 ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ
 μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ 30
 τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς
 μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλό-
 τιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν

μήτε ἃ χρὴ φοβούμενος μήθ' ὅτε μήθ' ὥς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ
 ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ * * ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκόλαστος * * καὶ ὁ
 ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπερβάλλων πᾶσιν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται, ἀναίσθητος δὲ
 ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ μὴδ' ὅσον βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλ'
 ἀπαθὴς ὥσπερ λίθος· κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεονεκτικός,
 ζημιώδης δὲ ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαχόθεν (?). ἀλαζὼν δὲ ὁ πλείω
 τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος, εἴρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ κόλαξ μὲν
 ὁ πλείω συνεπαινῶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικὸς δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ τὸ
 μὲν λίαν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀρέσκεια, τὸ δ' ὀλίγα καὶ μόγις αὐθάδεια· ἔτι δ'
 ὁ μὲν μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μὴδ' εἰ βέλτιον, τρυφερός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν
 ὁμοίως ὡς μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀνώνυμος, μεταφορᾷ δὲ λέγεται σκληρὸς
 καὶ ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπαθητικός· χαῦνος δ' ὁ μειζόνων ἀξιῶν αὐτόν,
 μικρόψυχος δ' ὁ ἐλαττόνων· ἔτι δ' ἄσωτος ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην

§ 6. διαθέσεις, i. q. ἔξεις. Cf. 1106 a, 6 n.

§ 8. τῷ περὶ μικρά, sc. εἶναι, 'differing in being concerned with small things.' The insertion of τῷ is

due to Ramsauer.

ἐπιδικάζονται, a legal metaphor. For the κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδι-
 κασίαι see 'Αθ. πολ. c. 43, 4. 56, 6
 with Sandys's notes.

1108^a ἐπαινούμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ 9
 τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιούμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν
 δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρό-
 πον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ 10
 5 μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον
 πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν
 δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
 γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀορ-
 γησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσιν μὲν 11
 10 τινὰ ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσιν δ' ἀλλήλων·
 πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν,
 διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστι περὶ τὰληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς,
 αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν
 πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα
 15 μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ
 δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν

ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἐλλείπων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
 μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον, ὁ δ'
 ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος· καὶ ὁ μὲν πανούργος πάντως καὶ πάντοθεν
 πλεονεκτικός, ὁ δ' εὐήθης οὐδ' ὅθεν δεῖ· φθονερός δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι
 ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ πράττειν λυποῦσι
 τοὺς φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες), ὁ δ' ἐναντίος ἀνωνυμώτερος, ἔστι δ' ὁ
 ὑπερβάλλων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν,
 ἀλλ' εὐχερὴς ὥσπερ οἱ γαστρίμαργοι πρὸς τροφήν, ὁ δὲ δυσχερὴς κατὰ
 τὸν φθόνον ἐστίν.—τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτως
 ἔχειν περίεργον διορίζειν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε
 ποιητικὴ, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τοῦτο προσδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'

§ 9. κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον,
 'according to the method we have
 traced out.' This seems more natural
 than to take the participle in an active
 sense. Cf. Pol. 1252 a, 17 κατὰ τὴν
 ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Some, however,
 translate 'the method which has
 hitherto guided us.' There is no
 difficulty in taking the perfect parti-
 ciple of a deponent in a passive sense,
 though this is avoided in other tenses.

§ 11. ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν κ.τ.λ.
 Note the motive assigned. It is most
 important all through the discussion
 of the ἀρεταί to remember that Aris-
 totle's aim is not mere description,
 and still less to set up ideal types
 for our edification. It is to show
 that the ἀρεταί are all μεσότητες and
 therefore imply a ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων.
 This must be shown in small things
 as in great.

οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ' ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἐνε-
12 κα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές
ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, 20
ἡ δὲ προσποίησης ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ
ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ
13 εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος
εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπεία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βω-
μολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων 25
ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ
τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσό-
της φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρε-
σκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
14 καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ 30
ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ
αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλ-
λων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
15 ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμε- 35
σις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ 1108^b
λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας
γινόμενας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνα-
ξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ
πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ 5

ἔστι πρὸς τὰς συκοφαντίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν
διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δ' ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἕξεων
λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

§ 14. ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is exactly
equivalent to περὶ τὰ πάθη. For ἐν
c. dat. i. q. περὶ c. acc. cf. Ind. s.v.
περί; and for the declension of πάθος
in the plural cf. Ind. s.v. These
μεσότητες differ from e.g. ἀνδρεία and
σωφροσύνη in not being ἕξεις, but
mere παθητικαὶ ποιότητες (cf. 1105 b,
21 n.). It is interesting to note,

however, that the principle of μεσότης
applies here too.

§ 15. νέμεσις is the feeling of
satisfaction at people getting their
deserts. It is not further discussed
in EN., but its association with αἰδὼς
is as old as Homer. Here too our
principle holds good.

λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρει. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ 16
 ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς
 λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἐκατέρας ἐροῦμεν
 πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· [ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν
 10 ἀρετῶν].

VIII. Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς
 μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς
 τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταιί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ
 15 μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλατ- 2
 τον μείζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι
 ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρά-
 ξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνε-
 20 ται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων
 πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον

1108 b, 11. EE. 1222 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ
 τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστα διά-
 8011 κεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς,
 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητα
 εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσ' ἅττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς.
 ἔσται δ' ἡ μεσότης ὅτε μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις),
 ὅτε δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὅτε δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέραις. ὁ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλον τῷ χαίρειν
 τῷ ἡδεῖ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἀπλῶς
 ἡ πρὸς τινα ὅρον, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς τοιοῦτος ἔσται ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ὥστε τοῦ

§ 16. ὁμοίως...ἀρετῶν. The term λογικαὶ ἀρεταὶ occurs nowhere else in Aristotle, and the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ are not μεσότητες.

VIII. § 1. Τριῶν δὴ κ.τ.λ. The question of the nature of the ἀντίθεσις between the three conditions is of cardinal importance to Aristotle. The extremes are opposite to each other and also to the means. We shall see that Speusippos made much of this

and drew unwarrantable conclusions from it. It is necessary to guard against such arguments as that, since intemperance is a vice, insensibility must be a virtue.

διαθέσεων, not distinguishable from ἕξεων. Cf. 1106 a, 6 n.

§ 2. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον κ.τ.λ., the stock illustration of this form of ἀντίθεσις. Cf. 1153 b, 5.

ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσω-
 3 τος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται
 τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι
 τὸν ἀνδρείον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ 25
 4 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις
 τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ
 πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων
 ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν
 5 τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον 30
 ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς
 τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα. τοῖς
 δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεῖ-
 στον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ
 6 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον 35

αὐτοῦ πράγματος οὗ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
 ἀνάγκη, ὡς ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἑξέεις
 ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ.

ΕΕ. 1234 a, 34 ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ
 ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδετέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ
 πολλάκις μετ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασυδείλοι, καὶ τὰ
 μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν
 γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ᾖσιν, οἱ μέσοι γίνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστί
 πως τὰ ἄκρα.

ΕΕ. 1222 a, 22 συμβαίνει μέντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ἔνθα μὲν
 φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσας, ἔνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ
 τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν. αἷτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ὅτι οὐκ αἰεὶ ἐπὶ
 ταῦτα (?) τῆς ἀνισότητος ἢ ὁμοιότητος (?) πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν
 θᾶττον ἂν μεταβαίῃ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσῃν ἕξιν, ὅτε δ' ἀπὸ
 τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ἥς <ὅς> πλέον ἀπέχει οὗτος δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι,
 οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἢ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς
 ἐλλείψεως καὶ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἢ ἔλλειψις ὑπερ-
 βολῆς. ὥστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικαὶ ἑξέεις αἱ φιλογυμναστικαὶ φιλοῦγιεῖς

§ 5. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is
 another peculiarity which has a great
 interest for Aristotle, and is worked
 out in detail with regard to each ἀρετή.
 It is evident that rashness is 'liker'
 courage than cowardice is. This again

shows we are not dealing with mere
 quantity.

τὰ δὲ πλείστον κ.τ.λ. The full
 definition of ἐναντία is τὰ πλείστον
 ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 γένει (Cat. 6 a, 18).

1109^a ἀντικείται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ
 ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή
 οὔσα ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ
 οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὔσα ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ-
 5 βολή οὔσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν 7
 μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
 καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ
 τὸναναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον
 10 δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέ-
 χοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν 8
 οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ῥέπομέν πως, ταῦτα
 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον
 15 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν

μᾶλλον ἔσονται καθ' ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἔνθα μὲν αἱ πολυπονώτεραι,
 ἔνθα δ' αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς ὁ λόγος
 ἔνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπονος καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἔνθα δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς καὶ οὐχ ὁ
 πεινητικὸς. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθύς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα
 ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἦττον μὲν φιλόπονοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον
 δ' ἀπολαυστικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ
 τίθεμεν τὴν ἑξὶν ἐφ' ἣν τε ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν οἱ πολλοί
 (ἡ δ' ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὔσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναίσθητος
 ἐστίν), οἷον ὀργὴν πραότητι καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πράγι. καίτοι ἐστὶν
 ὑπερβολή καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴλεων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ
 ὀργίζεσθαι ῥαπιζόμενον. ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐπ' ἐκείνο δὲ πάντες
 ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον.

1109 a, 1. EE. 1234 b, 6 αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν
 ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν
 καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· αἷτια δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα

§ 7. ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. This
 αἷτια is generally given in some such
 short form as χειρὸν γάρ. So 1122 a, 14
 (μειζὸν ἐστὶ κακόν), 1125 a, 34 (χειρὸν
 ἐστίν), 1126 a, 31 (οἱ χαλεποὶ χειρὸν),
 1127 b, 32 (χειρὸν γάρ).

§ 8. ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. This second
 αἷτια is made use of 1122 a, 15 (μᾶλλον

ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν), 1125 a, 34
 (καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον), 1126 a, 30
 (καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπι-
 κώτερον γάρ), 1151 b, 30 (διὰ τὸ τὴν
 ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις εἶναι φανεράν).

ῥέπομεν, Professor Bywater's con-
 jecture for ἔχομεν K^b, πεφύκαμεν L^b.
 Contr. p. 30. Cf. EE. above.

πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὕσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

ΙΧ. "Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ 20 πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλείψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἰκα- 2 νῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστω γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παν- 25 τὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ὧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ 3 καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν 30 ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
νῆα.

δύο, ὀλιγότης τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθήτων, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ο ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἦττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος (?) καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

a, 20. EE. 1222 b, 5 ἐπεὶ δ' εἴληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξεων καθ' ἕκαστα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων, καθ' ἃς ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον), φανερόν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶ, καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ λυπαὶ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕξεων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε βελτίστη ἕξις ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα μέση ἐστίν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἔσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων.

ἐπίδοσις, 'growth,' tr. 'in the direction of our growth.'

ΙΧ. § 1. "Οτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. After the recapitulation which, as usual, breaks the argument, we have some

practical rules for attaining the mean. This is a practical science.

§ 3. πρῶτον μὲν, Rule I.

ἡ Καλυψώ. The words are really said by Odysseus, Od. xii, 219. Some

33 τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἥττον·
 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπὸν, κατὰ τὸν δεύ- 4
 35 τερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. τοῦτο
 1109^b δ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ
 δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν—ἄλλοι γὰρ
 πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς
 ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοῦναν- 5
 5 τίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ
 ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα
 τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλα- 6
 κτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν
 αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην,
 10 τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι
 τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπό-
 μενοι ἥττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὥς ἐν κε- 7
 φαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν.
 χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ
 15 γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πό-
 στον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείπον-
 τας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαί-
 νοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ 8
 παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὗτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὗτ' ἐπὶ τὸ
 20 ἥττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος
 καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ

inferior MSS. have Κίρκη which is more nearly right, as it is Circe's warning which Odysseus is communicating to the steersman. Aristotle, like Plato, quotes Homer from memory and often makes slips like this.

§ 4. τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως has almost the effect of an oxymoron. But τὸ μέσον is ἄκρον πῶς.

κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 99 d τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν,

Menander says—

ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δῆπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχη τις οὐρίου κώπαισι πλεῖν.

σκοπεῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Rule II.

§ 5. τὰ διεστραμμένα, from Plato Protag. 325 d ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσι.

§ 6. ἐν παντὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Rule III. πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην. See II. iii, 156.

§ 8. ὁ μὲν μικρὸν...παρεκβαίνων. The verb παρεκβαίνειν is the *vox propria* for any deviation from a μεσότης (cf. 1160 a, 31 n.). Aristotle is here stating in a popular form his doctrine that the μεσότης is not an indivisible point but has magnitude. Cf. 1155 b, 14 n.

ἐπὶ πόσον, sc. παρεκβαίνων, cf. the parallel passage 1126 a, 32 sqq.

γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 9 ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο
 δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ἔξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ
 δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν· 25
 οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα...ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει. The first ἐν expresses the *matter*, the second that on which the *κρίσις* depends.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσις. In Aristotle's psychology, αἰσθησις is a δύναμις σύμφυτος κριτική (An. Post. 99 b, 35). We do not perceive what is ὁμοίως θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, but only the ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἑλλειψιν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶον μεσότητός τινος οὐσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως (De An. 424 a, 4). Just in the same way the good man, the man who has been well trained, will at once 'feel' any serious

deflexion from the mean, any excess or defect in feelings and actions. He will feel that he is too angry or not angry enough, just as he might feel that his bath is too warm or too cool. No general rules can be given for particular cases (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα). We must trust to the trained habit of feeling in a mean. On the Aristotelian theory of the moral 'sense,' cf. 1113 a, 1. 1126 b, 4. 1142 a, 26 sqq. 1143 b, 5. 1147 a, 26. 1149 a, 35.

§ 9. δηλοῖ intrans. = δηλόν ἐστι, as often.

BOOK III.

THE WILL.—COURAGE, TEMPERANCE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our deliberative analysis of Happiness has shown us that it mainly depends upon goodness of character, and we have seen that goodness of character is produced by habituation. We had to ask in the next place what quality our acts must have if their repetition is to produce goodness of character, and we found that acts which are to produce goodness must be of the same quality as the acts which proceed from goodness when it is formed. This made it necessary for us to define goodness, that is, to ascertain its "formal cause," and now that this is done, the next step will clearly be to discuss its "efficient cause."

It cannot be said that this connexion of thought is explicitly marked by Aristotle himself, and the commentators have generally failed to see it. But we must always remember that the reasons given by Aristotle for undertaking any inquiry are not necessarily or even usually the real motives of that inquiry. It is characteristic of him (1) to keep the metaphysical groundwork of his practical science in the background as much as possible, and (2) to enumerate all the incidental advantages, especially those of a practical character, that are likely to follow from the discussion. We shall have occasion to notice this peculiarity more than once in the sequel.

§ 2. In the first place, then, it is clear that a good act must be voluntary. An act of which we can truly say "I couldn't help it" is neither a sign of character nor productive of it. We must first of all, then, determine the limits of the voluntary. This was a question much discussed in the Athenian courts, especially in

connexion with charges of homicide. Homicide was primarily a religious offence since it carried with it religious impurity or blood-guiltiness, and therefore every form of it, from the accidental or involuntary up to deliberate murder, came under the cognisance of the courts. The speeches of Antiphon are specially instructive with regard to the moral consciousness of the Athenian dikast on this subject, and it is from this, in accordance with his usual method, that Aristotle starts. For us the chief interest of the discussion lies in his anticipation of some of the most important distinctions of Roman and later law. This goes far to justify his claim to be regarded as a teacher of lawgivers. It would have been well for Athens if law had been administered consistently on principles such as those here laid down.

§ 3. It is clear, however, that to call an act voluntary is merely a negative description of it. The acts of children and the lower animals may be voluntary in the sense that they are not done under compulsion or from ignorance; but they are not acts in the full sense of the word at all, and are therefore no sign of character. To be this an act must be willed, that is it must be "intended" or deliberately adopted as a means to some end which forms the object of a wish. This distinction too was already recognised by the Athenian law of homicide, which distinguished *φόνος ἐκ προνοίας* from ordinary homicide even of the voluntary kind. What we want, then, as the efficient cause of action is something related to acts in general as what lawyers call "malice" is related to wrong-doing. This Aristotle calls by the name *προαίρεσις*, a word which was much used in his own day to express the deliberate adoption of any course of conduct or line of action.

By a piece of dialectical argument we are led to see that Will—for this is after all the best rendering of the word—is neither a purely intellectual nor a purely appetitive function. It is the union of an intellectual element, Deliberation, with an appetitive element, Wish. Further, as we only deliberate about things "in our power," we may say that it is a "deliberative appetite of things in our power."

§ 4. We have come at last in our deliberation to something in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῶν*), and so our practical analysis of a good act is complete. The only doubt which can arise as to the question whether an act of will is in our power or not is with regard to

the object of Wish. Is it in our power to wish for the good? Aristotle answers this question in the affirmative, though with an important qualification. It is character that determines the object of wish, and character is produced by activities which are willed and therefore voluntary. We have, therefore, the formation of character in our own hands, though it is true that when the character is once formed we may not be able to change it.

The efficient cause of action, then, is Will. In willing man is an efficient cause just as he is the efficient cause of his children (*ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*). To produce Happiness we have only to reverse the order of the series which our deliberative analysis has revealed; though, as our aim is to produce it for the State, that is, for others, we have not yet fully solved the problem with which we started.

§ 5. Now that we know what goodness of character is, the next step will be to go through all its recognised forms and show that our account holds good of each. If we are right we must be able to show that every kind of goodness has as its matter some feeling or act which admits of quantitative determination, that it has as its form a "mean" or proportion in the sense explained, and that its efficient cause is a deliberative wish or will.

So far as we can trace any principle in Aristotle's treatment of the various forms of goodness, he seems to proceed from the more self-regarding virtues to those which have to do with others. This can be the only reason for separating justice from its usual companions Courage and Temperance. The reason given for taking the two latter first is purely "exoteric." They are, we are told, the forms of goodness proper to the "irrational parts," i.e. Temper and Desire, a purely Academic "division."

We notice at once in the treatment of Courage and Temperance a striking difference between Aristotle and Plato. Plato always tries to extend the scope of these virtues as widely as he can, while Aristotle's chief endeavour is to narrow them down to their most literal meaning. Partly, no doubt, this may be attributed to a difference of temperament between the two thinkers, but it is primarily due to the different objects each was aiming at. Plato was seeking for principles of universal application to life, Aristotle is looking for facts by which to test his theory of goodness, and it was important for that purpose to have facts as definite and unmistakeable as possible.

Γ

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ 30
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ
δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκού-
σιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
2 ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς
τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.

35

3 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα· 1110^a
βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμ-

1109 b, 30. EE. 1223 a, 9 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ
τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά (ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ
ἐπαινεῖται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλ'
ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἵτιοι ἐσμέν· ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἷτιος, ἐκείνος καὶ τὸν
ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ
ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν αὐτὸς αἷτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. ληπτέον ἄρα ποίων
αὐτὸς αἷτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσα μὲν
ἐκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐκάστου, ἐκείνον αἷτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ'
ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἷτιον. πάντα δ' ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἐκὼν δῆλον
ὅτι. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐκουσίων ἂν
εἴησαν.

1110 a, 1. EE. 1224 a, 10 τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ

I. § 1. Τῆς ἀρετῆς, sc. τῆς ἠθικῆς.
συγγνώμης...ἐλέου. Cf. Antiphon
e.g. Περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόνου § 92 τὰ
μὲν ἀκούσια τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἔχει
συγγνώμην, τὰ δ' ἐκούσια οὐκ ἔχει.

§ 2. χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. A
characteristic touch. Aristotle never
forgets that we are learning to be
lawgivers.

§ 3. βία...δι' ἄγνοιαν. Aristotle
is followed by all subsequent writers
in making compulsion and ignorance
the two conditions of an act being
regarded as involuntary.

ἡ ἀρχή, sc. ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις.

τοιαύτη οὖσα κ.τ.λ. The effect of
this restriction to cases where the
agent contributes nothing to the mo-

βάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι
 ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων 4
 5 κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι
 αἰσχροῦν τι πράξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πρά-
 ξαντος μὲν σφύζονται μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ἀμφισ-
 βήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ 5

ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναί φαμεν. ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βία σκεπτέον πρῶτον
 τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον
 καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικείμεναι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ
 τῇ πειθοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω
 βία καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμεν, ταῦτα δ' ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει
 καὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρεται, οὐ βία, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκούσια λέγεται,
 ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμος ἢ ἀντίθεσις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βία φαμέν. ὁμοίως
 δὲ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁρῶμεν βία πολλὰ καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ
 ποιῶντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν ἐξωθέν τι κινή. ἐν μὲν τοῖς
 ἀψύχοις ἀπλῇ ἢ ἀρχῇ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἡ
 ὁρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ. ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπλοῦν
 τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὁρεξιν
 ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὁρέξει ζῇ). ἐν δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω, καὶ ἐν
 τινι ἡλικίᾳ, ἣ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν. οὐ γὰρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίον
 πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη διὰ λογισμόν πράττοντα.
 δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεὶς βία μὲν ποιεῖ χαίρων
 δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις
 ἐστίν· ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμᾶς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὐτῷ πράττει, ὥσθ' ὁ τ'
 ἐγκρατὴς βία, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν (ἀλγεῖ
 γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντιτείνουσιν τὴν ὁρεξιν), ὁ τ' ἀκρατὴς βία παρὰ
 τὸν λογισμόν. ἥττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ἣ
 ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων, ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἐκὼν καὶ οὐ βία, ὅτι οὐ
 λυπηρῶς. ἡ δὲ πειθὼ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται. ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς
 ἐφ' ᾧ πέπεισται ἄγει, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βία ἀλλ' ἐκὼν. ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία

tive cause is to limit compulsion as a condition of the involuntary to actual *vis maior*. Where the agent contributes to the cause, the case is more complicated. The contribution may be of two kinds, either fear of greater evils (*metus*, 'duress *per minas*') or hope of greater goods, as in the case

of the man who does a wrong thing to save his parents or children. Are these voluntary agents?

ἢ ὁ πάσχων. This is added as a sort of correction. It is really a *páthos*, not a *prāxis*.

§ 4. ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει, 'admits of dispute.'

τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ 10
 6 τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν

οὐ πείσασα ἄγει· οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι
 μόνοι βία καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ὅτι καθ' ὁμοιότητά
 τινα τοῦ βία, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται· οὐ μὴν
 ἀλλ' εἴ τις προσθῇ τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον, κακεῖ λύεται τὸ
 λεχθέν. ὅταν μὲν γάρ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν κινήῃ ἢ
 ἡρεμίζῃ, βία φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μή, οὐ βία. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ
 ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ὁρμὴ ἐνοῦσα ἄγει—ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχει—ὥστ' οὐ βία
 οὐδέτερος ἀλλ' ἐκὼν διὰ γε ταῦτα πράττοι ἄν, οὐδ' ἀναγκαζόμενος. τὴν
 γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἀρχήν, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ ἐμποδίζουσιν ἢ κινουσαν,
 ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτει τινὰ
 ἀντιτείνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ὅταν δ' ἔσωθεν ἢ
 ἀρχή, οὐ βία. ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι. καὶ γὰρ
 ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ
 χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφελήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἡδὴ
 ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος
 οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἷεται γὰρ κακὸν
 πράττειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν βία ἐκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν
 ὁρεξίν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκάτερον ἄκοντά ποτε πράττειν· κεχωρισ-
 μένα γὰρ ὄντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν
 ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχὴν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ
 μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἢ δ' ὅλη ἐκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ
 τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν
 ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφοτέρα ἔχομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος
 φύσει ὑπάρχει, ὅτι ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται,
 καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστιν. σχεδὸν
 δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε ὅσα εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις
 ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίγνεται
 ἡμῖν, οἷον πολιά καὶ γῆρας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὥστε μὴ κατὰ
 φύσιν ἐκάτερος πράττει, ἀπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν.

§ 5. ἐκβολάς, *mercium iacturas*. In a contract quoted by Demosthenes against Lakritos § 11, we have the reservation πλὴν ἐκβολῆς ἣν ἂν οἱ σύμπλοι ψηφισάμενοι κοινῇ ἐκβάλωνται. ἀπλῶς is to be taken closely with ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν. 'No one, except

in special circumstances, voluntarily sacrifices his property.' The word ἀπλῶς merely marks the absence of qualifying circumstances, such as are indicated in the clause ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ κ.τ.λ.

§ 6. μικταί, because the efficient

αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, εἰκάσι δὲ μάλλον ἐκούσιος· αἵρεται
 γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ
 τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὅτε
 15 πράττει λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἐκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ
 κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἐστιν· ὦν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν
 καὶ μή. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια·
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ 7
 20 ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν
 αἰσχροὺν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ κα-
 λῶν, ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεί-

1110 a, 11. EE. 1225 a, 2 λέγονται δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον βία
 καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πράξαι, οὐ διαφωνοῦντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὁρέξεως,
 ὅταν πράττωσιν ὃ καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ἂν
 μὴ τοῦτο πράττωσι, πληγαὶ ἢ δεσμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὦσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ
 φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πράξαι. ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἐκόντες ποιοῦσιν
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο; ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ὑπομείναι τὸ πάθος.
 ἔτι ἴσως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δ' οὐ. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ
 τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι, αἰεὶ ὅσα πράττει ἂ μὴ βούλεται,

cause lies partly outside the agent (the tyrant's order or the storm) and is partly contributed by the agent (fear and desire).

αἵρεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'they are preferable at the time of the action, and the end of the act varies with the occasion.' We cannot call an act which is at a given moment the preferable alternative an involuntary act, simply because, regarded apart from the circumstances (ἀπλῶς), it would not be performed. 'We must use the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary* with reference to the time of the act.'

ὅτε πράττει. This use of the third person in an indefinite sense is specially common after *ei*, *ὅτε* etc. Zell quotes 1117 b, 16. 1128 b, 26. 1130 a, 29. 1132 b, 28. 1139 b, 33. 1141 b, 18. 1164 a, 15. 1166 b, 23. 1175 b, 8.

καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. There is no *force majeure* and therefore no compulsion. The agent is free to move his limbs or not. In the 'Parts of Animals' Aristotle distinguishes the 'instrumental parts' of the body from the 'sensory' parts (*αἰσθητήρια*) and the *περιττώματα* (secretions and excretions). Zeller (Eng. Trans. vol. II, p. 39).

ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια, 'though they may be involuntary if we regard them apart from the special circumstances of the case.' They are not *αἵρετά per se* (καθ' αὐτά), though they may become so as an alternative to something else.

§ 7. καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται. The fact that praise is sometimes given to such acts shows they must be voluntary.

ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, i.e. if they accept great dishonour for a trifling advantage.

ναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαι-
 νος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ
 τις ἂ μὴ δεῖ, ἂ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μη- 25
 8 δεῖς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντα τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ
 γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγ-
 9 κάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι
 ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι 30
 δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ
 πολὺ ἔστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἂ δ' ἀναγκάζον-
 ται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς
 10 ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς 1110 b

ἐκὼν πράττει καὶ οὐ βία· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων, βία πῶς,
 οὐ μέντοι γ' ἀπλῶς, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρεῖται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ
 ἔνεκα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τις διαφορά. εἰ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ λάβῃ
 ψηλαφῶν ἀποκτεῖνοι, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βία καὶ ἀναγκαζό-
 μενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μείζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι, ὃ πείσεται μὴ
 ποιήσας. οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ [μὴ] βία πράξει, ἢ οὐ φύσει,
 ὅταν κακὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἔνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ
 ἄκων γε· οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον
 τιθέασιν, καὶ θυμοὺς ἐνίους καὶ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν
 φύσιν· καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὥς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν.
 καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειε βία καὶ ἄκων πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ

ἐπ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. In this case the act is all but involuntary; for the agent's contribution is at a *minimum*. It is only the weakness inseparable from human nature.

§ 8. ἔνια δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. Still, even in this case, the act is not really involuntary; for there is no external compulsion, and the act may be such that the most painful death is preferable and will, therefore, be faced voluntarily.

τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα. The Aldine scholiast quotes the lines—

μάλιστα μὲν μ' ἐπὴρ' ἐπισκήψας
 πατήρ,

ὅθ' ἄρματ' εἰσέβαινε ἐλς Θήβας
 ἰών.

Alkmeon killed his mother Eriphyle to escape the curse of his father Amphiarao. The lines quoted below 1136 a, 13 on the same subject probably come from the 'Alkmaion' too. See note in loc.

§ 9. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ. The fact of the difficulty and of the consequent praise or blame proves the acts voluntary.

§ 10. τὰ δὲ ποῖα κ.τ.λ. This is a recapitulation rather than a duplicate passage.

μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ καὶ ὁ πράττων μη-
 δὲν συμβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν
 δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι,
 5 καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια.
 μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ
 ῥᾶδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 10 ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια 11
 εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια·
 τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν
 βία καὶ ἄκουτες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν
 μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ
 αὐτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν
 15 καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βί- 12

ἵνα μὴ ἡρέμα, καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα [μὴ] χαίρῃ. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὅλον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἷα τε φέρειν·
 ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷα τε, μὴδ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὀρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ
 ἐφ' αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, καίπερ διανοίας
 ἔργον ποιῶντας, ὅμως οὐ φαμεν ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι, οὐτ' εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον,
 οὔτε πράξαι ἃ ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε καὶ
 διάνοιαί τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς
 τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμούς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναί τινας
 λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.

νῦν is equivalent to ὅτε πράττει
 above and opposed to ἀπλῶς, ἀντὶ
 τῶνδε is opposed to καθ' αὐτά.

αἱ γὰρ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This is
 fundamental. There is no such thing
 as an act which is not this particular
 act in these particular circumstances.
 It is, therefore, a false way of speak-
 ing to say that a certain class of acts
 is involuntary. An act performed is
 always *this* act. Hence too the diffi-
 culty; for there can be no scientific
 rules about particulars.

§ 11. εἰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ. A caution
 against an error which language is
 apt to lead us into. The truth is that

it is not τὰ καλὰ or τὰ ἡδέα which are
 the motive or efficient cause of our
 acts, but our own ὄρεξις, which is an
 internal, not an external, ἀρχή.

καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν κ.τ.λ. This
 distinction in our attitude towards
 τὰ καλὰ and τὰ ἡδέα has not been
 mentioned above, but the want of
 logical connexion is merely formal.
 Aristotle is dealing with real life, and
 we know that it is only bad acts of
 which men try to shake off the re-
 sponsibility in this way. No one ever
 declines to be responsible for a fine
 act on the ground that it was so fine
 he couldn't help doing it.

αιον εἶναι οὐ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

- 13 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν 20 μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ἤδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν.
- 14 ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ 25 γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἄλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἀ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως
- 15 κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις 30 ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου

1110 b, 18. EE. 1225 a, 36 ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ ὀρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἐκούσιον ὥριται, λοιπὸν δὴ ὀρίσασθαι τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ,

§ 13. Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. We now pass to Ignorance, the second condition of the Involuntary, and consider the limits of its application.

ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. If he is not sorry for the act, he makes it his own by his acquiescence in it. Cf. the plea in Antiphon, Τετρ. B, β, 8 οὐ συνηδομένων μὲν οὐδὲ συνεθελόντων ἡμῶν, συναλγούντων δὲ καὶ συλλυπούμενων.

τοῦ δὲ...ὁ μὲν...ὁ δὲ... For the construction cf. 1127 a, 7.

οὐχ ἐκὼν, 'non-voluntary' as opposed to 'involuntary.' The contradictory is substituted for the contrary.

§ 14. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε κ.τ.λ. To be involuntary the act must be performed not merely *in* ignorance but *from* ignorance.

ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not the case of the ἀκρατής who knows the right and does the wrong, but that of the ἀκόλαστος to whom wrong is right.

§ 15. βούλεται λέγεσθαι, 'really means.'

ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια...οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου. Grant and Stewart seem right in refusing to draw a distinction between these two in the present passage. Ignorance shown in the deliberate preference of bad acts to good, and ignorance of the universal rules of conduct, come to the same thing, ignorance of the major premiss of the practical syllogism. Προαίρεσις has nothing to do with the minor premiss as such.

(ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν
 1111^a οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ
 συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
 ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς 16
 τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἡ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ
 5 τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς,
 οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν 17
 ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα·
 πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσκειν ἂν τις, οἷον
 †λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπείσειν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρ-

καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὃν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ'
 οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιαῖδες, ἥτοι ὡς τοδὶ
 μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα
 καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὃ δι' ἄγνοιαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν,
 καὶ ὃ καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὃν, ἀκούσιον· τὸ ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐκούσιον. ὅσα μὲν οὖν
 ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὃν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν, ἐκούσια
 ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν, καὶ διὰ
 τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἐν
 μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ
 ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως < ἂν > ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον
 εἰ δι' ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρήτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἂν, εἰ ὁ
 ῥάδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν μὴ ἔχει δι' ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. ταῦτ'
 οὖν προσδιοριστέον.

ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, i.e. ignorance of the minor premiss of the practical syllogism.

ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ, 'the persons or things which are the objects of the acts.' As we cannot use πράττω by itself with an external object accusative, we are forced to use a prepositional equivalent. Thus ἐν οἷς πράττομεν means the persons *on* whom we act.

§ 16. τίς, 'the agent'; τί, 'the act'; περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι, 'the object'; τίνι, 'the instrument'; ἔνεκα τίνος, 'the effect'; πῶς, 'the manner.' The phrase ἔνεκα τίνος does not mean that the agent may be ignorant of the

right end,—that would be ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια,—but merely that from ignorance he performs an act which leads to a different result from the one intended. He performs an act ἔνεκα σωτηρίας which, but for his ignorance, he would only perform for the sake of destroying its object. Cf. 1135 b, 14.

§ 17. τὸν πράττοντα, i.e. τίς πράττει.

λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπείσειν. The simplest way of dealing with this *locus vexatissimus* is to delete αὐτούς, and to translate 'they say they were put out (or 'flustered') when speaking,' and so did not know what they were

ρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος 10
 ἀφείναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν
 υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι
 τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ
 σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείναι ἄν· καὶ θίξαι βουλόμενος,
 18 ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὲ 15
 ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, [ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις,] ὁ τούτων τι

saying. The verb ἐκπίπτειν is sufficiently attested in this sense, though not common, and is doubtless a metaphor from the chariot-race (ἐκπίπτειν ζεύγους, λόγου). A clear instance is Lucian, Nigrinos § 77 πολλῇ συγχύσει καὶ ἱλίγγῳ κατειλημμένος, τοῦτο μὲν ἰδρῶτι κατερρεόμην, τοῦτο δὲ φθέγγασθαι βουλόμενος ἐξέπιπτόν τε καὶ ἀνεκοπτόμην, καὶ ἡ τε φωνὴ ἐξέλειπε καὶ ἡ γλῶττα διημάρτανεν. This is just the condition in which a man ἀγνοεῖ τί πράττει. This interpretation, though it has been neglected, is old; for Heliodorus has λέγοντας γὰρ περὶ ἄλλων συγχυθῆναι φασιν, καὶ τι καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων παραφθέγγασθαι, and Camerarius renders *non esse apud se*. There is no authority for ἐκπίπτειν c. acc. in the sense implied by the common version 'they say it escaped them unawares while they were speaking' (reading λέγοντας and αὐτούς).

ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος. This is the earliest reference to the accusation of Aeschylus for revealing the mysteries. Aspasio tells us that Herakleides of Pontos gave the details in Book 1. of his Περὶ Ὀμήρου. The indiscretions complained of were in the Τοξοτίδες, Ἰέρειαι, Σίσυφος, Ἰφιγενεία and Οἰδίπους.

ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος κ.τ.λ. This may refer to some rhetorical exercise on φόνος ἐκούσιος in the style of Antiphon's Tetralogies.

οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ. Ignorance of the object (ἐν τίνι ἡ πράξις). For

ἀγνοία of the person as a πρόφασις of συγγνώμη, cf. Dem. Meid. § 38.

ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη. Cf. Poet. 1454 a, 5 ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν· ἀποκτείνει δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν.

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι... κίσσηριν εἶναι. Ignorance of the instrument (τίνι). Xenophon (Eq. viii, 10) speaks of ἀκόντια ἐσφαιρωμένα.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας. We see from a, 5 above that this is the explanation of what is there called ignorance of the οὐ ἔνεκα. For the reading here see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. In MM. 1188 b, 31 a similar illustration is given—οἷόν φασί ποτέ τινα γυναῖκα φίλτρον τινὶ δοῦναι πιεῖν, εἶτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ φίλτρον, τὴν δ' ἄνθρωπον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποφυγεῖν κ.τ.λ. There is a case just like this in Antiphon Κατηγορία φαρμακείας κατὰ τῆς μητρύας. Cf. § 9 οὐκ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ φάσκουσιν διδόναι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ φίλτροις. See also EE. 1225 b, 4 quoted on p. 118.

θίξαι βουλόμενος. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. The word means 'just to touch' and is appropriate in connexion with 'sparring.' The mistake here is ignorance of the manner (πῶς). The man thinks he is touching ἡρέμα, whereas he really strikes σφόδρα.

§ 18. ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. I bracket these words with Ramsauer. They are awkward here and occur in their proper place two lines below, where the phrase means, as it ought to do,

ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου 19
20 λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μετα-
μελείᾳ.

Ὅντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκού- 20
σιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότες τὰ καθ'
ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκού- 21
25 σια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ 22
οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες·
εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν 23

1111 a, 24. EE. 1223 a, 21 ληπτέον ἄρα τί τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀκούσιον, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία ὀρίζεται τούτοις. πρῶτον σκεπτέον τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. τριῶν δὲ τούτων ἓν τι δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι, ἢτοι κατ' ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον κατὰ τούτων τι, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον παρὰ τούτων τι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταῦτα διαιρετέον, καὶ πρῶτον κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

δόξειε δ' ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον, τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐνός φησι

πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφν,

ὥστ' εἴ τι λυπηρόν, βίαιον, καὶ εἰ βίαιον, λυπηρόν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος), ὥστε βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτ'

the object of the act. It is true, indeed, that in § 20 it seems to be used in a wider sense to include all the particular circumstances of the act other than the agent, but this will hardly justify its use in two meanings within the limits of the same sentence.

§ 21. ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference is to Plato's Laws 863 b, sqq. where the discussion of τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον starts from the enumeration of three αἰτίαι τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, viz. θυμός, ἡδονή and ἄγνοια.

§ 23. εἴτα πότερον κ.τ.λ. There are certain acts proceeding from temper or desire which ought to be performed, and for the performance of which we are praised. It is absurd to say that such acts are involuntary; for there is no sense in saying that it is right to perform an involuntary act. Are we, then, to adopt the convenient doctrine that only the bad acts which proceed from temper and desire are involuntary while the good acts are voluntary? On what principle can we

καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροῦ ἀκου-
 24 σίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἑνὸς γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ
 ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι 30
 ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινων, οἷον ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως.
 25 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυ-
 26 μίαν ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ

ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι ἢ μοχθηρία ἀδικώτερον πᾶσα ποιεῖ, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία
 μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἀκρατὴς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν
 λογισμὸν οἷος πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτήν, τὸ δ'
 ἀδικεῖν ἐκούσιον, ὥσθ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἀδικήσῃ τῷ πράττειν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.
 ἐκὼν ἄρα πράξει, καὶ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ
 2 δικαιότεροι ἔσονται ἀκρατεῖς γενόμενοι. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν
 ἂν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοῦναντίον. ἅπαν
 γὰρ ὁ ἐκὼν τις πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὁ βούλεται ἐκὼν.
 βούλεται δ' οὐθεὶς ὁ οἶεται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος
 οὐχ ἂ βούλεται ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οἶεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν
 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν. ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν
 ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ἔτι δ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
 δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἢ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἢ
 δ' ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ. ἐγκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν πράττῃ παρὰ τὴν
 ἐπιθυμίαν κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ μὲν δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐκούσιον,
 ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (ἄμφω γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτα ἐκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη,
 εἰ θάτερον ἐκούσιον, καὶ θάτερον), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον,
 ἅμα ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἐκὼν καὶ ἄκων.

ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ. ἀκρασία γὰρ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ
 θυμοῦ δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν
 λυπηρόν, καὶ βίαιον ἢ κάθεξις, ὥστ' εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν
 θυμὸν ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη πᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν
 ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἢ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ· “χαλεπὸν
 γάρ,” φησι, “θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖται.” εἰ δ' ἀδύνατον τὸ
 αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν ἅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος,

justify this when we have admitted that both proceed from the same source?

§ 26. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. If, on the other hand, we say that all wrong acts proceeding from temper and desire are involuntary, and that the only voluntary misdeeds are those

which proceed from the rational part of us, we seem to be making an unwarrantable abstraction. ‘Irrational’ acts are, to say the least of it, as much incidents of human nature as the ‘rational,’ and it is absurd, therefore, for a human being to say he is not answerable for them.

λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω,
 1111^b δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα [πάθη], ὥστε 27
 καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
 ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

II. Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκούσιου καὶ τοῦ ἀκούσιου,
 5 περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἢ 2
 προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτὸν δέ, ἀλλ'

μᾶλλον ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν.
 τεκμήριον δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἐκόντες ἄνευ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

λείπεται ἄρα εἰ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ ἐκούσιον ταῦτὸ σκέψασθαι.
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ
 μοχθηρία ἀδικωτέρους ποιεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται.
 συμβήσεται δὲ τούναντίον, βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς ἃ οἴεται εἶναι
 κακά, πράττει δ' ὅταν γίνηται ἀκρατής. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν
 ἐκούσιον, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρατής γένηται,
 οὐκέτι ἀδικήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἔστι δικαιότερος ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀκρατής· τοῦτο
 δ' ἀδύνατον.

1111 b, 4. EE. 1225 b, 18 περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο
 λέγωμεν, διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.

EE. 1228 a, 11 ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν
 προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα—καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ
 ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς—ὅτι πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι,
 προαιρεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν
 ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποῖός τις.
 αἰρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δ' ἢ προαίρεσις. ἔκ τε
 τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.

§ 27. ἀνθρωπικός is used, like the
 Latin *humanus*, with special reference
 to the weaknesses of mere human
 nature.

τὰ ἄλογα, i.e. τὰ μὴ κατὰ λογισμὸν
 ἀμαρτηθέντα. The word *πάθη* is
 omitted by the first hand of the best
 MS. (K^b), and is better away. If we
 retain it, we must assume that *θυμός*
 and *ἐπιθυμία* are called *ἄλογα πάθη* in
 a loose popular way. Really, they
 are forms of *δρεξις*.

II. § 1. περὶ προαιρέσεως. See

Introductory note.

μᾶλλον...κρίνειν, 'to be a better
 test of character.' This has been
 shown above, 1105 a, 26 sqq.

§ 2. οὐ ταῦτὸν δέ. This distinction
 becomes of great importance later on
 in the discussion of moral weakness
 (*ἀκρασία*). A man may perform a
 wrong act voluntarily and therefore
 be fully answerable for it, and yet it
 may not show that his character is
 depraved. The acts of children and
 the lower animals are of this sort, and

ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ
τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης
3 ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες 10
αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εὐ-
κασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν
4 ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυ-
μῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνά-
5 παλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει 15
μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ
μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυ-
6 πηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἡττον· ἡκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ

ΕΕ. 1225 b, 19 διστάσειε γὰρ ἂν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν
ποιῶ θείναι αὐτὴν χρή, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταῦτόν τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ
προαιρετὸν ἢ ταῦτόν ἐστιν. μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ
ζητοῦντι δόξειε δ' ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἢ προαίρεσις, ἥτοι δόξα ἢ
ὄρεξις· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ
ἐστιν ὄρεξις φανερόν. ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός·
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μηθὲν πεπονθὼς τούτων. θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία
καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει, προαίρεσις δ' οὐ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἄμφω
ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς
πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ προαιροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν
καὶ θυμὸς αἰεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης.

so are acts done when we are taken unawares. Full moral, as distinct from legal, responsibility—to use a modern distinction—only arises when we adopt the act as our own as a means to the realisation of some end.

§ 3. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ. We do not know who gave these inadequate definitions or whether there is any reference to particular people at all. The passage is dialectical, and could be expanded into a Platonic dialogue on the model of the first part of the Theaitetos with its successive definitions of knowledge.

οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν κ.τ.λ. The argument is directed first of all to showing that προαίρεσις cannot be identified with

any form of appetite. In the first place, it cannot be the same as Temper or Desire; for they are found also in irrational creatures, while προαίρεσις is not. Observe that this argument does not apply to Wish, the third form of appetite; for it, like προαίρεσις, is only found in rational creatures.

§§ 4—5. The next three arguments are specially devoted to showing that προαίρεσις is not identical with Desire. For (1) in the case of the morally weak man and of the morally strong man we find a conflict between προαίρεσις and Desire. This is fully worked out in Book VII. (2) Desire never comes into conflict with Desire, but προαίρεσις does. This does not mean,

θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις 7
 20 γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
 ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
 ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ <καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον
 ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς 8
 δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν·
 25 προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι
 ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, 9
 ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα,
 προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα
 μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει· ὅλως
 30 γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ 10

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταῦτόν. βούλονται μὲν
 γὰρ ἔνια [ταῦτόν] καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι
 ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' ὅλως ἀδυνατὸν μὲν, μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ δ' οἴεται πράξαι ἢ μὴ
 πράξαι. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ τι εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδ' ἀπλῶς εἴ τις οἴεται
 τι. τῶν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τι ἦν τὸ προαιρετόν, δοξάζομεν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ
 τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον. ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι
 προαίρεσις ἀληθοῦς ἢ ψευδοῦς. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν
 δόξα, ἢ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν. κοινὸν

of course, that there can be no conflict of desires, but merely that there cannot be conflicting desires with regard to the same object. We cannot desire both to be asleep and to be awake; but we may desire to be asleep and intend to keep awake.

§ 6. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἡττον. If it cannot be identified with Desire, *a fortiori* it cannot be identified with Temper. Everyone can see that acts proceeding from Temper are *ἀπροαίρετα* in the highest degree.

§ 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. We have seen that Wish, the third form of appetite, is, like *προαίρεσις*, confined to rational beings; but we cannot identify *προαίρεσις* even with Wish.

For (1) we may wish for what we know to be impossible, but we cannot will it. (2) We may wish for what, though possible, is not in our own power, but we cannot will it. (3) We wish for the end, but we will the means.

<καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων. The *καὶ* comes from *Aspasios* and is confirmed by *EE.* above. See *Bywater, Contr.* p. 32.

§ 10. οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. We see, then, that *προαίρεσις* cannot be identified with any form of appetite, and that it is distinguished even from Wish by being confined to what is in our own power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*). We have now to consider the possibility of its being

- δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἡττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν
- 11 δόξῃ ταῦτόν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τινι· τῷ γὰρ 1112^a
- προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῖ τινὲς εἶμεν, τῷ δὲ
- 12 δοξάζειν οὐ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν [ἢ] τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς·
- 13 λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προ- 5
- αίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἂ μάλιστα
- 14 ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἂ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν· δοκοῦσι δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἂ 10
- 15 δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ,

δὲ περὶ δόξης τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· λέγω δ' οἷον οὐθεὶς ὑγιαίνειν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ περιπατεῖν ἢ καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἕνεκεν, οὐδ' εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἕνεκα· καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ αἰεὶ προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος, οὐ ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρεῖται ἕνεκα ἄλλου. βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, καὶ δοξάζει δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν. ὥστε φανερόν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ βουλήσεως. βούλεσθαι μὲν <γὰρ> καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

identified with the intellectual state known as Belief. In the first place, it cannot be identified with Belief in general; for that has to do with every kind of object, and not merely with things in our own power. Belief is true or false, while προαίρεσις is good or bad.

§ 11. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τινι. Nor can it be identified with any species of Belief, that is, not even with belief as to things in our own power as right or wrong. For (1) Belief does not determine character. (2) To believe

that a thing is good for us is not the same as to will it. (3) We praise a belief for its truth, an act of will for its rightness. (4) We only will what we are fairly sure is good for us, we believe without knowing very well. (5) We find that some persons have excellent beliefs, but that their προαίρεσις is bad.

§ 12. τι τῶν τοιούτων sc. ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 32.

§ 15. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται κ.τ.λ. This we shall find to be the case. The

οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτόν
 ἐστι δόξη τινί. τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων 16
 οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προ-
 15 αἰρετόν. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἢ γὰρ προ- 17
 αἵρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ
 τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

III. Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βου-
 λευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως 2
 20 βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινό-
 μενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς 3
 βουλεύεται, οἶον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
 πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, 4
 αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτ' αἰνομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ

dialectical argument, by showing that *προαίρεσις* cannot be identified either with appetite or thought in any form, prepares us for the view that it is the union of both.

§ 16. τί...ἢ ποῖόν τι; what is its genus and differentia?

ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. This gives the genus, the τί ἐστιν. τὸ προβεβουλευμένον. This word seems still to be chosen under the influence of Attic legal terminology. Antiphon, κατὰ τῆς μητρικῆς § 5, uses *προβουλή* as a synonym of *πρόνοια*. Cf. also the use of the verb below 1135 b, 10—20.

§ 17. μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας, 'is accompanied by a reason (ground) and thought,' i.e. is based upon consciousness of a ground.

ὡς ὃν, sc. τὸ προαἰρετόν. The fact that the object of *προαίρεσις* is a choice between two alternatives proves that it implies a λόγος; for it is only λόγος that can express at once a thing and its opposite. Cf. Met. quoted on p. 75.

III. § 1. Βουλευόνται δὲ κ.τ.λ. We have seen that *προαίρεσις* contains an intellectual element, namely Deliberation. We have first to examine this, and to determine its scope.

§ 3. περὶ...τῶν αἰδίων. The examples given show that the objects of First Philosophy (or Theology) and Mathematics are meant. Both of these are eternal and immovable, though the objects of the first are separate from matter (*χωριστά*), while those of the second are 'in matter,' though separated in thought. Met. 1026 a, 13 sqq. Zeller (Eng. trans.) I, 33.

περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. The κόσμος here means the spherical *πρῶτος οὐρανός*.

τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς. The incommensurability of the side of a square with its diagonal was the companion difficulty to the incommensurability of the diameter of a circle with its circumference, which makes it impossible to square the circle.

§ 4. περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει. These will be the objects of *ἀστρολογική* or *φυσική* according as they happen ἐξ ἀνάγκης or φύσει. The 'solstices and risings (of the constellations)' are an example of the first, the growth of an animal would be an example of the second.

φύσει ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατο- 25
 5 λῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμ-
 βρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως.
 6 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύ-
 θαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.
 7 οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ 30
 περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπίλοιπα.
 αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι
 δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι

1112 a, 18. EE. 1226 a, 17 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις
 οὔτε δόξα οὔθ' ὑπόληψις ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις, δῆλον· τί δὲ διαφέρει
 τούτων, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον; ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται καὶ τί
 ἔστι προαίρεσις. ἔστι δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα
 ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐκ ἐνδέ-
 χεται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν ἔστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἢ γένεσις ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας
 αἰτίας γίνεται, περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν·
 περὶ ὧν δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ * *
 βουλεύσασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστι
 πράξαι ἢ μὴ πράξαι. διὸ οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ
 πῶς ἂν ὁ κύκλος τετραγωνισθείη. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· τὸ δ'

§ 5. περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. This must be equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου. Rains and droughts are not regulated by an internal motive or efficient cause like organic growth. We have the phrase in Part. An. 641 b, 19 τὸ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν, where it is opposed to τεταγμένον.

περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης. When τύχη is distinguished from τὸ αὐτόματον, it is what happens by chance in the province of human thought or purpose. It is, in fact, related as an αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκός to Thought just as τὸ αὐτόματον is related to Nature. The finding of the treasure might have been due to design if the man had any reason to believe that there was

a treasure buried in his vineyard. See Bonitz on Met. 1065 a, 30.

§ 6. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. The successive elimination of Nature, Necessity and Chance from the sphere of Deliberation would leave us with the remaining cause, Man. But even here there is a limitation.

Σκύθαι. Eudemos substitutes 'Indians.' We may perhaps see in this a trace of the extension of the Macedonian Empire.

§ 7. ἐπίλοιπα. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 33.

αἰτίαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For this popular and traditional analysis of causation see Newman's 'Politics,' Introd. pp. 16—20.

ἕκαστοι, 'each class of men.'

βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς 8
 1112^b ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον
 περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον). ἀλλ'
 ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' αἰεί, περὶ τούτων βου-
 λεύομεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν,
 5 καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσῳ ἦττον
 διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ 9
 καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας. μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ
 αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 10
 πολὺ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς <τὸ πῶς δεῖ>
 10 ἀδιόριστον. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα,
 ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βου- 11

ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ πάντων
 (ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις ἐστίν). τὰ δὲ
 προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν
 ἂν τις τί δή ποθ' οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ βουλεύονται περὶ ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν
 ἐπιστήμην, οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὐ; αἴτιον δ' ὅτι διχῇ γινομένης τῆς
 ἀμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἀμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ
 δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἀμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ
 γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ ἧς ἂν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς
 ἀπειρον ἥξουσιν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησις [ἐστίν] προαίρεσις
 ἐστίν ὡς ἐκάτερον, οὐδ' ἄμφω (ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαίρεται μὲν οὐθείς,
 δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται). ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα. ἄμφω γὰρ
 ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκεπτέον;
 δηλοῖ δὲ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἴρεσις μὲν ἐστίν,
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς δέ, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου πρὸ ἐτέρου. τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ
 σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστίν ἡ προαίρεσις.

1112 b, 11. EE. 1226 b, 10 περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς

§ 8. ἀκριβεῖς. Cf. Introd. § 26.

οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων, 'for instance about spelling.' This is explained more fully by Eudemos (loc. cit.). The doctor may go wrong (1) in the treatment he adopts, an error of διάνοια, (2) in applying it to the particular case, an error of αἴσθησις. The latter kind of error alone is possible in the case of spelling; for

it is not an open question how a particular word is to be spelt.

§ 10. τὸ πῶς δεῖ. I have followed Rassow in inserting these words. It is true, as Bywater says (Contr. p. 33), that we can interpret the text as it stands, by supplying πῶς ἀποβήσεται in thought. But the fact that MM. (1189 b, 24) has τὸ ὡς δεῖ seems to decide in favour of Rassow's proposal.

λευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
 οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιᾶσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει,
 οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς
 περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων 15
 ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι
 διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπι-
 τελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κακείνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν
 ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν
 12 ἔστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν 20
 εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα—φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν
 ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικάί, ἡ
 δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις—καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀνα-
 13 λύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. καὶ μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐν-

βουλευέται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κεῖται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων,
 πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένου τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται.
 βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντες ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς
 γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν. εἰ δὲ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρασκευασά-
 μενος μηδὲ βουλευσάμενος εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλευέται δὲ ὅσα ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν ἐστι τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ
 προαίρεσις μὲν ἐστὶν ὁρεξὶς τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ βουλευτική. ἅπαντες γὰρ
 βουλευόμεθα ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα
 προαιρούμεθα. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικήν, ἥς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσις
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁρέγεται διὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι. διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ζώοις ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος
 ἀνθρώπου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί.
 ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλοῖς
 ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς
 τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός. ἡ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστὶν· τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία, οὗ δ' ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἡ γίγνεται τι, τοῦτ' αἰτιόν
 φαμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἢ κομιδῇ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα
 βαδίζει. διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικοί. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ

§ 11. οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν. This is fundamental. Cf. *Introd.* § 22.

θέμενοι, or more usually ὑποθέμενοι, is a term of geometry. We assume the Q. E. F. of the problem and then seek for the construction.

πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων. These two phrases are equivalent. Below we have πῶς alone (b, 18) and πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος (b, 30).

§ 12. ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. See *Introd.* § 22.

25 τύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἂ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζη- 14
 30 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὗ ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ 15
 τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ 16
 τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα

μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὃν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐὰν τις πράττη ἢ ἀπρακτῇ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἐκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἐκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἅμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἅπτονταί γέ πη τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὔτε ἀπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε δόξα ἐστί, δῆλον, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὄρεξις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι συμπερανθῶσιν.

1112 b, 34. EE. 1227 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται αἰὲς ὁ βουλευόμενος ἔνεκά τινος, καὶ ἔστι σκοπὸς τις αἰὲς τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμας ὑποθέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκριβείας), περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἢ σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν τοῦτο βουλευομένοις. ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ δι' ὅ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα, οἷον πλοῦτος ἢ ἡδονὴ ἢ τι ἄλλο

§ 14. δι' οὗ i.e. τὸ ὄργανον. πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος, i.e. ἡ χρεῖα. See b, 15 n.

§ 16. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ. Deliberation, like Demonstration, has its limits. Cf. Introd. § 22. We cannot demonstrate first principles

nor yet particulars. In the same way we cannot deliberate about ends nor yet about particular acts. The latter are a matter for αἴσθησις. In neither case is there an infinite progress or regress.

οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὥς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ 1113^a
 17 ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἰὲν βουλευσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. βουλευ-
 τὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ
 προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθέν προαιρετόν
 ἐστίν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει ὅταν εἰς 5
 αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·
 18 τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν

τοιούτων ὃ τυγχάνει οὗ ἔνεκα. βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος, εἰ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ τέλους ἔσκεπται, <ἢ> ὅτι ἐκεῖ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγάγῃ, ἢ
 αὐτὸς δύναται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν αἰὲν ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ κατὰ μέρος
 βουλεύονται, οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλεύσαιο ἂν εἰ δῶ φάρμακον, καὶ
 στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατοπεδεύσεται, οἷς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς
 ἄριστόν ἐστιν· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐπ'
 ἄλλῳ χρήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὄψει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἰδεῖν οὐ
 μή ἐστιν ὄψις, οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι οὐ μή ἐστὶν ἀκοή· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης
 ποιῆσαι καὶ οὐ μή ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ
 αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ νόσον, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ
 φύσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ, παρὰ
 φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρὰ
 φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

§ 17. ἀφωρισμένον, 'determined,'
 i.e. it is no longer in the form of a
 problem. For the expression cf.
 1142 b, 11.

κριθέν. Cf. a, 12 κρίναντες, Bywater,
 Contr. p. 83.

ὅταν ... ἀναγάγῃ, 'when he has
 reduced the efficient cause to himself,'
 when he has traced back the series of
 causes to something internal to him-
 self.

τὸ ἡγούμενον, 'the commanding
 part.' This shows that προαίρεσις is
 really what we call the will, though
 the idea is, generally speaking, foreign
 to Aristotle's thought in this form.
 In the Stoic philosophy τὸ ἡγεμονικόν
 plays a very important part. There
 is no need, however, to suspect that

this is a later interpolation; for Aris-
 totle is using popular language, and
 ἡγεῖσθαι was already familiar from
 Plato in a similar metaphorical sense.
 In like manner Aristotle calls it τὸ
 κύριον in Met. 1048 a, 10 (p. 77).
 Translated into Aristotelian language,
 this literary phrase means that προαί-
 ρεσις is the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, the ἀρχὴ
 ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις. Cf. De An. 406 b, 24
 φαίνεται κινεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῶον...διὰ
 προαιρέσεώς τινος καὶ νοήσεως.

§ 18. τοῦτο, sc. that τὸ προαιρού-
 μενον is τὸ ἡγούμενον, and that προαί-
 ρεσις is subsequent to βούλευσις and
 the cause of πράξις. The union of the
 imperative with the deliberative power
 arises from the fusion of thought and
 appetite in this 'part of the soul.'

ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν ἅς "Ομηρος ἐμιμείτο· οἱ γὰρ βασι-
 λεῖς ἃ προέλουντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ 19
 10 προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις
 ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι
 γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν 20
 προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν
 πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

15 IV. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται,
 δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου
 ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθὸν λέγουσι 2
 μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ
 ἔσται βουλευτόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν),
 20 τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ 3
 εἶναι φύσει βουλευτόν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ'
 ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τὰναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ 4
 ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλή-
 θειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;
 25 τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ
 τὸ τυχόν—ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ δια-

§ 19. βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις. The de-
 finition of προαίρεσις as a 'deliberative
 appetite of things in our power' is
 really the fundamental doctrine of the
 Ethics.

κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν, 'in the
 direction of (on the lines of) the
 deliberation.' Appetition follows all
 the steps of deliberation, but in the
 reverse order. Cf. the phrases κατ'
 εὐθείαν, κατ' εὐθυωρίαν.

IV. § 1. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις κ.τ.λ.
 We now come to the appetitive
 element in προαίρεσις, which has
 problems of its own.

εἴρηται. Cf. IIII b, 26.

§ 2. τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is the
 Academic view derived from Plato's
 Gorgias 466 e sqq. where ποιεῖν ἃ
 βούλονται is distinguished from ποιεῖν
 ἃ δοκεῖ.

ἦν. For this idiomatic use of the

imperfect, cf. IIII 5 a, 2. IIII 7 a, 16.
 III 47 b, 11.

§ 4. τῷ...σπουδαίῳ, exactly equiva-
 lent to τῷ ἀγαθῷ or τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. Cf.
 1099 a, 23. So τῷ φαύλῳ = τῷ κακῷ.

τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, sc. ἀγαθόν, εἶναι,
 sc. βουλευτόν.

ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων κ.τ.λ.
 The argument in favour of relativity
 drawn from morbid conditions is
 Cyrenaic. Cf. Sext. Math. 192 (RP
 § 210) καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς
 (suffering from vertigo) καὶ ἰκτεριῶν
 (jaundiced) ὡχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων
 κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθθαίνεται, ὁ
 δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὥς ὑπὸ
 δυοῖν κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ μεμηνῶς δισσὰς ὀρᾷ
 τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσοὺς φαντάζεται τὸν
 ἥλιον (from Eur. Bacch. v. 918 sqq.)
 κ.τ.λ. From our present point of view
 it is a sufficient answer to this to say
 that health is the normal condition.

κειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα—τὸν σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὰληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνε- 30
5 ται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἰδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τὰληθὲς ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὕσα 6 ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ 1113^b λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

V. Ὦντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ

1113 a, 31. EE. 1227 a, 31 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφὴ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὅσοις ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἐναντία δὲ τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον). αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἡδιον ἄμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν κακὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον χεῖρον. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ προαιρετὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὕσαι, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.

τὸν σπουδαῖον...κρίνειν. This is the reading of K^b and seems to be more original than the ὁ σπουδαῖος... κρίνει of L^b. I have therefore adopted it, marking the preceding sentence as parenthetical.

§ 5. καθ' ἐκάστην...ἕξιν. It is well to remember here that ἕξις and διάθεσις are medical terms. Cf. τοῖς εὖ διακειμένοις above.

κανών. The κανών is the builder's rule, the Latin *norma*. The metaphorical use of the word seems to occur first in Euripides. Cf. Hek. 602. El. 52.

μέτρον. This is a clear reference to the dictum of Protagoras.

§ 6. αἰροῦνται...ὡς ἀγαθόν. All men, the good included, *desire* pleasure; the mistake made by ordinary people is that they *wish* it, i.e. it appears to them in the light of good. Cf. Mot. An. 700 b, 28 δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν.

V. § 1. Ὦντος δὴ κ.τ.λ. We know that our deliberative analysis of Happiness will be complete when we reach something which is ἐφ'

καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
 5 κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν
 ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως 2
 δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ
 τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ
 πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 10 ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν,
 καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ 3
 καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράτ-
 τειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα
 τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν 4
 15 πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψεύδει τὸ δ' ἀλη-
 θεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκού-

1113 b, 13. EE. 1223 a, 4 ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄν-
 θρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερόν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ
 μή, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ
 εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἴτιος
 τούτων αὐτός ἐστιν· καὶ ὅσων αἴτιος, ἐφ' αὐτῷ.

ἡμῖν. It is therefore important to show clearly that good acts are ἐφ' ἡμῖν. They are so because they have προαίρεσις as their efficient cause, and all προαίρεσις is ἐκούσιον.

περὶ ταῦτα, sc. περὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. This is the middle term of the syllogism. All acts concerned with the means to an end are προαιρετά and therefore ἐκούσια, the activities of goodness are concerned with the means to an end, therefore the activities of goodness are voluntary.

§ 2. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the deliberative analysis of Happiness. We have at last come to something ἐφ' ἡμῖν. If the activities which produce goodness are voluntary, then goodness is in our power.

ἐν οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is because our capacities are μετὰ λόγου, and

every λόγος implies both 'yes' and 'no.' Cf. above 1103 a, 20 sqq.

§ 3. ἦν, 'is, as we saw.' For this idiomatic imperfect cf. 1117 a, 16. 1129 b, 11. 1134 b, 14.

ἐπιεικέσι...φαύλοις. This passage shows clearly that the various Attic equivalents for ἀγαθός and κακός are used without any distinction of meaning.

§ 4. οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν κ.τ.λ. The Aldine scholiast quotes a fragment from the Ἡρακλῆς ὁ παρὰ Φόλῳ of Epicharmos, in which occurs the line οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄταν ἔχων. Whoever wrote the verse as we have it no doubt meant only 'wretched' by πονηρός, as Muretus and Camerarius already saw. Victorius substituted μάκαρ for μακάριος to make an iambic line on the authority of [Plato] περὶ δικαίου 374 a. Cf. Tim. 86 d κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκῶν οὐδεὶς.

5 σιον. ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων
 6 ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν
 εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ 20
 7 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτοις
 δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν
 τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολλάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶν-
 τας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ
 αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν 25
 προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὥς οὐδὲν
 πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ

b, 17. Cf. EE. 1222 b, 15 εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι
 κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν,
 οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρώπους καὶ ζῶον ὃν ὅλως ζῶα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. πρὸς
 δὲ τούτοις ὃ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεών τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν
 ζώων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἵπομεν ἂν πράττειν. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ὅσαι
 τοιαῦται, ὅθεν πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δὲ δικαίως
 ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, ἣν ἴσως ὁ θεὸς ἀρχει. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκινήτοις
 ἀρχαῖς, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον, καίτοι λέγεταί
 γε καθ' ὁμοιότητα· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα
 μάλιστ' ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ' αὐτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει
 ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ
 δι' ἐκείνης δεῖξαι. ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς τινος· ἢ γὰρ πρᾶξις
 κίνησις. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ ἀρχὴ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὴν
 ὄντων ἢ γινομένων, δεῖ νοῆσαι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων. εἰ γὰρ
 ἔχοντος τοῦ τριγώνου δύο ὀρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετράγωνον ἔχειν τέτταρας
 ὀρθὰς, φανερόν ὥς αἴτιον τούτου τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν τὸ τρίγωνον. εἰ δέ
 γε μεταβάλλει τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον μεταβάλλειν,

§ 5. ἀρχὴν...τῶν πράξεων, sc. ὅθεν
 ἢ κινήσεις.

ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων, i.e. as ἄνθρωπος
 ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Cf. above, p. 110.

§ 6. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.
 We have 'reduced' the efficient cause
 to something internal to ourselves,
 namely προαίρεσις. Not only so, but
 there is no other ἀρχή to which we

could refer it; for neither Necessity,
 Nature nor Chance could produce
 human actions. Now that of which
 the ἀρχή is ἐν ἡμῖν will itself be ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν.

§ 7. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε κ.τ.λ. The
 usual appeal to the practice of νομο-
 θέται. Cf. above 1102 a, 7 n.

πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἦττον πεισό-
 30 μεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν 8
 αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ
 ἐπιτίμια. ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυ-
 σθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι
 τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι,
 1114^a κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα δι' ἀμέ- 9
 λειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὥς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν·
 τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε 10
 μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι
 5 ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν
 κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·
 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ 11
 δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν·
 διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ 12
 10 ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.

οἷον εἰ τρεῖς, ἕξ, εἰ δὲ τέτταρες, ὀκτώ. καὶ εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλοι, τοιοῦτον
 δ' ἐστί, κακεῖνο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. δῆλον δ' ὅ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι
 ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν· νῦν δ' οὔτε μὴ λέγειν οὔτε λέγειν
 ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τε, πλὴν τοσοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον τοῦ τὸ
 τρίγωνον οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχὴ τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὕστερον.
 ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἓνα τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ
 τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον τὸ
 συμβαῖνόν ἐστι, τὰ δέ γε ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τὰναντία, καὶ ὃ
 ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν
 τοιούτων εἰσὶν αὐτοί.

§ 8. διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια. A law of Pittakos. Cf. Pol. 1274 b, 19 νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἂν τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων. Rhet. 1402 b, 10 εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσι, ἐνστασις ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐὰν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.

§ 10. τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν, sc. οἱ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

Cf. above 1103 b, 21 ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. The words περὶ ἕκαστα are explained 1103 b, 6 sqq.

§ 12. ἀναισθήτου. The word is here used in its common meaning of 'dull,' 'stupid,' cf. 1104 a, 24 n., in which sense it is almost a synonym of ἀνάληγτος (1100 b, 32 n.). It is a very strong term, and is applied to the Thebans in Dem. de Cor. § 240.

- 13 ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ
τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράτ-
14 τει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε
βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιῆς, καίτοι εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς 15
βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ
μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ'
αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ [βαλεῖν
καὶ] ῥίψαι· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ
καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, 20
15 διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ
μόνον δ' αἰ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ
αἰ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ
φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· οὐθεὶς 25
γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσκειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης
16 ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κα-
κιῶν αἰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἰ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ
δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰ ἐπιτιμῶμεναι τῶν κακιῶν 30
17 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ

§ 13. ἔτι δ' ἄλογον κ.τ.λ. It is unjustifiable (οὐκ ἔχει λόγον) for a man who acts dishonestly to say he does not wish to be dishonest. He is making himself so to the best of his power, and that voluntarily. The reference is to the paradox of Sokrates, cf. MM. 1187 a, 8 εἰ γὰρ τις, φησὶν (ὁ Σωκράτης), ἐρωτήσκειεν ὀντιναοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἔλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 4; iv, 6, 6 sqq.

§ 14. καίτοι. Rassow's emendation of MS. καί. See Bywater, Contr. p. 34.

προεμένῳ, sc. τὴν ὑγίειαν.

τὸ [βαλεῖν καὶ] ῥίψαι. See Bywater, Contr. p. 34. I prefer to bracket the more common βαλεῖν rather than the

more striking ῥίψαι. No one would require a note on βαλεῖν. ἀρχή, sc. ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις.

§ 15. οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ. We have once more two common τόποι: (1) the analogy of bodily states, (2) praise and blame as a τεκμήριον of τὸ ἐκούσιον. Cf. Plato, Protag. 323 c sqq.

§ 17. εἰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ. The argument is as follows. "If any one were to say that we are not responsible for our φαντασία, we answer (1) that if a man is responsible in a sense for his ἔξις, he is responsible in the same sense for his φαντασία, (2) that if a man is not responsible for his ἔξις, he is not responsible for any of his bad acts at all. It is all a mere question of natural endowment."

φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός
 1114^b ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ
 μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἑξεώς ἐστί πως αἷτιος, καὶ τῆς
 φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἷτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ
 αἷτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
 5 πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ
 δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἑφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
 ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγα-
 θὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν·
 τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἶόν
 10 τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ
 τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ
 ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ
 ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ 18
 ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπωςδῆποτε φαί-
 15 νεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
 πράττουσιν ὅπωςδῆποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστω 19
 φαίνεται οἷονδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε
 τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκουσίως
 τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἥττον καὶ ἡ
 20 κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει
 τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ 20

τῆς φαντασίας. In this pas-
 sage ἡ φαντασία is simply equiva-
 lent to τὸ φαίνεσθαι. Bonitz rightly
 paraphrases the clause by οὐκ εἰσὶ
 κύριοι τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τι ἀγαθόν.

εὐφυῆς. In fact we should in that
 case have to go back to the doctrine
 that goodness comes to us φύσει. Of
 course Aristotle admits the importance
 of εὐφυΐα both in practical and theo-
 retical matters. Cf. Top. 163 b, 15
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα, τὸ
 δύνασθαι καλῶς ἐλέσθαι τὰ ληθὲς καὶ
 φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος. But he will not
 allow that we have no responsibility
 for the formation of ἑξεις.

εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. If it is all a matter
 of εὐφυΐα, and we are not responsible

for our character, then goodness is as
 involuntary as badness. Plato cannot
 mean this.

§ 19. εἴτε δὴ κ.τ.λ. We may try
 to maintain that goodness is voluntary
 by holding either (1) that the φαντασία
 of the end is not given to a man by
 nature, but is partly due to himself
 (παρ' αὐτόν), or (2) that the end is
 given by nature, but the means are
 voluntary. But both these views will
 make badness voluntary to the same
 extent as goodness.

τὸ δι' αὐτόν. Mr Bywater's pro-
 posal to read τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ is attractive.

§ 20. εἰ οὖν κ.τ.λ. The argument
 may be summed up thus. (1) Our
 πράξεις are in our power and we have

οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

25

- 21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύψω, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἔξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικά <καὶ> καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος
22 προστάξῃ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ 30 ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ 1115^a ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.
- 23 Ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης εἵπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσὶν. 5 καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. VI. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ

1114 b, 26. EE. 1228 a, 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές εἰσὶ τε ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, καὶ αὗται προαιρετικά, καὶ αἱ ἐναντία κακίαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, καθόλου εἴρηται· καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἵπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας.

1115 a, 4. EE. 1228 a, 26 σχεδὸν δὴ δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὁ τ' ἀνδρείος εἶναι περὶ φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον καὶ θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ πως ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις ταύτας λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς

full responsibility for them. (2) Our ἔξεις proceed from our πράξεις and are so far in our power. We have partial responsibility for them, that is we are responsible at the start (ἐν ἀρχῇ). (3) Our φαντασία of the τέλος depends on our ἔξεις, so we are just as responsible for that.

§ 21. Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The summary as usual destroys the connexion. The words οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ (b, 30) should be taken closely with

what precedes.

<καὶ> καθ' αὐτάς, not κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The καὶ comes from Aspasios and the Vetus Versio.

ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, 'the right rule' 1103 b, 32 n.

§ 23. περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς, sc. μεσότητές εἰσιν. Aristotle discusses all the ἀρεταί under these two heads.

VI. § 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This chapter deals with the question περὶ ποῖα μεσότης ἡ ἀνδρεία.

περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἥδη φανερόν γεγέννηται· φοβούμεθα 2
 δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν
 κακά, διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.
 10 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν 3
 νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀν-
 δρεῖος εἶναι· ἓνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ
 δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπι-
 εικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέ-
 15 γεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρείος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ
 τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

(οὗτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἥττον
 ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασύς· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος
 φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἥττον ἢ δεῖ, θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ παρω-
 νυμιάζεται· ὁ γὰρ θρασύς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως. ὥστ'
 ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, δεῖ δὲ
 μήθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι)
 μήθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταῦτὸ ποιοῦσι, πλὴν οὐ περὶ
 ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουσι, τῷ δὲ
 φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δῆλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ
 δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη.

1115 a, 10. EE. 1229 a, 32 περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν
 ἀπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν
 φοβερά λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται
 ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένοις
 λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἂν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δ'

ἡδη, 1107 a, 33.

§ 2. προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Plato, Protag. 358 d προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Laches 198 b ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ.

§ 3. οὐ περὶ πάντα κ.τ.λ. In EE. 1229 a, 34 sqq. this restriction is made clearer by the amended definition of τὰ φοβερά as ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς, i.e. those

λύπαι ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. But this is not an 'Eudemean development' for we read in Rhet. 1382 a, 21 ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακά φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δυνάται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνεται ὥστε μέλλειν.

οἷον ἀδοξίαν. Cf. the Platonic definition of αἰδώς as φόβος ἀδοξίας below 1128 b, 11 and see note there.

κατὰ μεταφοράν i.q. καθ' ὁμοιότητα. This alludes to Plato, see § 7 n.

4 πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα
 μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα
 ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα·
 ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευ- 20
 θέριοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχου-
 5 σιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖ-
 ται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ
 6 μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν
 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος 25
 τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.
 7 δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος

οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῶτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες
 λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἷαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται ὅσων
 ἢ φύσις ἀναιρετική τοῦ ζῆν. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ
 ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ [καὶ] δειλοί. καὶ
 δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ
 τὴν περὶ τούτου λύπην ἔχειν πῶς. εἰ γάρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος πρὸς
 ἀλέας καὶ ψύχην καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικὸς ὡς ὁ λόγος,
 ἀκινδύνους οὔσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ
 δι' ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν
 ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι
 δόξειε δειλός, οὗτος δ' ἀνδρεῖος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις
 λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ἢ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς
 ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἴρηται δὴ
 ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ λύπης τῆς φθαρτικῆς· ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον
 τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα
 ὥστ' εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. ἔνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαί-
 νεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερά καὶ διαταράττειν. οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, ὥσπερ
 θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ
 τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἕξεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
 παθημάτων.

§ 5. φθόνον. We might be tempted to think that φόνον is the true reading. It goes well with ὕβρις ('ὕβρις or murder of children and wife'), and

the corruption is common. This is a case, however, where the text is guaranteed by Eudemos. See above.

εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν 8
 30 τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ
 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ 9
 τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως 10
 δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής,
 καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγνια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μά-
 35 λιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ, καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ 11
 1115^b καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεής ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάτ-
 τιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνα-
 τον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ
 τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ 12
 5 ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέ-
 τερον ὑπάρχει.

VII. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι
 καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε

1115 b, 7. EE. 1228 b, 4 δοκεῖ δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος ἄφοβος εἶναι
 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα
 καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὁ δὲ τὸ
 ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ ὀλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα,
 καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά σφόδρα, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἡρέμα. ποῖα οὖν
 ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρείος; πρῶτον πότερον τὰ ἑαυτῷ φοβερά ἢ τὰ ἑτέρῳ; εἰ
 μὲν δὴ τὰ ἑτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἂν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτῷ,

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. This is directed against the doctrine of Plato in Laches 191 d—e that Courage is not displayed only in war. Sokrates asks for τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνους ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους κ.τ.λ. Plato was deepening the significance of ἀνδρεία, Aristotle has to do only with τὰ δοκοῦντα, the moral consciousness of the average Hellene, and he proves his point as usual by referring to the practice of free states and monarchs.

§ 10. ὑπόγνια. Tr. 'close at hand.' Cf. EE. 1229 b, 15 πλησίον γε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρῳ. MM. 1191 a, 33 εἰ γὰρ τις τὸν εἰς δέκατον ἔτος κίνδυνον μὴ φοβεῖται, οὕπῳ ἀνδρείος.

ἐνιοὶ γὰρ θαρροῦσι διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν, ἂν δὲ πλησίον γένωνται, ἀποθνήσκουσι τῷ δέει. Cf. also Rhet. 1382 a, 21 sqq. quoted above ἐὰν μὴ πόρρῳ ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνεται.

§ 11. οἱ μὲν, οἱ μὴ θαλάττιοι. There is surely a touch of humour in this contrast between the cheerful sailors and the brave Hellene who has given up all hope, and laments that drowning is a nasty death, not fit for a gentleman and soldier.

§ 12. ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκή, 'where there is a possibility of a brave defence.'

VII. § 1. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν κ.τ.λ. The μεσότης described and contrasted with the ὑπερβολή and ἑλλειψις.

νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ
 2 μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀν- 10
 δρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δέ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ
 3 ἔνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα
 4 φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι <δ> οὐ δεῖ, ἡ 15
 δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως

εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά. <φοβερὰ δὲ τὰ> φόβου ποιητικά
 ἐκάστω ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὁ φόβος,
 εἰ δ' ἡρέμα, ἀσθενής. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον μεγάλους φόβους
 καὶ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. ἐδόκει δὲ τοῦναντίον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρα-
 σκευάζειν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡρέμα
 καὶ μόλις. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ
 ἔστιν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς
 πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τὰ φοβερὰ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἔστι, τὰ δὲ τινί. ἃ μὲν δὴ δειλὸς φοβεῖται
 ἢ δειλός, τὰ μὲν οὐδενί ἔστι φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἡρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις
 φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ' ἀπλῶς φοβερὰ λέγομεν.
 ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά,
 ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερὰ αὐτῷ, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ, ἢ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φοβερά, ἢ
 δ' ἀνδρεῖος, οὐ φοβερὰ ἀλλ' ἢ ἡρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἔστι μέντοι φοβερὰ
 ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται ἢ ἕξις· ὥσπερ
 γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑγιεινὸς ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι οὐ τῷ ὑπὸ μηθενὸς ὁ
 μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι, ὁ δ' ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπερβολῆς, τοιούτοί εἰσιν,
 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθείς εἶναι, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡρέμα, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ
 καὶ οἱ πλείστοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ
 τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσιν τι, πλὴν θάπτόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ
 πολλοί, * * καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθείς
 ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἡρέμα.

ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθείη.
 ἢ οὐθέν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον; ἢ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολουθήσις τῷ

§ 2. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, sc. τὰ κατ'
 ἄνθρωπον.

ὡς ὁ λόγος (sc. λέγει, κελεύει,
 προστάττει), not 'reason,' but the

'rule' which guides him. Cf. 1114 b,
 29. 1115 b, 19. 1117 a, 8. 1119 a, 20.
 1125 b, 35. 1138 b, 20, 29.

ὑπομενεῖ, sc. ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα 5
 ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ
 καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος,
 20 πᾶσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας 6
 ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.
 τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει.

λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ
 τοῦτο ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἦτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ
 καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρείος μόνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἂν μὴ δεῖ
 φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἂν μὴ δεῖ θαρρεῖ· ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἄμφω ἂν δεῖ,
 καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἐστίν. ἂν γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ
 καὶ φοβεῖται. ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει
 ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει, ταῦτα
 θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος μόνος, ἔαν κελεύῃ.

1115 b, 17. EE. 1230 a, 21 καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία
 αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ' ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μὲν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἂν διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται.
 οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ
 τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικὰς· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερόν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ

§ 5. κατ' ἀξίαν. Not very different from κατὰ τὸ δέον.

§ 6. τέλος δὲ κ.τ.λ. The text here is not quite certain, but the argument is plain. The rule says that an act to be really brave must be done from the right motive (οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ). It is to be shown that this means τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. This is proved as follows. The end of every activity which proceeds from a ἔξις must be the end which corresponds to the ἔξις from which it proceeds. To the brave man, that is the man who embodies the ἔξις (τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν), bravery appears as τὸ καλόν, and therefore τὸ καλόν is its end. From this it follows that every act, if it is to be called brave, must have τὸ καλόν as its end, that is, it must be performed τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα.

τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. We might paraphrase this by saying that the end of

every activity is conformity to a certain type of character or, in more Aristotelian language, the reproduction of a form (εἶδος, λόγος τῆς οὐσίας). So the Paraphrast says the end of every activity according to goodness is τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἐξεως γίνεσθαι. The good man's end is the reproduction of the form of goodness in all his acts. Now a final cause appearing as a formal cause appears as τὸ καλόν, cf. Part. An. 645 a, 25 οὐ δ' ἔνεκα συνέστηκεν ἡ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἰληφεν.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. Rassow here reads καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δέ. ἡ <δ'> ἀνδρεία καλόν.

τοιοῦτον, sc. καλόν.

ὀρίζεται...τῷ τέλει, i.e. the end determines the form. Cf. Meteor. 390 a, 10 ἅπαντα δ' ἐστὶν ὠρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ.

καλοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
 7 τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ
 ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστίν 25
 ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος εἰ μη-
 δὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ
 τοὺς Κελτούς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ
 8 φοβερά θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ
 προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὥς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερά 30
 ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι. ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται,
 9 μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν
 10 τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ
 δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ
 καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. 35

προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἔνεκά τινος
 πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον
 ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ τις οὕσα ἔνεκά τινος ποιήσῃ τὰ φοβερά
 ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν)
 οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ, ἂν γε μὴ καλὸν ἢ ἀλλὰ μανικόν,
 οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχροὺς γάρ.

b, 24. EE. 1229 b, 22 οἱ μὲν <οὖν> δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς
 ἐπιψεύδονται διὰ τὰς ἑξέεις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τά τε μὴ φοβερά δοκεῖ
 φοβερά εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἡρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τά τε
 φοβερά θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἡρέμα, τῷ δ' ἀνδρεῖω τὰληθῆ
 μάλιστα. διόπερ οὗτ' εἴ τις ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρεῖος,
 οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένει φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὗτ' εἰ
 γιγνώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα
 ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ
 ἐστίν. ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
 ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὗτ' εἰ
 διὰ ταύτην οὗτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν

§ 7. ἀνάλγητος, cf. 1100 b, 32 n.

τοὺς Κελτούς. EE. 1229 b, 28 οἷον
 οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαν-
 τῶσι λαβόντες. Aristotle seems to
 have taken this from Ephoros; for
 Strabo (vii, p. 293) says upon his
 authority ὅπλα αἰρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πλημ-
 μυρίδας τοὺς Κίμβρους, καὶ ὅτι ἀφοβίαν

οἱ Κελτοὶ ἀσκοῦντες κατακλύζεσθαι
 τὰς οἰκίας ὑπομένουσιν.

§ 9. θρασύδειλοι. This compound
 is not found elsewhere, but may be-
 long to the language of comedy.

ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν οἷς δύνανται
 μιμεῖσθαι.

- 1116^a ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερ-
βάλλον μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δει- 11
λός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ
θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταῦτά μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλός 12
5 καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς
αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέ-
σως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ
βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ
δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
- 10 Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ 13
θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖ-
ται καὶ ὑπομένει ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μή. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν
φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ
15 οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. VIII. Ἔστι
μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι
κατὰ πέντε τρόπους. πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ

μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως <ἀν> ἀνδρείος λέγοιτο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ
ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἀν δι' ἀκрасίαν ἀπέθνησκον οἱ
ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος,
τῶν ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δι' ἀκрасίαν περιπίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὧν
οὐθεὶς <ἀν> ἀνδρείος εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἐτοίμως ἀποθνήσκειν.
οὐτ' εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων
οὐδεὶς ἀνδρείος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

“φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσσωμένοι,
θανεῖν ἐρώσιν.”

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἔλκουσ ὀδύνην εὐξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα.

1116 a, 15. EE. 1229 a, 12 ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε
λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· <τὰ> αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ

§ 12. ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται.
For δὲ connecting a finite verb with
a participle, cf. 1135 b, 31. 1152 a, 4.

§ 13. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, sc. ἐν τοῖς
καλλίστοις, i.e. ἐν πολέμῳ.

VIII. § 1. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.

We pass now to the five forms of
ἀνδρεία καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

ἡ πολιτική. This is the courage
of the citizen army, the courage that
won Marathon.

ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδέη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρείοτατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ 20
2 ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα·

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ [Διομήδης]

Ἑκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων

25

“Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.”

3 ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς
4 γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταυτό· 30
χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι,

αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὖσα. δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ' ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, δι' ἣν τὰ παιδιά καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἱ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ φερόμενα, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὄφεις. ἄλλη δ' ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα, καθ' ἣν οἱ τε κατευτυχηκότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος. ἄλλη δὲ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἂν τε γὰρ ἐρᾷ, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ θυμόν ὡσαύτως. ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σύες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήτητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. κατ'

§ 2. Πουλυδάμας κ.τ.λ. Il. xii, 100.

[Διομήδης]. This seems to be an adscript. Bywater, Contr. p. 35.

Ἑκτωρ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Il. viii, 148.

§ 3. δι' αἰδῶ. For αἰδῶς cf. 1128 b, 10 sqq. Fritzsche quotes Il. v, 529

ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε, καὶ ἄλκιμον ἦτορ ἔλεσθε,

ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας·

αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἢ ἐφανται.

καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκά-
ζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

35 ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,
οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες τὸ αὐτὸ 5
1116^b δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάτ-
τοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην
ἀνδρείον εἶναι ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία 6
ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾤθη
5 ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλ-
λοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι

ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς
κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.

1116 b, 3. EE. 1230 a, 4 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι
δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὥνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι
τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸναντίον ἔχει
ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὔτε γὰρ
διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερά θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν
ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσασι τῆς βοήθειας τῶν δεινῶν· οὔτε δι' ὃ θαρ-

§ 4. ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν κ.τ.λ. Il. ii, 391 with slight variants. The words are not Hector's, but Agamemnon's. They are attributed to the right speaker in Pol. 1285 a, 10, but there too with variants. Aristotle quotes his Homer from memory.

§ 5. οἱ προστάττοντες. Lambinus says that Amyot affirmed he saw *προτάττοντες* "in codice quodam pontificio." But ms. authority is of no weight in deciding between these two words. Victorius renders *qui in prima acie locant*. Still *προστάττοντες* is probably right, for it suggests the order of the *δεσπότης* to the *δοῦλος*. For *καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες* cf. Herod. vii, 223.

οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. τοῦτο περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων λέγοι
ἂν· τοιαύτην γὰρ τινα μάχην, ὅτε πρὸς

Μεσσηνίους ἐμαχέσαντο, ἐπολέμουν, ἧς
καὶ Τυρταῖος μνημονεύει.

§ 6. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The second form of ἀνδρεία καθ' ὁμοιότητα, στρατιωτικὴ ἀνδρεία.

ὁ Σωκράτης. In the Laches (199 a sqq.) courage is defined as ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μή, but this definition is soon shown to involve a great deal more. When Sokrates identifies goodness and knowledge, he does not mean knowledge or experience of any special kind, but knowledge of the good. Aristotle's statement is only accurate if we understand by ὁ Σωκράτης not the final result of the discussion, but a provisional position temporarily adopted, and that too not originated by Sokrates, but borrowed by him from the culture of his time.

οἱ στρατιῶται. These are the pro-

πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρείοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. 7 εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχον- 10 τες ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ 8 παθεῖν κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὀπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα 9 ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρα- 15 τιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καὶ πῖ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ φεύγειν

ραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχύς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ Θεόγνιν ἀνδρεία εἴεν.

“πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος.”

φανερῶς <δ> ἐνιοὶ δειλοὶ ὄντες ὁμῶς ὑπομένουσι δι' ἐμπειρίαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οἶονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. σημείον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλησίον ᾗ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανείεν <ἂν> ἀνδρείοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἑκτορά φησιν ὑπομείναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα.

“Ἑκτορα δ' αἰδῶς εἶλε.”

<καὶ>

“Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.”

fessional soldiers of the fourth century as opposed to the citizen soldiers of the fifth. Eudemos (l. c.) calls this form of courage στρατιωτικὴ ἀνδρεία.

κενά. The MSS. vary as usual between κενά and καινά. Both phrases seem to have been in use. Cf. Thuc. iii, 30 and the commentators. The reading κενά has more point. Regular troops are less likely to be frightened by ‘false alarms,’ what Tacitus calls the *inania belli*. Grant quotes Cic.

Att. v, 20 “scis enim dici quaedam πανικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου.”

§ 7. ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν. K^b adds the explanation καὶ φυλάσασθαι καὶ πατάξαι ‘to ward off and deal a blow.’ Perhaps these words should be substituted for πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν below (b, 11).

§ 9. καὶ πῖ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ. Tr. ‘in the battle at the temple of Hermes.’ Schol. Anon. Ἑρμαῖον ἐν Κορωνείᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας τόπος οὕτω λεγόμενος

20 καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ
καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνεον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ
φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ
δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν 10
φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
25 ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ
ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἱτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς
κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ "Ὀμηρος "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ
"μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥίνας μένος"
καὶ "ἔξεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαί-
30 νειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι 11
διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ
θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖ-
σθαι, ἐπεὶ εἴαν γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἔλει] ἦ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ
δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
35 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ
οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ
1117^a οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπι-
θυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. [οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ 12
δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.]
φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσ-

πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωμάτων
ὄντων, ἐν ᾧ παρατεταγμένοι ποτὲ Κορω-
νεῖς σὺν τοῖς βοηθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς στρα-
τιώταις ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχοίου μετὰ τῶν
βιοιωταρχῶν, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβε
καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν εἶχεν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ
'Ονόμαρχος ὁ Φωκεὺς προδοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ
(B.C. 354-3), αὐτοὶ μὲν μέιναντες ἀπέ-
θανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν 'Ονόμαρχον,
ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πύλας, ἵνα αὐτοῖς
μηδὲ βουλομένοις εἴη φυγεῖν καὶ κατα-
λιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν
βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις ἐκ τοῦ
Μεταχοίου ἐφυγον εὐθύς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς
μάχης, αἰσθόμενοι ἕνα τεθνάναι τῶν
βιοιωταρχῶν Χάρωνα. ἱστοροῦσι περὶ
τῆς μάχης ταύτης Κηφισόδωρος ἐν τῇ
ιβ' <τῶν> Περί τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου καὶ
'Αναξιμένης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν Περί

Φίλιππον καὶ "Εφορος ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ
(FHG. I, 274, 153).

§ 10. "Ὀμηρος. These are inexact
reminiscences of Il. xvi, 529 and Od.
xxiv, 18. The phrase ἔξεσεν αἷμα
'his blood boiled' occurs nowhere in
Homer, but ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν
αἵματος was a current definition of
Anger (De An. 403 a, 31). In poetry
it occurs first in Theokritos, Id. xx,
15 ἐμοὶ δ' ἄφαρ ἔξεσεν αἷμα.

§ 11. ἢ ἐν ἔλει was bracketed by
Victorius. It seems to be a mere
variant of ἐν ὕλῃ.

οἱ ὄνοι. Cf. Homer's comparison
of Aias to a stubborn ass which goes
on eating the corn though the boys
keep on beating it. Il. xi, 558 sqq.

λαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ 5
 ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδον-
 ται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀν-
 δρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ
 13 διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλ-
 πιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς 10
 νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι
 ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρη-
 μένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μὴθὲν
 14 <ἀν> ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι·
 εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, 15
 φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερά ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ
 15 φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. διὸ
 καὶ ἀνδρειότερου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις
 ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ
 ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προ- 20
 φανῇ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο,
 16 τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ
 οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ'
 ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα

§ 12. προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα, 'will and motive,' i.e. if the man acts προαιρούμενος and τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. As in Plato, θυμός is recognised as the natural basis of courage.

τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί. Cf. EE. 1229 b, 31 (l. c. p. 145), Rhet. 1378 b, 1 καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἔπεσθαι τινα ἡδονῇν (ἀνάγκη) τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι.

§ 13. οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι...οἱ δὲ... Bywater points out (Contr. p. 56) that this "twofold use of the article," the first being an ordinary article, the second meaning 'others,' is "a favourite construction with Aristotle." Cf. 1149 a, 16. 1149 b, 2. 1158 a, 31. διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα sc. ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.

§ 14. εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. Probl.

955 a, 2 διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύμως, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐελπίδας ποιεῖ καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γῆρας δύσελπίς ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ νεότης ἐλπίδος πλήρης.

§ 15. ἀπὸ ἕξεως κ.τ.λ. We know that a man may perform a brave act without being already brave; for it is only so that he becomes brave. But it is only the formed ἕξις that can be trusted in an emergency.

ἦν. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 35 and, for the idiomatic imperfect, 1113 a, 19 n.

§ 16. ἀξίωμα, not 'dignity' but 'self-reliance.' It is the same thing as τὸ οἶεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι.

μένουσι sc. οἱ εὐέλπιδες.

25 χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἡπατημένοι, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑπο-
 πτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν, ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες
 τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἳ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται 17
 ποιοῖ τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

IX. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὐσα οὐχ
 30 ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ
 γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταύτ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρείος
 μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπο- 2
 μένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ
 ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυ-
 35 πηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ 3
 1117^b δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν
 κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γί-
 νεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ
 στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ
 5 σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ
 ταύτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὃν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

οἱ δ' ἡπατημένοι, i.e. οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες.
 ἡ ὑποπτεύσωσι, 'or (even) suspect
 that it is.' L^b has ὑποπτεύσουσι, K^b
 ὑποπτεύουσιν. The corruption is due
 to the scribes having taken ἕτερον ἡ
 together.

ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κ.τ.λ. The story
 is told in Xen. Hell. iv, 4, 10. The
 Spartan cavalry had taken Sikyonian
 shields with a *sigma* upon them.
 This was in the battle at the Long
 Walls of Corinth B.C. 392.

IX. § 1. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ κ.τ.λ. We
 now approach the question πῶς
 μεσότης ἡ ἀνδρεία, and we find that
 it has more to do with pains than
 pleasures, whereas we shall see that
 σωφροσύνη has more to do with plea-
 sures than pains (1117 b, 26). This
 is really the same question as πῶς
 ἀντίκεινται ἀλλήλαις καὶ τῇ μεσότητι
 ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις; The fact
 that the θρασὺς is like the ἀνδρείος
 while the δειλός is not (1108 b, 30 sqq.)
 is due to the fact that ἀνδρεία is

μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά ἢ τὰ θαρραλέα.
 It has already been pointed out how
 important these questions of ἀντίθεσις
 are. Cf. above 1108 b, 11 n.

§ 2. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The merit of
 ἀνδρεία does not lie in not facing the
 wrong things, but in facing the right
 things; for it has to do with τὰ φοβερά
 rather than τὰ θαρραλέα. That is
 why it is harder to be ἀνδρείος than
 to be σώφρων. Ἀνδρεία implies the
 presence of positive pain, σωφροσύνη
 only the negation of certain pleasures.
 For the merit of σωφροσύνη lies in
 abstaining from the wrong pleasures,
 not in enduring the right pains.

§ 3. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος,
 'the end of an act which conforms to
 the definition of ἀνδρεία.' Cf. 1115 b,
 21 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. Being an ἐν-
 ἔργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, it must be ἡδὺ καθ'
 αὐτό.

ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ, 'by the attendant
 circumstances,' cf. Rhet. 1367 b, 29.
 1407 a, 35. 1415 b, 24.

4 εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος
καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται,
ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. καὶ
ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέσθε- 10
ρος ἦ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ
γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπο-
στερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀνδρείος,
ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ'
5 ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως 15
ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
6 στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μη-
δὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν
7 βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν 20
ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ
γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι
γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· 25
ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
2 ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ

1117 b, 20. EE. 1230 a, 34 περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ
ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύνανται
ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ἔφοδον ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ
σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον. λέγεται
δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς.

b, 28. EE. 1230 b, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ

§ 5. ἐφάπτεται sc. τις. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

§ 6. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. A practical remark for the benefit of the statesman. The ἀνδρεία we have been describing is not necessarily the best for professional soldiers.

X. § 1. τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν, sc. θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. Aristotle starts

as usual from τὰ δοκοῦντα, in this case the Platonic view. Aristotle did not himself believe in 'parts of the soul.'

ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The question περὶ ποῖα μεσότης ἢ σωφροσύνη; is discussed after a brief indication of πῶς μεσότης, i.e. ἦττον...περὶ τὰς λύπας. Cf. above 1115 a, 5 n.

αἱ σωματικάί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ
 30 τούτων χαίρει οὐ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώ-
 ματος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύ-
 τας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως
 δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικάί εἰσιν· τοὺς
 γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
 35 κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ
 1118^a λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμενούς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. περὶ 3
 δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ
 ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώ-
 μασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκό-
 5 λαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαί-
 ρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως 4
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως
 χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ

ἡδονὰς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν
 περὶ τίνος. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων
 σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περί τε τὸ
 γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἀπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ
 τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν
 αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων,
 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι' ὁσφρήσεως, τὰς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ
 δυσωδίας, οὐκ ἐστίν ὁ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ
 πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος ἢ
 ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ᾄδοντος, μὴ βούλοιτο μήτε ἐσθίειν
 μήτε πίνειν μήτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δ'
 ᾄδόντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ
 κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρήσιν.

§ 2. οἷον refers to ψυχικάι, which is the emphatic word, as it is really the pleasures of the soul that are being divided from the more obvious pleasures of the body.

ἐκάτερος. For similar constructions *ad sensum* cf. 1118 b, 20. 1161 a, 16.

οὐ, i.e. τούτῳ or τῷ οὐ. The ellipse of the demonstrative or article before the relative is common. Cf. 1132 b,

1. 1156 a, 22. 1168 a, 11. 1174 a, 10. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 45.

§ 3. οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες κ.τ.λ. This distinctive character was already given to the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell by Plato. Cf. *Phileb.* 51 b ἀληθεῖς ἡδονὰς ὁρθῶς τις ὑπολάβοι ἂν τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων.

5 τοὺς ὥς δεῖ σῶφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμια- 10
 μάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς
 μύρων ἢ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι
 6 διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι
 δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅταν πεινώσι χαίροντας ταῖς
 τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· 15
 7 τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες
 χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν ἡ ὁσμὴ ἐποίη-
 σεν· οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι 20
 δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἦσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ
 φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν “ἢ [εὐρών] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον

1118 a, 9. EE. 1230 b, 36 ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τᾶλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα,
 καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἅπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ
 τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθήτως
 διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον
 λόγου, φαίνεται πᾶσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει
 τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μὴ τί που συμβέβηκε τειρατῶδες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς
 τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τὰς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πᾶσας.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός

§ 5. πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. There is no ἀκολασία in the pleasures of smell *per se* (καθ' αὐτάς), it only comes in so far as they incidentally suggest the hope or memory of pleasures of another class. Plato (loc. cit.) had said τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας. Aristotle shows with great skill how it happens that to take pleasure in certain smells may be ἀκόλαστον. It is only in so far as they suggest pleasures of taste and touch.

§ 6. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, sc. τοὺς μὴ ἀκολάστους.

ἀκολάστου. In Probl. 950 a, 12 sqq. the example of the smell of

salt fish is given, which is unpleasant when we are not hungry, ἢ τοῦ ταρίχου ὁσμὴ, ὅταν ἄδην ἔχωμεν τοῦ φαγεῖν. ...ἢ δὲ τοῦ ῥόδου αἶε ἡδέϊα.

§ 7. ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις. The peculiarly human character of the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell is evidence of their 'pure' character.

τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν...ἐποίησεν, 'it is the smell that makes them aware of the presence of hares.'

[εὐρών]. This word comes from Aspasios, who meant to correct what seemed a misquotation of Il. iii, 24 εὐρών ἢ ἔλαφον κεραδὸν ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα. But εὐρών is pointless, for it does not

αἶγα," ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς 8
 ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
 25 ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται.
 αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύ- 9
 σει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ
 κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες
 καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ
 30 οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι'
 ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις

εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς. λέγω δὲ <μὴ> καθ' αὐτάς, αἷς ἢ
 ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἑτέραν γὰρ
 ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ' αὐτάς δὲ οἷον αἱ
 τῶν ἀνθῶν εἰσιν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν
 τὰς δὲ ἡδύ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν
 ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὄσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἢ αἰσθησις, ἀλλ'
 ὄσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἀφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ
 ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὐχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα
 γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόμενα, ὡς
 ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος περὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν. οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεΐα καὶ

express a definite αἰσθησις like sight (see Bywater, Contr. p. 36). We have had ὁσμή and ἀκοή, so we must now have ὄψις.

§ 8. ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κ.τ.λ. Probl. 949 b, 6 διὰ τί κατὰ μόνas δύο αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν, οἷον ἀφῆν καὶ γεῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις. ἄτε οὖν κοιναὶ οὔσαι ἀτιμότατοί εἰσι. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα ἡ μόναι ἐπονείδιστοί εἰσιν.

§ 9. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even taste, so far as it affords an opening to ἀκολασία, may be reduced to touch. So far as it is strictly speaking the sense of taste, i.e. a δύναμις κριτική which distinguishes the various savours which lie between sweet and bitter, it does not appeal to the

ἀκόλαστος. The real ἀκόλαστος would certainly refuse to be appointed wine-taster and pass his life in distinguishing vintages. That is rather on the level of artistic pleasure.

τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. 422 a, 8 sqq. for Aristotle's theory of taste.

οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις. It is not the distinction of tastes that gives pleasure to the glutton, but the contact of food with the gullet. Would he be willing to spit it out after tasting it? Cf. Part. An. 690 b, 29 ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἰσθησιν· τῶν δὲ ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καθόδῳ ἢ ἡδονῇ...καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ὄψων καὶ ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καταπόσει τῇ τάσει ('tension' v. l. θίξει 'contact') τοῦ οἰσοφάγου γίνεται ἡ χάρις.

- 10 λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἠϋξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὦν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία. 1118^b
καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ ἄνθρω-
11 ποί ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἡ ζῶα. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν
καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώτα-
ται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς 5
γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι. οὐ
γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ
τινα μέρη. XI. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική.

ὀψοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς
ἅπερ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται. περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ὅψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ
ὀσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐθεὶς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος εἶναι ὑπερβάλλη, ἀλλ'
ἄνευ ὀνειδούς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα
μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς. οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ
σώφρονες.

§ 10. ὀψοφάγος ὦν. Eudemos names him. He was Philoxenos son of Eryxis. A certain pudding was called after him (Φιλοξένειοι πλακοῦντες). As he was a favourite butt of the comic poets, Athenaeus is full of information about him. In a comedy of Krobylos he was called κάμινος, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος because he liked to burn his throat with hot slices of fish. When he went out to dine his servant used to take his own wine, oil, vinegar and sauce, with which he corrected the crudity of his host's cookery. Theophilus (FHG. IV, 516) says of him ἠϋξατό ποτε γεράνου τὴν φάρυγγα σχεῖν, and Machon has put his prayer in verse:

Φιλόξενός ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος
ἠϋξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πηχέων,
ὅπως καταπίνω, φησίν, ὅτι πλείστον
χρόνον
καὶ πάνθ' ἅμα μοι τὰ βρώμαθ' ἡδονὴν
ποῇ.

τὸν φάρυγγα. This is incorrect, of course, from the anatomical point of view. Aristotle himself restricts the name φάρυγξ to the *trachea* or wind-pipe. But it was popularly used for οἰσοφάγος. Cf. Eur. Cycl. 215 ὁ φάρυγξ εὐτρεπῆς ἔστω (for dinner), Ar. Frogs, 571 ὦ μιὰρὰ φάρυγξ. We cannot expect correct anatomy from an ὀψοφάγος, a Satyr and a πανδοκεύτρια. Machon says λάρυγγα, which is equally wrong.

κοινοτάτη, i.e. πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις. Cf. Probl. 950 a, 9 sqq. οὐσῶν δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέντε, τὰ τε ἄλλα ζῶα ἀπὸ δύο μόνων τῶν προειρημένων ἡδεται.

§ 11. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A further restriction to certain pleasures of touch.

XI. § 1. κοιναὶ implies φυσικαί. Certain desires are common to all as opposed to ἴδιαι, and therefore φυσικαί as opposed to ἐπίθετοι 'adventitious.'

10 πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δὲ
 ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὁμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων.
 τῆς δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ 2
 φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσι-
 κόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω
 15 τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι 3
 ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἓν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ
 τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ
 τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας
 ἢ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς
 20 παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν
 ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ 4
 πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομέ-
 νων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὥς οἱ πολ-
 λοί, ἢ μὴ ὥς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερ-
 25 βάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισσητὰ
 γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ

1118 b, 16. EE. 1221 b, 15 ὀψοφάγοι δὲ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι καὶ
 οἰνόφλυγες τῷ πρὸς ὁποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν
 παθητικὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον.

φησὶν Ὁμηρος. Il. xxiv, 129.

τῆς δὲ τοιαῦδε, sc. ἐπιθυμεῖ. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 36. Keeping the MS. τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε, Ramsauer reads παντός for πᾶς.

§ 2. φαίνεται, sc. τὸ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖν.

ἡμέτερον, i.e. ἴδιον as opposed to κοινόν. Still some things are naturally more pleasant than others to certain classes of people, and even to all.

§ 3. αὐτήν, sc. τὴν γαστέρα implied in γαστρίμαργοι. Cf. 1117 b, 29 n.

§ 4. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων κ.τ.λ. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 36, and for φιλοτοιούτος see 1099 a, 9 n. Aristotle speaks here as if 'φιλο-so-and-so' was always used in a

bad sense, but in discussing φιλοτιμία later on, he calls attention to the fact that τὸ φιλοτοιούτον πλεοναχῶς λέγεται (1125 b, 14), i.e. that compounds with φιλο- are ambiguous and sometimes have a good sense, sometimes a bad one.

τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοί. For this test cf. 1125 b, 16. 1150 a, 12. b, 1. 1151 a, 5. What οἱ πολλοί do would be the average or ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, not the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς. But any wide divergence from the average raises the presumption of excess or defect.

κατὰ πάντα δὲ κ.τ.λ. For δὲ connecting a finite verb with a participle, cf. 1116 b, 8 n. The ἀκόλαστος goes wrong in all three ways.

- 5 καὶ ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
 ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς
 λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται
 σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μῇ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ 30
 λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν
 λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι
 τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.
- 6 Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ 1119^a
 τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχά-
 νων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν—μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία—ἀτόπῳ
- 7 δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς 5
 ἡδονὰς καὶ ἡττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ
 ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ
 ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ·
 εἰ δὲ τῷ μηδέν ἐστὶν ἡδὺν μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἐτέρου, πόρρω
 ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος 10

1119 a, 5. EE. 1231 a, 26 ἀναισθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ
 ὀνομάζειν, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ὥς
 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον ἀκόλαστος. πάντες
 γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν
 οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ
 δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδ'
 ἀνάλγητοι (οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 ὑπερβάλλουσιν).

§ 5. περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας κ.τ.λ. The
 question of πῶς μεσότης is here briefly
 touched, and the relation of σωφρο-
 σύνη to pleasure and pain is contrasted
 with that of ἀνδρεία. To perform a
 brave act we must endure positive
 pain, to act in a temperate way we
 have only to abstain from pleasure.
 If we are σώφρονες this will give us
 positive pleasure and not pain; if
 we feel pain in abstaining, we are
 ἀκόλαστοι, but the pain is not positive;
 τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

§ 6. μετὰ λύπης...ἡ ἐπιθυμία. Cf.
 1105 b, 21.

§ 7. οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, 'hardly
 occur.' For the use of οὐ πάνυ, cf.
 Ind. s. v.

οὐ τέτευχε δ'...ὀνόματος. Cf. 1107
 b, 6 where he adds ἔστωσαν δ' ἀναι-
 σθητοί. Eudemos (loc. cit.) com-
 pares the New Comedy type of the
 ἀγροῖκος. There were comedies of
 this name by Antiphanes, Anaxan-
 drides, Anaxilas, Philemon and Me-
 nander.

διὰ τὸ μὴ πάννυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ' 8
 ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 λον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ
 οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ
 15 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·
 ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων
 ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμ-
 ποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.
 ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς
 20 ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιούτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

XII. Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν,
 τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν 2
 τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιούτον ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον
 25 δὴ ἐκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονιδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι
 ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ
 ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε 3
 δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον·

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
 μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἢ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία. ὥστ' εἰ
 σωφροσύνη ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις, περὶ ἧς ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ
 εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσότης οὐσα
 ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας· ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία· ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις
 ἦτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευομένη. ἀκριβέ-
 τερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
 ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.

§ 8. ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, sc. λέγει, κε-
 λεύει, προστάττει. Cf. 1115 b, 12 n.

XII. § 1. Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This discussion of the voluntariness of ἀκολασία and δειλία is due to the need of showing how far the respective ἀρεταί are really ἐφ' ἡμῖν, and therefore how far it is true that our deliberation is really complete with regard to them.

ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν κ.τ.λ. The point

is that it is more in our power not to pursue a good thing than to avoid a bad one.

§ 2. ἐξίστησι, explained by φθείρει τὴν φύσιν, φύσις here being used in the Academic sense of normal state or condition. Cf. below 1149 b, 35.

§ 3. δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. There is no pain in being a coward, for the coward keeps out of the way of pain; but particular acts of cowardice imply

αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε
καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ρίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ 30
4 βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα
ἐκούσια—ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ—τὸ δ' ὅλον ἡττον·
5 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκο-
λασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι
γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν 1119^b
πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προ-
[6 τέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ
τὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὐξήσιν ἔχον, τοιοῦ-

1119 a, 33. EE. 1230 a, 38 λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλα-
χῶς· ὁ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μὴδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος
ὁ μὴ τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· ἄτμητον
γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατόν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον
δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς
δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ
ἀμαρτίας περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ
ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον
οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως. πλεοναχῶς δὲ
λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσὶ,
φανερὸν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακεῖσθαι πως καὶ ἀλλήλων
διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκο-
λασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι'

actual pain. On the other hand, there is no pain—quite the contrary—in committing a particular act of intemperance; but to be an intemperate man is always painful (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἢ ἡδονή).

δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. Really they are μικταὶ πράξεις.

§ 5. τὸ δ' ὄνομα κ.τ.λ. A note on etymology. The word ἀκόλαστος was used of children like the English 'spoiled.' It conveys the idea of the proverb "Spare the rod," etc.

φέρομεν. The verb φέρειν is used of 'applying' a name to a thing. See Met. 1062 a, 13 δεῖ τοίνυν τῶν ὀνο-

μάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ δη-
λοῦν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον δ' ἐν· ἂν
δὲ πλείω σημαίνει (i. q. πλεοναχῶς
λέγεται), φανερόν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὃ φέρει
τοῦνομα τούτων. Rhet. 1412 b, 10
ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ.

Cf. below 1125 b, 15. b, 28.

§ 6. οὐ κακῶς...μετενηνέχθαι, 'not to be a bad metaphor' (μεταφορά). The word μεταφέρειν is to be explained from the use of φέρειν given in the last note. We 'transfer' a name from its proper application in virtue of some ὁμοιότης or, more strictly, in virtue of some ἀναλογία. Cf. Poet. 1457 b, 6 sqq.

5 τον δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ
 ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παῖδια, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος
 ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ 7
 ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ
 ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἢ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὖξει τὸ συγγενές,
 10 καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὧσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.
 διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μη-
 θεὺν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκο- 8
 λασμένον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα
 τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν
 15 λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν 9
 τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ
 σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ
 λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης. 10

ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους,
 οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δ' οὐ πάνυ
 γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον
 ἀμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων
 ἦτταν καὶ αἰσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷους οἱ κωμωδοδιδά-
 σκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα
 πλησιάζουσιν τοῖς ἡδέεσιν.

καὶ ὁ παῖς. Cf. above 1103 a, 3
 ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

§ 7. τὸ συγγενές. Here apparent-

ly in the sense of τὸ σύμφυτον as in
 1149 b, 11 and often.

ἐκκρούουσιν. Cf. 1154 a, 27.

BOOK IV.

GOODNESS IN SOCIAL LIFE.

Introductory Note.

The Fourth Book shows how the principles we have discovered apply not only to the great virtues of Fortitude and Temperance, but also to those "minor morals" which make up nine-tenths of life. If our principles are worth anything at all, they must be capable of explaining these also, and in fact it is the best possible test we can apply to them. The importance of this book is entirely missed if we imagine that Aristotle is setting before us types of character for our admiration and imitation. His aim is not edification, but the application of the test of fact to a general law. From this point of view the criticism that he has strayed from moral philosophy into matters more fitting for a handbook of etiquette will be seen to be wide of the mark. Our principles must be shown to explain what the average Athenian understood by *καλοκάγαθία*, or they stand condemned. The lesser men who came after Aristotle did not rise to this point of view. They apologise for discussing such things, or even deny to them the name of "virtues." But Aristotle's greatness is seen in this, that he felt bound to show that the Mean was exemplified not only in the regulation of such passions as Fear and Desire, but just as much in the ordinary acts of everyday social life.

Δ

Λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρί-
 25 σεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νο- 2

1119 b, 22. EE. 1231 b, 27 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσεται μὲν πάσῃ μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ, ἀποβολῇ δὲ πάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἀνελεύθερος, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἥττον ἢ δεῖ ἄσματος, ὁ δ' ἀμφω ὡς δεῖ

I. § 1. περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. The restriction of the word ἐλευθέριος to Liberality in money matters was Attic. Cf. Plato, Rep. 402 c, Theait. 144 d ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότης, Xen. Symp. 4, 15 ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα, passages which show that the limitation did not even in Attic always 'go without saying.' Many points in Aristotle's sketch are suggested by Plato's picture of Cephalos in the Republic.

περὶ χρήματα. The first question is περὶ ποῖα μεσότης. Cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, sc. ἐν οἷς ὁ ἀνδρείος. ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, sc. ἐν ἡδοναῖς τισιν. ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, Par. ὥσπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Aristotle speaks as if δικαιοσύνη had already been treated in its natural place along with ἀνδρεία and

σωφροσύνη, though it had really been postponed, on the ground, as we are told above (1108 b, 7), that οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται.

περὶ δόσιν...ἐν τῇ δόσει, a good example of the equivalence of these two prepositional phrases to express the material (ὕλη) of goodness, which is here a πρᾶξις not, as hitherto, a πάθος. Cf. also ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κ.τ.λ. above.

μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. Cf. above 1117 b, 26 ἥττον...περὶ τὰς λύπας.

§ 2. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν κ.τ.λ., 'all that has a money value,' not merely money itself. The money value is the *continuum* in which we have to find the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Aristotle's theory of money is discussed later on in Book V.

3 μίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία
 περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνε-
 λευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρή-
 ματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμ- 30
 πλέκοντες. τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανη-
 4 ροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν, διὸ καὶ φανυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·
 πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγο-
 5 ρεῦνται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων,
 τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμε- 1120^a
 νος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
 ὥς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχό-
 μεθα.

ἐλευθέριος. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων, τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκείνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ
 καὶ ἐλλείψει, ὅπου δὲ ἔσχατά εἰσι, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἐν
 δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον τῷ εἶδει τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα
 μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ

§ 3. ἀσωτία, 'prodigality.' Antiphanes and Euthykses wrote comedies called Ἄσωτοι, and Timostratos one called Ἄσωτος. Ennius and Caecilius each wrote an *Asotus*. We shall see that all through this book Aristotle draws more on Comedy than on life. The 'Middle' and New Comedy had provided a *hortus siccus* of types of character, which furnished him with the material he wanted. There could be no better evidence of τὰ δοκοῦντα.

ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις. The plural is used because each may be either ὑπερβολή or ἐλλειψις according as we refer it to λήψις or δόσις.

ἐπιφέρομεν, 'we apply.' For φέρειν, ἐπιφέρειν ὄνομα cf. 1119 a, 34 n.

συμπλέκοντες. Of this word Bonitz says "logice saepe usurpatur de coniungendis in eandem notionem plurimis notis" (Ind. Ar. 718 a, 55). We may render 'in a complex sense,' 'with a wider connotation.' 'Pro-

digality' often connotes Incontinence and Intemperance.

§ 4. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται, i.e. ἀλλοτρίως προσαγορεύονται. We have ἀλλοτρίως ἀποδιδόναι in Cat. 2 b, 35 of those who answer the question τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος in any other category than the τί ἐστὶν (genus and species). So Top. 108 b, 28 οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὀρίζεσθαι. From Phys. 195 b, 3 we see that οἰκείως is also opposed to κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and that term could be substituted for ἀλλοτρίως in the passages above. The meaning here, then, is κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγονται.

§ 5. βούλεται...εἶναι. 'By ἄσωτος we mean ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων.' The phrase βούλεται εἶναι is often used in the same sense as βούλεται λέγεσθαι (for which see 1110 b, 30 n.). So below 1125 b, 33. The usage explained 1132 a, 21 n. is a little different.

Ἦν δ' ἐστὶ χρεῖα τις, ἔστι τούτοις χρήσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κα- 6
 5 κῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρή-
 ται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ ἑκάστον ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὲ χρήσεται
 ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν
 ὁ ἐλευθέριος· χρήσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ 7
 δόσις· ἢ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἢ φυλακὴ κτήσις μᾶλλον· διὸ μάλ-
 10 λόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν
 δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ· τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον
 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μάλ-
 λον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροὶ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν 8
 δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λή-
 15 ψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν· καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ
 δίδοντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον·
 καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἡττον 9
 προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον· καὶ ἐλευ- 10
 θέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ δίδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ

ἀποβολήν· διχῶς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν·
 ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ χρήσις τοῦ κτήματός ἐστιν, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ
 ἱματίου, ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὥς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῶ
 χρήσαιτο τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἢ πώλησις καὶ ἢ μίσθωσις· χρήται
 γὰρ ὑποδήματι· ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά ἐστιν ἐσπουδακώς,
 τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς χρήσεώς ἐστιν·
 ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον
 τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν
 αὔξησιν διώκει· ὁ δ' ἄσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος
 τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν.

§ 6. Ἦν δ' ἐστὶ χρεῖα κ.τ.λ. The middle term of the first syllogism is τὰ χρήσιμα = ὧν χρεῖα ἐστίν, that of the next is ὁ ἔχων...τὴν ἀρετήν.

§ 7. χρήσις...κτήσις. Cf. 1098 b, 32 n. The point is that the ἀρετή derives its character from its ἐνέργειαι.

§ 8. καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος. We are looking for an ἐπαινετὴ ἔξις, and that will have to do with τὸ χαλεπώτερον and not τὸ ῥᾶον.

§ 9. ἡττον προΐενται, sc. τοῦ δέοντος. 'Men are apter to give away too little of their own than to take their neighbours' goods.' It is not the μᾶλλον which is redundant, as editors say, but the οὐ. For μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ after a negative (explicit or virtual) see Liddell and Scott s. v. μάλα II, 6, Kühner, § 516, 6. So in French, "on donne trop peu du sien, plus souvent qu'on ne prend le bien d'autrui."

εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἥττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· 20
 11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχε-
 δὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ,
 12 τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ
 τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα
 καὶ ὀρθῶς. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα 25
 13 ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ
 14 κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺν ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδούς
 οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην
 αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυ-
 πηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς 30
 15 πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ
 δεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη
 16 λήψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιούν-
 17 τος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὥς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὥς ἀναγκαῖον, 1120^b
 ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων, βουλόμενός γε
 διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ
 18 διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ

§ 10. εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα. Cf. Rhet. 1376 a, 28 ἀμφισβητεῖν περὶ τοῦ ἡθους εἰς φαυλότητα.

οὐχ ἥττον, i.e. μᾶλλον. We call them 'honest' rather than 'liberal.'

οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες, sc. ὡς δεῖ.

§ 11. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, sc. λεγομένων. Cf. 1152 b, 7 τὸν μακάριον ὀνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.

§ 12. καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. For the proof of this see 1115 b, 20.

τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει, i.e. τῇ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον δόσει.

§ 13. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως. Cf. above 1104 b, 5 sqq.

§ 16. εὐχερῶς, 'without caring how,' μὴ δυσχεραίνων. The εὐχερής is not 'nice' or 'fastidious.'

§ 17. οἷον ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ., e.g. the produce of his own lands or live stock, not from the public property

(ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν), as some politicians do. Cf. below 1163 b, 8.

καλόν...ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the opposition between the end and the *conditio sine qua non*, the final and the material cause. The ἀναγκαῖον here referred to is not τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, but τὸ οὐδ' ἄνευ τοῦ εὖ (Met. 1072 b, 12), τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον (Part. An. 642 a, 9), the conditionally necessary, that which must be if something else is to be.

οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων. I prefer οἰκείων, the reading of L^b, to ἰδίων (K^b) which all the editors follow. Above ἰδίων (opp. κοινῶν, δημοσίων) is in place, but here we want an opposite to ἀλλοτρίων.

§ 18. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show the need of the caution given in the preceding section.

5 σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν
 ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου.
 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ 19
 πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος
 ἔξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν [δίδωσιν]. οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει
 10 ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλατ-
 τόνων διδῶ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησά- 20
 μενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς
 ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα,
 ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν
 15 ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικόν
 δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς
 δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι 21
 ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ
 γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ
 20 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὲν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ 22
 δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ
 τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς
 ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ 23
 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
 25 ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἄσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆ-
 θος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
 δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσότητος 24
 οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ
 δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μι-
 30 κροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν

§ 19. αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, sc. ἐστὶ. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 37. It is the προαίρεσις which makes the man liberal.

§ 20. εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. Cf. infra 1167 b, 34. 1168 a, 21. This ἐνδοξον comes from Plato, Rep. 330 b οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἡρόμην, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺν οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ

οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ἤπερ οἱ ἄλλοι.

§ 21. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται κ.τ.λ. Cf. the σκολιὸν of Timokreon ὠφελὲν σ', ὦ τυφλὲ Πλουῦτε κ.τ.λ. (Bergk-Crusius p. 269), and the Ploutos of Aristophanes.

δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὕσης μεσότη-
 τος, ποιήσῃ ἀμφοτέρω ὡς δεῖ· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δό-
 σει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτῃ ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν
 οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆ-
 25 λον ὡς οὐ. εἰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμ- 1121^a
 βαίνειν αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ·
 τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ
 26 ὡς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
 27 δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ 5
 μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ
 μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδου οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.
 28 ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται ἐφ'
 οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϋούσι φανερώ-
 29 τερον. εἴρηται δὲ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἢ 10
 ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λή-
 ψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
 ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ
 λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλ-
 λείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς. 15
 30 τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον

§ 24. ἔπεται. By this word Aristotle "denotat praedicari aliquam notionem de altera, ita ut hac posita, illa etiam ponenda sit" (Bonitz).

§ 26. εὐκοινώνητος, 'easy to do business with.' For the sentiment cf. Menander fr. 95 Kock—

οὗτος κράτιστός ἐστ' ἀνὴρ, ὦ Γοργία,
 ὅστις ἀδικεῖσθαι πλεῖστ' ἐπίστατ' ἐγ-
 κρατῶς.

§ 27. τῷ Σιμωνίδου. I have adopted Bywater's conjecture for MS. τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ. See Contr. p. 37. Simonides had a reputation for avarice. *Aspasios* says φιλαργυρίας αὐτοῦ μέμνηται ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἡθῶν καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ πλούτου. The saying here referred to is probably that given in Rhet. 1391 a, 8 ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμων-

νίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἰέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρεῖττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· Πλούσιον εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας.

§ 29. πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς. If it were ἐν μεγάλοις he would be ἀδικος, cf. 1122 a, 7.

τὰ...τῆς ἀσωτίας, excess in giving, defect in taking.

οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται, i.e. οὐχ ἔπεται ἀλλήλοις. There is no necessary connexion between the two attributes of ἀσωτία and so 'they do not go much together.' For οὐ πάνυ, see Ind. s. v. It does not mean 'not at all,' except in the sense that οὐχ ἡκιστα may mean μάλιστα.

μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι—ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλεί-
 πει ἢ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσσωτοι
 εἶναι—ἐπεὶ ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῶ βελτίων εἶναι 31
 20 τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐίατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας
 καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.
 ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβά-
 νει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὥς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἢ πῶς
 ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ,
 25 καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος
 τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν
 διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν 32
 τρόπον ἄσσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ
 τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα,
 30 ἄλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ 33
 εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο
 ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀνα- 34
 λίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ
 ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν
 1121^b πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλι-
 γώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι,
 τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευ- 35
 θέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου
 5 ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλου-
 σίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν,
 τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ
 ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες
 καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς
 10 τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσω- 36

§ 30. οἵπερ καί, 'and it is just these,' i.e. private persons as opposed to tyrants.

§ 31. ἐπεὶ, *quoniam*. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος, i.e. ὁ μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνων καὶ πᾶσι διδούς. This is the prodigal young man of the New Comedy, who is usually a sympathetic character.

§ 34. εὐχερῶς here is simply 'con-

veniently,' 'easily,' opp. to *δυσχερῶς*. In this sentence the meaning expressed by *εὐχερῶς* above (1120 a, 34) is given by *ὀλιγώρως*.

§ 35. τούτου ἔνεκα, sc. τοῦ καλοῦ, cf. 1120 a, 24.

εὐχερῶς once more with the same meaning as 1120 a, 34.

πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν. *Rhet.* 1389 b,

τος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
 37 δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. ἡ δ'
 ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτος τ' ἐστίν—δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γήρας καὶ πᾶσα
 ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν—καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 ποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον 15
 38 ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστίν·
 πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ
 γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς
 λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χω-
 ρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δό- 20
 39 σει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις
 οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλεί-
 πουσι, τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβά-
 νειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσchrῶν
 (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἐνιοὶ ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ 25
 ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσchrόν τι πράξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ
 κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς

1121 b, 21. EE. 1232 a, 10 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἶδη λέγονται
 διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον περὶ μόρια, οἷον ἀνελεύθερος φειδωλὸς
 καὶ κίμβιξ καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προΐεσθαι,
 αἰσχροκερδής δ' ἐν τῷ ὀτιοῦν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ
 διατεινόμενος, παραλογιστῆς δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητῆς ὁ ἄδικος κατ' ἀνελευ-
 θερίαν. καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτως ἀναλί-
 σκειν, ἀλόγιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ λύπην.

37 (οἱ πρεσβῦται) πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον
 ζῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν. 1390 a,
 34 οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον
 οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
 ἅμφω.

§ 37. τὸ γήρας. The New Comedy
 usually represented old men as ἀνελεύ-
 θεροι. Cf. Rhet. 1389 b, 28 ἀνελεύθεροι
 (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι). ἐν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγ-
 καίων ἢ οὐσία· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν
 ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτή-
 σασθαι καὶ ῥᾶδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν.

§ 38. χωρίζεται opp. to συνδυάζεται
 above 1121 a, 16.

§ 39. οἷον κ.τ.λ. Cf. EE. 1232 a,
 12 above. We are here in the midst
 of the New Comedy vocabulary.

κίμβικες. According to Coraes,
 quoted by Stewart, the word κίμβιξ
 properly meant 'flea' (Modern Greek
 τζιβίκι = κιμβικιον). The name seems
 to have been applied to Simonides (by
 Xenophanes, according to schol. Ar.
 Peace 697), cf. Athenaeus 656 d ὄντως
 δὲ ἦν ἀληθῶς κίμβιξ ὁ Σιμωνίδης καὶ
 αἰσχροκερδής, ὡς ὁ Χαμαιλέον φησί.

κυμινοπρίστης, 'cummin-sawer.'
 Cf. our 'skin-flint,' 'cheese-parer.'

ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι)· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέ-
 χονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὥς οὐ ῥάδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων
 30 λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μή· ἀρέσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ
 μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι. οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν 40
 ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ
 τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ
 πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ.
 1122^a πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅπόσον οὐ δεῖ.
 κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ 41
 ἔνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς 42
 γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἂν δεῖ, οὐ
 5 λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας
 καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
 ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτῆς καὶ λωποδύτης [καὶ ὁ ληστής] 43
 τῶν ἀνελευθέρων· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἔνεκα
 ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ
 10 μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἔνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ
 τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὲ ὅθεν
 οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ
 τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι 44
 ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς
 15 ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
 λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1357, has the expressive compound *κυμινοπριστο-καρδαμογλύφος*. The word is found in Alexis (fr. 251) and Poseidippos (fr. 26), while *κυμινοκίμβιξ* is quoted from an anonymous comic writer.

ἀρέσκειν. I prefer this, the reading of both *K^b* and *L^b*, to the more colourless *ἀρέσκει* of inferior sources. The sudden transition to indirect speech brings vividly before us some comic old man's tirade.

§ 40. **πορνοβοσκοί**, the *lenones* of the New Comedy. Cf. Theophr. Char. 6 *δεινὸς δὲ καὶ πανδοκεῦσαι καὶ*

πορνοβοσκήσαι καὶ τελωνῆσαι καὶ μηδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν ἐργασίαν ἀποδοκιμάσαι, ἀλλὰ *κηρύττειν μαγειρεῦειν κυβεῦειν*.

κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ, 'in small sums and at high interest.'

§ 43. **καὶ ὁ ληστής** is omitted by *Aspasios* and is inconsistent with *ἀμφότεροι* below. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 38.

οἱ μὲν, the robbers (*λωποδύται*); **οἱ δέ**, the sharpers.

§ 44. **μεῖζόν τε γάρ κ.τ.λ.** For the question *πῶς ἀντίκεινται* see notes on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

II. Δόξαι δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας
 διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι.
 οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν 20
 χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον. ἐν
 τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ
 τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν.
 2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ
 καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ 25
 3 περὶ ὅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν
 οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ “πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη,”
 ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευ-
 4 θέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς
 τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, 30

1122 a, 18. EE. 1233 a, 31 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ
 περὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρᾶξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μὴ
 που κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν. ἄνευ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ
 ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν
 τυχόντων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὴ
 ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικός, καὶ τῆς
 τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ ὀρεκτικός, μεγαλοπρεπής.
 ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος, ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ

II. §1. περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας, ‘munificence.’ This was a form of goodness regularly expected of the Athenian upper classes, and showed itself chiefly in λητουργίαι and ἐπιδόσεις.

ὑποσημαίνει, cf. 1112 a, 16.

ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα. Of course in the compound μεγαλοπρεπής, πρέπειν has its original sense of ‘to be conspicuous,’ but Aristotle treats it as if it meant ‘to be fitting.’

§ 2. πρὸς τι, ‘relative.’

τριηράρχῳ...ἀρχιθεωρῷ. The trierarchy was an ἐγκύκλιος λητουργία (Dict. Ant. s. v.), the ἀρχιθεωρία was an extraordinary one. The ἀρχιθεωρός had to equip the sacred pilgrimages to Delos, Olympia and else-

where. See Ἀθ. πολ. 56, 3 καθίστησι δὲ καὶ (ὁ ἄρχων) εἰς Δῆλον χορηγούς, καὶ ἀρχιθεωρὸν τῷ τριακοντορίῳ τῷ τοῦς ἡθέους ἄγοντι. These are the δις ἐπτά of Plato, Phaid. 58 a and Bakchylides.

ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ, synonymous, ‘the object.’ Cf. above 1119 b, 25 n. The expression is condensed for πρὸς τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ. For the omission of the antecedent, cf. below 1122 b, 2.

§ 3. πολλάκι κ.τ.λ. Od. xvii, 420-1

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον
 ὀλβιος ἀφνειόν, καὶ πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη.

§ 4. μικροπρέπεια. The word does not seem to occur before Aristotle.

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ 5
 35 δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ 6
 1122^b γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται καὶ ὧν ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δα-
 5 πάνης ἄξιον δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἣ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ 7
 ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ 8
 9 προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλ-

γεινίασιν, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας. οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὢν, δοκεῖ πρέπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἷον ἀγαθοδαιμονιστὰς ἐστιῶντι, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπὴς, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ δι' ἐξουσίαν ὁμοῖος τῷ σαλάκωνι, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὥς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπὴς· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι [καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος (l. πράττοντος) κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον (περὶ ὃν Jackson)] καὶ περὶ ὃ (οἷον περὶ οἰκέτου γάμον ἕτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἶπερ ἐπὶ

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κ.τ.λ. EE. 1233 a, 38. Isokr. Dem. 7 d ἔστι φιλοκάλου μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ περίεργον.

βαναυσία. The origin of the word is unknown, but its primitive application was clearly to mechanical arts unworthy of a free citizen. In the Politics we find it in this sense without any moral implication, e.g. 1277 b, 35 ἡ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον.

ἀπειροκαλία, 'want of taste,' coupled with ἀμουσία in Plato, Rep. 403 c.

§ 5. ἐπιστήμονι, 'an artist,' 'a connoisseur.'

§ 6. ἐν ἀρχῇ. No such statement has yet been made, but that will not justify us in bracketing the sentence

with Ramsauer. It has been implied throughout in the discussion of ἕξεις under the two heads περὶ ποῖα (= ὧν ἐστίν) and πῶς (= ταῖς ἐνεργείαις). The point here is that we must have πρέπον μέγεθος not only in the ἐνέργεια, i.e. the δαπάνη, but also in the ἔργον, the object of the δαπάνη. I therefore read αἱ δὲ for the MS. αἱ δὴ.

§ 8. προετικῶς, 'profusely,' already in Xen. Mem. iii, 1, 6.

ἀκριβολογία, 'nice counting of the cost.' This use of the word for the habit of ἀκριβὴς λογισμὸς instead of ἀκριβὴς λόγος (cf. ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι 1139 b, 19) is rare. The usual term for this is μικρολογία (Theophr. Char. 10). A similar idea, however, under-

λιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ
 10 πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλο- 10
 πρεπῇ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς
 δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
 περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δα-
 πάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ
 ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον 15
 τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ
 γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυ-

(ἐστὶ Jackson) τοσοῦτον ἢ τοιούτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾔετο
 Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν, ἣν ἐποίησατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν
 ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἔχων πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν [δ']
 οὐθεὶς τούτων. καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως· ἔστι γὰρ τις οὗτ'
 ἐλευθέριος οὗτ' ἀνελεύθερος.

lies the use of ἀκριβῆς in Andok. 33
 § 19 ἀκριβῶς διαιτᾶσθαι and Menander
 fr. 235 Kock ἀκριβῆς τοὺς τρόπους.
 Cf. also Plato, Laws 844 b ἐὰν δὲ δι'
 ἀκριβείας ἦ (τὸ ὕδωρ), i.e. so scarce
 that they have to count every bucket-
 ful.

§ 9. πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου,
 'how much it will cost and how it
 can be done cheapest.'

§ 10. ἐν τούτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. ἐν
 τῷ ᾧ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. 'It is here that
 the μέγα (i.e. the μέγεθος) of the
 μεγαλοπρεπῆς shows itself, and this is
 what liberality has to do with. He
 will produce a more magnificent re-
 sult (than the μικροπρεπῆς or the
 βάνανσος) at the same expense.' The
 whole sentence is intended to show
 the likeness of the ἐλευθέριος and the
 μεγαλοπρεπῆς. It is not the actual
 amount that he spends which makes
 him munificent, but the way he
 spends it. The clause ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
 δαπάνης κ.τ.λ. does not, I think, con-
 trast Munificence with Liberality, but
 with its own excess and defect. Sup-

pose the μικροπρεπῆς and the βάνανσος
 to spend the same sum as the μεγαλο-
 πρεπῆς on a public object, the result
 will be neither μέγα nor πρέπον. In
 the one case it will be spoiled by a
 desire to do more for the money than
 can properly be done, in the other by
 the desire to make the ἔργον look ex-
 pensive at the cost of higher qualities.
 Cf. 1122 a, 32.

οἷον μέγεθος, quasi dicas μέγεθος.
 Aristotle uses οἷον to introduce ex-
 planations of an etymology. Cf.
 1128 a, 10.

κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Public
 munificence is not to be gauged by
 its money value like property, but by
 its impressive character. The word
 θεωρία is a characteristic Greek touch.
 The munificent man is the man who
 provides fine 'sights,' processions,
 tragedies, public buildings and the
 like. The Athenians were born φιλο-
 θεάμονες. The munificent man pro-
 duces something 'grand,' not merely
 something costly.

μαστόν). καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ [μεγαλοπρέπεια] ἐν μεγέθει.
 ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ 11
 20 περὶ θεοῦς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
 εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμ-
 πρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασιν δ' 12
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς
 25 ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ
 μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν—διὸ 13
 πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν
 πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ
 τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς—πρέ- 14
 30 πει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. 'The goodness of an ἔργον lies in its grandeur,' not in its cost. I bracket μεγαλοπρέπεια with Muretus. Its shifting place in the MSS. indicates that it is an adscript.

§ 11. τίμια. Cf. 1101 b, 11 n.

κατασκευαί. The word is used absolutely for 'buildings.' Here temples etc. are clearly meant.

πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητα. This is said to mean 'objects of patriotic ambition.' But εὐφιλοτίμητα is a very strange word, and ought to mean 'easy objects of ambition.' I believe that we should read οὐκ εὐφιλοτίμητα or ἀφιλοτίμητα (the confusion of εὐ- and ἀ- is constant in MSS.). The greatest λητουργίαι were far from being objects of public ambition, as we know; but just for that reason they attract the μεγαλοπρεπής. Cf. what is said of the μεγαλόψυχος 1124 b, 23. Dion. Hal. has the phrase εἰς τὰ κοινὰ ἀφιλοτιμία.

λαμπρῶς is a word of constant occurrence in connexion with the λητουργίαι.

ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. The λητουργία

of the ἐστιάτορες was simply ἐστιᾶν τὴν φύλην, and this might conceivably be πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν φιλοτίμητον. Here we have something 'grander,' appealing only to a μεγαλοπρεπής like Konon who τῇ περὶ Κνίδον ναυμαχίᾳ νικήσας Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τειχίσας τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἐκατόμβην τῷ ὄντι θύσας καὶ οὐ ψευδωνύμως πάντας Ἀθηναίους εἰστίασεν. (Athenaeus i, 3 d.)

§ 12. τίνων ὑπαρχόντων, 'what are his antecedents?' The reference is not merely to property, though it includes that.

πρέπειν. The sentence continues after the parenthesis with πρέπει δὲ (b, 29). Bywater, Contr. p. 38. For the example given in EE. 1233 b, 11 (p. 175), cf. Plutarch, Them. 5 εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἐλθὼν Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ διαμιλλώμενος τῷ Κίμωνι περὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σκηναὶς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευήν, οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὄντι νέῳ καὶ ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγάλης ᾤοντο δεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχωρεῖν· ὁ δὲ μήπω γνῶριμος γεγονώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκῶν ἐξ οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαίρεσθαι, προσωφλίσκανεν ἀλαζονείαν.

προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς
 ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει
 15 καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ
 εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα· τῶν δὲ ιδίων ὅσα 35
 εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί 1123^a
 τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ
 ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντι-
 δωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἀλλ'
 εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. 5
 16 μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως
 τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
 μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα
 17 γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀρ-
 μόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ 10
 τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλο-
 πρεπέστατον <ἀπλῶς> μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ
 18 ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ
 δαπανήματι—σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλο-
 πρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ 15
 19 ἀνελεύθερον—διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ
 γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐνυπέμβλη-
 20 τον) καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν
 ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάνανσος τῷ

§ 14. ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, 'those they have to do with' by relationship (τῶν γένει προσηκόντων) or otherwise.

§ 15. τῶν δὲ ιδίων, 'private' as opposed to τὰ περὶ θεοῦς and τὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.

ξένων...ἀποστολάς. Specially used in connexion with gifts given to the parting guest.

§ 17. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. A long compound protasis which goes down to a, 14 δαπανήματι, followed by a parenthesis (a, 14 σφαῖρα...a, 16 ἀνελεύθερον). The apodosis begins at a, 16 διὰ τοῦτο.

ἀπλῶς, inserted by Bywater (Contr.

p. 38), seems necessary to make an antithesis to ἐνταῦθα. 'Expenditure is munificent ἀπλῶς when it is great expenditure on a great object, in a given kind of expenditure, it is what is great in that kind.' The words ἐνταῦθα and ἐν τούτοις are equivalent to ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει.

§ 20. βάνανσος. Cf. above 1107 b, 19. 1122 a, 31, where βανανσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία are coupled. Eudemos (loc. cit. p. 174) speaks of ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας, and Theophrastos (ap. Stob. II, 140 Wachsm.) called the ὑπερβολή by the name

20 παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν
 γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ
 λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν,
 καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων,
 ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ οὐ τοῦ
 25 καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ
 ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀνα-
 λῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικρο- 21
 πρεπῆς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν
 μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅτι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ
 30 σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος,
 καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις 22
 αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνειδῆ γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλα-
 βερὰ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λῖαν ἀσχήμονες.

III. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνό-

1123 a, 34. EE. 1232 a, 19 περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς
 μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδόμενων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ

of σαλακωνία. Cf. also Hesych. s.v. σαλακωνεύσαι. Ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος σαλάκωνά φησιν εἶναι τὸν δαπανῶντα ὅπου μὴ δεῖ. Cf. Rhet. 1391 a, 3 (of the ἡθῆ which go with wealth) καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες· τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφήν καὶ τὴν ἐνδειξιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας εἰσθῆναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῷ ὀλεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἃ καὶ αὐτοί.

παρὰ μέλος, i.e. πλημμελῶς, *absonè*, opposed to ἐμμελῶς (1122 a, 35) for which Plato has ἐν μέλει Soph. 2 427 d. Cf. also παρὰ μέλος φθέγγασθαι, εἰπεῖν Phileb. 28 b, Kritias 106 b, Laws 696 d and EE. 1233 a, 39 (p. 173).

ἐρανιστὰς, "Ἐρανος being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course

bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour." Grant. Eudemos refers to ἀγαθοδαιμονιστάι.

κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν. For the cost of a comic χορηγία Zell refers to Lys. p. 699 κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν Κηφισοδότῳ ἐνίκων καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τῆς σκευῆς ἀναθέσει ἐκκαίδεκα μνᾶς. A tragic χορηγία might cost 30 minae.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ, sc. τοῦ χοροῦ.

ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38. Megarian comedy was thought φορτικόν at Athens.

§ 21. ἐν μικρῷ...ἀπολεῖ are to be taken together. He will spoil the beauty of his work 'for a trifle' (Welldon). This use of ἐν resembles its use in the phrase κινδυνεύειν ἐν c. dat. for which see Kühner § 431, 1.

III. § 1. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία, best rendered 'Pride.'

2 ματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν· δια- 35
 3 φέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ 1123^b
 δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ
 γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 4 οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος.
 ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σῶφρων, μεγα- 5
 5 λόψυχος δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἢ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμ-

ἄλλα <ᾠ> κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι τοῦ λανθάνει πόρρω
 προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτ' συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ
 ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ αὐ-
 θάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
 ὁμοιοὶ μέχρι τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασὺς,
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὦδε ὁ δ' ὦδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει πλεῖστον. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν
 μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει
 τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ
 ὁμοῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται.

περὶ ποῖα...πρῶτον. Cf. 1115 a, 5 n.
 λάβωμεν. For the dialectical phrase
 λαβεῖν περὶ with an interrogative cf.
 1130 b, 7. 1139 a, 15. 1168 b, 13.

§ 2. τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, 'the man
 who corresponds to the ἕξις,' who
 embodies the type. Cf. 1126 b, 20.
 For the τόπος of σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ
 τὴν ἕξιν, cf. Top. 147 a, 12.

§ 3. δοκεῖ δὴ...εἶναι. These words
 are enough to show that Aristotle is
 not depicting an ethical ideal of his
 own, as has been supposed, but is
 still analysing ἔνδοξα. His own ideal
 we learn from Book X; this is the
 ideal of the average Hellene, and the
 character described reminds one of
 Περικλῆς οὐλύμπιος. The description
 itself has much quiet humour and is
 surely half-ironical. In An. Post.
 97 b, 15 Aristotle takes the search for
 the definition of the μεγαλόψυχος as an
 illustration of method—οἷον λέγω εἰ τί
 ἐστὶ μεγαλοψυχία ζητοῦμεν, σκεπτέον
 ἐπὶ τινων μεγαλοψύχων οὕς ἴσμεν

(σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν) τί
 ἔχουσιν ἐν πάντες ἢ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον εἰ
 Ἀλκιβιάδης μεγαλόψυχος ἢ Ἀχιλλεὺς
 καὶ ὁ Αἴας, τί ἐν ἅπαντες; τὸ μὴ ἀνέ-
 χεσθαι ὑβριζόμενοι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπολέ-
 μησεν, ὁ δ' ἐμήνισεν, ὁ δ' ἀπέκτεινεν
 ἑαυτόν. πάλιν ἐφ' ἐτέρων, οἷον Λυσάν-
 δρου ἢ Σωκράτους, εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀδιάφοροι
 εἶναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦντες, ταῦτα
 δύο λαβὼν σκοπῶ τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἢ
 τε ἀπάθεια ἢ περὶ τὰς τύχας καὶ ἢ μὴ
 ὑπομονὴ ἀτιμαζομένων (the definition
 here fulfils this condition). εἰ δὲ μη-
 δέν, δύο εἶδη ἂν εἴη τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας.

§ 4. σῶφρων, here in its popular
 sense, equivalent to κόσμιος, 'modest.'

§ 5. τὸ κάλλος κ.τ.λ. Cf. Poet.
 1450 b, 34 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ
 ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα δ' συνέστηκεν ἐκ
 τινων οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ
 ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ
 τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ
 τάξει ἐστίν. Pol. 1326 a, 33 ἐπεὶ τὸ
 γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴθωθε
 γίνεσθαι. Probl. 915 b, 37. 920 b, 29.

μετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν 6
χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων 7
10 ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάντε μεγάλων ἐάντε μετρίων, ἐάντε
καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ
μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει εἰ
μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν με- 8
γέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν
15 ἀξιοῖ, οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ μεγά- 9
λων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ
ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· 10
μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὐ
μάλιστα ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
20 ἀθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ 11

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν.
δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα ἃ διώκει ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἕξιν περὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα [εἶναι ἡδέα]. ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη· κρίνει δ' ἡ περὶ
ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν
κελεύσειε καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὥστε ἔπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ αὐτὴν
ἔπεσθαι πάσαις.

1123 b, 13. EE. 1232 b, 14 οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως
ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι
τῶν πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. δεῖ δὴ τοῦτο διορίσαντας
εἰπεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς· ἡ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ
πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων λόγου, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ
τίνι ἢ τιμῇ διαφέρει. μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ
τῷ ποιῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμίαν εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ
τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν,

§ 6. χαῦνος. The literal sense of this word is 'gaping.' It is then applied to anything porous, spongy or loose (Liddell and Scott) as for instance snow. It is from this that the meaning 'flimsy,' 'frothy,' 'inane' is derived.

§ 8. τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος κ.τ.λ.

Cf. 1107 a, 6 διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστίν ἢ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

§ 11. ἄνευ λόγου, 'we need not prove,' i.e. it is evident on the face of it even apart from the explanation or ground. Cf. 1131 a, 13. 1142 b, 2.

12 τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
 13 κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
 14 καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς 25
 ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ
 δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
 μείζονος γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
 τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ
 δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα. 30
 15 οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι,
 οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα πράξει αἰσχροῦ ὃ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα;
 καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ
 μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος
 φαῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται 35

ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους
 ποιεῖν ἐκάστη, περὶ ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν. ἀλλ'
 ὅμως ἐστὶ τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ
 ἰδίᾳ μεγαλόψυχον τοῦτον λεκτέον τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν
 ἓν αὐτῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια τὰ δ' ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν
 τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά, καὶ
 τούτων ἓνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτούς, ἐν τούτοις ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλό-
 ψυχος. τετραχῶς δ' ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι
 μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἄξιόν τινα
 τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἑκάτερα
 αὐτῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος ἄξιος ὢν μικρῶν μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν
 ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ ἄξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοίη ἂν μικρῶν
 ἑαυτόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν ψεκτός
 (ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τυγχάνειν), ψεκτὸς δὲ
 καὶ ὅστις ἄξιος ὢν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει μὴ ἀξιοῖ
 ἑαυτόν· λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίος τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις, ὅστις ὢν

§ 12. οἱ μεγάλοι. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38.

§ 14. τὸ...μέγα, 'the grand.' Everything is 'on the grand scale' with the μεγαλόψυχος.

§ 15. φεύγειν παρασείσαντι. The meaning is made quite clear by De Motu Animalium 705 a, 17 καὶ οἱ

θέοντες θᾶπτον θέουσι παρασείοντες τὰς χεῖρας, Probl. 881 b, 6 ὁ δὲ θᾶπτον θεῖ παρασείων ἢ μὴ παρασείων. The attitude is familiar from vase-paintings and is certainly beneath the dignity of our hero. Is it possible not to see that this is a humorous touch?

1124^a τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος 16
 τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνε-
 ται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλό-
 ψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μάλιστα 17
 5 μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι. καὶ
 ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως
 ἡσθήσεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρε-
 τῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῇ, οὐ μὲν ἀλλ'
 ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν.
 10 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλι-
 γωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ
 γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ 18
 εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ
 πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
 15 μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρῆς
 ἔσται οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει
 ὥς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν
 τιμὴν ἐστίν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν
 βούλονται· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα.
 20 διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα 19
 συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιούν-
 ται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ
 γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινων·
 25 κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ὃ δ' ἄμφω 20
 ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιούται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ

ἄξιος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τούτων, καὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος
 ἀξιῶν ἑαυτόν. οὗτος ἐπαινετὸς καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ
 τιμῆς αἵρεσιν καὶ χρήσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀρίστη
 ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποδίδομεν, καὶ οὐ περὶ τὰ
 χρήσιμα, τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης αὕτη ἐπαινετωτάτη,
 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἂν εἴη.

§ 16. κόσμος...τῶν ἀρετῶν. Sim-
 ply 'an adornment of goodness.' Grant
 rightly translates 'the crown of the

virtues.'

§ 19. τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον. For
 this τόπος, cf. Top. 117 a, 16.

τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιού-
 σιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς
 21 παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ 30
 ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ
 φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν κατα- 1124^b
 φρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῳσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται
 γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν
 οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρο-
 22 νοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως κατα- 5
 23 φρονεῖ—δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς—οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ
 ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν,
 μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὥς
 24 οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος
 δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. 10

1124 b, 1. EE. 1232 a, 38 ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ
 καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι. ἐκάστη δ' ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικούς ποιεῖ τῶν
 παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι
 (ὑπομεῖναι τι Fritzsche) τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ πλήθος (πάθος Fritzsche)
 οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν), καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ
 ἐλευθέριος χρημάτων. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα
 σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἐτέρῳ τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς
 τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν
 ἀπολογία ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγωρον τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστ'
 εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ
 ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς. καὶ λυπήσεται ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχόμενος ὑπὸ
 ἀναξίου. καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.

§ 21. καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ.
 Those who have wealth and power
 (without goodness) become haughty
 too. We have seen already (a, 20)
 that the μεγαλόψυχος is considered
 supercilious. As Aristotle goes on to
 say, haughtiness is the one point in
 which they can successfully imitate

the μεγαλόψυχος.

ἐν οἷς δύνανται. Cf. 1115 b, 31.

§ 23. μικροκίνδυνος. L^b and As-
 pasios have πυκνοκίνδυνος.

ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν κ.τ.λ. 'Life at
 any price is not worth having.' The
 adverb πάντως corresponds in meaning
 to the verbal phrase πᾶν ποιεῖν.

καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ οἱ προσοφλήσει
 ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημο- 25
 νεύειν οὐ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ (ἐλάπτων
 γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν), καὶ
 15 τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ
 λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Δίῳ, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
 Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἂ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ 26
 μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς
 μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ
 20 τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ
 σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ
 ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθε-

§ 24. ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων, 'he is apt to return it by a greater benefit.' For the reading in the next clause, see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 39. By ὁ ὑπάρξας is meant the man who starts the interchange of benefits, 'the original benefactor.' Cf. 1136 b, 13. 1163 b, 21. In the same way ὁ ὑπάρχων is the aggressor in war as opposed to ὁ ἀμυνόμενος.

§ 25. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle enjoys noting the *travers* of this character. The μεγαλόψυχος was an object of raillery from the days of the Old Comedy downwards,—Perikles got his share,—but all the same he was the type that all true Hellenes inwardly admired.

οὐ ἂν, neuter, 'any benefit they have conferred.' This is Bywater's correction of MS. οὐς (Asp. ὧν). See *Contr.* p. 39. If we keep οὐς, we shall have to insert ὑφ' before ὧν with Münscher.

ἀκούειν, sc. δοκοῦσι, 'to be told of.' Bywater's correction of MS. ἀκούει (*Contr.* p. 39).

διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν κ.τ.λ. This seems to be referred to as if it were a well-known difficulty. Achilles had told Thetis to remind Zeus of certain

definite services she had done him (Il. i, 394 sqq.), but she contents herself with saying εἴποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ὄνησα | ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ (ib. 503). The question why she did not take her son's advice is just the sort of πρόβλημα that ancient critics propounded, and Aristotle here gives the λύσις. Cf. *Poet.* c. 25.

οἱ Λάκωνες. The schol. quotes Kallisthenes ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν who related ὅτι Θηβαίων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν εἰσβαλλόντων, ἐπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχίας δεόμενοι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅσα μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεποιθήκασιν εὖ τούτων ἐπελάθοντο ἐκόντες, ἃ δ' αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων ἐπεπόνθεσαν τούτων ἐμμένοντο, ὥς διὰ τούτων αὐτοὺς ἐπαξόμενοι πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον. If this refers to 369 B.C., the speeches in Xen. *Hell.* vi, 5, 33 do not bear it out.

§ 26. ἐπ' ἐκείνοις...ἐν δὲ τοῖς. Both expressions are admissible. For ἐπὶ cf. χαίρειν ἐπὶ, and for ἐν cf. γέλῳτ' ἐν σοὶ γελῶ. Aristotle likes to vary his prepositions. So we have immediately after εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς.

27 νεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ πρω-
 τεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἄλλ' ἢ ὅπου
 τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων 25
 28 δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστών. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῇ εἶναι καὶ
 φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβούμενον, καὶ ἀμελεῖν
 τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν
 φανερώς (παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι,
 καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ] 30
 29 πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν
 ἄλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κό- 1125^a
 30 λακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ
 μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ
 31 μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐ- 5
 τοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇται μέλει
 αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγονται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός
 ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι'
 32 ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς
 καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. 10
 33 καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
 34 καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κί-
 νησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
 βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα

§ 27. εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα κ.τ.λ., i.e., if I am right, he reserves himself for τὰ ἀφιλοτίμητα. Cf. above 1122 b, 22 n.

§ 28. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. On the reading and interpretation of this passage see Bywater, Contr. p. 39. The ms. tradition is more confused than anywhere in the Ethics.

ἀληθευτικός, 'frank.' Cf. below 1127 a, 13 sqq.

δι' εἰρωνείαν. For the meaning of this word see below 1127 a, 21 n. The proud man affects a certain mock-humility in order to evade those who would trouble him with small matters. "I fear that is not quite in my line."

§ 29. πρὸς ἄλλον...ζῆν, 'to take his rule of life from another.' The preposition πρὸς is used of the standard. So πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν, πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν ζῆν etc.

§ 31. ἀνθρωπολόγος, apparently here only. The proud man does not care for personal conversation.

εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. The proud man will not indulge in weak abuse, though, when he wants to insult and humiliate people, he will speak his mind freely enough.

§ 34. καὶ κίνησις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle knows in his heart that the μεγαλόψυχος is something of a poseur.

15 σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἶόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυ-
φωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτῆς διὰ τούτων.

Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρό- 35
ψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι οὐδ' οὔτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ.
20 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὧν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν
ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος
ᾗν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὲν ἡλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ
25 χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφί-
στανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευ-
μάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ 36
δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταύτ' ἐπιφανῶς·
οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελέγχον-

1125 a, 17. EE. 1233 a, 9 τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὥσπερ διεγράψαμεν,
ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιον ὄντα χαυνότης
(τοὺς τοιοῦτους γὰρ χαύνους λέγομεν, ὅσοι μεγάλων οἶονται ἄξιοι εἶναι
οὐκ ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων
μικροψυχία (μικροψύχου γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅστις ὑπαρχόντων δι' αὐτὸν
ἀν' ἡξιοῦτο, μὴ ἀξιοῖ μηθενὸς μεγάλου ἑαυτόν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν
μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας. ὁ δὲ
τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος,
περὶ οὐδὲν ἔχ<ον> ὧν μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἀξιοῖ μεγάλων,
διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἀξίῳ
ὄντι μεγάλων τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον <μικρῶν> ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὐκ ἔστι
δ' ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι (ὥς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει).
καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ (ὧν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων
ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὺς ἄμφω). καὶ ὁ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος (ἀξιώσει γὰρ

σύντονος, 'shrill,' as is shown by
Gen. An. 786 b, 35 δοκεῖ γενναιοτέρας
εἶναι φύσεως ἢ βαρυφωνία καὶ ἐν τοῖς
μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον·
τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, ἡ δὲ βαρύτης
ὑπεροχὴ τις. This seems better than
making it a mere synonym of σπεν-
στικός. We want a word for the voice

as well as one for the gait. So
ὀξυφωνία immediately afterwards.

§ 35. οὐδ' οὔτοι, any more than
the μικροπρεπῆς and the βάναντος.
Cf. 1123 a, 31.

ὀκνηροί, 'backward,' 'shy,' 're-
tiring.' They are not ἡλίθιοι like the
others. Cf. 1123 b, 3.

ται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, 30
καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερά εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέ-
37 γουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται
δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἢ μικροψυχίᾳ μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος·
38 καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χειρόν ἐστιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν μεγαλο-
ψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. 35

IV. Ἐοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, καθάπερ ἐν 1125^b
τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἢ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς
τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν με-
γαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὐται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι,
περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ· 5
2 ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ
ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ
3 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε
γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ
τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς 10
4 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον
ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον
ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπο-
μεν. δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου λεγομένου οὐκ
ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες 15

ὧν ἐστιν ἄξιος), ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὅς ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ μεγάλων κατὰ
τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, τί ἂν ἐποίει εἰ μικρῶν ἄξιος ἦν; εἰ γὰρ [ἂν]
μεγάλων ἀξίων χαῦνος ἦν, * * ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἔτι. διὸ καὶ οὐθὲς ἂν
εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὧν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ'
ὑπέκει· ἀλλ' εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὧν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.

§ 36. σχήματι, 'manner.'

§ 37. ἀντιτίθεται. We expect ἀντί-
κεῖται, but cf. 1145 a, 25 n.

καὶ γὰρ γίνεται κ.τ.λ. See notes
on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

IV. § 1. ταύτην, sc. τὴν τιμὴν.
ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις 1107 b, 24.

§ 4. πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου
λεγομένου, 'as φιλο-so-and-so is am-
biguous, it is clear that we do not

always apply the name φιλότιμον (on
the reading, Bywater, Contr. p. 40)
to the same thing.' In other words,
compounds with φιλο- sometimes have
a good sense, sometimes a bad one.
Mr Stewart instances φιλομαθῆς and
φιλοῖνος. On φιλοτοιοῦτου cf. 1099 a,
9 n., 1118 b, 22 n., and for φέρειν
ὄνομα ἐπὶ τι 'to apply a name to a
thing,' see 1119 a, 34 n.

μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ 5
20 δεῖ καὶ ἥττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὔσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρωθεν δὲ ἀμφοτέρωθεν πῶς. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' 6
εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' 25 οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

V. Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργᾶς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσιν, ἀνώνυμον οὔσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν. 2

1125 b, 26. EE. 1231 b, 5 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ πραότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρῶτον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γιγνομένην ὀρώμεν ὄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν πῶς. διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ

τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. On this test see 1118 b, 23 n. It is put here to vary the expression. The more accurate μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ follows in the next clause.

ὡς ἐρήμης...ἀμφισβητεῖν. In the sense of 'lay claim to' ἀμφισβητεῖν takes the genitive like ἀντιποιεῖσθαι (e.g. Pol. 1283 a, 11 ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, Isaios 3, § 1 οὐδεὶς προσεποιήσατο οὐδ' ἠμφεσβήτησε τῆς κληρονομίας). The best commentary is the parallel passage 1107 b, 31 ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας. We are not to understand δίκης with ἐρήμης, for the allusion is to the κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδικασίαι, and in that connexion ἔρημος means 'unclaimed.' Cf. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 43, 4 καὶ τὰς λήξεις τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ὅπως μηδένα λάθῃ μηδὲν ἔρημον γενόμενον, Isokr. Aigin. § 3

τὸν οἶκον ἔρημον ποιῆσαι, and especially Isaios 3 § 61 ὡς ἐρήμων τῶν κλήρων ἐπιδικάζεσθαι.

§ 6. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Cf. 1108 b, 19—25.

ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. If ὁ μέσος had a name, one or other of the ἄκροι would have been thought μᾶλλον ἀντικεῖσθαι τῷ μέσῳ. As it is, they are only opposed to one another.

V. § 1. Πραότης, 'good temper,' 'patience.'

φέρομεν, 'we apply the name Patience to the mean.' See 1119 a, 34 n.

ἀνώνυμον οὔσαν. But see EE. 1231 b, 8 διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ (EN. 1126 a, 13) καὶ χαλεπῷ (EN. 1126 a, 26) καὶ ἀγρίῳ...τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη (EN. 1126 a, 8) καὶ τὸν ἀνόητον (cf. ἡλίθιοι EN. 1126 a, 5).

τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ 30
 3 διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος,
 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινείται· πρᾶος
 δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινείται. βούλεται γὰρ
 ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους,
 ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ 35
 4 τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον 1126^a
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικός ὁ πρᾶος ἀλλὰ μᾶλ-
 5 λον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστὶν
 εἴθ' ὅτιδήποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς
 δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὥς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' 5
 6 οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργι-
 ζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον
 7 ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἡ δ'

(πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ διαθέσεως) τὸν ἀνδραποδῶδη καὶ
 τὸν ἀνόητον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μηδ' ἐφ' ὅσοις
 δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ προπηλακιζομένους εὐχερῶς καὶ
 ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγωρίας. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ
 μόλις, τῷ δ' ἡρέμα τὸ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον λυπεῖσθαι
 ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἣν καλοῦμεν θυμόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων εἵπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ καὶ θᾶττον καὶ μᾶλλον πάσχων καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον καὶ ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὁποίοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, ὁ δ' ἀνδραπο-
 δῶδης τούναντίον), δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶ τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς ἀνισότητος.
 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτημέναι ἀμφοτέραι αἱ ἕξεις ἐκείναι, φανερόν ὅτι ἐπιεικὴς
 ἡ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ οὔθ' ὑστερίζει οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ
 ὀργίζεται οὔτε οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ πραότης ἡ βελτίστη
 ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη καὶ ἡ πραότης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ
 πρᾶος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδῶδους.

§ 3. ἐφ' οἷς neut., οἷς masc.

βούλεται ... εἶναι, 'we mean by patient one who is imperturbable and not led on by feeling.'

ἐπὶ τούτοις neut., cf. above ἐφ' οἷς.

§ 5. εἴτ' ἀοργησία. Eudemos and MM. call it ἀναλγησία, on which see 1100 b, 32 n. Probably the usage by which ἀνάλητος meant rather

'coarse' or 'stupid' prevented Aristotle from giving it this more restricted sense. Cf. 1115 b, 26 n.

ἐφ' οἷς, neuter. Cf. 1125 b, 31 n.

§ 6. αἰσθάνεσθαι, like *sentire*, 'to have a sense of one's position,' to realise what is going on whether pleasant or otherwise. Hence ἀναίσθητος, cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται—καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
 10 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον,—οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ ὁλό-
 κληρον ἢ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν 8
 ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
 15 δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμ-
 βαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ'
 ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀπο-
 παύονται. ὑπερβολὴ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκράχοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς 9
 πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ 10
 20 δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ
 τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἡ γὰρ
 τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.
 τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπι-
 φανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεῖς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι
 25 τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖται. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότα-
 τοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' 11
 οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
 τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ 12
 30 γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται—ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι—
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 13

1126 a, 13. EE. 1221 b, 10 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων
 εἶδη κατονομάζεται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνον ἢ τοῦ
 μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τι τῶν ποιούντων τὰ πάθη. λέγω δ' οἷον ὀξύθυμος μὲν
 τῷ θάττον πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, πικρὸς
 δὲ τῷ φυλακτικὸς εἶναι τῆς ὀργῆς, πλήκτης δὲ καὶ λοιδορητικὸς ταῖς
 κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.

§ 8. ἢ φανεροί εἰσι, sc. ἀνταποδι-
 δόντες, 'in an open way.'

§ 10. ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία κ.τ.λ. Cf.
 1117 a, 6 n.

τὸ βάρος. "The πικρὸς has as it
 were a load of indigestible anger in
 him." Stewart.

δεῖται. For the reading see By-

water, Contr. p. 41. The metaphor
 of digesting anger is at least as old as
 Homer. Cf. Il. i, 81.

§ 12. μᾶλλον γίνεται κ.τ.λ. See
 notes on 1109 a, 6 and 12.

ἀνθρωπικώτερον. Cf. 1111 b, 1 n.
 συμβιοῦν. We have the more
 correct συζῆν below 1126 b, 11.

πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
 ῥάδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον
 χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἀμαρ-
 τάνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ 35
 τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας
 ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀν- 1126^b
 δρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκ-
 βαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
 14 καθ' ἕκαστα κὰν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον
 δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργι- 5
 ζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,
 αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν
 γινόμεναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα.
 15 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ 10
 τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

VI. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
 πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα
 πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι
 2 δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις
 πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φρον- 15
 3 τίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ

1126 b, 11. EE. 1233 b, 29 φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολα-

§ 13. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον...ἀνθεκτέον. This passage is repeated almost verbally from 1109 b, 14 sqq.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, sc. τὰ τοιαῦτα (1109 b, 23). κὰν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις, sc. τῶν τοιούτων. See the note on 1109 b, 23. The reading κὰν for MS. καὶ is due to Professor Bywater. The parallel passage has καὶ ἐν.

VI. § 1. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις κ.τ.λ. Eudemos says (1234 a, 24) that these are not ἀρεταί· ἀνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. They are mere παθητικαὶ μεσότητες. The author of the Magna Moralia says (1193 a, 35) εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ ἀρεταί,

ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος. We see how the notion of ἀρετή had been narrowed and starved. The principle of the Mean must apply here too if it is any good at all. Cf. below 1127 a, 14—17.

ἄρεσκοι. The ἄρεσκος is beautifully described by Theophrastos. The 'Good-natured Man' has always been a type in Comedy. The Schol. here says ὥσπερ ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν κωμωδιοποιῶν προαγόμενος Ὅμοιος.

§ 2. δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες. There were comedies entitled Δύσκολος by Mnesimachos and Menander. For δύσερις cf. Isokr. Demon. 8 d, ὁμιλητικὸς δ' ἔσει, μὴ δύσερις ὧν μηδὲ δυσάρεστος.

εἰρημέναι ἔξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση
 τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἂ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ 4
 20 τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλία. τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν
 μέσην ἔξιν οἶον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπικῆ φίλον, τὸ
 στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ 5
 πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ
 ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος
 25 εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις
 καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμό-
 ζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν,
 οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, 6
 ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται
 30 τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ 7
 λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας· τούτων δ' ὅσας
 μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερα-
 νεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημο-
 σύνην φέρη, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις
 35 μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφόρως 8
 δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον
 1127^a ἢ ἥττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς,

κείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ
 δὲ πρὸς ἀπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ [τε] πρὸς ἅπασαν
 ἡδονὴν μήτ' ἀκολουθῶν μήτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον
 βέλτιστον, φίλος.

1126 b, 36. EE. 1233 b, 34 σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ
 ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς αὐθάδης,

§ 4. **φιλία**. The Greeks had no word for 'amiability.' Aristotle is careful to note the difference between *φιλία* in that sense and the *ἀρετή πρὸς ἕτερον* discussed in Books VIII and IX. With the addition of affection (τὸ στέργειν προσλαβών) the amiable man becomes the friend. Without it he is not so, for his amiability does not depend on feeling for another, but

on his own character (τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι).

§ 8. **διαφόρως**. The usual reading is *διαφερόντως*. It is true that Aristotle often uses this word incorrectly in the sense of 'differently'; but here K^b has *διαφερόντως διαφόρως δ'*, which may perhaps justify us in substituting the more Attic adverb.

ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἔνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις μεγάλης μικρὰ 5
9 λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ διὰ τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ 10 φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

VII. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὕτη. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ 15 ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν 2 ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ 20 δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ

ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός.

1127 a, 12. EE. 1233 b, 38 ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἀπλοῦς, ὃν

§ 9. τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν... ὁ δὲ... For the construction cf. 1110 b, 22.

κόλαξ. The κόλαξ is the Parasite of the New Comedy. Athenaeus vi, 235 c sqq. has a learned dissertation on the words. The word παράσιτος was originally σεμνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, being the name of certain persons associated with the priests in the sacrificial meal. Accordingly οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ποιηταὶ τοὺς παρασίτους κόλακας ἐκάλουν. Eupolis wrote a comedy entitled Κόλακες, satirising Kallias the son of Hipponikos and his train of parasites. The first to use the word παράσιτος in its later sense was Ἀραρῶς ἐν Ὑμεναίῳ (Kock II, 218).

B. A.

ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1125 b, 24.

VII. § 1. Περὶ τὰ αὐτά, sc. περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν (1126 b, 11).

ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης, 'the mean between ἀλαζονεία and its opposite.' It is unnecessary to insert καὶ (τῆς) εἰρωνείας with Imelmann and recent editors. It is idiomatic Greek to omit one of the extremes with μέσος and μεταξύ, cf. Aristophanes, Birds, 187 ἐν μέσῳ δῆπουθεν ἀήρ ἐστὶ γῆς (καὶ οὐρανοῦ).

οὐ χεῖρον κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1126 b, 11 n.

§ 2. ὁ ἀλαζών. The original meaning of ἀλαζών was 'vagrant'

ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν 3
 ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθὲ- 4
 καστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικός καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ
 25 ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε
 ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ 5
 μηδενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει
 καὶ οὔτω ζῇ, εἰ μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττη. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ 6
 μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ
 30 ἐπαινετόν. οὔτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικός μέσος ὢν ἐπαινε-
 τός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφοτέρω μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ
 ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἵπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀλη-
 θευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος 7
 λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης
 1127^b γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενός τοιούτου δια-
 φέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν
 τοιούτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιούτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ 8
 φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει

καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον, μέσος τοῦ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖρω καθ' αὐτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ
 βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δ' ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθὴς καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον πεπνυμένος·
 καὶ ὅλως ὁ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὁ δὲ φιλοψευδής.

(ἀλάσθαι), cf. πλάνος. Hence the meaning 'charlatan,' 'quack' (Italian *ciarlatano*, 'a mountebank doctor'). In Plato and Aristophanes the word still means 'impostor' quite generally and is associated with γόης. Sokrates is an ἀλαζών as well as an εἴρων. For the specialised sense here given to the word cf. Xen. Kyr. ii, 2, 12 quoted below b, 15 n. In the New Comedy the ἀλαζών is the Miles Gloriosus. The original adapted by Plautus had this title.

§ 3. ὁ εἴρων. The εἴρων is properly the 'sly' man. Cf. Philemon, fr. 89 Kock:

Οὐκ ἔστ' ἀλώπηξ ἢ μὲν εἴρων τῇ φύσει, ἢ δ' αὐθέκαστος.

The word occurs first in Aristophanes, Clouds, 449.

§ 4. αὐθέκαστος, not 'the man who is always himself,' but ὁ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον λέγων, 'the man who calls each thing itself,' i.e. 'by its proper name.' So ὁ τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγων, 'the man who calls a spade a spade.' The opposite is given in Antiphanes fr. 52 Kock, αὐτὸ μὲν μηδέν. See last note.

κάν. Cf. 1127 b, 2 καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ. The reading κάν is suggested by Professor Bywater. The MSS. have καί.

§ 7. τῷ...τοιούτος εἶναι. Cf. 1126 b, 24. We are not discussing truthfulness as an ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον.

καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὥς γὰρ αἰσχροὺν τὸ ψεύ- 5
 δος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοι-
 9 οὔτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
 ἀποκλινεῖ· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς
 10 ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιού-
 μενος μηδενὸς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε 10
 11 τῷ ψεύδει—μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ'
 ἔνεκά τινος [ὥς ὁ ἀλαζών], ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν
 ψεκτός, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος.
 12 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·
 κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν· ὥσπερ 15
 καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης

From that point of view it comes under the head of δικαιοσύνη.

§ 9. ἀποκλινεῖ. So Coraes for MS. ἀποκλίνει. The Paraphrast has νεύσει. *sed Asp.*

ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς. The adjectives ἐπαχθές and φορτικόν are constantly found together in the orators. The sentiment is thoroughly Attic, and accounts for the use of ἐπιεικής, μέτριος and σπουδαῖος in the sense of ἀγαθός. Cf. 1137 a, 34 n.

§ 11. ὥς ὁ ἀλαζών. This seems to be an adscript; for in the MSS. it comes after οὐ λίαν ψεκτός where it does not make sense. I take it that the μάταιος who μηδενὸς ἔνεκα προσποιεῖται is not classed as an ἀλαζών at all, and that the object of the awkward sentence οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. is to reiterate this. But there may be some further dislocation; for Aspasios read οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. after εἰρημένα 1127 b, 22. Bywater, Contr. p. 41.

§ 12. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. The μάταιος who μηδενὸς ἔνεκα προσποιεῖται has only the 'potency' of an ἀλαζών in him; he only becomes one when he of deliberate purpose uses προσποίησις as means to an end. For the expression, cf. Top. 126 a,

30 ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατόν ἔ-
 θηκεν, οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ διάβολον, ἢ κλέπτην τὸν δυνάμενον λάθρα τὰ ἀλλό-
 τρια κλέπτειν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν εἰρη-
 μένων τῷ δυνατός εἶναι τι τούτων τοι-
 οὔτος λέγεται· δύναται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ
 θεὸς καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ φαῦλα δρᾶν,
 ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι· πάντες γὰρ οἱ
 φαῦλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται.
 This is just the difference between the διαλεκτικός and the σοφιστής. Cf. Met. 1004 b, 22 περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ δια-
 λεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει
 τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς
 δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει. Rhet. 1355 b, 17 ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ
 δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.

κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, opp. κατὰ τὴν δύνα-
 μιν.

ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης κ.τ.λ. We may best understand the point by asking whether we call the man who 'spins yarns' a liar. In the same way 'innocent vanity' is not ἀλαζονεία. Cf. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 12 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζών ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρειωτέροις καὶ ποιῆ-
 σειν ἃ μὴ ἱκανοὶ εἰσιν ὑπισχνουμένοις, καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ

ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύμενοι 13
 τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
 οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ δια-
 20 λαθεῖν ἐστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρὸν. διὰ τοῦτο
 οἱ πλείστοι προσποιούνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται.
 ἐστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλατ- 14
 τον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἥθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ
 κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν.
 25 μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνούνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκρά-
 τῆς ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερά [προσποιούμενοι] 15
 βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ
 ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακόνων ἐσθῆς· καὶ
 γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν· οἱ δὲ 16

λαβεῖν τι ἔνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι ποιοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ μηχανώμενοι γέλωτα τοῖς συνοῦσι μήτε ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῶν κέρδει μήτ' ἐπὶ ζημίᾳ τῶν ἀκούοντων μήτ' ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μηδεμιᾶ, πῶς οὐχ οὗτοι ἀστείοι ἂν καὶ εὐχάριτες δικαιότερον μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλαζόνες;

§ 13. οἱ δὲ κέρδους, sc. τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται, 'they pretend to things from which their neighbours derive benefit.' Then καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἐστι μὴ ὄντα is added as if προσποιούνται τοιοῦτοι εἶναι had preceded; for ὄντα must be masculine singular if μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρὸν is to have any construction. 'They assume characters the unreality of which may escape detection.'

§ 14. οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης. This passage seems to be the origin of the current phrase 'Socratic irony,' a thing which is almost as mythical as 'tragic irony.' We know from Plato that Sokrates was often called 'sly' by his opponents, and no wonder. But neither here nor anywhere else is the word used in a good sense.

§ 15. προσποιούμενοι, bracketed by Vahlen, is exactly the opposite of what is meant. The verb to be supplied is ἀπαρνούμενοι. It seems to

have come from the correct προσποιούμενοι μὴ ἔχειν of Aspasios. Bywater, Contr. p. 41.

βαυκοπανοῦργοι. A word from the language of comedy. Schol. Anon. β. φησὶν ὡς ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς εἰπεῖν τοὺς σεμνοπανούργους. βαυκὸς γὰρ ὁ τρυφερός, ὡς ὁ ποιητῆς Ἀραρὼς ἐν Καμπυλίῳ (Kock, Com. Frag. II, 217)

βαυκὰ μαλακὰ τερπνὰ τρυφερά. μετενήνεκται δὲ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τῶν βαυκίδων, ὃ ἐστὶν εἶδος ὑποδημάτων Ἰωνικῶν, οἷς αἱ Ἰάδες χρῶνται, οὐ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν Θεσμοφοριαζούσαις (sc. β Kock I, 482) μέμνηται. Κλείταρχος μέντοι ὁ γλωσσογράφος τὸ σεμνὸν ἀποδέδωκεν.

ἡ τῶν Λακόνων ἐσθῆς. Schol. Anon. εὐτελὴς ἄγαν ἱστορεῖται Ξενοφῶντι (Λακ. πολ. 2 § 4). διὰ ταῦτα καὶ σκώπτουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ κωμῳδοί, ὡς Πλάτων ἐν Πρέσβεσι (Kock I, 634)—Χαίρεις οἴμαι μεταπεττεύσας αὐτὸν διακλιμακίσας τε, τὸν ὑπηνόβιον σπαρτιοχαίτην ῥυποκόνδυλον ἐλκετρίβωνα.

I do not know why the editors think this refers to Laconising Athenians, not to the Spartans themselves.

μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδῶν 30
17 καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι
δ' ὁ ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.

VIII. Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ
διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις
ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. 1128^a
διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.
2 δῆλον δ' ὥς καὶ περὶ ταύτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις
3 τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, 5
καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν
εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ'
αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραί-
νοντες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς

1127 b, 33. EE. 1234 a, 4 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπελία μεσότης, καὶ
ὁ εὐτράπελος μέσος τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου.
ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ τροφήν ὁ σικχὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὁ μὲν
μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς, οὕτω
καὶ ὁ ἀγροίκος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ βωμολόχον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς προσίεται, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως.

§ 17. χείρων γάρ, sc. τοῦ εἰρωνος.
For this test see 1109 a, 6 n.

VIII. § 1. ἀναπαύσεως. For
Aristotle's theory of Rest, see below
1176 b, 34. It is ἀνεσις τῆς ψυχῆς
(Pol. 1337 b, 42), 'relaxation of the
soul,' and is necessary for the worker
(ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως ib.
38). It must be carefully distinguished
from σχολή (διαγωγή) which is an end
in itself, not a means to further ex-
ertion.

καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ κ.τ.λ. Besides Play,
Aristotle recognises Sleep and Drink
(μέθη) as forms of ἀνάπαυσις (Pol.
1339 a, 17). For the importance of
μέθη cf. the Second Book of Plato's
Laws.

διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς. The word
διαγωγή is here used in its wide
popular sense of passing time, not in

the narrow sense (equivalent to σχολή)
which it often has, and in which it is
contrasted with ἀνάπαυσις.

λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν. This distinc-
tion is elaborated in the Eudemian
Ethics (1234 a, 14 sqq. p. 198). The
man who can *make* a joke (the μέσος
between the φορτικός and the ψυχρός),
and the man who can *take* a joke
even at his own expense are both
described.

ἐν τοιούτοις...τοιούτων, 'whether
those in whose company he speaks
are like himself, and whether those
by whom he is spoken to are like
himself.'

§ 3. πάντως, 'at any cost.' Cf.
1124 b, 9 n.

ἄγροικοι. All mss. but K^b have
ἄγριοι, which, however, means 'sa-
vage' and is out of place here. In

10 παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποι· τοῦ
 γὰρ ἥθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ
 σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἥθη. ἐπι- 4
 πολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ
 παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι
 15 εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ διαφέ-
 ρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. τῇ μέσῃ δ' 5
 ἔξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ
 τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ
 ἀρμόττει· ἐστὶ γὰρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν
 20 παιδιᾷς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ δια-
 φέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαι-

δεῖ δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· οὗτος δ'
 εὐτράπελος. ἡ δ' ἀπόδειξις ἡ αὐτή· ἡ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη,
 καὶ μὴ ἦν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἔξις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης
 ἐπαινετή, τὰ δ' ἄκρα ψεκτά. οὔσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἡ μὲν
 γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶ τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ἡ τοιονδί, ὣν ἐν
 καὶ τὸ σκῶμμά ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι
 μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀμφοτέραι μέντοι μεσότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνά-
 μενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' ὅσοις ἡσθήσεται <ὁ> εὖ κρίνων, καὶ εἰς
 αὐτόν ἡ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἐστὶ τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ'
 ὁρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ <μὴ> λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκωπτο-
 μένῳ ὄντι ὁποιοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι ὄντι ἀρέσκειν·
 οὗτος γὰρ κρίνει εὖ.

1108 a, 26 we have ἄγροικος, and so in Eth. Eud. 1234 a, 5 and Magna Moralia 1193 a, 11. Bywater, Contr. p. 42. The ἄγροικος was a well known type in Comedy, cf. Eth. Eud. 1230 b, 18 μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι (sc. ἀναίσθητοι) οἷους οἱ κωμωδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν. There were comedies entitled Ἀγροίκος by Antiphanes, Anaxandrides, Anaxilas, Philemon and Menander.

οἷον εὐτροποι, quasi dicas εὐτροποι. Cf. 1122 b, 12 n. The word which

is applied to the movements of the body is used to explain the metaphor in the word applied to the movements of the mind.

§ 4. οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται. EE. 1234 a, 12 ἡ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ μὴ ἦν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἔξις. The word εὐτράπελος has already a bad sense in Pindar (Pyth. i, 92).

§ 5. ἐπιδεξιότης. Cf. Rhet. 1381 a, 34 οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι τωθᾶσαι καὶ ὑπομεῖναι... δυνάμενοι τε σκώπτεσθαι καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες.

6 δεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν
καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία,
τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα
7 πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστείον 25
τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῇ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα
ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ
8 ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται—ἂ γὰρ
9 ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ· οὐ δὲ πᾶν ποιήσῃ—
τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λαιδόρημά τί ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια 30
10 λαιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὲ χαρίεις
καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν
οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ
δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε
τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσῃ, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων 35
ὢν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' 1128^b
ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμ-
11 βαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ
12 παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι
ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν 5
καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλή-
θειάν ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν

§ 6. ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν κ.τ.λ. This is not the technical distinction between the Old and the New Comedy, which the grammarians called ἡ ἀρχαία and ἡ νέα κωμωδία. Aristotle is simply noting a distinction between the comedies of the 5th century (τὰ παλαιά) and those of his own day (τὰ καινά). The Middle Comedy (ἡ μέση) is a grammarian's figment of still later date. See Fielitz, *De Atticorum Comcedia bipartita* (Bonn, 1886).

αἰσχρολογία, 'indecenty.' Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 395 e κωμωδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας. Aristotle felt very strongly on this point. Cf. *Pol.* 1336 b, 3 ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ (l. εἴπερ) τι ἄλλο, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν. This marks the change in manners. Xenokrates was just as strong on the

subject, cf. Plutarch, Πῶς δεῖ ἀκούειν, 38 b τοῖς παισὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἐκέλευε περιάπτειν ἀμφωτίδας, ὥς ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ ὦτα ταῖς πληγαῖς, τούτων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ἦθη διαστρεφόμενων.

ἡ ὑπόνοια, 'innuendo.'

§ 8. καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. I have written καὶ for the MS. καί. Translate 'What he listens to patiently, we think he would not stop at himself. Now he will draw the line somewhere' (οὐ δὲ πᾶν ποιήσῃ). The sentence is usually taken as if ποιεῖν σκῶμμα could mean 'to make a joke.' The phrase πᾶν ποιεῖν means 'to stop at nothing,' and we must start from that in translating.

§ 9. καὶ σκώπτειν, sc. ἔνια.

§ 10. ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, 'cannot resist a joke.' He is γέλωτος ἀκρατής, cf. 1145 b, 19 n.

ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίου
ὁμιλίαις.

10 IX. Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν·
πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις
ἄδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλή- 2
σιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον
φοβούμενοι ὠχρίῳσιν. σωματικὰ δὲ φαίνεται πῶς εἶναι
15 ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οὐ 3

1128 b, 10. EE. 1233 b, 16 σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα
τῶν περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δ' ἐλλείψεις
τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικά. οἷον ὁ φθονερός καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος.
καθ' ἃς γὰρ ἔξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ'
ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ
ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διὸ καὶ θεὸν
οἶονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. αἰδῶς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ κατα-
πλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναισχυντος, ὁ δὲ

IX. § 1. Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς κ.τ.λ.
In 1108 a, 30 sqq. we were told of
two μεσότητες which were ἐν τοῖς πα-
θήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη, viz. αἰδῶς
and νέμεσις. Here we are told that
αἰδῶς is not an ἀρετή, because it is
the feeling itself, not a ἔξις or habitual
attitude towards the feeling. Nothing
is said of νέμεσις at all. The two
seem to be μεσότητες in the feelings
of fear and anger which come by
nature.

ὀρίζεται. Plato, Laws 646 e φο-
βούμεθα δὲ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγού-
μενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοὶ πράττοντες ἢ
λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν δὲ καὶ
καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἶμαι δὲ
καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνην. (Aristotle does
not distinguish αἰδῶς and αἰσχύνη at all
in this discussion, see next note.) In
Top. 126 a, 6 he criticises this de-
finition of shame. Shame, he says,
is ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, fear ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ.
So in the Rhetoric (1383 b, 13) we

have an amended definition which
leaves out fear, ἔστω δὲ αἰσχύνη λύπη
τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινό-
μενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ
γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, or more short-
ly περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία (1384 a, 23).

§ 2. ἐρυθραίνονται...αἰσχυνόμενοι.
We see here that Aristotle ignores the
thoroughly Hellenic distinction be-
tween αἰδῶς and αἰσχύνη. The sign
of the former is not blushing, but the
downcast eye. Cf. Rhet. 1384 a, 36
where Aristotle himself quotes the
proverbial ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰδῶς. The
tendency was to use αἰσχύνη for αἰδῶς;
Aristotle, at least in the Ethics, uses
αἰδῶς for αἰσχύνη. Cf. Schmidt,
Ethik der alten Griechen I, 168, sqq.

σωματικὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. De An. 403 a,
16 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη
πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πρα-
ότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ
καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ
τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.

πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν 20
 4 αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ 5
 5 πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχυρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, 6
 6 ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον). φαύλου δὲ καὶ τῷ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἶον 25
 πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξει τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἷεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκὼν δ' ὁ 7
 7 ἐπιεικῆς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξει, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν· οὐκ ἔστι 30
 δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχυρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ 8
 8 τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν. 35

πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων.

EE. 1234 a, 24 πᾶσαι δ' αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μὲν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἀρεταί, οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τί ἐστὶν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἕκαστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδώς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην· ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ὁ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὁ δ' ἄφρων.

§ 3. αἰδήμονας. The regular Attic word for this was αἰσχυνηλός, which is used in exactly the same sense below. Cf. Plato, Charm. 158 c καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυνηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν. (Cf. also 160 e.) So Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1389 a, 29 that the young are αἰσχυνηλοί but not the old. It is characteristic of

Xenophon's diction that αἰδήμων is a favourite word with him.

§ 6. καὶ τῷ εἶναι. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 42, and for the construction cf. 1107 a, 3. 1127 b, 15.

§ 7. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 'conditionally good,' and the hypothesis is that we have done something bad.

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, in Book VII.

BOOK V.

JUSTICE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Justice receives a much more elaborate treatment than any other form of goodness. This is not only because of its great importance, but also because of the greater complexity of the problems to which it gives rise. The object of the whole discussion is, of course, to show that the principle of the Mean applies to Justice as well as to other forms of goodness; but justice differs from the forms of goodness we have studied hitherto in being essentially relative (*πρὸς ἕτερον*). It thus involves four terms and not three only; for there are at least two persons and at least two things which are just for those persons. The mean which Justice aims at is at first an unknown x which has to be found by some application of the Rule of Three.

Aristotle begins at once by limiting the sense of the word justice. In Greek *ἀδικεῖν* meant not merely "to be unjust," but also "to be guilty" of any offence whatsoever against the law, and the word *δικαιοσύνη* could therefore be used as equivalent to "righteousness," that is to say, the whole of goodness regarded as relative to others. In the Republic, Plato had given it a wider meaning still, and had made it include the relations between the different "parts" of the individual soul, a view which Aristotle discusses later on (1138 b, 5 sqq.). It was therefore necessary at the outset to distinguish "particular" from "universal" justice; but the distinction is of little interest to us, seeing that the English word "justice" is never used naturally in the wider sense which Aristotle is anxious to distinguish and set aside. We have only to consider justice in the special sense in which it refers to the fair apportionment of "external goods."

§ 2. The first form of justice in this sense which Aristotle treats of is Distributive Justice. He has to show that the principle of the Mean applies to this, and he does so by showing that the formula of justice may be expressed as a proportion of the form $A : B :: C : D$ or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$. This is what the Greeks called a "geometrical" proportion. The name of the second kind is usually mistranslated "Corrective Justice," and this mistranslation has led to much confusion in the interpretation of the argument. Really this form of justice regulates *obligationes ex contractu* quite as much as *obligationes ex delicto*. The true meaning of διορθοῦν is to "adjust" whether by correction (ἐπανόρθωσις) or otherwise, and the scholastic term *iustitia directiva* is really far more accurate. There would be no harm in calling the form of justice which adjusts the damages and penalties imposed by a court of law *iustitia correctiva*, and that which regulates the exchange of commodities and the like might then be called by S. Thomas's name *iustitia commutativa*. But this would obscure the fact that the two are applications of the same principle, that, namely, of "arithmetical proportion."

We are not in the habit of calling an equation of the form $A - B = C - D$ a proportion at all, but it was one of the recognised Pythagorean μεσότητες, and in Aristotle's day it was commonly called an ἀναλογία, though that word was properly confined to the γεωμετρικὴ μεσότης. It will be convenient for us to speak of "arithmetical proportion" too.

Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας
 τε τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ
 5 δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν 2
 ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὲ 3
 πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην,
 ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπρα-
 γοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
 10 περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ
 καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ 4
 τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων

I. § 1. περὶ ποίας...πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης. The two regular questions περὶ ποία μεσότης and πῶς μεσότης; cf. III 15 a, 5 n.

§ 2. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον, i.e. that of starting with τὰ ἔνδοξα and arguing dialectically from them. For μέθοδος, see 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 3. ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ κ.τ.λ. This ἔνδοξον comes from Plato, Gorgias 460 b (referred to by Fritzsche). Τί οὖν, ὃ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός ἢ οὐ;—Ναί.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;—Ναί.—Καὶ ὃ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός κ.τ.λ.;—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὃ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;—Πάντως δήπου.—Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει;—Ναί.—Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;—Φαίνεται γε.

ὡς ἐν τύπῳ. Schol. Anon. καὶ ταύτας αὐτῶν ἀποδοὺς ὑπογραφάς τινας· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὁρισμοὺς εἶπεν αὐτά· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἓνα λόγον ἀποδοθῆναι οὔτε τῆς δικαιοσύνης οὔτε τῆς ἀδικίας, ἐπεὶ προῖων δείξει ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγονται.

§ 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. I understand the connexion of this section with the preceding exactly as Professor Stewart does; and, if we suppose that there is a direct reference to Plato's Gorgias, it comes out still better. Plato was right in adding ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν, for the case is really different from that of the ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ δυνάμεις (τεκτονική, μουσική and ἱατρική) from which he starts. If δικαιοσύνη were a δύναμις, then the just man would also be the clever thief (Plato, Rep. 334 a). It is, however, an ἔξις, and we know that the

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ
 τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων
 οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ 15
 τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν
 5 βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἢ
 ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις ἀπὸ
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων· εἴαν τε γὰρ ἢ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἢ
 καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἢ εὐεξία 20
 καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ εὐεξία πυκνότης
 σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς
 6 καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολου-

ἕξις determines βούλησις (and therefore προαίρεσις) by determining τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. So in Top. 145 b, 34, the definition of δικαιοσύνη as δύναμις τοῦ ἴσου διανεμητική is criticised; δίκαιος γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ προαιρούμενος τὸ ἴσον διανεῖμαι τοῦ δυναμένου. For δύναμις and προαίρεσις cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

δύναμις μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is true, of course, only of αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις (cf. 1103 a, 26 n.). Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard justice as an art, it will be the art of doing unjust things as well as just, exactly as νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάσασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας (Rep. 333 e).

ἢ ἐναντία. It is needless to read ἢ αὐτή, though it would be more logical. The double ἐναντία is idiomatic, cf. below a, 18.

ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας, the typical ἕξις.

ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, here in the sense of τὸ σημαντικὸν ὑγείας, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως, cf. Top. 106 b, 36 τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἢ ποιητικῶς ἢ φυλακτικῶς (i.e. πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν) ἢ σημαντικῶς (i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως) ῥηθήσεται.

§ 5. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For σκέψις ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου as applied to ἕξεις, cf. Top. 147 a, 17.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. I cannot believe that this means anything else

than the things in which the ἕξεις are found. As a ποιότης, δικαιοσύνη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται τῷ δικαίῳ (Bonitz, Ind. 260 b, 41). If this is so, the ὑποκείμενα will be σύστοιχα, and σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν συστοίχων is a recognised dialectical method. Further, this is in accordance with the actual procedure which Aristotle follows; for what he actually does is to consider the ἄδικος, i.e. the ὑποκείμενον of the ἐναντία ἕξις. If I am right, τῶν εὐεκτικῶν must = τῶν εὖ ἐχόντων as below 1176 a, 15 and often.

τὸ ποιητικόν. The ambiguity of the word εὐεκτικός seems to have caused a transition to another class of σύστοιχα, for τὰ ποιητικά are not properly ὑποκείμενα. But it matters little; for τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν are identical with τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως and these are such as τὰ ἔχοντα perform. The mention of them here will not seem irrelevant if we remember that our aim is not merely to know justice but to produce it.

§ 6. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Top. 106 a, 9 πότερον δὲ πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς τῷ εἶδει λέγεται, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου σκοπεῖν εἰ πολλαχῶς λέγεται, εἴαντε τῷ εἶδει εἴαντε τῷ ὀνόματι διαφωνῇ.

θεῖ δ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται,
 25 καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἶον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ
 ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιο- 7
 σύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
 αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον,
 (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν) οἶον ὅτι καλεῖται
 *30 κλείς ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἢ τὰς
 θύρας κλείουσιν. εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. 8
 δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ
 ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ [ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος
 καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ
 1129^b δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεο- 9

ἐὰν θάτερα κ.τ.λ. On the reading see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 42 and Stewart's note in loc. I have followed Stewart in keeping the θάτερα of K^b L^b. Bywater reads θάτερον from the Vetus Versio and omits καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. But (1) the idiomatic θάτερα is more likely to have been lost in the Versio than invented by the scribes, and (2) we really want the two pairs, the ἔξεις and the ὑποκείμενα. 'If one pair of terms is ambiguous, the other pair will be so too.' I do not think it necessary to insert καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη after τὸ δίκαιον with Stewart. Aristotle does not care for minute symmetry in such clauses. Cf. 1108 a, 16 οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά, quoted by Bywater, *Contr.* p. 29.

§ 7. τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν. The word is here used in the widest sense, in which any two things which share the same name are called ὁμώνυμα, not in the restricted sense explained in 1096 b, 27 n. As a matter of fact they are συνώνυμα (cf. 1130 a, 33).

2 λανθάνει, sc. ἡ ὁμωνυμία. Cf. *Phys.* 249 a, 23 εἰσὶ τε τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺν ἀπέχουσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμῆαι εἶναι οὖσαι. So *Top.* 139 b, 28 λανθανούσης

τῆς ὁμωνυμίας, *An. Post.* 97 b, 30 αἱ ὁμωνυμῆαι λανθάνουσι. In the present case the ὁμωνυμία is σύνεγγυς γένει and therefore properly a συνωνυμία.

ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ κ.τ.λ. The γάρ introduces the reason for the choice of the instance which follows. Cf. 1104 a, 13. κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, 'in outward appearance.'

§ 8. καὶ ἄνισος, 'unfair, i.e. unequal.' This is added because the popular word πλεονέκτης does not bring out the fact that the ἄδικος not only takes more than his share of good things, but less than his share of bad things. Cf. 1129 b, 10. (Bywater, *Contr.* p. 43).

τὸ παράνομον. Of course the English word 'unjust' has not this wider sense, but it was quite familiar to Athenian ears. 'To be guilty' of any offence whatsoever was in the language of the courts ἀδικεῖν. The ὁμωνυμία is, therefore, a mere accident of the Greek language, and we should not erect the distinction between "universal and particular injustice" into a part of Aristotle's system. He is only clearing the ground as usual by narrowing the application of the word.

νέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ,
 τινὲ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διώκουσιν·
 δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς 5
 10 ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' ἄδικος
 οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ πλεον αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν ἀγαθόν
 πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ
 11 πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστω δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ 10
 12 κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος,
 δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ
 ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τού-
 13 των δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάν-
 των, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς 15
 ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρό-
 πον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιη-
 τικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ

§ 9. περὶ ὅσα κ.τ.λ., sc. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Cf. 1099 b, 8 n. For ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, cf. Top. 115 b, 33 ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀπλῶς ῥηθήσεται. See too Pol. 1332 a, 21 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώριστα κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾧ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὰ ἐστι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ.

§ 11. ἔστω, Vermehren's conjecture for MS. ἔστι.

περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. The word ἄνισος includes the man who τὸ πλεον αἰρεῖται τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν and also the man who τὸ ἔλαττον αἰρεῖται τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. It is 'common' to both.

§ 12. ἦν. Cf. 1113 b, 13 n.

πως δίκαια, i.e. in the wide sense in which τὸ δίκαιον includes the practice of all goodness so far as it is enjoined by law.

§ 13. ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων. This need not be taken too literally.

Aristotle only means that the laws deal with all departments of life, but we are looking for the particular department to which Justice belongs. The verb ἀγορεύειν belongs to Attic legal style, and is never used in Aristotle except of οἱ νόμοι.

στοχαζόμενοι κ.τ.λ. This refers to the distinction between ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι and παρεκβάσεις, for which see below 1160 a, 31 sqq. I think Rassow is right in his view that the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία στοχάζεται τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις, while the παρέκβασις στοχάζεται τοῦ συμφέροντος τοῖς κυρίοις, whether one (tyranny), few (oligarchy), or many (democracy). I therefore retain κατ' ἀρετὴν, though omitted by K^b, and I understand it of ἀριστοκρατία, while κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον refers to τιμοκρατία and the like.

ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, i.e. in the wide sense. The μὲν is answered by δέ γε in 1130 a, 14.

πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀν- 14
 20 δρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν
 μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὄπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοι-
 χεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν
 μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς
 καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὁρθῶς
 25 μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὁρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη 15
 μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν
 ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ "οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἐῷος"
 οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν "ἐν δὲ δικαιο-
 30 σύνη συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἐνι." καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ,
 ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσις ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ
 ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι,
 ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις
 τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνα-

§ 14. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος κ.τ.λ. The argument is intended to show that δικαιοσύνη as a separate form of goodness must have some other meaning than legality. That is shown to extend to all forms of goodness so far as they are πρὸς ἕτερον.

§ 15. οὐθ' ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (p. 210, 9 Heylbut) τοῦτο ἐξ Εὐριπίδου σοφῶς (Σοφῆς Usener, or is it a marginal exclamation?) Μελανίππης· λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ (fr. 486 Nauck)—

δικαιοσύνας τὸ χρύσειον πρόσωπον. This is explained and confirmed by Plotinos Enn. i, 6 ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πρόσωπον καὶ οὐτε ἔσπερος οὐτε ἐῷος οὕτω καλά, ib. vi, 6 δικαιοσύνη... ἥς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ οὐτε ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ. Bywater, Hermes V, 356.

παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (loc. cit.) τοῦτο Θεόγνιδος· εἴρηται δὲ οὕτως (v. 145-6)—
 Βούλεο δ' εὐσεβέων ὀλίγοις σὺν χρή-
 μασιν οἰκεῖν

ἢ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως χρήματα πασά-
 μενος.

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετὴ (sic) χώραν μέντοι παροιμίας ἐπέχει καὶ μέμνηται αὐτῆς ὡς παροιμίας Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἠθῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ὡς <Φωκυλίδου αὐτοῦ μέμνηται. καὶ ἴσως καὶ > Φωκυλίδης αὐτῷ ἐχρήσατο.

καὶ τελεία κ.τ.λ. We shall not feel any difficulty about this passage if we remember that it is purely literary, and that we must not look for technical precision in it. Justice (= Righteousness) is 'complete' because it is all goodness, 'complete' goodness. It is 'complete' because it is the use (not merely the possession) of goodness. It is 'complete' because it is πρὸς ἕτερον.

χρήσις. The implied antithesis is κτήσις. Cf. 1098 b, 34 n. In Pol. 1328 a, 38 εὐδαιμονία is defined ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος.

16 τοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος ὅτι ἀρχὴ 1130^a
 ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων.
 17 διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ
 δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλω
 18 γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. κάκι- 5
 στος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος
 τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ
 19 πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ
 δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐν-
 20 ἀντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει 10
 ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
 ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν
 πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἀπλῶς, ἀρετή.

II. Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἐστὶ

§ 16. τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος. In L^b the reading is ἀρχά, but why should Bias of Priene speak Doric? This is one of those γινώμαι which Sophokles has made into poetry. Cf. Antig. v. 175 sqq.

ἡδη, *ex vi termini*. We may bring out this force of ἡδη by paraphrasing 'when we come to the ruler, a relation to others is at once implied.' Cf. 1142 b, 14. 1177 a, 6. This is correlative to the idiomatic use of οὕτω and οὐκέτι. See Ind. s. vv.

§ 17. ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν. This is one of the definitions given by Thrasy-machos in the First Book of the Republic. Cf. 343 c, 'Righteousness and right are really ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, what is good for the stronger and the ruler, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετούντος βλάβη.'

ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. The first will be the case in a παρέκβασις, the second in an ὀρθὴ πολιτεία. Jackson.

§ 18. καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν κ.τ.λ. Since the worst man is he who acts badly, not only πρὸς αὐτόν, but also πρὸς ἕτερον, the best man is he who acts

well not only with regard to himself, but also with regard to others.

§ 20. τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cf. 1141 b, 24. The full expression would be οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ἀρετῇ καὶ τὸ εἶναι δικαιοσύνη, cf. Top. 133 b, 23 ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι· οὐ ταῦτόν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ λευκῷ. Simplicius in Phys. (p. 735, 12 Diels) speaks of τὸ εἶναι συνήθως ὑπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ εἶδος σημαῖνον. Cf. Phys. 202 a, 18, ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἐν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ τὸ ἀναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν, ὁ μόντοι λόγος οὐχ εἷς, with Met. 1066 a, 32 where we have the same examples but the last clause runs ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ἓν. (Ramsauer.)

ἀπλῶς, closely with τοιάδε ἕξις, 'without qualification.' Translate 'regarded simply as a state of this kind, it is the same as goodness.'

II. § 1. Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε, 'Yes, but we are looking for—.' This answers ἓνα μὲν τρόπον 1129 b, 17. The

15 γάρ τις, ὥς φαμεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ
μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας 2
μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον
ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλε-
πότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ
20 πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν
οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γέ τινα (ψέγομεν γάρ)
καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὥς μέρος 3
τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ
τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ 4
25 προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν,
οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης,
ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ
κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται 5
ἢ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινα μοχθηρίαν αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν,
30 ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν,
εἰ δ' ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθη-
ρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία 6

particles δέ γε are used with their idiomatic force.

τὴν ἐν μέρει δικ., 'particular justice,' i.e. that justice which is a part of goodness and not ὅλη ἀρετή. The phrases ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος below are equivalent. The force of the preposition here is modal (Ind. Ar. 245 b, 27 sqq.) and may be best brought out by 'as,' 'justice as a part of goodness.' So we have ὥς μέρος τῆς ὅλης below a, 22.

§ 2. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The argument is as follows. In the case of particular vices we say that a man ἀδικεῖ even although he gains no unfair advantage for himself, and in this use of the word ἀδικία = ὅλη κακία πρὸς ἕτερον. But, on the other hand, there are cases where a man gains an unfair advantage and therefore ἀδικεῖ, but where his ἀδικία is neither identical

with any particular vice nor yet with ὅλη κακία. Yet it is κακία (for we blame it), and it is ἀδικία (for in one sense of the word, ἄδικος = πλεονέκτης, cf. above 1129 a, 32).

οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας. We have the same argument about ἀκρασία below 1146 b, 4.

§ 3. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 43.

ὥς μέρος, equivalent to ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος above.

§ 4. προσλαμβάνων...προστιθείς, 'making money,' 'spending money.' Cf. Plato, Euthyphro, 3 d λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλει ἀκούειν.

διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν, sc. ἄδικος λέγεται.

§ 5. ἀδικήματα, in the wider sense = παράνομα.

ἐμοίχευσεν. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τιτι ἔχοιμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ πάντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

5

7 "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία 8 τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ 9 μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ 10 δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταῦτόν ἀλλ' ἕτερον καὶ ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιο- 15 σύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου 10 καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἢ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἢ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὐσα χρήσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ 20 τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν

§ 6. συνώνυμος. This is more technical than the ὁμωνυμία of 1129 a, 27, and for the reason given. The definition is in the same genus, and συνώνυμον τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος (Top. 123 a, 28).

τὴν δύναμιν, i. q. τὸ εἶναι above 1130 a, 12.

ταῦτα πάντα. They are, of course, περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία (1129 b, 3), i. e. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ.

§ 7. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. A striking example of the cumbrous transitions and recapitulations which disfigure

the Ethics. We may attribute these to Nikomachos if we please. Introd. § 5.

§ 9. τὸ παράνομον. For the reading see Stewart's note.

§ 10. τὰ...πραττόμενα. I agree with Professor Stewart in preferring the πραττόμενα of L^b to the προσ-ταττόμενα of K^b. See, however, Bywater, Contr. p. 44. The νόμιμα are called δίκαια τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι and τῷ ποιητικῷ εἶναι (b, 25), i. e. τῷ πρὸς ἐν εἶναι, cf. 1096 b, 27 n. They are related to justice exactly as τὰ εὐεκ-

προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος.

25 τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενο- 11
μοθέτῃται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς
καθ' ἑκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι,
πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ
γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτόν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.
30 τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου 12
ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν
τούτοις γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἐτέρου), ἐν

τικά το εὐεξία (1129 a, 20), or τὰ
ὕγεινά το ὕγεια. This does not mean,
however, that general and special
justice are related in that way.

§ 11. τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, 'the
education which is to make a good
citizen.' For the expression cf. Pol.
1310 a, 14 τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς
πολιτείας...εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί,
δημοτικῶς, εἰ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοί, ὀλιγαρ-
χικῶς.

ἀπλῶς, i.e. without any such quali-
fication as 'a citizen of a democracy
or an oligarchy.'

οὐ γὰρ ἴσως κ.τ.λ., 'it is not per-
haps the same thing for a man to be
a good man and to be a good citizen
of any state' (lit. 'any citizen'). For
the question here raised see Newman's
Politics, Introd. pp. 234 sqq. The
main point is that the goodness in
virtue of which a man is a good
citizen is relative to the constitution
(πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν) and cannot there-
fore in all cases be identical with the
goodness of a good man. Pol. 1276 b,
34 ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον
μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπου-
δαῖος ἀνὴρ. This is because the state
is not the κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτεία, the
true ἀριστοκρατία. In it the good
man and the good citizen coincide.
Cf. Pol. 1293 b, 5 ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ (ἀριστο-
κρατία) ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης
ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοί

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν.
Yet even here the good man in the
fullest sense and the good citizen are
completely identified only in the ruler;
for he alone has occasion to exercise
φρόνησις.

ἀνδρὶ...ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. This use of
εἶναι with a predicative dative is a
favourite way of expressing the cate-
gory of οὐσία or, in other words, the
definition of a thing (λόγος). Cf. the
account given of the similar phrase τὸ
δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό 1130 a, 12. As
a ποιότης, ἀγαθός has always the same
meaning; but, since it is a relative
term also (πρὸς τι), it will have dif-
ferent definitions when it is predicated
in the category of οὐσία.

παντί. Jackson illustrates this use
from Pol. 1277 a, 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται
τινὸς (in any state) ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου
τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου;

§ 12. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος κ.τ.λ.
We now come to the two divisions of
Justice in the particular sense, the
only sense which the word has in
English.

ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς. Citizenship
meant to a Greek the right to share
in the goods of the state, and only in
the second place the corresponding
duty of contributing to them. The
citizen was a shareholder, not a tax-
payer.

13 δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρος 1131^a
 δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια ἐστὶ τὰ δ'
 ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὥνῃ δανεισμός
 ἐγγύη χρήσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται,
 ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δ' 5
 ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμα-
 κεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία,
 τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἄρπαγὴ πῆρως
 κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

III. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, 10
 2 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον·
 ἐν ὁποῖα γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ
 3 ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ
 λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι
 4 ἂν εἴη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ 15

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι. A wide word which includes all business transactions and is not at all confined to 'contracts' (συνθήκαι). The ἐκούσια are contracts, but the ἀκούσια are *obligationes ex delicto*.

διορθωτικόν. Much confusion has been caused by the current translation 'Corrective Justice.' The *iustitia directiva* of the schoolmen is really more accurate; for διορθοῦν is a word of far wider meaning than ἐπανορθοῦν and signifies 'to adjust,' whether before or after the transaction. Cf. Lobeck on Phrynichus p. 250 "Ὁρθοῦν et erigere et dirigere notat; signate dicitur illud ἀνορθοῦν hoc διορθοῦν. Utrique affine est ἐπανορθοῦν quod locum habet in iis quae ad pristinum statum, unde luxata erant, reducuntur; omnibus autem subest notio mutationis in melius; quamobrem usum promiscuum habent."

§ 13. ἐκούσια. Jackson maintains that the form of justice applicable to these is only the "rectification of wrong arising out of such trans-

actions." But this will not do; for, if a wrong has arisen, the συνάλλαγμα at once becomes ἀκούσιον. And we shall see that all the examples given refer to the preliminary adjustment of terms, and not to the rectification of wrong.

πρᾶσις ὥνῃ *emptio venditio*, δανεισμός *mutuum*, ἐγγύη *pignus*, χρήσις *commodatum* (loan for use as distinct from loan for consumption), παρακαταθήκη *depositum*, μίσθωσις *locatio conductio*.

τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων κ.τ.λ. These correspond roughly to the *obligationes ex delicto*. The distinction between λαθραῖα and βίαια is like that between *furtum* (κλοπή) and *rapina* (ἄρπαγὴ). Cf. also Plato, Laws 864 c.

III. § 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἄδικος κ.τ.λ. We now begin the discussion of Distributive Justice.

§ 3. ἄνευ λόγου. Cf. 1142 b, 2 n. The view is universally held apart from any ground. Cf. Pol. 1282 b, 18 δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἡ
 μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἑλάττω), ἡ δ'
 ἴσον, δυοῖν, ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον 5
 ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει
 20 ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ 6
 ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς,
 οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ'
 ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ μὴ ἴσα ἴσοι
 ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν 7
 25 τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι
 πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν
 αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες [ὑπάρχειν], ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ
 ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ'

§ 4. καὶ πρὸς τι. This follows from the fact that all δικαιοσύνη is πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ τισίν. This is explanatory of καὶ πρὸς τι. Translate 'the just is necessarily...relative, i.e. just *to* certain individuals.' Pol. 1282 b, 20 τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

§ 5. ἐν οἷς explained by τὰ πράγματα (which may be an adscript), 'the objects' which are to be divided. For the use of ἐν cf. 1111 a, 1 n.

§ 6. ἡ αὐτὴ...ἰσότης, 'there will be the same equality in the persons and in the objects,' i.e. if the persons are equal, the objects will be equal; if the persons are unequal, the objects will be unequal.

ὥς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'there is the same ratio between the one pair, the objects, as there is between the other pair.' It is not necessary to follow K^b in omitting τὰ ἐν οἷς, nor is there any difficulty in the double ἐκεῖνα.

ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1301 b, 28 ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. Eur. Hec. 306—

Ἐν τῷδε γὰρ κάμνουσιν αἱ πολλαὶ πόλεις,
 ὅταν τις ἐσθλὸς καὶ πρόθυμος ὢν ἀνὴρ
 μηδὲν φέρηται τῶν κακίωνων πλέον.

§ 7. ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, 'from the

principle of *according to merit*.' Cf. Isokr. Nik. § 12 δικαιοτάτον μὴ τοὺς ἀνομοίους τῶν ὁμοίων τυγχάνειν ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττειν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστους. Areop. § 21 δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοι νομιζόμεναι εἶναι καὶ τῆς μὲν ταῦτόν ἅπασιν ἀπονεμούσης, τῆς δὲ τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστοις...τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν καὶ κολάζουσαν προ-
 ηρῶντο.

[ὑπάρχειν]. See Bywater, Contr. p. 44.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1280 a, 22 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἀνισοὶ ὦσιν, ὅλον χρήμασιν, ὅλως ὅλονται ἀνισοὶ εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τι ἴσοι, ὅλον ἐλευθερία, ὅλως ἴσοι. ib. 1317 a, 40 ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία. ib. 1290 b, 1 δῆμος μὲν ἐστὶν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι. ib. 1301 b, 1 εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὐτοῦς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητά ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. ib. 1293 b, 40 ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν. ib. 1293 b, 9 καλοῦνται ἀριστοκραταὶ...ὅπου γε μὴ μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς.

8 ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι—
 τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' 30
 ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ—ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν
 9 τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι,
 δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρήται
 καὶ δις λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ Α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Β, οὕτως ἡ 1131^b
 τοῦ Β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Γ. δις οὖν ἡ τοῦ Β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν
 10 ἡ τοῦ Β τεθῇ δις, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ
 τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός·

§ 8. μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, 'abstract number,' which is not a number of anything particular but a number of units. Cf. Met. 1092 b, 19 αἰεὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅς ἂν ᾗ τινῶν ἐστίν ('is always a number of something'), ἡ πύρινος ἡ γῆϊνος (e.g. the proportion of fire and earth in flesh and bone) ἡ μοναδικός. As this last is the object of ἀριθμητική, it is also called ἀριθμητικός. So already Plato, *Phileb.* 56 d οἱ μὲν (οἱ πολλοὶ) γὰρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο...οἱ δ' (οἱ φιλοσοφούντες) οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει. Cf. Rep. 525 b sqq.

ἡ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This gives the reason of the statement made in a, 29. I have therefore marked τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον...ἀριθμοῦ as a parenthesis.

ἰσότης λόγων, 'equality of ratios.' Euclid, Book v, def. 3 defines *ratio* thus: λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν ἡ κατὰ πηλικότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ποιά σχέσις, and in def. 8 we have ἀναλογία δὲ ἐστίν ἡ τῶν λόγων ταυτότης. There is a various reading ἡ τῶν λόγων ὁμοιότης. On the question whether Proportion is identity or similarity of ratios, see Stewart's interesting note.

§ 9. διηρημένη...συνεχής, 'con-

tinuous...discrete.' Cf. Theon of Smyrna p. 82, 10 (Hiller) λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν συνεχής ἀναλογία, ἡ δὲ διηρημένη, συνεχής μὲν ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις τρισὶν ὄροις, διηρημένη δὲ ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις τέσσαρσιν. For instance the ἀναλογία 8, 4, 2 is 'continuous,' while 6, 3, 4, 2 is 'discrete.' Theon points out, just as Aristotle does, that a continuous proportion may be re-regarded as discrete, ἔστι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής ἐν τέτταρσιν ὄροις, δις λαμβανομένου τοῦ μέσου. Other terms were in use for 'continuous' and 'discrete,' e.g. συνημμένη and διεzeugμένη.

ἡ τοῦ Α, sc. γραμμῇ, 'the line A.' The ellipse of γραμμῇ is regular, but the usual phrase is ἡ Α or ἡ ἐφ' ἧς (ἧ) Α (cf. 1132 b, 6 sqq.). I suspect that τοῦ has crept in from the reading ἡ τοῦ πρώτου etc. found in K^b, and this, as we can see from Michael of Ephesus, originated in the absurd idea that ἡ τοῦ πρώτου σχέσις was intended. In the absence of a system of numeration based on the zero, arithmetical questions must be treated geometrically. Jackson's defence of ἡ τοῦ πρώτου (sc. ὄρου) γραμμῇ in the sense of 'the line which we take for our first term' is not quite convincing, but the sense would be the same.

5 διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ᾧ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ πρῶτος 11
 ὅρος πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον, οὕτως ὁ τρίτος πρὸς τὸν τέταρτον, καὶ
 ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς τὸν τρίτον, ὁ δεύτερος πρὸς
 τὸν τέταρτον. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἅπερ ἡ νομὴ
 συνδυάζει, καὶ οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ
 10 πρῶτου ὅρου τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου τῷ τετάρτῳ σύζευξις 12
 τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί,
 <τὸ δ' ἄδικον> τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον,
 τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον—(καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν 13
 γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμ-

§ 10. διήρηται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is quoted in Pol. 1280 a, 17 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς. The πράγματα are here expressed by ᾧ instead of ἐν οἷς as the verb lends itself to this. 'There is a similar division into persons and things,' i.e. the line which represents $A+C$ is 'similarly divided' to that which represents $B+D$.

§ 11. ὡς ὁ πρῶτος ὅρος κ.τ.λ. In Mathematics ὅρος is the 'term' of a proportion, and the word was transferred by Aristotle from Mathematics to Logic. It is evident from 1133 a, 6 that it was customary to arrange the 'terms' in a square, a fact which may explain the word ὅρος and the symbol ::. I have read $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$ as ordinals here with Jackson, since we are now dealing with ὅροι, not γραμμαί.

ἐναλλάξ, *alternando*, i.e. $A:\Gamma::B:\Delta$. Cf. An. Post. 74 a, 18 τὸ ἀνάλογον ὅτι ἐναλλάξ. Euclid, v, def. 13 ἐναλλάξ λόγος ἐστὶ λήψις τοῦ ἡγουμένου πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, καὶ τοῦ ἐπομένου πρὸς τὸ ἐπόμενον.

τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, sc. ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον (b, 14), i.e. *componendo*, $A+\Gamma : B+\Delta :: A : B$. Euclid calls this σύνθεσις (cf. συντεθῇ here). Cf. v, def. 15 σύνθεσις λόγου ἐστὶ λήψις τοῦ ἡγουμένου μετὰ τοῦ ἐπομένου ὡς ἐνὸς πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπόμενον.

ἅπερ, i.e. the two terms in each ὅλον, the person and the thing. I have adopted Bywater's correction of MS. ὅπερ. See Contr. p. 44.

§ 12. σύζευξις. The 'conjunction' of the terms. The word refers merely to the drawing of lines in the graphic formula, thus—

A	B
Γ	Δ

Cf. the note on ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις below (1133 a, 6).

<τὸ δ' ἄδικον>. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 11.

§ 13. καλοῦσι...ἐκάτερον. This would be a footnote in a modern work. It breaks the connexion, for it seems to make the next sentence say that geometrical proportion cannot be continuous, which is absurd.

γεωμετρικὴν. Cf. Theon of Smyrna p. 85, 8 (Hiller) ἀναλογίας δὲ ὁ μὲν Θρασυλλὸς φησιν εἶναι προηγουμένας τρεῖς (1) ἀριθμητικὴν, (2) γεωμετρικὴν, (3) ἁρμονικὴν. In the first each mean exceeds and is exceeded by the same number; in the second by the same ratio, e.g. 2, 4, 6, 8 form an ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία while 2, 4, 8, 16 form a γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία. The 'harmonic proportion' does not concern us here. Properly speaking, the name ἀναλογία should be confined to geometrical proportion, and so it was originally. But

βαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκά-
 14 τερον)—ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται 15
 εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-
 λογον· τὸ δ' ἀδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ
 μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμ-
 βαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος
 15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ 20
 γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακόν·
 16 ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ
 17 δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν
 εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

IV. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς 25
 2 συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ
 τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανε-
 μητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ
 τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν εἰς γίνηται
 ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι 30

we see that by Aristotle's time it was already extended to series in arithmetical progression (cf. 1106 a, 35 n.), and later it was used for all manner of series. See Gow, *Greek Mathematics*, p. 93, n. 1.

§ 14. αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία, sc. ἡ τοῦ διανεμητικοῦ δικαίου, not ἡ γεωμετρική. We cannot have the continuous proportion—

$$A : B :: B : \Gamma$$

for the person (ᾧ) and the thing (ὅ) cannot be an identical term, which is necessary for continuous proportion. Cf. 1131 a, 33 and *Phys.* 262 a, 19 *τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων, ἀρχῆς μέσου τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ἄμφω ἐστί, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ δὲ δύο.* The phrase ἀριθμῷ ἐν expresses the complete identity of a particular thing with itself (cf. *Met.* 999 b, 33 *τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον λέγειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει*), as opposed to unity of species, unity of genus and analogical unity.

τὸ μὲν...τὸ δὲ... i.e. the one ὅλον—the other ὅλον. In unjust distribution of good things, if A is ὁ ἀδικῶν and B ὁ ἀδικούμενος, $\frac{A+\Gamma}{B+\Delta}$ becomes more than $\frac{A}{B}$.

§ 15. ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ, cf. 1129 b, 8.

IV. § 1. Τὸ...λοιπὸν ἐν. These and the following words imply that there is but one other kind of justice, viz. τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον, and that it is applicable, not only to ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα (which are treated first), but also to ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα (for which see 1132 b, 30 sqq.). The notes will show how I avoid making a third εἶδος ('Catallactic or Commutative Justice') with Professor Ritchie (*Classical Review*, vol. viii. pp. 185 sqq.).

§ 2. τὴν εἰρημένην, sc. τὴν γεωμετρικήν.

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν 3 τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιόν ἐστι μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἰ ἐπιεικὲς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὲς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέ-

τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. This word is properly used of the εἰσφορά or property-tax raised from the wealthier citizens in time of war. But here it cannot be intended as anything more than an illustration; for it implies that the principle of κατ' ἀξίαν is understood of wealth. In Pol. 1280 a, 28 the argument οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενεγκόντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν is dismissed as ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος.

§ 3. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν, sc. ἀναλογίαν. Cf. 1106 a, 35 n. An arithmetical proportion—we do not usually call it a proportion—is one in which the first term exceeds the second by the same number (or length) that the third exceeds the fourth. Its formula is $a - b = c - d$, not $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$. The

ἴσον τι involved in such a proportion arises from the fact that, if four quantities are in 'arithmetical proportion,' the sum of the means is equal to the sum of the extremes, $a + d = b + c$, whereas in geometrical proportion the equation is $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{a+c}{b+d}$.

οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. The persons (οἷς) are regarded as equal, but the things (ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα) are usually unequal. So Demosthenes, Meid. § 46, speaking of the extension of the γραφὴ ὑβρεως to slaves, says οὐ γὰρ ὅστις ὁ πάσχων ᾤετο δεῖν σκοπεῖν (ὁ νομοθέτης) ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ὁποῖόν τι τὸ γιγνόμενον. It is the

business of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον to make the same difference between the persons as exists between the things, either (1) before they enter into a συνάλλαγμα at all (ἐν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις), or (2) before the συνάλλαγμα is dissolved by process of law (ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις). The διόρθωσις consists in the process of adding to A or subtracting from B till an ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία is established.

ἐπιεικὲς...φαῦλος. This is a different illustration of the principle of τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον from that implied by τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα above. It is taken from ἀριστοκρατία, not from ὀλιγαρχία, and κατ' ἀξίαν this time means κατ' ἀρετήν.

τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν. This is usually supposed to mean simply 'the amount of the damage' or 'the difference produced by the hurt'; but surely Aristotle is not to be credited with the childish doctrine that a court of law simply awards compensation. The Athenians were too well accustomed to discussing the question ὅτι χρή παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι by their elaborate process of τίμησις and ἀντι-τίμησις, not to be aware that the wrong done by the one party may be much greater or much less than the damage suffered by the other, and Plato has preserved in the Laws such formulae as διπλάσιον τοῦ βλάβους... ἐκτείσάτω (843 d), τὸ βλάβος ἀποτινέτω (843 c) and τοῦ βλάβους τὸ ἥμισυ τίνειν (767 e, 915 a) to be applied in different circumstances. The διαφορὰ

πει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρήται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδι- 5
 4 κεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἀδικον
 τοῦτο ἄνισον ὃν ἰσάζειν πειράται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν
 ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διή-
 ρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ
 5 ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς 10

to which the judge really looks in assessing the penalty is that between the ἀδικία (*iniuria*) and the βλάβος (*damnum*), and Aristotle is only following Greek idiom in omitting one of the terms (cf. 1127 a, 13 n.). Cf. Plato, Laws 862 b πρὸς δύο δὴ ταῦτα βλέπ-
 τέον, πρὸς τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην. Justice is not done either by transferring the gain of the wrong-doer to the injured party, or by making the wrong-doer compensate the injured party for his loss. We must assess the penalty κατ' (ἀριθμητικὴν) ἀνα-
 λογίαν, not κατ' ἰσότητα (1132 b, 33).

ἀδικεῖται and βέβλαπται are both perfect in sense.

εἰ ἔβλαψεν. For the idiomatic omission of ὁ μὲν, cf. below ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ, and Vahlen on Poet. 1447 b, 14.

§ 4. πληγῇ...πατάξῃ, 'has been wounded,' 'has wounded,' not 'has been beaten,' 'has beaten,' which would be πληγὰς ἐμβάλλῃ...πληγὰς λάβῃ.

κτείνῃ. The archaic κτείνω (Attic prose has only ἀποκτείνω) is regularly used as a legal term, and so occurs in Plato, Euthyphron 4 b εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινε ὁ κτείνας κ.τ.λ. and often in the Laws. ἀποθάνῃ is of course its passive.

τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις, lit. 'the being done to and the doing.' If the verbs had been used, we should have had ποιεῖν, not πράττειν, but πράξις has to do duty as the noun of ποιεῖν, since ποίησις has been specialised in meaning. It has not, I think, been observed that this sentence is a highly

compressed reference to a passage in Plato's Laws, 876 d sqq., which leaves no doubt as to the meaning. The question there is how far we are to leave it to the judges προσάπτειν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ πράξεως, and this is illustrated by the various degrees of wounding and killing as here, and a law is given for the γραφὴ τραύματος. We have first the case of the man who wounds intending to kill, a case where the wrong done (ἀδικία) far exceeds the wrong suffered (βλάβος). The guilty man is not to be punished for murder, but he is not to be let off with the penalty of wounding. He is sentenced τὸ βλάβος ἐκτίνειν τῷ βλαφθέντι, and also to be banished. Then come cases such as that of a child wounding his parents, where the ἀδικία includes ἀσέβεια and the penalty is death. The whole passage will repay study.

εἰς ἄνισα. The πάθος and the πράξις are of course just the same thing looked at from different points of view, and yet they are represented by a line divided into *unequal* segments. The common view of the passage can afford no explanation of this; it would require an undivided line simply transferred from one side to the other, and thus making the two sides unequal. But nothing is said of this.

τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, sc. τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν πράξιν, 'to equate the wrong suffered and the wrong done by the penalty he imposes.' I think Michael

εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ εἰ μὴ τιςιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία 6 τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον 15 μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὣν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, 7 20 ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἵεναι ἵεναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον

was right in taking τῇ ζημίᾳ here as instrumental dative, though the accepted interpretation seems to be that of Münscher and Jackson, *πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ*, 'to equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ κέρδος) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (τὴν ζημίαν) by taking from the former and giving to the latter.' In any case the meaning will be the same, and it will not be that the judge forces A to make good the loss of B. What the judge has to do is *τιμᾶν ὅτι χρή παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι*, and that means that, if the wrong done by A is greater than the damage suffered by B, A will have a severer penalty than merely *τίνειν τὸ βλάβος*. How much severer, we shall see presently.

§ 5. ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, sc. τοῖς ἀκούσίοις. We find *κατηγορεῖν, λέγειν ἐπὶ τινι* in the same sense as *ἐπὶ τινος*. The words *ζημία* and *κέρδος*, 'loss' and 'profit' are properly used of *ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα*. They are therefore not appropriate (*οἰκεῖον*) to all kinds of *ἀκούσια*, though they are to some (*τισίν*), e.g. theft and fraud.

§ 6. ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ. The words *ζημία* and *κέρδος* can be applied as soon as the damage and the wrong have been assessed.

ὥστε κ.τ.λ. We have now got a more and a less, namely the profit of the wrong-doer and the loss of his victim. We know that the just is the equal, and the equal is the mean between the more and the less. Therefore the just sentence will be that which imposes upon the wrong-doer, not the exact equivalent of the damage he has inflicted, but the arithmetical mean between the damage he has inflicted and the wrong he has committed. Cf. Plato's case of the man who wounds intending to kill.

ἐπανορθωτικόν. The narrower term is correct when we are speaking of *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*. We now see how corrective justice in *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* is a μέσον, and that is the object of the discussion.

§ 7. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. An argument from popular language for the benefit of those who are not impressed by mathematical formulae. A good judge is μέσος—(this really meant 'impartial,' but it will serve as a *λογικὴ πρότασις*)—but a good judge is living justice, therefore justice is a μέσον. Q.E.D.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1133 b, 14. 1160 b, 18. 1161 a, 28. 1171 a, 12. This is a Platonic way of expressing the ideal which anything aims at. Cf. Phd. 74 d.

δίκαιον ἔμφυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν
 ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὥς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξό-
 8 μενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ
 δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμη- 25
 μένης, ᾧ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ'
 ἀφείλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ
 δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτοῦ ὅταν
 9 λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ
 ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ 30
 ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι
 10 δίκαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής. ἐπὰν γὰρ δύο ἴσων
 ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τού-
 τοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ
 δέ, ἐνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, 1132^b

ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον. For the predicative object after *ζητεῖν*, cf. 1144 b, 7. 1158 a, 31. For the phrase Thuc. IV. 83 μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν.

ἔνιοι, 'some peoples.' The word is constantly used to introduce terms belonging to some dialect (γλῶσσαι).

μεσιδίους. Pol. 1306 a, 26 ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν (αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι) στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ. The context does not enable us to decide whether this was at Larisa or Abydos.

§ 8. ἐπανισοῖ, 'restores equality.'

ὥσπερ γραμμῆς. Cf. 1131 b, 8 n. The *διαφορὰ τοῦ βλάβους* is ᾧ...ὑπερέχει ἢ πρᾶξις τοῦ πάθους or *vice versa*. Observe that it is the excess of the larger segment over the half, and not its excess over the lesser segment, which is subtracted from the one and added to the other.

δίχα, i.e. *els ἴσα*. So in Phys. 239 b, 18 we read that Zeno's second argument (the Achilles) differs from his first ἐν τῷ διαιρεῖν μὴ δίχα (= μὴ διχοτομεῖν) τὸ προσλαμβανόμενον μέγεθος.

§ 9. τῆς μείζονος, sc. γραμμῆς.

ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν. This is a Pythagorean fancy if we can trust Alexander. But it sounds more like Kratylos.

§ 10. ἐπὰν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We now get the mathematical proof of the formula, which may best be stated as follows. It is to be shown that, however the wrong and the damage may be apportioned, the just sentence will be that A shall pay and B shall receive the arithmetical mean of the difference between them. Let the whole *πάθος καὶ πρᾶξις* (C + D) = 10, of which C (*ἀδικία* estimated as *κέρδος*) = 7, while D (*βλάβος* estimated as *ζημία*) = 3. The parties come before the judge as A + 7 and B - 3. The problem is to restore equality by equating *ζημία* and *κέρδος*. This implies the formula

$$(A + 7) - (B - 3) = (C + 5) - (D - 5).$$

Therefore 5 is the μέσον (= δίκαιον) required. However the 10 may be divided, A will always have as his *υπεροχή* twice the arithmetical mean.

τοῦ μέσου ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Fully expressed this would be τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ ὑπερέχει θάτερον, καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριούμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν 11
 δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον
 ἔχοντι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι
 5 δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ὃ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ 12
 ἀφηρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ὃ ΓΔ,
 ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ· τῆς
 ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. [ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·
 10 ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον,
 καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.] ἐλή- 13
 λυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ
 τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ
 κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι,

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη ἐνὶ ὑπερέχει. For the ellipse of τοῦ (which Zell would insert) before ἀφ' οὗ, cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 45 and 1117 a, 30 n.

§ 11. τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, sc. τοῦ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη. ὃ δ' ὑπερέχεται sc. τὸ μέσον.

§ 12. αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ κ.τ.λ. sc. γραμμαί. τὸ ΑΕ, τὸ ἐφ' ὃ ΓΔ, sc. τμήμα. The figure is

A	E	A
B		B
Δ	Γ	Ζ
	Γ	Γ

Now, in whatever proportions the πάθος καὶ πράξις ΑΑ is divided, the line ΒΒ will always be the arithmetical mean between ΑΕ and ΔΓΓ, and will therefore represent τὸ δίκαιον. Mr Jackson says "In the following figure $\Gamma\Delta = \Gamma\text{Z} = \text{AE}$. It is strange that this is not expressly mentioned in the text." But Aristotle had doubtless a διαγραφή to refer to, and in that case it might seem superfluous to write down that $\text{AE} = \Gamma\text{Z}$. And it is wrong to say that $\Gamma\Delta = \text{AE}$, for the whole argument implies that $\Delta\Gamma = \text{EA}$, a very different thing. Aristotle is not putting in an el-

aborate way the obvious fact that, if the gain and the loss are equal, the judge must take the gain from the one party and give it back to the other. He is discussing the more interesting case where the gain and the loss are unequal, and showing that however we split up, say the number 10, the same principle will apply. For instance we may get such equations as $17 - 10 = 10 - 3$, or $16 - 10 = 10 - 4$, or $15 - 10 = 10 - 5$, or $14 - 10 = 10 - 6$ etc. In all these cases 10 represents justice.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. This seems to have been interpolated here from 1133 a, 13—16. But it is a very valuable interpolation; for it shows that whoever noted the sentence as a parallel passage here took the right view of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς in its relation to τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον. See the notes on 1132 b, 21 sqq.

§ 13. ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1133 a, 20. 1142 a, 8. 1143 a, 16. 1166 a, 2. Note in passing that, if the words ζημία and κέρδος have been transferred in this way from ἐκούσια to ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα, we have a strong presumption that these two fall under the same kind of justice.

οἶον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν 15
 14 δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἄλλ'
 αὐτὰ <τά> δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασιν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε
 ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας
 μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν
 καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. 20

V. Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον,
 ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δί-
 2 καιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρ-
 μόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτι-

ἄδειαν δέδωκεν. The judge does not restore equality in ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα, they must be adjusted beforehand. Even if the purchaser makes a bad bargain, the law says *caveat emptor*. Of course if the vendor is fraudulent, it is an ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα and not a contract at all.

§ 14. ὅταν...γένηται, sc. αὐτοῖς, 'when the parties have got exactly what they gave,' <τά> δι' αὐτῶν sc. γενόμενα. Rassow's insertion of τά is much simpler than any of the interpretations which have been proposed. Nothing is commoner than the omission of τά after αὐτά by haplography.

τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, i.e. τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν, *in obligationibus ex delicto*. We are coming to the ἐκούσια in the next chapter, and we shall see that the same holds good of them.

V. § 1. τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, 'the inverse' or 'reciprocal.' It is confusing to start from Euclid's definition of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι, for that refers solely to geometrical proportion. If we can speak of an arithmetical proportion at all, we can surely have an 'inverse' or 'reciprocal' arithmetical proportion of the form

$$a - b = d - c.$$

There seems to be an instance of this usage in Theon of Smyrna p. 87, 11 (Hiller) τὸ δὲ ἀντιπεπονθότως ἐστὶ

τοιούτον· ὅσον ἂν τοῦ μεγέθους ἀφέλῃς τῆς ὅλης ἐν τῷ κανόνι χορδῆς, τοσοῦτον τῷ τόνῳ προστίθεται, καὶ ὅσον ἂν τῷ μεγέθει τῆς χορδῆς προσθῇς, τοσοῦτον τοῦ τόνου ὑφαιρεῖται, which certainly appears to refer to addition and subtraction only. The phrase τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ἄλλῳ would mean literally 'that which has had done to it the opposite of something else,' and would very well apply to a quantity from which the same sum was subtracted as had been added to another.

ἀπλῶς is the emphatic word and is repeated. Aristotle, as we shall see, has no objection to τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, if we add κατ' ἀναλογίαν. To omit this qualification is to neglect the διαφορά τοῦ βλάβους, i.e. to assume that the κέρδος and the ζημία are equal.

οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι. According to Alexander's commentary on Met. 985 b, 26 the Pythagoreans regarded τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός and τὸ ἰσάκεις ἴσον (quadrature) as the proprium of Justice, whence some gave the number of Justice as 4 (the first *even* square), some as 9 (the first *odd* square).

§ 2. οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικόν. This is obvious; for distributive justice is κατ' ἀξίαν and is therefore determined by a (geometrical) proportion.

οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν, for the

25 κόν—καίτοι βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος 3
δίκαιον·

εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο

—πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ 4
δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι
30 μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ 5
ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς 6
ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ

ζημία and κέρδος have to be measured by the judge in each case. We must not assume that they are equal; for *πολλαχοῦ διαφωνεῖ*. The *βλάβος* is seldom exactly equal to the *ἀδικία*.

§ 3. *καίτοι βούλονται γε*, i.e. people generally, not the Pythagoreans. For this formulation of the *lex talionis*, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,' cf. Hesiod fr. 212 Mark. The case is well stated in MM. 1194 a, 37 οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἴ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψεν τινος, ἀντεκκοπῆναι μόνον ἀλλὰ πλείονα παθεῖν ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ἦρξε πρότερος καὶ ἠδίκησεν, ἀδικεῖ δὲ κατ' ἀμφότερα, ὥστε ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν πλείω ὢν ἐποίησεν δίκαιόν ἐστιν.

οἷον εἰ κ.τ.λ. There is no inconsistency between this and 1132 a, 5 *χρηται ὡς ἴσοις*. The inequality does not lie between the officer and the private, but between the blow given and the blow received. If an officer strikes a private, that is not merely a blow, but may also be an act of discipline; if a private strikes an officer, that is not merely a blow, but also an act of mutiny. Cf. Probl. 952 b, 28 *εἰάν μὲν τις ἄρχοντα κακῶς εἴπη, μεγάλα τὰ ἐπιτίμια, εἰάν δέ τις ἰδιώτην, οὐθέν· καὶ καλῶς· οἴεται γὰρ τότε οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὸν κακηγοροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὑβρίζειν*. The case of

Demosthenes v. Meidias is in point here. The judge must therefore 'measure' the *πάθος καὶ πρᾶξις* before he can treat the parties as equal, and strike the balance of debit and credit between them. The amount of *damnum* (*βλάβος*) being the same, the amount of *iniuria* (*ἀδικία*) is quite different. Accordingly we do not apply the principle of the arithmetical mean 'simply' (*ἀπλῶς*), but 'proportionally.'

§ 5. *ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον κ.τ.λ.* In *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* the *ἀδικούμενος* *ἀδικεῖται ἄκων*, but the *ἀδικῶν* *ἀδικεῖ* either *ἐκῶν* or *ἄκων*. Here we see a clear case where the damage suffered may remain the same, while the wrong committed is quite different. Cf. Dem. Meid. § 43 *οἱ νόμοι... ἂν μὲν ἐκῶν βλάβῃ, διπλοῦν, ἂν δ' ἄκων, ἀπλοῦν τὸ βλάβος κελεύουσιν ἐκτίνειν*.

§ 6. *ἐν...ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς*. These are precisely the same as *τὰ ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα* described above (1131 a, 2 sqq.) and they therefore belong to *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* in the widest sense (1131 a, 1 n.). We shall therefore find that they are regulated by the *arithmetical* mean, and this must therefore work out as a case of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*, not *ἀπλῶς* indeed, but *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*.

κατ' ἀναλογίαν κ.τ.λ. In the case of *τὰ ἀκούσια*, we must not assume that *ἀδικία* and *βλάβος* are equal, and

- ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἡ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν—εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ—ἡ τὸ εὖ—εἰ 1133^a
 δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν.
 7 διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις
 ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ
 8 χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ 5
 δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύ-
 ζευξις. οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Β, οἰκία
 ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκο-
 δόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν
 ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν πρῶτον ᾗ τὸ κατὰ τὴν 10

in the case of ἐκούσια we must not assume that the things to be exchanged are of equal value.


συμμένει κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1261 a, 30 διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σφύζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.

τὸ κακῶς sc. ἀντιποιεῖν. I am not sure that Muretus was right in bracketing εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ. It is redundant, of course; but the future indicative clause, δουλεία ἐστὶν εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσω, 'if I am not to retaliate,' is rather too idiomatic for an interpolator. For the omission of the subject of ἀντιποιήσῃ, cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

§ 7. ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται. Zell notes that according to Pausanias there were temples of the Charites in the ἀγορά at Sparta, Orchomenos and Olympia.

ἄρξαι, 'to take the initiative.' Cf. 1135 b, 26.

§ 8. ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, 'diagonal conjunction.' If we arrange our ὅροι in the same way as above (1131 b, 9 n.), and we wish to effect a μετάδοσις, it is clear that we must 'conjoin,' not A with Γ and B with Δ as we did in the case of διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον (this might have been called ἡ κατὰ πλευρὰν σύζευξις), but A with Δ and B with Γ. Thus



Now the condition of such a σύζευξις being just ('equal') is that the terms should form an ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία, for it is only in that case that the sum of the extremes will be equal to the sum of the means. The meaning of 'diagonal conjunction' is well illustrated by Jackson from EE 1242 b, 15, where we are told that in unequal friendships (φιλαί καθ' ὑπεροχὴν) the ὑπερέχων is apt to expect to get more services from his friend than he gives, in proportion to his own superiority (on the principle of τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον), whereas the ὑπερεχόμενος τούναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν, i.e. he

says the rule is not $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{A+\Gamma}{B+\Delta}$

but $A+\Delta = B+\Gamma$.

Cf. below 1163 b, 33.

ἐφ' ᾧ, sc. ὅρῳ. Mr Jackson says "ἐφ' ᾧ Α κ.τ.λ. are lines, not...points." But the line Α is ἐφ' ᾧ Α (Stewart). The ὅροι are neither lines nor points, but dots.

δεῖ οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the problem is.'

τοῦ...ἔργου, τοῦ αὐτοῦ. This is the reading both of K^b and L^b, and

ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο 9
15 γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ <δ> ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πᾶσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ,

I do not think it impossible. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 45) reads τὸ...ἔργον (so M^b), τὸ αὐτοῦ on the authority of the Vetus Versio. This is certainly neater, but the authority of the Versio is not high upon a point of this kind.

ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. Before we can say that $A + \Delta = B + \Gamma$ we must make a διόρθωσις of the terms. In this διόρθωσις there are two stages. First (πρῶτον), we must equate Γ and Δ . Say $1\Gamma = x\Delta$. This is τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, the stage which the Pythagorean formula ignores. Secondly (εἴτα), we must bring the terms A and B into inverse arithmetical ratio of 1 and x . This will give us $A + (x - 1) - B = \Gamma - \Delta$ (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός). After this διόρθωσις 'diagonal conjunction' becomes possible (ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον) thus;

$$A + (x - 1) + \Delta = B + \Gamma.$$

οὐδὲ συμμένει, sc. τὸ συνάλλαγμα. The parties enter into a συνάλλαγμα or 'business relation' (συναλλάττονται) as soon as the one offers a house for shoes and the other shoes for a house. If, however, it is found impossible to effect the διόρθωσις or adjustment of terms, οὐκ ἐμμένουσι τῷ συναλλάγματι. Having failed to come to terms, they break off negotiations (διαλύονται τὸ συνάλλαγμα). It is not correct to say, as Mr Jackson does, that "one of the two parties will be obliged to have recourse to corrective justice in order to obtain his rights"; for this is a case in which ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ

νόμος (1132 b, 15). Surely an action will not lie against a man with whom one has made a bad bargain unless force or fraud were used, in which case the συνάλλαγμα, being βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν, would be by definition ἀκούσιον (βλαιοῖον or λαθραῖον).

§ 9. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. The case of a builder and a shoemaker is comparatively simple; for we may say roughly that a house is worth, say 125 pairs of shoes, and then

$$x - 1 = 124.$$

But the same principle applies to more complicated cases, like that of a doctor and a farmer, whose ἔργα are not definite units, but things like ὑγίεια and τροφή. What meaning can we assign to $1\Gamma = x\Delta$ in that case? It seems as if Γ and Δ were incommensurable.

ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. There can, I think, be no doubt that, in this context, τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πᾶσχον must refer to the two terms A and B which are ἀντιπεπονθότα to 1 and x . The use of τὸ ποιοῦν in this sense will not seem very strange if we remember that the case primarily in view is that of the doctor who produces health and his 'patient.' In the language of modern economics τὸ ποιοῦν is Supply and τὸ πᾶσχον is Demand. What Aristotle really means, then, is that there would be an end of all commerce unless Supply and Demand can be made identical in every respect. The insertion of δ is due to Rassow.

- καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
 10 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή. ἐφ'
 ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ 20
 μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, πόσα
 ἅττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ
 οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ
 τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία.
 11 τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἐνὶ τινὶ πάντα 25
 μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν
 ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεΐᾳ, ἢ πάντα συνέχει—εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν δέοιντο
 ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτή—οἶον δ'

τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι, sc. κατ'
 (ἀριθμητικὴν) ἀναλογίαν, not κατ'
 ἰσότητα. We must equate the pro-
 ducers (τούτους) as well as the pro-
 ducts (ταῦτα δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι 1133 a, 13)
 to get the ἀναλογία required for pur-
 poses of exchange.

§ 10. συμβλητά, 'comparable,'
 i.e. commensurable (σύμμετρα). The
 formula we have been working with
 assumes that the value of the one
 product can always be expressed as
 a multiple of the other. But, since
 the products are dissimilar, there must
 be some "common measure" of both
 if this is to prove true. The principle
 is clearly laid down in Gen. Corr. 333 a,
 20 εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν (συμβλητὰ)
 ἀνάγκη ταυτό τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον πᾶσι
 τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ᾧ μετροῦνται. The
 "common measure" is money, which
 forms as it were 'a middle term'
 (γίνεται πως μέσον) under which
 both the ἔργα may be brought.

ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1132 b, 12 n.

πως μέσον. This is the important
 point. The existence of money tends
 to disguise the fact that justice ἐν τοῖς
 ἔκουσλοις συναλλάγμασιν is an arith-
 metical mean like the other forms.

τὴν ὑπεροχὴν...τὴν ἑλλειψιν. These
 words show we are dealing with *difference*, not *ratio*.

πόσα ἅττα δὴ κ.τ.λ. If the value
 of shoes is fixed in money, it becomes
 comparable, not only with the value of
 a house, but also with that of τροφή.

δεῖ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., what is wanted,
 then, is that the proportion

$$A + (x - 1) - B = \Gamma - \Delta$$

should be generalised in such a way
 that it will represent not one equation
 only, but a whole series. We know
 already that 'x shoes' (τοσαδὶ ὑπο-
 δήματα) = 1 house. But, unless this
 can be extended, so that we can
 also equate shoes with τροφή etc.,
 commerce is impossible.

ὅπερ, sc. διαφέρει. Identity of differ-
 ence, not of ratio, as above 1131 b, 14.

§ 11. ἡ χρεΐα. Aristotle derives
 this idea from Plato (Rep. 369). A
 modern economist would say rather
 that Normal Value is determined by
 Cost of Production (which some editors
 import into the argument here); but
 Aristotle is thinking of the more
 ultimate fact that, but for χρεΐα, the
 thing would have no value at all,
 whatever the cost of production might
 be, and infers from this that 'x shoes'
 = 1 house because the shoemaker's
 'need' of the builder exceeds the
 builder's 'need' of the shoemaker
 by $x - 1$.

ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτή, e.g. if the need of

ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην·
 30 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ
 ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται 12
 δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργός πρὸς
 σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ.
 1133^b εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται (εἰ
 δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ'
 ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ

the builder for the services of the shoemaker were not so great, the rate of exchange would not be the same. Aristotle does not seem to see that Cost of Production narrows this variation to a comparatively slight fluctuation.

ὑπάλλαγμα, 'a pledge, security.' This is one of the non-Attic terms which Aristotle may have brought from Stageira. Phrynichos even says **ὑπάλλαγμα** ἀμαθῶς τινες ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνέχυρον. The meaning is precisely the same as in 1133 b, 11 τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής κ.τ.λ.

κατὰ συνθήκην...οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. In Pol. 1257 b, 10 Aristotle quotes this view in an extreme form, probably derived from the Cynics, λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασιν, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων ('adopting a new currency') οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδέν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλούτου οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῶ ἀπολείται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδα μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. It is true that there is an element of *συνθήκη* or *νόμος* in currency—we may have a gold or a silver standard—but it has an intrinsic (*φύσει*) value also determined by its Cost of Production.

§ 12. **ἔσται δὴ κ.τ.λ.** After the

digression on currency, we are reminded of the two stages of the *διόρθωσις*. The inverse arithmetical ratio will only be applicable (**ἔσται**) after the equation has been made in money value (**ὅταν ἰσασθῇ**). We can then work out the new problem of exchanging shoes and *τροφή*, as easily as that of exchanging them with a definite *ἔργον* like a house.

ὅπερ, sc. *διαφέρει*. Cf. 1133 a, 22. The *διαφορά* is *ὑπεροχή* or *ἐλλειψις* of *χρεία*.

εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας κ.τ.λ. The translation certainly is 'We must not bring them into the figure of proportion after they have exchanged, but when they still have their own products, otherwise one of the extremes will have both excesses.' This can only have any real meaning if we understand it of the generalisation of the equation to other cases than that first stated. The *ἔργον* of the *σκυτοτόμος* must not be equated with that of the *γεωργός* in the form it received from its exchange with that of the *οικοδόμος*, otherwise the *γεωργός* will have not only his excess over the cobbler, but the excess of the builder over the cobbler as well. The *σχῆμα ἀναλογίας* then is

οἰκία ὑποδήματα τροφή



It is only such a figure that can give any meaning to τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον.

ισότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α, τροφή Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω 5
 13 μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἔν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρεία ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὐ <οὐκ> ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἶον οἶνον, διδόντες σίτου ἑξα-
 14 γωγὴν. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης 10 ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἶον ἐγγυητῆς ἐσθ' ἡμῖν. δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέρουντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πᾶσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό. οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσον δύναται. ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινω- 15 νία. τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιήσαν ἰσά-

γεωργὸς Α κ.τ.λ. Having equated τοσαυτὰ ὑποδήματα to τροφή, we can now apply τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός by 'diagonal conjunction' in the same way as we did before.

§ 13. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία κ.τ.λ. These constant equations would be very troublesome, and we therefore look for some common *nexus*, which will enable us to measure each commodity once for all.

ὥσπερ ὅταν κ.τ.λ. This must surely be an instance of failure to effect an exchange (οὐκ ἀλλάττονται), and it must lead up to the view of money as ἐγγυητῆς τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς. The meaning must therefore be 'no exchange takes place when the producer (τις) wants something which the consumer (αὐτός) has not got.' I have therefore written οὐ <οὐκ> ἔχει for οὐ ἔχει (L^b), or οὐχί (K^b). *Philosophical*

διδόντες...ἐξαγωγήν, 'offering the privilege of exporting corn.' The phrase διδόναι ἐξαγωγήν is technical in the sense of to permit exportation of a home product. Cf. Isokr. Trapez. § 57 where we read that Satyros, King of Bosporos, and his father treated the Athenians as 'the most

favoured nation' and, πολλάκις ἤδη διὰ σπάνιν σίτου τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐμ- πόρων ναυς κενὰς ἐκπέμποντες, ὑμῖν ἐξαγωγήν ἔδωκαν, Theophr. Char. xxiii καὶ διδομένης αὐτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ξύλων ἀτελοῦς ('duty-free'). Bywater (Contr., p. 46) also compares CIG 3523 (= Cauer 126) and Dittenberger, Sylloge 60 b 1 and 354, 6. The plural participle referring to the same subject as a singular indefinite pronoun is quite a common construction. Cf. 1135 b, 31.

§ 14. οἶον ἐγγυητῆς, cf. ὑπάλλαγμα above 1133 a, 29.

πᾶσχει...τὸ αὐτό, 'the same thing, indeed, happens to money,' i.e. there is not always the same demand for it. I think that the context sufficiently justifies this interpretation; for in 1133 a, 28 the two cases have been already distinguished, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγή (failure to exchange, when wine is wanted and corn offered), ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή (unfavourable exchange). See, however, Bywater, Contr., p. 46.

τετιμῆσθαι, 'to have a price put on them,' not, we may be sure, by the 'higgling of the market.' Aristotle no doubt is thinking of a tariff prescribed by the magistrates.

ζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ᾗν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγῇ
 ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν
 οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα
 20 γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. ἐν δὴ τι δεῖ 15
 εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο
 γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομί-
 σματι. οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ,
 εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἡ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον
 25 μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον
 οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ᾗν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα 16
 εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας,
 ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. 17
 30 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεον ἔχειν τὸ δ'
 ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν·
 1134^a ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ

§ 15. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, i.e. κατὰ συν-
 θήκην.

οἰκία α κ.τ.λ. The sum of 10
 minae is taken as the common measure
 of houses and beds, which are not
 directly commensurable. We know,
 however, that a house is worth five
 minae and a bed worth one, so we
 can say that $a = \frac{\beta}{2}$ and $\gamma = \frac{\beta}{10}$ from
 which it follows that $a = 5\gamma$. The
 diagram is given thus by the Par.—



The 10 minae take the place of 'x
 shoes' in the earlier diagram.

ἡ ἴσον, 'worth five minas or = 5
 minas.' For the use of ἴσον in the
 sense of the sign =, cf. 1133 a, 22.

οὕτως, i.e. five beds for a house.

§ 17. Τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now
 come to the question πῶς μεσότης ἡ
 δικαιοσύνη; That δικαιοπραγία, the
 ἐνέργεια, is a μέσον, we have suffi-
 ciently shown; but what are we to
 say of the ἔξις?

οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. The dif-
 ference arises from the fact that δικαιο-
 σύνη is an ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον. We
 have no longer to find simply a μεσότης
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς, but an unknown x which
 involves a proportion, whether geo-
 metrical or arithmetical. Justice is
 τοῦ μέσου because, whether in distri-
 bution or in adjusting penalties and
 prices, it seeks to find this x , while
 Injustice seeks to secure for oneself
 $x + n$ of good things and $x - n$ of bad,
 and to secure for others either $x + n$
 or $x - n$ of good things or bad, as the
 case may be.

καθ' ἣν, sc. ἔξιν.

δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ
 διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον
 οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἵρετοῦ πλεον αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ
 πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' 5
 18 ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοῦ-
 ναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις τοῦ
 ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
 ἑλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἑλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ'
 αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἑλλείψεως 10
 δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ
 δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος
 τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μείζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
 19 περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἐκατέρας ἐστὶν
 ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ 15
 δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα
 ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέ-
 πτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστής; ἡ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ
 ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως 20
 2 ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἐστίν,
 οἷον οὐ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ·

πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν. A more accurate expression than the βούλονται with which we started 1129 a, 9.

διανεμητικός. There is no reason to suppose that this word is intended to include διορθωτικός here. Aristotle touches upon τὸ διορθωτικόν below a, 12.

§ 18. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, i.e. in the case referred to above as ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον (a, 3). In that case the total result is the same, i.e. that one gets too much and the other too little, but the violation of proportion is not necessarily in the same direction, as it always is in the case of αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. It may be one way or the other (ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν).

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος κ.τ.λ. This

refers to τὸ διορθωτικόν. The ἀδικήμα (the πάθος καὶ πράξις of 1132 a, 9) is divided into unequal segments, the κέρδος and ζημία of 1132 a, 12.

VI. § 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. A note on the importance of προαίρεσις intended to remind us of what we have learnt before. Such reminders are characteristic of lectures.

ἡ οὕτω μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'or does the quality of the ἀδικήμα make no difference?' Of course διοίσει is personal, and we must explain οὕτω as τῷ τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἀδικήμα ἀδικεῖν.

εἰδώς. Cf. 1105 a, 31 πρῶτον μὲν εἰδώς.

διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχήν, 'from the efficient cause of Will.' For προαίρεσις as the ἀρχὴ πράξεως cf. 1113 a, 6 n.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπε- 3
 πονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαν- 4
 25 θάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
 πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ
 εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ
 κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐστὶ τούτοις
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ'
 30 ὁμοιότητα. ἐστὶ γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς·
 νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἢ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ
 τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς
 δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία), τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλεον αὐτῷ
 νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν.
 35 διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅτι ἐαυτῷ 5

§ 3. εἴρηται πρότερον, 1132 b, 21 sqq. The allusion to τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς is not irrelevant; τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις (*ib.* 33).

§ 4. καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ., 'not only justice, but justice in the state.' We are learning to be lawgivers. Hitherto we have been discussing the subject καθόλου (1134 a, 16); we must now look at its particular application to our subject.

πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν. On 'self-sufficiency,' see Bradley' in *Hellenica* pp. 197—199. The state must be all-sufficient in itself for the good life.

2 ὅσοις μὴ κ.τ.λ. It is quite clear from the reference below (b, 14) that this refers to the κοινωνίαι of husband and wife, father and children, master and slaves. Among them there cannot be τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον in the strict sense, but only something which may be called justice metaphorically or by analogy (τι δίκαιον καθ' ὁμοιότητα, cf. 1115 a, 19 n.).

1 ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν κ.τ.λ., 'either proportionally or arithmetically equal,' e.g. the citizens of an aristocracy are 'proportionally equal,' those of a

democracy 'arithmetically equal.' We find ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἀριθμῶ, κατὰ ποσόν, opposed to κατ' ἀναλογίαν, λόγῳ, κατ' ἀξίαν. Cf. 1158 b, 30.

ἐν οἷς ἀδικία, 'among whom there is a possibility of injustice.' We shall see that injustice is, strictly speaking, impossible towards wife, children or slaves (*infra* b, 13).

καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις. The possibility of the ἐνέργεια follows from the possibility of the ἔξις, but not *vice versa*.

τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν. See 1129 b, 2 n.

§ 5. διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Pol.* 1281 a, 34 ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον, φαῦλον. The objection is that a human being has feelings of his own, cf. 1286 a, 17 κρεῖττον δὲ ᾧ μὴ πρόσσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ τὸ συμφυές, τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν.

ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον. This is the reading of M^b only, and is therefore probably due to conjecture. Both K^b and L^b have ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, which is supposed

τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ 1134^b
 6 τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν
 αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος—(οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ
 ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν 5
 7 τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)—μισθὸς ἄρα
 τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ
 8 τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον
 καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτόν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
 ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, 10
 9 ἕως ἂν ᾗ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν
 δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς
 αὐτά. οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ
 νόμον γὰρ ᾗν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ' ᾗσαν
 οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον 15
 πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο
 γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πο-

to mean 'contrary to the general principle' embodied in the law, τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου of Pol. 1286 a, 17. But surely this would not be sprung upon us without anything in the context to suggest it. For the confusion of νόμος and λόγος in the MSS., see 1138 a, 10 n. In later times λόγος was supposed to mean 'reason.'

§ 7. μισθὸς...δοτέος. All this comes from Plato, Rep. 345 e sqq.

§ 8. τὸ δεσποτικόν...τὸ πατρικόν. Justice between master and slaves or between father and children resembles the δίκαιον of the state. But it is not the same; for these κοινωνίαι do not fall under the head of ἐν οἷς ἀδικία. There cannot be ἀδικία ἀπλῶς to parts of oneself, but only ἀδικία καθ' ὁμοιότητα. The word πατρικός properly means 'hereditary,' but Aristotle gives it a new application.

ἕως ἂν ᾗ πηλίκον κ.τ.λ., 'till it attains a certain age and has been separated.' L^b inserts μὴ before χω-

ρισθῇ, the scribe supposing ἕως ἂν to mean 'as long as.'

ὥσπερ μέρος. Cf. Pol. 1254 a, 9 τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον.

§ 9. πρὸς αὐτά, Ramsauer's reading for MS. πρὸς αὐτόν, seems clearly right.

ᾗν, ᾗσαν, as we saw above a, 24 sqq.

ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. This is not quite how the equality was formulated above, but it comes to the same thing; for, in the Third Book of the Politics, Aristotle shows that the citizen is necessarily ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι (1283 b, 42).

μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκα. Cf. Pol. 1259 a, 39 γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς.

τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον. In Pol. 1253 b, 8 the τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς are thus given. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ δεσ-

λιτικοῦ. VII. τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ
 δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν,
 20 καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν
 διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ
 μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,
 ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρα-
 σίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα 2
 25 τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν
 ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσiais καίει,
 τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως 3
 ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδα-
 μῶς, παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι
 30 πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον 4
 δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ
 ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως,
 δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύ-
 σει γὰρ ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδε-
 35 ξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν 5
 1135^a δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ

ποτική καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἢ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις), καὶ τρίτον πατρική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). The word γαμικός properly means not 'conjugal,' but 'pertaining to a wedding,' while πατρικός is properly 'hereditary.'

VII. § 1. φυσικόν...νομικόν. See 1094 b, 16 n.

ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, 'when they have adopted it.'

μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι. In Herodotos, vi, 79 we are told ἀποινα δὲ ἐστὶ Πελοποννησίοισι δύο μνᾶι τεταγμέναι κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἐκτίνειν. But Asia in the 4th century is not Peloponnesos in the 5th.

τὸ αἶγα θύειν κ.τ.λ. We do not know what this refers to.

τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα, at Amphipolis. Cf. Thuc. v, 11.

τὰ ψηφισματώδη. On the dis-

tinction between ψηφίσματα and νόμοι see below 1141 b, 27.

§ 3. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. It is true that τὰ δίκαια are κινητά, but it is not true that τὸ φύσει is ἀκίνητον. On the contrary, τὰ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως (Phys. 192 b, 13).

καίτοι παρά γε κ.τ.λ. In heaven there is 'immutable justice,' so the argument would not be true at all of the gods. There is nothing remarkable in the fact that Aristotle attributes justice to the gods in a dialectical argument like this. It is true that he shows below (1178 b, 10) that it is absurd to talk of the gods being just, but ordinary speech does so, and that is enough to make an ἐνδοξον.

§ 4. ποῖον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle means τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Cf. Introd. § 26.

οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ
 δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ'
 ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολι-
 6 τεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη. τῶν 5
 δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ'
 7 ἕκαστον ἓν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ
 ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ
 ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδί- 10
 κημά ἐστὶ, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ
 κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ'
 ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα
 τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. VIII. ὄντων δὲ τῶν 15
 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ
 ὅταν ἐκῶν τις αὐτὰ πράττη· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε
 δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέ-
 2 βηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ
 δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισταί τῳ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ 20
 ἐκούσιον ᾗ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ'
 ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον
 3 προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται,
 ὃ ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττη
 μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε οὐ <ένεκα>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ 25
 τίνος ἔνεκα, κακείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ
 βία (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον,
 οὐχ ἐκῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον
 πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις

§ 5. οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται κ.τ.λ., i.e. wholesale and retail measures differ.

§ 7. τὸ κοινόν, sc. τῳ διανεμητικῷ καὶ τῳ διορθωτικῷ. Aristotle had used δικαίωμα above to get a neat antithesis to ἀδίκημα. But he admits that this is stretching the meaning of the word considerably.

VIII. οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'they perform

acts of which justice or injustice are accidents,' the regular way of explaining the term κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

§ 3. καὶ πρότερον, IIII a, 1 sqq. μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός represents μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν. He strikes some one ὃ συμβέβηκε πατρὶ εἶναι, but not καθ' αὐτόν.

30 γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διω-
ρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πράξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὲ
ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ
βία, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδό-
1135^b τες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἐκούσιον οὔτ'
ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως 4
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ
5 φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον
ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζό-
μενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ
συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. τῶν 5
δὲ ἐκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελό-
10 μενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα
δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς 6
κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν
μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ
οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα ᾤθη,
15 ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἔνεκα ᾤθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ'
ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως 7

μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν. This is the same class of things as is referred to at 1113 b, 26. It is explained in the next sentence, πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

οὔτ' ἀκούσιον. This has been suspected, but it seems to me quite correct. We cannot rightly call τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα involuntary any more than voluntary. They are altogether outside that classification, for they happen φύσει and not βία. It would be absurd to say that we grow old intentionally.

§ 4. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as well as τὸ καθ' αὐτό.

§ 5. τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι. For τὸ ἐκούσιον is a wider term than τὸ προαιρετόν. See above 1112 a, 14 ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται (τὸ προαιρετόν), τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προ-

αιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἀρά γε τὸ προβουλευ-
μένον;

§ 6. μετ' ἀγνοίας, sc. τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα.

ἀμαρτήματα is here used in its widest sense including ἀτυχήματα. In legal terminology, ἀτύχημα is *casus*, ἀμαρτήμα implies *culpa*, ἀδίκημα implies *dolus*. Cf. Menander fr. 426 Kock—ἀτύχημα καδίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δ' αἰρέσει. The distinction was a commonplace of the δικαστήρια.

§ 7. παραλόγως. Cf. Rhet. 1374 b, βῆστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν. The παράλογον is what is contrary to reasonable ex-

ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ
 δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ
 8 ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν). ὅταν δὲ
 εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ 20
 θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτουντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνον-
 τες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι
 διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη·
 9 ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς 25
 τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
 10 ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ πέρι τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ
 ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ
 ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
 περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι 30
 μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες
 περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβη-

pectation. For instance it is not παράλογον if you unintentionally kill a man when shooting in the street, but it is παράλογον if you shoot in an uninhabited place and a man suddenly appears and is killed.

ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας. Mr Jackson would read ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀγνοίας. But surely αἰτία here means simply 'the charge,' 'the offence,' as often in the orators.

§ 8. μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ. It does not require προαίρεσις to make an act unjust, though we do not call a man unjust unless the act comes from a ἔξις προαιρετική.

ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά. The ἀναγκαῖα πάθη have to do with τὰ σωματικά, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρεῖαν (1147 b, 26); the φυσικά include more than that, ὅσα κοινὰ πᾶσι καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοινὰ (1149 b, 5). They are ἀνθρώπινα, though not ἀναγκαῖα, e.g. anger etc.

§ 9. ἐκ προνοίας, the legal phrase. We do not presume 'malice.'

οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει, sc. τῆς αἰτίας, 'is not the aggressor.'

§ 10. οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. The issue of fact is not raised, but only that of justification.

ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is the φαντασία of wrong suffered that is the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως of that form of δρεξις called θυμός. The process is explained below 1149 a, 32.

ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν. Cf. Rhet. 1417 b, 27 μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ (sc. ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι) τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγνοια αἰτία ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν (the present case).

ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην κ.τ.λ., 'unless in cases where the wrong has been done from forgetfulness.' For instance a man may forget to pay a bill, and in that case is not μοχθηρός. There is no difficulty about the plural, cf. 1133 b, 9 n.

περὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For δέ connecting a

τοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδι-
 1136^a κείσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ 11
 κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ
 τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν
 προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν
 5 πρᾶττη. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμονικά· τὰ δ' 12
 οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ
 καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι'
 ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν
 μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

10 IX. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις εἰ ἱκανῶς διώριστα περὶ τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης
 εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

Μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.

—Ἐκὼν ἐκούσαν, ἢ <οὐχ> ἐκούσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν;

15 πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ'
 ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον; καὶ ἄρα

finite verb with a participle, see
 1116 a, 8 n.

ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ.
 Clearly ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας is contrasted
 with ὁ μὴ προβουλεύσας above (b, 20).
 He is the man who has received no
 provocation and is the aggressor
 (ἄρχει). He cannot plead ἄγνοια, and
 the ἀμφισβήτησις, if there is one, will
 be περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι, not περὶ τοῦ
 δικαίου. The word ἐπιβουλεύειν im-
 plies an unprovoked act, not a re-
 taliation of any kind.

§ 11. ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ.
 The presence of προαίρεσις, i.e. of
 βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις, not mere ὁρεξις like
 θυμός, at once makes the man ἄδικος,
 though his act may be an ἀδίκημα
 even without προαίρεσις.

παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον,
 according as the citizens are equal
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν or κατ' ἀριθμόν (1134 a,
 27). The reference is not to Distri-
 butive and Corrective Justice.

ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν, i.e. even without
 προαίρεσις.

§ 12. διὰ πάθος δὲ κ.τ.λ. An act
 of this kind would not be an ἀδίκημα,
 but something worse. In the Seventh
 Book these 'bestial' πάθη are dis-
 cussed.

IX. § 1. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις
 κ.τ.λ. In the light of the distinctions
 just made certain old difficulties may
 be solved. The first is 'Can a man
 be wronged with his own consent?'

Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε. Cf. 1110 a, 28 n.
 The two lines seem to have formed
 part of a στιχομυθία. The MSS. have
 ἢ θέλουσαν, but the sense seems to
 require an antithesis to ἐκούσαν. Gro-
 tius restored οὐ θέλουσαν, Jackson and
 Bywater read οὐχ ἐκούσαν, comparing
 Hippol. 319 φίλος μ' ἀπόλλυσ' οὐχ
 ἐκούσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν. The speakers are
 probably Alkmeon and Phegeus.

καὶ ἄρα πᾶν κ.τ.λ. On the ditto-
 graphia see Bywater, Contr. p. 47.

πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, [ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον,] ἢ
 2 τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιο-
 οὔσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ὥστ' εὐλογον
 ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἐκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δι- 20
 καιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ δικαιοῦνται
 3 οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ
 τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράτ-
 τειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐν- 25
 δέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμοίως
 δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τᾷδ' ἀδικᾷ
 πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνα-
 τον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιο- 30
 4 πραγοῦντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα
 τινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δ' ἀκρα-
 τῆς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο καὶ ἐν-
 δέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῶν ἀπο-
 5 ρουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις 1136^b
 δι' ἀκрасίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ'
 ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ
 βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου

The alternative is whether (1) τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι is in every case necessarily one or the other, or whether (2) it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other.

§ 2. δικαιοῦσθαι, 'having justice done to one.' Aristotle requires an opposite to ἀδικεῖσθαι and uses δικαιοῦσθαι in a sense of his own. So above (1135 a, 12) he used δικαίωμα as the opposite of ἀδίκημα.

εὐλογον, opp. ἄτοπον (a, 21), marks a dialectical argument.

§ 3. ἔπειτα answering to πρῶτον μὲν a, 11. The reading is Bywater's correction of MS. ἐπεὶ. See Contr. p. 47. The second ἀπορία is 'Can we say that every man who suffers a

wrong is wronged?'

ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων, sc. ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν. We have seen already that ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν it is possible to commit an ἀδίκημα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, e.g. when we act δι' ἄγνοιαν. Is it also possible κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀδικεῖσθαι?

§ 4. ἀπλῶς, opp. to ἢ προσθετέον below (b, 3). If we say that a wrong is 'simply' *damnum* knowingly inflicted, we shall have to say that the ἀκρατής, who knowingly suffers *damnum* at the hands of another or his own, ἀδικεῖται. We must, however, regard *iniuria* as well as *damnum*, and *volenti non fit iniuria*.

§ 5. προσθετέον, i.e. προσδιοριστέον.

5 βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τ᾿ ἄδικα πάσχει, 6
 ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής,
 ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς
 ὁ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατής οὐχ ἂ οἶεται δεῖν
 πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὁμηρός φησι 7
 10 δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει “χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκα-
 τόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων,” οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ δι-
 δόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα
 δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, 8
 δῆλον.

15 Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ'
 ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεόν ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ
 εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον 9
 λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἄλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν,
 εἴ τις πλεόν αὐτοῦ ἐτέρῳ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἐκὼν, οὗτος αὐτὸς
 20 αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιει-
 κῆς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ
 ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ.
 ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ
 τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο,
 25 ἄλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανέ- 10
 μων ἀδικεῖ, ἄλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων αἰεί· οὐ γὰρ αἶ τὸ
 ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἄλλ' ὧ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
 τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι
 ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν 11
 30 λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ
 οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.
 ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δί- 12

§ 6. βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We may consent to *damnum*; but, if it is essential to *iniuria* that it should be παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν, we cannot consent to that. For no one ‘wishes’ anything but τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.

§ 7. Ὁμηρος. Il. vi, 236.

§ 8. ὧν προειλόμεθα. This has no reference. Aristotle forgets that he has

not enumerated the ἀπορίαι. He now mentions the third and fourth.

§ 9. ἐλαττωτικός, opp. πλεονεκτικός.

§ 11. κτείνει, the legal word.

§ 12. ἀγνοῶν, sc. τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα. The case supposed is one in which material facts were not before the court.

- καιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἢ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. 1137^a
- 13 ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ εἴ τις μερίσαιοτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλεόν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν
- 14 ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ 5 δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδὶ ἔχοντας
- 15 ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, 10 ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός). ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλεόν ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κακεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς 15 δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον
- 16 ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἥττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἥττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πράξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν 20

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτός. The unjust judge ἀδικεῖ, for he takes more than his share of the ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά. It is not essential that he should literally share the spoils of the ἀδίκημα. Even if he were to decide the case on those terms (ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ), it is not the land in dispute but a money equivalent that he would receive. So the equivalent need not be more than the gratitude of the one party (χάρις) or the pleasure of punishing the other (τιμωρία). These are enough to constitute πλεονεξία.

§ 14. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδὶ κ.τ.λ. It is not easy to be ἄδικος, though it is easy to commit an ἄδικον.

§ 15. ἀλλ' οὐ κ.τ.λ., 'though these

things are not just except accidentally.' For a parenthesis introduced by ἀλλά='though,' followed by a main clause introduced by ἀλλά='but,' Bywater (Contr. p. 48) compares 1139 b, 2. 1150 b, 6 sqq.

τοῦτο δὴ, sc. τὸ γνῶναι πῶς πραττόμενα κ.τ.λ. The mss. have τοῦτο δέ, but see Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

§ 16. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, i.e. because they ignore the fact that it is easy to do an unjust act, but not to be unjust. Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard Justice as a mere external accomplishment or τέχνη, the just man will be the best thief (Rep. 334 a).

ἀσπίδα ἀφείναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ
τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστὶ, πλὴν
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσ-
περ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ
25 τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
ὠδί. ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς 17
ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς
δ' οὐδὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα
30 βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι του· τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

X. Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἢ μὲν
ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὔθ' ὡς
ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοποῦμένοις· καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιει-
35 κὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ
1137^b ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιει-
κέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι
φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν ἐπαι-
νετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς [οὐ
5 δίκαιον] εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἢ μὲν 2
οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς,
ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον

§ 17. τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, i.e. τῶν ἐκτός, things which are good in themselves, though they may be bad in relation to something else. Cf. 1129 b, 3.

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ., 'but admit of excess or defect in them.' Of course ἔχουσι is the dative of the participle, which is connected with the finite verb by δέ. Cf. 1116 a, 8.

τοῦτο δ'. This is the reading implied by the Vetus Versio, and I have followed Stewart in preferring it. The MSS. have διὰ τοῦτ', which leaves ἐστίν without a subject. Others read διό for διὰ.

X. § 1. Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας κ.τ.λ.

The questions of legal casuistry we have been discussing lead up naturally to the question of "equity."

ὥστε καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'so much so that in praising things we even transfer the word ἐπιεικὲς to other things than δίκαια, and use it as equivalent to ἀγαθόν.' Attic avoids the strong terms ἀγαθός and κακός and prefers the milder terms ἐπιεικής, μέτριος and φαῦλος or ὁ τυχών. Aristotle often uses ἐπιεικής in this sense. Cf. 1102 b, 10.

[οὐ δίκαιον]. These words are not translated in the Vetus Versio and seem better away, as Giphanius saw.

ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι δί-
 καιον, καὶ οὐχ ὥς ἄλλο τι γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου.
 ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοις ὃν- 10
 3 τοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπι-
 εικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρ-
 4 θωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς,
 περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἶόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν
 ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἶόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ 15
 τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον.
 καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός
 5 ἐστίν· εὐθύς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν
 οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ 20
 τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης
 καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ καὶ
 ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἥδει, ἐνο- 01
 6 μοθέτησεν. διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου,
 οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. 25
 καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου,
 ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ
 πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι
 7 νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ

§ 2. δικαίου τινός, 'better than a species of justice.' It is itself a species of τὸ δίκαιον, not another γένος.

§ 4. ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Polit. 294 a νόμος οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναίτο τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιοτάτον ἀκριβῶς πᾶσιν ἅμα περιλαβὼν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτάττειν.

εὐθύς, 'from its very nature.' This use of εὐθύς is derived from such phrases as εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς, εὐθύς φύσει ὑπάρχει. Cf. 1140 b, 17.

ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη, sc. τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, for ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἡ πράξις.

§ 5. ὃ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ. Cf.

Rhet. 1374 b, 11 (ἐπιεικὲς) τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ('the letter') ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου. We see from the word παρών that Aristotle is thinking of the lawgiver's ἀποδημία in Plato, Polit. 294 a sqq., and that in turn is suggested by the story of Solon.

§ 6. ψηφίσματος δεῖ. A ψήφισμα is an executive, not a legislative, act. The ἐκκλησία was an executive, not a legislative, body. Allowing for differences, we may think of an Order in Council.

30 ὁ κανὼν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολί-
βδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται
καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλ- 8
τιον δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς
35 ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ
1138^a ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἄλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ
ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικὴς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπι-
είκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

XI. Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερόν
5 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶ-
σαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀπο-
κτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἔτι 2
ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων ἐκὼν, ἀδι-
κεῖ, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν
10 σφάττων ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ

§ 7. τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας. This is said to refer to the 'Cyclo-
pean' building, e.g. at Tiryns, where
polygonal stones were used and a
μολίβδινος κανὼν would doubtless be of
service. But why should it be called
'Lesbian'? Stewart asks whether the
reference is not to the Lesbian κῦμα
or 'moulding' (Dict. Ant. s. v. *Cυμα*).
The Lesbian κῦμα was undulating,
not a simple hollow like the Dorian.
Surely this must be right. Cf. Aes-
chylus fr. 72, Dindorf—

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβιον φατνώματι
κῦμ' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραίνεται ῥυθμοῖς.

XI. § 1. Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται
κ.τ.λ. All the other ἀπορίαι lead up
to this one, and it derives its im-
portance from its bearing on Plato's
account of δικαιοσύνη.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Even in the
wide Platonic sense of Justice it is
impossible.

ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. It is
now common to say after Victorius,

that οὐ κελεύει = ἀπαγορεύει just as οὐκ
ἐᾷ = κωλύει, and that the remark here
is merely an explanation of this. But
then it would be mere tautology, and
if οὐ κελεύει is idiomatically equivalent
to ἀπαγορεύει, no explanation would
be needed. If we had to do here
with an explanation of an idiomatic
οὐ κελεύει = ἀπαγορεύει, we should
most certainly have ἀ δὲ οὐ κελεύει,
not ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει. Further, there
is really no authority for οὐ κελεύειν =
ἀπαγορεύειν. The simple interpreta-
tion, and the right one, is to supply
ἀποκτιννύναι after μὴ κελεύει.

The law forbids us to kill anything
which it does not expressly enjoin us
to kill. We must not kill except
where the law gives us ἄδεια. The
argument is that as suicide is not
expressly exempted from the penalties
of φόνος, it must come under them.

§ 2. παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, 'in
violation of the same law' as the μὴ
ἀντιβλάπτων who βλάπτει παρὰ τὸν

3 ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ;
 ἐκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πό-
 λιν ζημιοῖ, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι
 4 ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν
 καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν—τοῦτο 15
 γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου· ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥς-
 περ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ
 ταύτην ἀδικεῖ—ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶη ἀφηρηθῆσθαι καὶ
 προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν πλείο-
 5 σιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν 20
 τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον· ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ
 τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὐτόν, ταῦτά
 ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἶη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖ-
 6 σθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων
 οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ 25
 τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοίχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ
 λύεται τὸ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ
 7 ἐκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα,
 καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ

νόμον above. The L^b reading *παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* seems to me meaningless in this context. K^b has *παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* and the Vetus Versio implies *νόμον*, whence we may infer that the reading of M^b, though doubtless a conjecture, is right. For the confusion of *λόγος* and *νόμος* in MSS., see above 1134 a, 35.

§ 3. *ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ*. Cf. Aischines against Ktesiphon § 244 *εἰάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσεται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν*. It is clear from this that the *ἀδικία* consisted in bringing blood-guiltiness (*μίσμα*) on the state, not in depriving the state of a citizen. Hence *ἀτιμία* is the appropriate punishment, not damages.

§ 4. *ἔτι καθ' ὃ κ.τ.λ.*, in the special sense to which we have limited *ἀδικία*, i.e. so far as it has to do with *πλεονεξία* of *τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ*. Here ὁ ἀδικῶν

is *ἄδικος μόνον* (there is no *ἐπαναφορά* to any other kind of badness 1130 a, 28), but not *ὅλως φαῦλος* (i.e. his *κακία* is not *ὅλη κακία πρὸς ἕτερον*, but the *ἐν μέρει κακία*).

οὕτω πονηρός, 'bad in the same sense,' i.e. as having a particular form of badness.

ἅμα γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ. If A and B are *ἀριθμῶ ἔν*, there can be no *ἀδικία*, for Γ and Δ (*τὰ πράγματα*) cannot be added to A=B and subtracted from it at the same time.

§ 5. *ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Not only is an act of injustice voluntary and deliberate, but doing wrong is prior to having wrong done to one—if wrong has first been done to one, there is no *ἀδικία*—but, if a man could wrong himself, the agent and patient being identical, the wrong done would be simultaneous with the wrong suffered.

30 δὲ πλεον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου * * * καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν
ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ). ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ
ἀδικεῖν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ
κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν
τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ
35 ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἥττον φαῦλον, 8
1138^b κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι κακόν.
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρίτιν λέγει μείζω
νόσον προσπταίσματος. καίτοι γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ
5 τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν.

Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς 9
αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ
τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις
διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον. εἰς
10 ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν
τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις. ὥσπερ οὖν
ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ
τούτοις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τῶν ἠθικῶν 10
15 ἀρετῶν] διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

§ 7. καὶ ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. These words seem to have no grammatical connexion as they stand. Some phrase like τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον (Rassow) may have been lost by homoeoteleuton.

ἢ ἐγγύς, for the ἀδίκημα may be ἄνευ προαιρέσεως, in which case the agent is not ἄδικος.

§ 8. τῇ τέχνῃ, as usual τῇ πολιτικῇ, but illustrated by ἰατρικῇ. No art as such takes account of συμβεβηκότα.

§ 9. Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

We can now dispose finally of the account of δικαιοσύνη in Plato's Republic. It is based on a metaphor, and (1) it only refers to the relation between 'parts of the soul,' (2) it is not true πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, which implies equality.

τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν. For this Platonic phrase, cf. e.g. Crito 47 c ποῦ τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; 47 e ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων.

ἐν τούτοις...τοῖς λόγοις, i.e. in the writings of Plato and his followers.

BOOK VI.

GOODNESS OF INTELLECT.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our account of goodness cannot be complete until we have described Goodness of Intellect as well as Goodness of Character. We know that Happiness is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it may be that this will prove to be some kind of intellectual goodness. But there is a still more pressing need for such a discussion, since the nature of goodness of character cannot be made perfectly clear without it. We have assumed all along that the mean state in which goodness is to be found was determined by the "right rule" (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*), and we said also that this meant it was determined "by what the wise man would determine it by." Now Wisdom is certainly a form of intellectual goodness, and we must therefore discuss that if we are to make our previous inquiries thoroughly intelligible. The case is just like that of health. We may define that roughly as a mean, and we may say truly enough that we can feel when we are healthy and when we are not (*ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις*). This will even enable us to look after our own health to some extent; for we can always warm ourselves by exercise if we find we are too cold. But such an account of health will not be enough for us if we intend to become doctors. In that case we must have the form of health in our souls. Now the object of the present course is not to give empirical rules for action, but to train lawgivers; for we know that the fairest and grandest aim of practical science is to produce Happiness for a state. The lawgiver, then, must have the "right rule," the form of goodness, in his soul; and we cannot fulfil the task we set before us at the

beginning of the course if we do not address ourselves to the solution of this problem.

§ 2. We may convince ourselves by a process of dialectical reasoning that the forms of intellectual goodness are two in number, namely Practical and Theoretical Wisdom (*φρόνησις* and *σοφία*). This might have been deduced at once from the doctrine that all thought is either theoretical or practical (Introd. § 11); but it is more in accordance with our method to work it out from current philosophical views, and especially those of the Academy. In any case we find that there are these two forms of intellectual goodness; and if we compare them and ask how they are related to each other, we shall come very near the final answer to the question with which we started.

§ 3. All forms of thought, practical and theoretical alike, perform their functions through syllogism; but there is a fundamental difference between the syllogism of action and that of knowledge. This is due to the fact that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is always an action, and an action is necessarily particular, it is this action and not another. Now we know that there can be no demonstration of the particular, and therefore the thought which enters into the practical syllogism must be of a different character altogether from that which is operative in demonstration. Practical Wisdom, the virtue of that form of thought, must be capable, not only of apprehending the things that are good for man, the "right rule" (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*) to apply in each department of life; it must also enable us to see that the particular act under consideration is in the circumstances a case of that general rule. In theoretical science, it is to sense we must go for the particulars; but we can hardly call our perception of the character of a particular act by the name of sense. It is not unlike the intuition by which we apprehend mathematical relations; but even that is not the same. It is better to call it "practical thought," and to leave the explanation of its true nature to the physicist or the "first Philosopher." We all know quite well what is meant by it. And we now see how it is that the Mean is determined. The wise man, the lawgiver, has the form of goodness, the "right rule" in his soul, and he has also the power of seeing how that form is to be embodied in a particular act. And he has the form of goodness in his soul just because he knows the end of human life; for the form is

always determined by the end. The test, then, of whether a certain state of the soul is goodness or not is just the degree in which it is subservient to the supreme end of all human activity.

What, then, is that supreme end? We know that it is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it looks as if we had already stated what that is. For it is clear that Theoretical Wisdom is something far higher than Practical. Practical Wisdom has to do with what is good for Man; but Man is far from being the highest thing in the world. We shall come back to this in Book X; meanwhile it is enough to point out that Practical Wisdom is, as it were, the handmaid of Theoretical Wisdom, and that all its commands are subservient to the realisation of the highest kind of activity by the highest thing in man.

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Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ 20 μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.

Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσιν, καὶ τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων,

I. § 1. ὡς ὁ λόγος...λέγει, 'as the rule says.' Cf. 1115 b, 12 n.

διέλωμεν. This sense of *διαίρειν* (*διαίρεῖσθαι*) *τι* or *περί τινος* is often found in Herodotos (Stein on vii, 16, γ) and seems to be derived from such phrases as *διαίρειν διαφοράς*, *dirimere controversias*. The oldest example is probably Herakleitos fr. 2 *διαιρέων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει*. It cannot therefore come from *διαίρειν* in its special Platonic or Aristotelian sense, as Bonitz seems to suggest (Ind. 180 a, 23).

ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, sc. ταῖς ἠθικαῖς ἀρεταῖς.

τῶν ἄλλων, e.g. health and strength, cf. 1104 a, 11.

σκοπός. Cf. 1094 a, 24 n. Here the metaphor changes at once from 'hitting the mark' to 'tuning a lyre,' from which we may infer that the literal meaning of *σκοπός* was already lost sight of. This is only natural, since the correlative verb *τυγχάνειν* was constantly used without any feeling for the metaphor. There is no justification for Grant's view that

the non-metaphorical use is a mark of Eudemian authorship (see Stewart's note); for it is found already in Plato, e.g. Gorg. 507 d οὗτος ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν.

ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων, i.e. the man who has in his soul the *λόγος* (*λόγος τῆς οὐσίας*, *εἶδος*, formal cause) of goodness, as the doctor has the *λόγος* of health. Cf. 1138 b, 31 and note. The definition of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* has already suggested that this is the *φρόνιμος*.

ἐπιτείνει...ἀνίσιν. The true pitch (*ἁρμονία*) is a *μεσότης* between τὸ ὀξύ and τὸ βαρύ, and the *μουσικός* has its *λόγος* in his soul. The process of *ἐπίτασις* and *ἀνεσις* is that described 1109 a, 24 sqq.

ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων. This is also supposed to be a 'Eudemian' touch on the ground (1) that the word *ὅρος* in the sense of 'standard,' 'determining principle,' is not found in the undisputed books of EN, and (2) that it is found in EE 1222 b, 7 (quoted on p. 105) and 1249 a, 21 (quoted on p. 251). But (1) though the word

ὡς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως,
 2 οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως 25
 ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπι-
 μελείαις, περὶ ὧσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν,

1138 b, 23. EE. 1249 a, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ὁρος καὶ τῷ
 ἱατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν
 μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ (1. εἶναι) ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ
 πλεόν, οὐκέτι· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν
 φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως

is not found in EN, it is distinctly implied in the definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ as ἐν μεσότητι...ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν, and (2) the passages from EE can be most naturally explained as reproductions of the present passage. Indeed it seems incredible that Eudemos should have written 1249 a, 21 sqq. if he also wrote the passage before us as part of the same work. Further, there is no difficulty in supposing that Aristotle should have used the word ὅρος in the sense here given to it. It meant originally 'land-mark,' and its metaphorical use is as old as Bakchylides, fr. 10 εἰς ὅρος, μία βροτοῖσιν ἐστὶν εὐτυχίας ὁδός, | θυμὸν εἴ τις ἔχων ἀπενθή διατελεῖν δύναται βίον. So Demosthenes says (De Cor. § 296) τὴν δ' ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδέν' ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτοῦ, ἃ τοῖς πρότερον Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετροφότες. In the more precise sense of 'standard,' 'regulative principle,' it is used by Plato (Rep. 551 a ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων) and Aristotle (Pol. 1294 a, 10 ἀριστοκρατίας ὅρος ἀρετῆς, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, *et passim*). Note that the ὅρος and the σκοπός are the same thing and identical with whatever we may ultimately find to be man's chief end.

§ 2. ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. This has been supposed to be a

criticism of Aristotle by Eudemos; but, as Eudemos repeats the remark on the last page of his own Ethics 1249 b, 5 (quoted p. 252), it would seem as if he had applied the same criticism to himself. In this case too, it appears incredible that one writer should have written both passages as part of the same work. It is true that Eudemos is fond of the phrase, cf. 1216 b, 32 (p. 40), 1217 a, 19 (p. 14), 1220 a, 17, and that it occurs nowhere else in EN. But (1) it is a thoroughly Aristotelian way of speaking, cf. de An. 413 a, 11 ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίγνεται τὸ σαφές καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον. And (2) there is no occasion for the alleged criticism, since the theory of the Mean is avowedly given as a provisional sketch or τύπος (EN 1104 a, 1 sqq., 1114 b, 27), and in Book X Aristotle explains what the ὅρος or σκοπός is much more fully than Eudemos ever does. We there learn that it is the θεωρητικὸς βίος on which the φρόνιμος keeps his eye, and the meaning of this is thoroughly worked out, while Eudemos dismisses in half a page his corresponding doctrine that the ὅρος τῆς καλοκάγαθίας (i.e. τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς) is τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν.

ἐπιμελείαις. The word is used both of Medicine and Politics.

ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ
τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν
30 τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς
τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς
ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ 3
μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον
τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

35 Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι 4
1139^a τοῦ ἥθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν

καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος
καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ “ὡς ὁ
λόγος.” τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφήν
εἴπειεν “ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης.” τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μὲν,
οὐ σαφὲς δέ.

πονεῖν...ῥαθυμεῖν. These words are taken from the ἐπιμέλεια of the γυμναστικῆς or παιδοτροφίας. Cf. e.g. Plato, Rep. 410 b τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόνους. Isokr. Dem. § 12 τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνουσι... αὐξεσθαι πέφυκε. Galen says on Hippokrates, Epid. 6, 5, 9 τὸ πόνος ὄνομα πολλάκις μὲν εἰώθεν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἀντὶ τοῦ γυμνασίου λέγειν, ἐνίοτε ἀντὶ τῆς ὁδύνης (cf. 1154 b, 7). So ib. 6, 6, 5 πόνου, σιτία, ποτά, ὕπνοι, ἀφροδίσια, πάντα μέτρια, *et passim*. The usual opposite of πόνος in this sense is ἀνάπαυσις (cf. 1127 b, 33 n.), but cf. Rhet. 1370a, 14 (ἡδέα) αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ ῥαθυμίαι. We see that the use of ῥαθυμία in a bad sense is secondary from e.g. Isokr. Evag. § 42 τὰς ἀληθινὰς τῶν ῥαθυμιῶν οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἀργίαις...ἐνούσας.

οὐδὲν...πλέον, ‘would be none the wiser.’ Cf. the idiomatic οὐδὲν πλέον ποιεῖν, the negative of πλέον τι ποιεῖν.

ἡ ἰατρικὴ...ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. Observe that these take the place of ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος and ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων and thus show how we are to understand those expressions.

§ 3. καὶ περὶ κ.τ.λ., i.e. with regard to ἕξεις of the soul as well as those of the body.

τούτου τίς ὅρος. The ὅρος is indifferently the ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων and the ὅρος τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. This is quite correct; for the λόγος is the εἶδος of goodness, i.e. the Mean, existing in the soul of the φρόνιμος, just as the art of medicine is the form of health existing in the soul of the doctor. Cf. Met. 1070 a, 29 ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγείας ἐστίν, 1070 b, 32 ὑγεία γὰρ πῶς ἡ ἰατρικὴ. (Introductory Note, § 1.)

§ 4. Τὰς δὴ κ.τ.λ. There is nothing in Rassow's view that an independent introduction to Book VI begins here (see Stewart's note on 1138 b, 18). The connexion of thought is this. We know from the definition that the φρόνιμος has the ὅρος we are looking for, and we know that φρόνησις is a διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ (1103 a, 6), so we must go on to discuss διανοητικὰ ἀρετά.

ἔφαμεν, 1103 a, 3 sqq.

ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
 5 πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη
 δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλο-
 γον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαι- 5
 ρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ
 θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέ-
 χονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ
 τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ
 γένει τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα 10
 6 καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τού-
 των τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικόν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέ-
 σθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταυτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ

§ 5. πρότερον, 1102 a, 27 sqq.

τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Aristotle did not himself admit 'parts of the soul' in the proper sense (cf. 1102 a, 31 n.), but he is still content for the purpose in hand to take his psychology from ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι (1102 a, 26 n.).

ὑποκείσθω, cf. 1103 b, 32 n.

ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Introd. § 10.

τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, sc. καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. It makes no difference whether we say the things themselves or their ἀρχαὶ are necessary or contingent. Cf. 1140 a, 34 n.

ἕτερον...τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον πεφυκός. This is a clear reference to the argument of Plato, Rep. 476 e, sqq. Cf. especially 477 b ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε. The principle is laid down 477 d δυνάμει δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι (=πρὸς ὃ πέφυκε) καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, ...καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. The distinction, then, is that between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα.

εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle himself did not hold the *similia similibus* theory of knowledge in this

naked form; the argument still proceeds on Platonic lines.

§ 6. λεγέσθω. The imperative marks the dialectical character of the argument. Cf. ὑποκείσθω above.

λογιστικόν. We expect δοξαστικόν, and so this 'part' is called below 1140 b, 26. In Plato the name λογιστικόν is given to the highest of the three parts of the soul, and includes τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν instead of being opposed to it. Aristotle never uses the word elsewhere except in discussing Platonic psychology, and then he always uses it in the Platonic sense, as opposed to τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν and τὸ θυμοειδές. He does, however, speak of λογιστικὴ φαντασία (cf. App. A), and this has led to the use of the word here.

τὸ γὰρ...λογίζεσθαι κ.τ.λ. As usual Aristotle appeals to the language of common life to justify him in giving a narrower sense to the word than Plato had done. The phrases λογίζεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα, λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος were of everyday occurrence.

οὐδεὶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1112 a, 21. This completes the proof that τὸ λογιστικόν has to do with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.

τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστίν
 15 ἓν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἐκατέρου τού- 7
 των τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἡ δ'
 ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.

II. Τρία δὴ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀλη-
 θείας, αἰσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις, τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ 2
 20 πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως
 δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἐστὶ δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ

§ 7. βελτίστη ἔξις...ἀρετὴ...πρὸς
 τὸ ἔργον. Cf. 1097 b, 24 sqq.

II. § 1. Τρία δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle approaches the question of the οἰκεῖα ἔργα of the two 'parts' from the other side, that of the distinction between theoretical and practical (Introd. § 11), and bases it now upon his own psychology. There are two specifically human ends, namely *πᾶξις* and *γνώσις*, or, as he here says, *πᾶξις* and *ἀλήθεια*. If we wish to find the οἰκεῖον ἔργον of any 'part' of the human soul, we must find what it contributes to either of these. That this must be the connexion of thought is made clear, I think, by the difficulties into which we get if we take *πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας* as equivalent to *πρακτικῆς ἀληθείας* (see Stewart's note). It seems much more likely that Aristotle should here oppose *πᾶξις* to *ἀλήθεια*. Though, as we shall see, *πᾶξις* also implies *ἀλήθεια*, *ἀλήθεια* is not the τέλος in practical matters (τὸ τέλος οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ *πᾶξις*). If Aristotle had written here *πράξεως καὶ γνώσεως* there would have been less misunderstanding.

κύρια. The adjective *κύριος* corresponds to the substantive ἀρχή, especially in the sense of efficient cause. Cf. 1147 a, 26.

αἰσθησις. There can be no γνώσις without αἰσθησις (de An. 432 a, 7 μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι) nor without νοῦς (An. Post. 87 b, 28 sqq. δι' αἰσθήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπίστασθαι).

Therefore νοῦς and αἰσθησις are κύρια τῆς (θεωρητικῆς) ἀληθείας, κύρια τῆς γνώσεως. The position of the word νοῦς between αἰσθησις and ὄρεξις indicates that it is to be taken with both.

§ 2. τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις κ.τ.λ. We turn now to consider our more immediate object, the κύρια πράξεως, i.e. νοῦς and ὄρεξις. Cf. de An. 433 a, 9 φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινούμενα, ἡ ὄρεξις ἡ νοῦς. de Mot. An. 700 b, 18 ταῦτα δὲ πάντα (sc. τὰ κινούμενα) ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν.

οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ πράξεως. This is not fully explained here and must be supplemented from the de Anima and the de Motu Animalium, for which see App. A and B. The lower animals have τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, but this can be explained by αἰσθησις and ὄρεξις alone. There can be no ὄρεξις without a φαντασία, but φαντασία may be either αἰσθητικὴ or λογιστικὴ (βουλευτικὴ). It is only the latter of these that implies νοῦς, and we do not call a κίνησις by the name of *πᾶξις* unless it arises from an ὄρεξις moved by νοῦς, i.e. by a λογιστικὴ φαντασία.

ἐστὶ δ' ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. To find the οἰκεῖον ἔργον of τὸ λογιστικόν (i.e. νοῦς so far as it is a κύριον πράξεως), we now analyse the contributions of νοῦς and ὄρεξις to *πᾶξις*. Now the characteristic activities of νοῦς are affirmation and negation, while those of ὄρεξις are pursuit and avoidance, and these are evidently 'analogous'

ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὁρέξει διώξις καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ
 ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετικὴ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὁρεξις βουλευ-
 τικὴ, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν
 ὁρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν 25
 μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ
 3 ἀλήθεια πρακτικὴ· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακ-
 τικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τ' ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ
 ψεῦδος—τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον—τοῦ δὲ
 πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ 30
 4 ὁρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ
 κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὁρεξις καὶ λόγος

activities. Hence their relation is stated as a proportion.

ἐν διανοίᾳ. There is no distinction here between διάνοια and νοῦς.

ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ. As Ramsauer says, the middle term of this argument is σπουδαία προαίρεσις. We know that ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ is ἔξις προαιρετικὴ (1106 b, 36), and that προαίρεσις is ὁρεξις βουλευτικὴ (1113 a, 10). It follows that a good προαίρεσις (and therefore a good πράξις) implies (1) an ὀρθὴ ὁρεξις, i.e. βούλησις τἀγαθοῦ, and (2) an ἀληθὴς λόγος, or true judgment that for a certain class of persons a certain class of acts is good. The function of νοῦς here is strictly analogous to its function in creating theoretical truth. In the latter case it makes explicit the universal latent in αἴσθησις, and thus produces a λόγος, which in turn becomes an ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως: in the former it makes explicit the universal latent in ὁρεξις, and thus produces a rule of conduct (ὀρθὸς λόγος), which in turn becomes an ἀρχὴ βουλεύσεως, the major premiss of a practical syllogism.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Practical διάνοια has for its function the conversion of ὁρεξις into a λόγος or general rule of conduct. This is practical truth and the οἰκείον ἔργον of

τὸ λογιστικόν which we are seeking.

§ 3. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς κ.τ.λ. Introd. § 11. In both its aspects the οἰκείον ἔργον of διάνοια is truth.

§ 4. πράξεως...ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, 1113 a, 6 n.

ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα. The final cause of πράξις is τὸ ὁρεκτόν, i.e. τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.

προαιρέσεως δὲ κ.τ.λ. The ἀρχὴ προαιρέσεως is ὁρεξις (as κινούμενον κινεῖν) and a λόγος ἕνεκά του (as κινεῖν ἀκίνητον). For the different way in which these 'move,' cf. App. A.

λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. This is a general rule of conduct, such as παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά (1147 a, 5), the λόγος which tells us what sort of thing we must do if we are to attain the object of ὁρεξις, and which therefore forms the major premiss of the practical syllogism. It is the fact of its being ἕνεκά του that brings such words as δεῖ, συμφέρει into it (cf. 1140 b, 18 δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα πράττειν). The prime mover of πράξις, then, is always something distinctly formulated by thought; for the ὁρεκτόν can only become an efficient cause τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι (De An. 433 b, 12), and if it is only in φαντασία we have no πράξις. We must not infer from this, however, that thought constitutes the

ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ
 ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἢ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ
 35 ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἡθους οὐκ ἐστὶν. διὰ- 5
 νοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆ·
 1139^b αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ
 πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς—ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ
 τινος—τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἢ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος,
 ἢ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ
 5 ὄρεξις διανοητικῆ, καὶ ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.

end. Thought simply universalises and formulates the material furnished by ὄρεξις in the same way as it universalises and formulates the material furnished by αἰσθησις. In itself it is indifferent to right or wrong, and we shall see that it can universalise wrong ὀρέξεις as well as right, and formulate false λόγοι as well as true.

οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. Two words for the same thing.

οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς...ἕξεως. This secures that the ὀρέξεις which thought has to universalise into rules of conduct are right, and thus that τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν shall be the same as the true good, i.e. τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

§ 5. διάνοια δ' αὐτή, 'thought by itself,' 'thought alone,' i.e. without ὄρεξις.

ἢ ἕνεκά του, cf. λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος above.

αὕτη, sc. ἢ ἕνεκά του διάνοια. This completes the proof that διάνοια αὕτη οὐθὲν κινεῖ. We have seen that this is true of πρακτικῆ διάνοια, and it is also true of ποιητικῆ διάνοια. There too the ἀρχή is ἢ ἕνεκά του διάνοια, and that implies ὄρεξις as well as νοῦς. The end of the builder or the doctor is the realisation of the form, whether of a house or of health, existing in his soul. The formal becomes the final cause, and that can be effected by ὄρεξις alone. It is not necessary to

prove that the third kind of thought, θεωρητικῆ διάνοια, οὐθὲν κινεῖ by itself; for its objects are either ἀκίνητα or have their ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in themselves. Cf. Introd. § 10.

οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς. The process of production (τὸ ποιητόν) is not an end in the unqualified sense in which πράξις is so. It is relative (πρὸς τι) and it is the production of something (τινός). By τὸ ποιητόν here we must not understand the thing produced (τὸ ἔργον). It is used in the same way as τὸ πρακτόν and means the thing *done*, not the thing *made*, the building and not the house. We may say either ποιεῖν ποιήσιν or ποιεῖν ποίημα (ἔργον). Here τὸ ποιητόν corresponds to the internal accusative.

ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι κ.τ.λ. Tr. 'though it is etc.' For the structure cf. 1137 a, 111 n.

ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν, sc. τέλος ἀπλῶς. The end of the πράξις is the ἐνέργεια itself, not an external ἔργον.

ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. 'This sort of efficient cause is Man.' For the others see 1112 a, 31. Aristotle sometimes calls this efficient cause νοῦς or διάνοια (see the note referred to). In those cases we must understand the qualification ἕνεκά του. The language here brings out well the absolute interdependence of νοῦς and ὄρεξις in προαίρεσις.

- 6 Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονός οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων

μόνον γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
ἀγέννητα ποιεῖν ἄσπ' ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.

10

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

III. Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι 15 πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.

- 2 Ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάν-

§ 6. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This seems to be a detached fragment loosely appended as usual to the end of a section. It appears to be part of a proof that Practical Thought deals with τὸ ἐσόμενον, for which doctrine cf. *Introd.* § 12.

Ἀγαθῶν, fr. 5. The quotation merely embodies a favourite γνώμη, for which see also Pindar, *Ol.* ii, 17; Simonides fr. 52; Soph. *Aias* 378, *Trach.* 740; Plato, *Protag.* 324 b, *Laws* 943 a.

τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων, sc. τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ καὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. As νοῦς is equivalent to διάνοια, so is νοητικός to διανοητικός.

καθ' ἃς οὖν κ.τ.λ., for ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον 1139 a, 17.

III. § 1. ἄνωθεν, cf. 1155 b, 2 n.

ἔστω δὴ, the regular formula in introducing a dialectical πρότασις, in the present case a λογικὴ πρότασις (cf. *Top.* 105 b, 20) used also in *An. Post.* 88 b, 30—89 b, 9. We must regard this as a mere preliminary enumeration of states with a *prima facie* claim to be regarded as διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί, and not as Aristotle's

own list. We shall find that he reduces them to two, φρόνησις and σοφία (so Prantl). For a similar preliminary list afterwards reduced to two, cf. *Mot. An.* 700 b, 17 (App. B).

ὑπολήψει...δόξῃ. Here these are introduced as coordinate, quite in accordance with the tentative character of the present discussion. Later we shall see that ὑπόληψις is the genus of which ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις are species.

§ 2. Ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ. It is natural to start with the familiar pair ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη, which look as if they might be the two ἀρεταί we are seeking for.

εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι. We are now going to fix the precise meaning of these vague popular terms. The name of ἐπιστήμη is given to many things καθ' ὁμοιότητα (1115 a, 19 n.) which are not ἐπιστήμη at all τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, e.g. it is given to πολιτικὴ itself. This passage is referred to in *Met.* 981 b, 25 εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τίς διαφορά τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν. This, so far as it goes, is evidence of the Aristotelian character of Book vi.

20 τες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰδίου ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δ' αἰδία ἀγένητα καὶ ἀφθαρτα.
25 ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν 3 μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν—ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῶ· ἢ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστι

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As usual in discussing a *ἔξις*, the first question is *περὶ ποῖα*; cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν, 'when removed from actual observation.' The verb *θεωρεῖν* expresses the *ἐνέργεια* of knowledge (cf. 1146 b, 31 n.). A triangle has its angles equal to two right angles whether any one actually knows Eucl. I, 32 or not. We cannot say the same of τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, the facts of nature and of human life.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐπιστητόν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην.

αἰδίου ἄρα. On the αἰδία see 1112 a, 21 n.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης...ἀπλῶς, 'necessary in an unqualified sense' as opposed to ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 quoted above. That the angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles is necessary ἀπλῶς, that a saw should be of iron if it is to cut is necessary ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (Phys. 200 a, 12). The results of πολιτική are only ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα, but πολιτική is not τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἐπιστήμη. Note that the ὑπόθεσις in this phrase is the Q.E.F., the problem to be solved.

ἀγένητα καὶ ἀφθαρτα, not subject to γένεσις and φθορά, 'coming into being' and 'ceasing to be.' Cf. Part.

An. 639 b, 23 ὑπάρχει δὲ τὸ μὲν (sc. ἀναγκαῖον) ἀπλῶς τοῖς αἰδίοις, τὸ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσει πᾶσιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς, οἷον οἰκία κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. διδακτὴ. Met. 981 b, 7 ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δ' οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν. This introduces us to the second question, πῶς;

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς. An. Post. 71 a, 1 πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.

ἢ μὲν γὰρ, sc. διδασκαλία, not ἐπιστήμη. Aristotle never admits that ἐπιστήμη can be got δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, for it is always apodeictic. For the present statement cf. An. Post. 71 a, 6 ἀμφότεροι γὰρ (sc. οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ οἱ διὰ συλλογισμῶν λόγοι) διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ συνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον.

ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. 1393 a, 26 ἢ δ' ἐπαγωγή ἀρχή. This must be a proof that ἢ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς διδασκαλία is ἐκ προγινωσκομένων just as much as ἢ συλλογισμῶ, so the reading of L^b, ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ, cannot be right. To say that ἐπαγωγή 'is of the ἀρχή and the universal' is true, but not to the point here. The ἀρχή must be iden-

καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου—εἰσὶν
 ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογι- 30
 4 σμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀπο-
 δεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυ-
 τικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ
 ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος,
 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. 35

IV. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον
 τοῦτον· τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν 1140^a
 2 καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις—πιστεύομεν
 δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις—ὥστε καὶ ἡ

tical with the προϋπάρχουσα γνώσις, and there is no difficulty in taking it so. For ἀρχή simply means 'starting-point' (Introd. § 22), and it is just as proper to call τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα the 'starting-point' of our knowledge of τὸ καθόλου as to call τὸ καθόλου the 'starting-point' of demonstration. In both kinds of διδασκαλία there is an ἀρχή. The meaning of καὶ τοῦ καθόλου now becomes clear. The universal has an ἀρχή (principium cognoscendi) just as much as syllogism or demonstration has, and that ἀρχή is ἐπαγωγή. The reading of L^b must be due to a corrector who thought that ἀρχή could be used only in the special sense of ἀρχή ἀποδείξεως.

εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαί. Introd. § 22. There is no inconsistency between the statement here that ἐπαγωγὴ is τῶν ἀρχῶν and the statement made 1141 a, 7 that νοῦς is τῶν ἀρχῶν. No amount of ἐπαγωγὴ could give us an ἀρχή without νοῦς, but on the other hand νοῦς must have data.

§ 4. καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα, sc. ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος (An. Post. 71 b, 20).

πως, 'in a certain way,' i.e. in the way explained by the quotation from the Analytics above, especially ἐκ

γνωριμωτέρων, as we see from the next sentence. Not every kind of πίστις is ἐπιστήμη.

μᾶλλον, sc. γνώριμοι.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. He will have something which as a matter of fact is knowledge (ὃ συμβαίνει ἐπιστήμη εἶναι), but he will not have it as knowledge (καθ' αὐτό). Cf. An. Post. 71 b, 28 τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ὧν ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστὶ, ib. 99 b, 20 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους.

IV. § 1. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης κ.τ.λ. The positive result of this discussion is that, though (1) ἐπιστήμη is περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and so far fulfils the requirements of the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, yet (2) it always implies a προϋπάρχουσα γνώσις upon which all its necessity depends, and therefore cannot be the ἀρετὴ itself.

τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου κ.τ.λ. We might suppose that τέχνη was the ἀρετὴ of the λογιστικόν, but we are met by the distinction between ποίησις and πρᾶξις. A little dialectic will show that τέχνη has to do only with the former, and therefore will not cover the whole ground of τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. Observe that the distinction is taken from ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι. Cf. Introd. § 11.

μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιη-
 5 τικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ
 ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ 3
 οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου
 ποιητικῆ, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἣτις οὐ μετὰ λό-
 γου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν
 10 ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆ. ἐστι 4
 δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεω-

§ 2. μετὰ λόγου ἕξις. This is the correct Aristotelian designation for what popular philosophy calls ἕξις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. As we are coming to a dialectical κατασκευὴ of the definition in due form, it is necessary to substitute the true genus. It was not necessary to define ἐπιστήμη, as we could refer to the Analytics for a sufficient ἐνδοξον, but it is necessary to define τέχνη. On the distinction between μετὰ λόγου and κατὰ λόγον see 1144 b, 26.

ἕτερόν ἐστι. The τόπος here is σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν πτώσεων καὶ συστοίχων, which is applied to the πρόβλημα of ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον in Top. 151 b, 30. Assuming, on the basis of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, that πρᾶξις and ποίησις are γένει ἕτερα (cf. 1140 b, 3), it follows that ἕξις πρακτικὴ and ἕξις ποιητικὴ are γένει ἕτερα, for the ἐνέργεια and the ἕξις are σύστοιχα.

διὸ οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Therefore neither is contained in the other.' This follows from the fact that they have ἀντιδιηρημέναι διαφοραί. They are co-ordinate γένη falling under the higher genus from which they are differentiated. For the phraseology, see next note.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ κ.τ.λ. Building is an εἶδος both of τέχνη and of ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ. The same εἶδος cannot be in two γένη neither of which is contained in the other (see last note). Therefore τέχνη and ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ are the same γένος. For the principle here applied cf. Top. 144 a,

12 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸν ἐν δύο γένεσιν εἶναι μὴ περιέχουσιν ἀλλήλα. So 140 a, 1. 144 b, 14. 152 a, 16.

ὅπερ...τις. The pronoun ὅπερ is used to mark predication ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, and when τις is added as here, it marks that the γένος is predicated of the species or of the individual (cf. 1153 b, 6 and Bonitz, Ind. 533 b, 36 sqq.). It is necessary to mark that the γένος and the διαφορά are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, for otherwise we should have no definition. Cf. An. Post. 97 a, 23 εἰς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν ὅρον διὰ τῶν διαιρέσεων τριῶν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, (1) τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγορούμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, (2) καὶ ταῦτα τάξαι τί πρῶτον ἢ δεύτερον, καὶ (3) ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα. Here we see that (1) ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ is predicated of οἰκοδομικῆ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, and that (2) it is first, for ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς.

καὶ οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is added to secure the third requirement for the κατασκευὴ of a definition, viz. ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα. Cf. Top. 154 a, 37 δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς οὗ τοῦνομα (i.e. τέχνη) κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸν ὅρον, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀντιστρέφειν, εἰ μέλλει ἴδιος εἶναι ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὅρος.

μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς. The qualification ἀληθοῦς may be added because ἀλήθεια is the ἔργον of διάνοια, whether theoretical or practical (1139a, 29).

§ 4. περὶ γένεσιν. An. Post. 100 a, 6 τὸ καθόλου...τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπι-

ρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἢ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι 15
5 ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποιήσεις καὶ πράξεις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

τέχνη τύχην ἑσπερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

20

6 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

V. Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὲ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ 25

στήμης· ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν. Most editors bracket καὶ with Muretus, making τὸ τεχνάζειν a new subject. See, however, Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. This is added to distinguish the sphere of τέχνη from that of φύσις, which is also περὶ γένεσιν. Introd. § 10.

§ 5. τρόπον τινά. Cf. Part. An. 640 a, 28 ἔνια γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου γίνεται ταῦτα τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὅλον ὑγίεια. Phys. 197 a, 5 ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἑνεκά του. διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἄνευ διανοίας. Rhet. 1362 a, 2 αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι. Both have to do with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. The limits of the operation of τύχη in the sphere of προαίρεσις are discussed in Met. 1034 a, 9 sqq.

Ἀγάθων, fr. 6.

V. § 1. Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ. We shall see that φρόνησις is the ἀρετὴ of the 'calculative part'; but

we must first discover its precise meaning. In Plato the word φρόνησις is exactly equivalent to σοφία, but Xenokrates had already marked a difference between the two. Cf. Clem. Strom. p. 441, 20 Pott. ἐπεὶ καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐν τῷ περὶ φρονήσεως τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῶν πρώτων αἰτιῶν καὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας εἶναι φησιν, τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγούμενος διττήν· τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν, τὴν δὲ θεωρητικὴν· ἣν δὲ σοφίαν ὑπάρχειν ἀνθρωπίνην· διόπερ ἡ μὲν σοφία φρόνησις· οὐ μὴν πᾶσα φρόνησις σοφία. We see here that φρόνησις, though still regarded as both theoretical and practical, is made something specifically human. Aristotle also makes φρόνησις something human, but he confines it to the practical, a restriction which he justifies as usual by an appeal to the use of the word in current language.

οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, 'the way to get a definition of φρόνησις is——.' For the use of λαβεῖν in the dialectical sense (opp. ἀποδοῦναι) with περὶ, cf. 1142 a, 32 n. The method is σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, cf. 1123 a, 35 n.

δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
 συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς
 ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ 2
 τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπου-
 30 δαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν
 εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν 3
 ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
 πράξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ'
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἐστὶν ἀπό-
 35 δειξις—πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν—καὶ οὐκ
 1140^b ἐστὶ βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέ-
 χεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ
 γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι 4
 5 ἕξιν ἀληθῇ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ

καλῶς βουλευσασθαι, cf. the defini-
 tion in Rhet. 1366 b, 20 φρόνησις
 δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ' ἣν εὖ
 βουλευεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

ὅλως, opp. κατὰ μέρος.

§ 2. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ. This is
 the argument from πρόσθεσις and ἀφαί-
 ρεσις (cf. 1094 b, 28 n.). If the various
 φρόνιμοι περὶ τι are all βουλευτικοὶ περὶ
 τι, we may generalise this and say
 that βουλευτικός (ἀπλῶς) will be
 φρόνιμος (ἀπλῶς). The words ὥστε
 καὶ ὅλως mark the argument as an
 ἐπαγωγή.

ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη, i.e. where πράξις
 and not ποίησις is concerned.

§ 3. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς κ.τ.λ. We
 pass to the first question asked with
 regard to every ἕξις, viz. περὶ ποῖα;

ὥστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. The argument is
 that φρόνησις is deliberative (i.e. not
 τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), ἐπιστήμη is demon-
 strative (i.e. τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), therefore
 φρόνησις is not ἐπιστήμη.

πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If the ἀρχή is
 contingent, so is everything that
 follows from it. This is added to

anticipate the objection that, though
 the ἀρχή may be contingent, yet,
 when once it is determined, what
 follows may be necessary, and there-
 fore capable of demonstration. This,
 however, is not what Aristotle means
 by necessary. It only gives us τὸ ἐξ
 ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον, while the object
 of knowledge must be ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἀπλῶς. Cf. 1139 b, 23 n.

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι. As this is a new
 protasis dependent on εἴπερ, we might
 expect μὴ instead of οὐκ. But the
 use of οὐ after εἰ (εἴπερ) in a causal
 sense is well attested in classical
 Attic (Kühner § 513, 5), and in
 post-classical Greek becomes the rule
 (Jannaris Hist. Gr. Gr. § 1807 sqq.).
 There is therefore no need to continue
 the parenthesis down to ὄντων with
 Ramsauer and Stewart.

§ 4. ἕξιν ἀληθῇ μετὰ λόγου. There
 is no difficulty in the substitution of
 this phrase for ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς
 above. The ἕξις in which the soul
 ἀληθεύει (1139 b, 12) may be called
 ἀληθής just as well as the λόγος.

καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ
 5 πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ
 τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους φρονίμους οἴομεθα εἶναι,
 ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεω-
 ρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιοῦτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς 10
 6 πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύο-
 μεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σφάζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν, σφάζει δὲ τὴν
 τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει
 οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἶον ὅτι τὸ τρίγων-
 ον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακ- 15
 τόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τὰ
 πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς
 οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἔνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ'
 αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ
 ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου 20
 7 ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν. ἀλλὰ μὴν

περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. These words are necessary to complete the definition; for all ἔξεις are relative, and the διαφορά must be relative when the γένος is relative. Cf. Top. 145 a, 14 τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τι καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ πρὸς τι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης (in the loose sense)· θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων πρὸς τι σημαίνει· θεωρητικὴ γὰρ τινος καὶ ποιητικὴ τινος καὶ πρακτικὴ.

τῆς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to justify the way in which the differentia of φρόνησις has been made relative. As the end of πράξις is the good for Man, this is the proper qualification. We cannot determine the differentia of τέχνη in so simple a manner.

§ 5. διὰ τοῦτο, since φρόνησις is relative to human good.

Περικλέα, as opposed to σοφοί like Thales and Anaxagoras. Cf. 1141 b, 4.

οἰκονομικούς...πολιτικούς. These are instances of φρόνιμοι κατὰ μέρος.

§ 6. ἔνθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. From Plato, Krat. 411 e σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὐ νυνδὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως.

δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν. Introd. § 22. οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, sc. τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. His φαντασία is warped (διέστραπται) by pleasure, so that his φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν is not the true good.

φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. Cf. 1151 a, 15 σφάζει τὴν ἀρχήν.

ὥστ' ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. We now get the complete definition by genus (ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆς) and differentia (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴ).

§ 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This is the first of the ἔξεις we are considering to which we are able to give the name of ἀρετή. Incidentally this section gives the reason for refusing that name to τέχνη. It is really the addition of the words περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ that shows φρόνησις to be an ἀρετή, for all ἀρετή is relative to the οἰκείον ἔργον, and it is clear that

τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν
 τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν
 ἥττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή
 25 τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοι μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς 8
 τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ·
 ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ
 φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον
 δ' ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ'
 30 οὐκ ἔστιν.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπό-

τέχνη is not in the same way relative to the οἰκεῖον ἔργον of Man.

τέχνης...ἀρετή. We learn from 1141 a, 12 sqq. that σοφία in its original sense is the ἀρετὴ τέχνης, and that it connotes ἀκρίβεια. In other words, we may say that τέχνη admits of τελείωσις just as ἐπιστήμη does, and therefore neither is an ἀρετή in the full sense (see p. 69 sqq.). On the other hand, φρόνησις requires no such τελείωσις, for it implies its own ἀρχαί as we have just seen. It is therefore a complete ἀρετή.

ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος. This is a Socratic paradox (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 20) which was used in various forms by Plato, but most explicitly in the 'Hippias Major,' to show that goodness was no mere art or external accomplishment. The reason why the ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων is αἰρετώτερος is that he has the δύναμις, while the ἄκων ἀμαρτάνων has not, and πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν αἰρετῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῶν φαύλων δυνάμεις αἰρεταί, διὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἔχειν φαμέν αὐτάς· δυνατοὺς γὰρ εἶναι τὰ φαῦλα πράσσειν (Top. 126 a, 36). Now the φρόνιμος necessarily has a good προ-αίρεσις, and so he cannot go wrong intentionally, but this is not so with the οἰκοδόμος. He may have a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆς ποιητικῆς οἰκίας, and yet deliberately build a bad house.

On the relation of δύναμις to προ-αίρεσις, cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 8. **τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ.** The substitution of the name δοξαστικόν for λογιστικόν makes a more Platonic antithesis to τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. The term itself is not, however, Platonic, nor does Aristotle ever refer to it elsewhere. We have to pass lightly over the fact that the Platonic distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα does not correspond to the Aristotelian distinction between θεωρητικὴ and πρακτικὴ διάνοια. We are able to ignore the difference only because τὰ φύσει γινόμενα do not at present enter into the inquiry.

λήθη...ἔστι. Cf. 1100 b, 17 τοῦτο γὰρ (sc. τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοῖς μακαρίοις) ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτάς (sc. τὰς τιμιωτάτας τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν) λήθην. From this it seems to follow that here too the point is that the ἐνέργεια of φρόνησις is more continuous than that of other ἕξεις μετὰ λόγου (ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη) just because it is πρακτικὴ. We shall see later (cf. 1175 a, 4 sqq.) that a continuous ἐνέργεια is impossible to man, and τέχνη depends upon external conditions.

VI. § 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ. We have seen that ἐπιστήμη always implies a προϋπάρχουσα γνῶσις

ληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικ-
 τῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς
 ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε
 φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχά- 35
 νουσιν οὔσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ 1141^a
 σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπό-
 2 δειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευ-
 δόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
 ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τού- 5
 των δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία
 φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν
 ἀρχῶν.

and cannot therefore be the complete ἀρετή of τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. We have now to consider what is lacking to ἐπιστήμη in this respect. We shall then be able to discover the ἀρετή which is coordinate with φρόνησις.

περὶ τῶν καθόλου... ὑπόληψις. This point was not specially mentioned in the account of ἐπιστήμη given above, and it is no doubt brought in now because it is of importance in the contrast between φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη. Cf. 1141 b, 14 sqq. For the doctrine cf. Met. 1059 b, 25 πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων, 1060 b, 20 τὸ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν καθόλου καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦδε. An ὑπόληψις that *this* triangle has its angles equal to two right angles is not ἐπιστήμη, we only have that when we know it of *this* triangle as a whole. Knowledge does not descend to particulars, there is no knowledge of 'a this' (τόδε τι), but only of 'a such' (τοιοῦνδε τι).

μετὰ λόγου γάρ. This puts shortly the proof given above 1139 b, 25 sqq. All ἐπιστήμη implies a ground (λόγος) and therefore an ultimate ground; for otherwise we should have a process *ad infinitum* (Introd. § 22). Now

the ultimate ground cannot have a ground, and therefore (ἐπιστήμη being μετὰ λόγου) it cannot be the object of ἐπιστήμη. It must be the 'starting-point' (ἀρχή) of ἐπιστήμη or ἀπόδειξις.

§ 2. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Note that τέχνη is tacitly dropped from the ἐνδοξον which we are using as a major premiss. This may be accidental, or it may be due to the fact that σοφία is the ἀρετή τέχνης.

νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. In An. Post. 100 b, 5 the same result is reached by a similar dialectical process. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθὴ δ' αἰεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης. To understand the meaning of the doctrine νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, we must remem-

VII. Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστά-
 10 τοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν
 καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο
 σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ 2

ber that νοῦς and αἴσθησις are both 'immediate' (ἄνευ λόγου). We cannot give a ground for the 'principle of contradiction' any more than we can give a ground for our perception of this triangle. This immediate cognition Aristotle described in a metaphor taken from sense as a 'contact' (θιγεῖν). No error (ψεῦδος) is possible about the ἀρχαί, we either apprehend them or we do not, in which case we have, not ψεῦδος or ἀπάτη, but ἄγνοια. Cf. Met. 1051 b, 24 with Bonitz's note, Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. trans. vol. I, p. 197.

VII. § 1. Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν κ.τ.λ. A consideration of the use of the word σοφία in current language will show that it connotes ἀκρίβεια or 'finish,' and that therefore it will be a better name for the complete ἀρετὴ we are seeking.

ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις, followed, after the parenthesis ἐνταῦθα μὲν κ.τ.λ., per anacoluthiam by εἶναι δέ instead of καὶ εἶναι. The first use of the word σοφός in current language is of the skill of the cunning workman. This is a correct observation. The word σοφία occurs only once in Homer, and then it is used of a carpenter (Il. xv, 412). The method here is just like that by which we discovered the meaning of φρόνησις, cf. 1140 a, 24 n. We ask to whom we give the name σοφός, and we find in the first place that we give it to δημιουργοί and τεχνῖται in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια.

§ 2. εἶναι δέ τινος κ.τ.λ. Just as we found that current language recognises φρόνιμοι ἀπλῶς as well as φρόνιμοι περί τι, so we find that it

recognises σοφοί ἀπλῶς as well as σοφοί λιθουργοί and ἀνδριαντικοί. Here as there we are entitled to use the τόπος of πρόσθεσις and ἀφαίρεσις, and we may infer that they are called σοφοί in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια also. Much light is thrown upon this passage by the discussion of ἐνδοξα concerning the σοφός in Met. 982 a, 4 sqq. These are (1) ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφόν, (2) τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γινῶναι δυνάμενον... τοῦτον σοφόν, (3) ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ διδασκαλικώτερον σοφώτερον εἶναι, (4) οὐ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν. From the examination of these which follows (982 b, 25) we learn that ἀκριβεστάται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λαμβανομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίαις (cf. 1078 a, 9 καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλουστέρων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ἀκριβέ· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν). The conclusion is (982 b, 8) ἐξ ἀπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν. We may, then, from the fact that when σοφία is predicated of τεχνῖται it connotes ἀκρίβεια, infer that when it is predicated ἀπλῶς it connotes the same thing, and that means that it is (1) knowledge of the most primary and simple things, (2) dependent on the immediate first principles of all knowledge; for such knowledge alone can have perfect ἀκρίβεια. It alone can be free from irrelevant ὕλη.

τινας σοφούς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ "Ομηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα
οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

15

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σο-
3 φία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέ-
ναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ
σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη
τῶν τιμιωτάτων· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν 20
φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἶεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν
4 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγα-
θὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθύ-
ταῦτόν αἰεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταῦτόν πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρό-
νιμον δὲ ἕτερον—τὸ γὰρ περὶ [αὐτὸ] ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν 25

ὥσπερ "Ομηρος. That the Homeric authorship of the 'Margites' was taken quite seriously by Aristotle is clear from Poet. 1448 b, 28 sqq. The end of the second verse, *πάσης δ' ἡμάρτανε τέχνης*, is preserved by Clem. Strom. i, 281 a. The quotation is humorously made for the sound rather than the sense. Aristotle seems to have been suddenly reminded of it by his own words *οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς*, and he did not shrink from enlivening his lecture by a joke at the expense of his own favourite pursuits. Of course the quotation also illustrates the primitive meaning of *σοφός*.

§ 3. *δεῖ ἄρα κ.τ.λ.* The argument is that the *σοφός* must be in a true state as to the *ἀρχαί*, for otherwise his knowledge would not be *ἀκριβής*, and there would be nothing in common between the *σοφὸς περὶ τι* and the *σοφὸς ἀπλῶς*.

κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα. Cf. Rhet. 1415 b, 8 ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλὴν (sc. ὁ λόγος). This comes from Plato, Gorg. 505 d ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἀνευ κεφαλῆς περίη (sc. ὁ λόγος). Phileb.

66 d ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Tim. 69 a τελευτὴν ἤδη κεφαλὴν τε...ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν.

τῶν τιμιωτάτων. This is added because the *διαφορά* of *σοφία* must be made relative as well as its genus *ἐξίς* (cf. 1140 b, 5 n.). The section beginning at *ἄτοπον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* justifies our making it relative in this particular way. By *τὰ τιμιώτατα* Aristotle means as usual God, the *πρῶτος οὐρανός* and the like. Cf. Met. 1026 a, 21 *τὴν τιμιωτάτην* (sc. *ἐπιστήμην*) *δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι*. For the meaning of *τίμιος*, cf. 1101 b, 11 n.

§ 4. *εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* I follow Zell in taking this as a long protasis going down to *προνοητικήν*. The argument is that, while the *φρόνησις* we have been studying is relative to Man, there are other *φρονήσεις* relative to each species of living beings. Now we have no right to assume that Man is the highest thing in the world.

τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα κ.τ.λ. 'For that which sees the good (τὸ εὖ) of (περὶ) a given class of beings (ἕκαστα),

φαίεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν <ἂν> αὐτά, διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἓνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν—φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ 30 τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφαί· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ 1141^b θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ 5 καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρο-

they would call "wise" (e.g. φρόνιμος περὶ ἵππους, πρόβατα) and would entrust that class (αὐτό) to him' (as groom or shepherd). I still think (see Classical Review vol. III, p. 373) that περὶ αὐτό and περὶ ἕκαστα are alternative readings, of which the latter deserves the preference. The words περὶ ἕκαστα τὸ εἶ will then be equivalent to τὸ ἐκάστων ἀγαθόν in accordance with the regular periphrasis of the genitive by περὶ c. acc. Bywater, however, reads τά for τό at the beginning of the sentence and construes τὸ εἶ θεωροῦν τὰ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα, 'particulars concerning itself' (Contr. p. 50). He also reads with K^b φησὶν and ἐπιτρέψει which may well be right. It is worth while noting that this is simply the old Socratic problem of the ἐπιστάτης, for which cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 20 b εἰ μὲν σου τῷ ὑεὶ πῶλῳ ἢ μὸσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι...νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν;

τῶν θηρίων ἓνια. Not only the ἐπιστάται, but even the beasts themselves are called φρόνιμα if they have the capacity of foresight, e.g. ants, bees

etc. Cf. Gen. An. iii, 2 (quoted in the Introductory Note to Book VIII), Hist. An. 488 b, 15 τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ δεῖλα, οἷον ἔλαφος, δασύπους, and often in the biological works. So too in Met. 980 b, 21 we read that animals which have memory are φρονιμώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν. Cf. Plato, Pol. 263 d εἰ που φρόνιμόν ἐστὶ τι ζῶον ἕτερον.

οἷον φανερώτατά γε, 'as, to take the most visible things only, the bodies of which the heavens are composed.' That the stars are meant is clear from Met. 1026 a, 18, where they are called τὰ φανερά τῶν θείων, and Phys. 196 a, 33 τὰ θειότατα τῶν φανερώων. The First Mover is ἀφανές, but the stars are visible. In them we already see τὸ θεῖον. Cf. also de Caelo 290 a, 32, Zeller (Eng. Trans.) I, p. 504.

§ 5. δῆλον. This shows that the purpose of the preceding section is to justify the addition of τῶν τιμιωτάτων to the differentia of σοφία.

Ἀναξαγόραν...Θαλῆν. This seems to be suggested by Plato, Hipp. Maj. 281 c οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ,...τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον Θαλῆν καὶ ἐτι τῶν ὑστέρων

νίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμ- 5
φέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ
καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

6 Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι
βουλευσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναι 10
φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ' οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν
ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο
πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου
ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.

7 Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ 15
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πράξις περὶ
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδόντων
πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη
ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα

μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου...φαίνονται ἀπεχθόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων. For the anecdotes told to show the 'uselessness' of σοφία, cf. my "Early Greek Philosophy" pp. 41 n. 29, 273 n. 8. Thales and Anaxagoras are contrasted with Perikles (1140 b, 8).

§ 6. καὶ περὶ ὧν κ.τ.λ. This limits τὰ ἀνθρώπινα by excluding everything which is not δι' αὐτοῦ πρακτόν. Cf. 1112 a, 28—31.

ἀπλῶς, as opposed to κατὰ μέρος, explained above 1140 a, 27.

στοχαστικός, 1106 b, 15 n.

κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν, equivalent here to κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν, cf. 1139 a, 12 τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίεσθαι ταῦτόν.

§ 7. Οὐδ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. A second point of difference between φρόνησις and σοφία.

τῶν καθόλου μόνον. This of course implies that φρόνησις is also τῶν καθόλου, and hitherto that is the aspect of it we have been discussing. We have only spoken of φρόνησις as περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ, and both ἄνθρωπος and ἀγαθὰ are universals.

We must not suppose, however, that it is φρόνησις which makes us aim at the φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν (that is the sphere of ὄρεξις), nor that it makes our φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν the true good (that is the function of ἡθός). What ἡ καθόλου φρόνησις does is, given the true good as an ὀρεκτόν, to frame general rules for its attainment. This is the aspect in which it resembles science; for πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου (Met. 1059 b, 26 et passim).

περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Cf. 1110 b, 6 αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. The sphere (περὶ) or matter (ἐν) of πράξις is always the particular; for we cannot perform any act that is not a particular act. Hence our deliberative analysis cannot be complete till we have carried it as far as the particular. In science this is impossible; for particulars are the objects of αἴσθησις alone.

διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. For the opposition of ἐμπειρία and τέχνη see p. 67.

εἰδείη, 1110 a, 14 n.

20 ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσῃ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσῃ μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

VIII. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταυτόν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ 2
25 πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἡ δὲ ὡς [τὰ] καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτικὴ. αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν

κοῦφα καὶ. It does not seem necessary to bracket these words with Trendelenburg. The case given is the analysis of τὰ ὑγιεινὰ in the sense of τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ ὑγείας, and its terms are (1) digestible, (2) light, (3) poultry. The empirical practitioner may be supposed to know steps 2 and 3, and his treatment will therefore be more successful than that of the theorist who knows only steps 1, 2, but stops short of the particular 3. What the ἔμπειρος does not know is the middle term connecting κοῦφα and ὑγιεινά.

ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον, sc. τὴν περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

καὶ ἐνταῦθα, 'in this case' as well as in that of diet, there is a master art (i.e. πολιτικὴ) which it will be better to know, for it will teach us the αἰτία. Aristotle returns to this point at 1180 b, 13 sqq. On ἀρχιτεκτονική (sc. τέχνη) see Introd. § 13.

VIII. § 1. **τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταυτόν.** Cf. 1130 a, 12 n. Here the meaning is that ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις or πολιτικὴ is a special application of φρόνησις generally. There is also φρόνησις concerned with the family (οἰκονομία) and the individual.

§ 2. **ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονική,** corresponding to the master-science of physiology in the case of medicine.

ὡς καθ' ἕκαστα. The words καθ' ἕκαστα are treated as a single in-

declinable adjective. Cf. 1097 a, 13 n. I have followed Mr Stewart's suggestion in bracketing τὰ. Cf. 1110 b, 33 ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀγνοία.

τὸ κοινὸν...ὄνομα. In Aristotle's terminology πολιτικὴ includes νομοθετική, but he is here speaking of ordinary language. The cheirotechnic art has usurped the name which belongs equally to the architectonic.

πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική, while νομοθετική is concerned with τὸ καθόλου and therefore not πρακτική.

τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα κ.τ.λ. The νόμος corresponds to the major premiss of the political syllogism and the ψήφισμα to the minor. We must always remember that the Athenian ἐκκλησία was not a legislature, and that its ψηφίσματα were executive acts applicable to particular cases. Cf. 1137 b, 29. 1152 a, 20. Now the restriction of the name πολιτικός to the 'practical politician,' the ῥήτωρ or σύμβουλος in the ἐκκλησία, is only one effect of the general tendency of the Athenian democracy to put ψηφίσματα in the place of the νόμοι. Demosthenes complains of this in his speech against Leptines § 91 καὶ γὰρ τοι τότε μὲν τέως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐνομοθέτουν, τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι νόμοις ἐχρῶντο, καινοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐτίθεσαν, whereas now ψηφισμάτων οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν διαφέρουσιν οἱ νόμοι, ἀλλὰ νεώτεροι οἱ νόμοι, καθ' οὓς τὰ ψηφίσματα δεῖ γράφεσθαι, τῶν

ὥς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν.
 3 μόνου γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ
 δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἓνα· καὶ 30
 ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν
 οἰκονομία ἢ δὲ νομοθεσία ἢ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἢ
 4 μὲν βουλευτική ἢ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη
 γνώσεως τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν,
 καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος 1142^a
 εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης—

ψηφισμάτων αὐτῶν ὑμῖν εἰσιν. In Pol. 1292 a, 15 sqq. Aristotle speaks strongly on the same subject. He says that the corruption of democracy into a tyranny of the people (κύριον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον) comes about ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος. The δῆμος then becomes a μόναρχος, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν. Its ψηφίσματα are analogous to the arbitrary behests (ἐπιτάγματα) of a tyrant, and the δημαγωγοί to his flatterers. Diogenes Laertios (v, 17) attributes to Aristotle the remark that, of the two great inventions of Athens, wheat and laws, wheat is used while the laws are not.

ὥς τὸ ἔσχατον, sc. ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει, the 'ultimate,' the last step of the analysis. Cf. 1112 b, 23 καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, De An. 433 a, 15 οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὁρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ (the efficient cause which sets βούλευσις at work), τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. The first thing we come to in our analysis that is ἐφ' ἡμῖν is the last step of the analysis and the first step in action. The πολιτικός embodies this in a ψήφισμα.

§ 3. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'There is a belief that—.' Of course this is not Aristotle's view, but a popular use of language like the restriction of the name πολιτική to 'practical politics.' In both cases one branch has usurped τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα.

ἐκείνων, 'the other species.' The pronoun refers vaguely to all forms of φρόνησις which have to do with more than the individual, whether the family (οἰκονομία), or the state (νομοθεσία and πολιτική).

βουλευτική...δικαστική. Cf. Pol. 1297 b, 40. We should say 'executive and judicial,' the functions of the ἐκκλησία and the δικαστήρια. The 'legislative function' was not exercised by the δῆμος, but by the νομοθέτης.

§ 4. εἶδος μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. To know one's own good is a species of φρόνησις just as οἰκονομία and πολιτική are, but it is so differentiated from the other species that it is taken for a different genus and incorrectly called by the κοινὸν ὄνομα. There is no difficulty in γνώσεως, which is simply the noun of εἰδέναι. The variant φρονήσεως is probably a conjecture.

ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν. There are degrees in the differentiation of εἶδη within a γένος. The greatest διαφορὰ in a given γένος makes the εἶδη into ἐναντία.

τὸ περὶ αὐτόν, i.e. τὸ αὐτοῦ. I read τό with K^b; the reading τά doubtless originated from a misunderstanding of the periphrasis περὶ c. acc. = gen.

Εὐριπίδης. The quotation as given by Aristotle is as usual defective, indeed in the present case it is unintelligible. The whole passage can be restored from Plutarch and Stobaeus with the help of Dion Chry-

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
 ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμημένον στρατοῦ
 5 ἴσον μετασχεῖν...
 τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον....

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρόνιμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἀδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον.

Σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν 5 νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν 15 ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνῶριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ 6 τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ'

sostom (Or. 59), from whom we learn that the words are spoken by Odysseus in the Prologue to the 'Philoktetes.' It ran thus—

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμό-
 νως

ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμημένον στρατοῦ
 ἴσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχῃ;

* * * * *

οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω γαῦρον ὥς ἀνὴρ ἔφυ·

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας
 πλέον

τιμῶμεν, ἄνδρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.

The quotation is made solely to illustrate the sense popularly given to φρονεῖν. 'How can I be wise, seeing I have preferred πράγματα to minding my own business?'

ζητοῦσι, sc. οἱ ἄνθρωποι implied in δοκεῖ 1142 a, 1. It is the practice and belief of the many that gives rise to the popular abuse of the term φρόνιμος.

ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1132 b, 12 n.

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. The reason is that man is φύσει συνδυαστικόν and φύσει πολιτικόν (1162 a, 17).

καὶ σκεπτέον. This seems to refer to the discussion at the end of the

Ethics on the functions of the family and the state in producing goodness.

§ 5. τοῦ εἰρημένου, sc. τοῦ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα εἶναι. This is plainly the meaning, though the reference is a little obscure. That does not justify us, however, in bracketing the highly characteristic passage 1141 b, 23—a, 11. This is a lecture, not a treatise.

διότι, only here in the Ethics = ὅτι, though common enough elsewhere in Aristotle, especially after σημεῖον.

δοκεῖ. For the change of number cf. 1141 b, 18.

καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, as well as τῶν καθόλου. Young men may know the general principles of conduct, but they do not know the facts of life, and cannot therefore complete the deliberative analysis. They may know that men should not drink too much; they do not see that 'This is too much for me.'

§ 6. ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ. We may widen the question and ask not only why a boy may be a mathematician though he cannot be φρόνιμος, but also why he cannot be a σοφός (philosopher) or even a φυσικός.

ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν 7 οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; ἔτι 20 ἢ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα 8 φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἢ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

ἢ φυσικός. Cf. Met. 1005 b, 1 ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη. The object of φυσική is Nature, which has its ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in itself, that of the πρώτη φιλοσοφία is τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν, 'Reality as such.'

δι' ἀφαιρέσεως 'abstract.' Cf. Met. 1061 a, 28 ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται· περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα κ.τ.λ....μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές. The mathematician strips τὰ αἰσθητά of all their sensible ἐναντιώσεις and treats them as mere *quantia*. It is this 'taking away' which is called ἀφαίρεσις, *abstractio*. The opposite of ἀφαίρεσις is πρόσθεσις, cf. De Caelo 299 a, 15 τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως (motion is 'added to' extension). Aristotle means here that in mathematics so much is 'taken away' that a minimum of experience is enough; he does not mean to say that the ἀρχαὶ of mathematics are independent of experience, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν (An. Post. 81 b, 2).

τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. The undemonstrable first principles of Physics, being ἐκ προσθέσεως as compared with Mathematics, require a long ἐπαγωγή before they can be apprehended by νοῦς.

οὐ πιστεύουσιν, 'have no conviction of them.' Cf. 1147 a, 18 τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον...καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαυθά-

νοντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω.

τὸ τί ἐστιν, 'the definition' (ὁ ὁρισμὸς δηλοῖ τὸ τί ἐστι), e.g. the definitions of the point, line etc. which are the ἀρχαὶ of mathematics.

§ 7. ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία κ.τ.λ. There are two opportunities for going wrong in deliberative analysis, (1) with regard to the general rule, (2) with regard to its particular application. In mathematics the second does not exist. We must know the definition of a line, but the question 'Is this a line?' is irrelevant.

ἢ γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Note the brachylogy. The full sense is ἢ γὰρ ἡ ἀμαρτία περὶ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

τὰ βαρύσταθμα. Theophrastos ap. Athen. 42 c χεῖρω δ' ἐστὶ τὰ βαρυσταθμότερα (ὕδατα)...δυσκατεργαστότερα γὰρ ἐστι...τῷ πολὺν τὸ γεῶδες ἔχειν.

§ 8. τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου. Cf. De An. 433 a, 15. App. A. Like ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις implies both the universal and the particular; but, while ἐπιστήμη only uses τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον in order to arrive at τὸ καθόλου (there being no ἐπιστήμη of τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον), φρόνησις is emphatically τοῦ καθ' ἑκάστου. Its analysis is not complete till it reaches τὸ ἐσχατον, the ultimate individual which can be analysed no further, for an act is always a particular act and φρόνησις is practical. Then what is ἐσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει becomes πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

25 τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῶ· ὁ μὲν 9
 γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου,
 οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων,
 ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἐσχατον
 τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις
 30 ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

IX. Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ
 βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβου-

§ 9. τῷ νῶ, in the special sense in which νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν.

τῶν ὄρων, i. q. τῶν ἀμέσων ἀρχῶν. Cf. 1143 a, 36 τῶν πρώτων ὄρων...νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος. These are the definitions (ὅρος = ὁρισμός) which are the starting-point of every science.

λόγος, i. q. συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις. It is impossible λόγον ἀποδοῦναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, sc. αἰσθητῶν. An ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν is one δ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐτέρα αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, e.g. colour, sound, taste; τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητά are κίνησις, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος. These are αἰσθητά, but are not perceived by one special αἰσθητήριον. On *propria* and *communia sensibilia* see De An. 418 a, 7 sqq., and on the 'intuitional' element in φρόνησις Introd. § 23.

οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα κ.τ.λ., i.e. like the perception of the fact that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle. Introd. §§ 22, 23. Bywater brackets ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς because the words seem to imply that there is no mathematical ἐσχατον except a triangle. See Contr. p. 51. We must bear in mind the ἀναλύειν ὥσπερ διάγραμμα of 1112 b, 20. The case supposed is that of the geometer who breaks up his figure till he comes to something—say a triangle—which enables him to start the construction or proof at which he aims. It is in this way, for instance, that the properties of parallelograms are discovered.

στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ, 'for on that

side too there will be a stop.' We reach the limit of analysis just as much when we descend to particulars as when we ascend to the ἀρχαί or πρῶτοι ὅροι. It is as impossible to give a reason why a triangle cannot be divided any further as it is to give a reason for the axioms. For the impersonal use of στήσεται (opp. εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν 1094 a, 20 n.), cf. e.g. Phys. 242 a, 19 οὐ δὴ εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν ἀλλὰ στήσεται που.

ἀλλ' αὕτη κ.τ.λ. Mathematical intuition (αὕτη) is more properly called αἰσθησις than φρόνησις can be. It really is αἰσθησις, though not ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, while φρόνησις is of course intellectual, not sensuous. I have no hesitation in preferring the reading of K^b, ἡ, to that of L^b, ἡ. Still better, I think, would be ἡ ἡ.

ἐκείνης, sc. τῆς φρονήσεως. Mathematical and practical intuition belong to the same genus, but they are specifically different, their differentiae being αἰσθητική and διανοητική.

IX. § 1. Ζητεῖν τι, a species of τὸ ζητεῖν. It is necessary to put βούλευσις into its genus, in order that we may have the needful προτάσεις for the following piece of dialectic. We shall see that the qualities now to be discussed are the natural basis of φρόνησις. They are δυνάμεις and come by nature.

λαβεῖν...περί. Cf. 1140 a, 24. Here the sense is made more explicit by the addition of τί ἐστὶ, cf. 1123 a,

λίας τί ἐστὶ, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ
 2 ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι
 περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἢ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὃ δὲ βουλευόμε- 1142^b
 νος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἀνευ
 τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πο-
 λὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βου-
 3 λευθέντα, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἢ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον 5
 καὶ ἢ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ
 δόξα ἢ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευό-
 μενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρ-
 θότης τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης·
 ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία— 10
 δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισταί ἤδη πᾶν οὐ

35 n. We shall see from the sequel that Aristotle's reason for discussing εὐβουλία is that Plato, and doubtless his followers, had made certain statements about it which must be discussed if they are not to confuse the account we have given of φρόνησις. The argument is therefore on strictly Academic lines.

πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις. Plato had said so. Cf. Rep. 428 b ἢ εὐβουλία δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἐστίν. Alc. I., 125 e Πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην;—Εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε.

ἢ δόξα. The most obvious Platonic alternative.

ἢ εὐστοχία. We may perhaps infer that some such definition was current in the Academy from [Plato] Def. 412 e ἀγχίνοια εὐφυῖα ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων στοχαστικός ἐστὶν ἐκάστω τοῦ δέοντος. On ἀγχίνοια as a species of εὐστοχία cf. 1142 b, 6.

§ 2. ἀνευ...λόγου. The εὐστοχος can give no account of his success, he has no conscious ground for what he does. It is not quite correct to say that ἀνευ λόγου = ἀνευ λογισμοῦ, though it comes to much the same thing. Rather, it is the opposite of μετὰ λόγου. See Ind. s.v. λόγος.

καὶ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. A favourite γνώμη. Cf. Isokr. Demon. § 34 βουλευόμεν βραδέως, ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα.

§ 3. εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια. Cf. 1142 a, 33 n. So too An. Post. 89 b, 10 ἢ δ' ἀγχίνοιά ἐστὶν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου (the middle term), οἷον εἴ τις ἰδῶν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Since εὖ- in εὐβουλία means ὀρθῶς, εὐβουλία must be an ὀρθότης.

ὀρθότης τις. The mention of δόξα seems to have suggested the Platonic ὀρθὴ δόξα. It is an ὀρθότης, though not an ὀρθότης of δόξα. The word ὀρθότης in this sense, as opposed to ἀμαρτία, is not Aristotelian but Platonic.

ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There can be no rightness of knowledge any more than a wrongness, for knowledge is always right; there is a rightness of belief, but it is truth and not εὐβουλία.

ὥρισταί ἤδη. Everything which is an object of belief is already deter-

δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. διανοίας
 ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὐπω φάσις. καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα
 οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εἴντε
 15 εὖ εἴντε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.
 ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστίν ἢ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλή ζη- 4
 τητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς,
 δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προ-
 τίθεται δεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται

mined one way or the other, but the object of βουλή is still ἀόριστον, for ὁ βουλευόμενος has not yet determined which course to adopt.

οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου, even though it is not the rightness of either knowledge or belief, it is μετὰ λόγου, i.e. it proceeds upon grounds and can give a reason for what it does.

διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται, sc. αὐτὴν ὀρθότητα εἶναι. This implies an exhaustive division of ἔξεις μετὰ λόγου into ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and διάνοια. Such a division is to be found only in Plato, and we have seen that we are here criticising him. For the definition of διάνοια in this sense cf. Theait. 189 e (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καλῶ) λόγον δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. Soph. 263 e ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῶν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια. All the difficulties of this section disappear if the reference to Plato is borne in mind. The older commentators took the sentence to mean 'it falls short of thought,' while modern editors suppose Aristotle to be using διάνοια here in the unparalleled sense of the 'discursive faculty.' In Aristotle διάνοια includes *all* intellect, theoretical and practical, intuitive and discursive, but here the terminology is not his own. See next note for the relation of διάνοια to δόξα in Plato.

φάσις τις ἤδη. This is also from Plato. Cf. Soph. 263 e Καὶ μὴν ἐν

λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνόν—Τὸ ποῖον;—Φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.—Ἰσμεν.—"Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπης αὐτό; Hence δόξα is called διανοίας ἀποτελεῦσις ib. 264 b. Note the idiomatic οὐπω and ἤδη. Ind. s.vv.

ζητεῖ τι. Here again we make use of the premiss τὸ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι (1142 a, 31).

§ 4. ὀρθότης...βουλῆς. There is no contradiction; for the Platonic διάνοια includes the Aristotelian βουλή.

ζητητέα. Aristotle may have trusted his memory to fill in at lecture the usual statements that no one deliberates about what is necessary or due to chance, etc. At any rate, he goes on to discuss ὀρθότης and not βουλή.

πλεοναχῶς, sc. λέγεται. Cf. 1125 b, 14 n.

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς κ.τ.λ. The *first* requirement is that the end should be right. We do not call the bad man εὐβουλος, though he gains his end by deliberation (φαῦλος here is equivalent to ἀκόλαστος). Nor do we call the morally weak man (the ἀκρατὴς) by that name. As we shall see, the ἀκρατὴς, though against his better knowledge, aims at the pleasure of the moment, and the ἀκόλαστος does so on principle.

ὁ προτίθεται δεῖν. This reading is implied by the Vetus Versio, while the MSS. have the meaningless ἰδεῖν.

βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν 20
 τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλευσθαι. ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς
 5 εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ
 συλλογισμῶ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι'
 οὗ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι. ὥστ' οὐδ'
 αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μὲν- 25
 6 τοι δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν,
 τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθό-
 7 της ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι
 ἔστι καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλευσθαι καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν
 δὴ ἀπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τίς δὲ 30
 ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλευ-
 σθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς
 τὸ τέλος οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἐστίν.

It is true, as Bywater points out (Contr. p. 51), that δεῖν strictly speaking implies ὑποτίθεται, but (1) we can hardly credit the author of the Versio with the emendation δεῖν for ἰδεῖν, and (2) the pleonasm of δεῖν is extremely common with *verba imperandi*, and is still easier with *verba proponendi*. Jackson quotes Plato, Soph. 221 a ὅπερ ἄρτι προὔθεμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν. The absence of τούτου is idiomatic, cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

§ 5. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ κ.τ.λ. The *second* requirement is that the means shall be right as well as the end.

δ...τυχεῖν. For the ellipse of τούτου cf. b, 19 above.

ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον. Strictly speaking the ὅρος can neither be true nor false; the meaning is that the wrong middle term altogether may be taken, so that one or both of the προτάσεις of the practical syllogism are false, though the συμπέρασμα is a true statement of the particular act that must be done to reach the end. Aristotle even speaks of πράγματα as ψευδῇ when they are not what

we take them to be (Met. 1024 b, 25).

§ 6. ἔτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ. The *third* requirement is that the time should be right.

ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον κ.τ.λ. This sums up the three requirements of ὀρθότης, (1) end (οὗ), (2) means (ὥς), (3) time (ὅτε).

§ 7. ἔτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ. A *fourth* requirement is that it must be directed to *the* end, not merely to *an* end, to εὐδαιμονία, not merely to e.g. health or strength. Cf. 1140 a, 27.

κατορθοῦσα, 1098 b, 29 n. ?

οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις, sc. τοῦ συμφέροντος πρὸς τὸ τέλος. This avoids the contradiction of making φρόνησις a true conception of the *end* of Man. Others read πρὸς τι τέλος. It is not φρόνησις but δρεξις which makes us aim at the good, and it is not φρόνησις but ἥθος which makes our good the true good. But, on the other hand, τὸ ὀρεκτόν can only become an efficient cause τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι (App. A), and neither δρεξις nor

X. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λέ-
 1143^a γομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὐθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη
 ἢ δόξη—πάντες γὰρ ἂν ᾗσαν συνετοί—οὔτε τις μία τῶν
 κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἢ γεω-
 μετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ
 5 ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστὶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁπουοῦν,
 ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ
 τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτόν σύνεσις
 καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστὶν, τί γὰρ 2
 δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις
 10 κριτικὴ μόνον. ταῦτόν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συν-
 ετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν 3
 οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαρθάνειν
 λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρήται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ
 χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ
 15 φρόνησις ἐστὶν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ

ἦθος could give us an ἀληθὴς ὑπό-
 ληψις of τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος
 such as the rule παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ
 συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά. That is the
 function of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, and
 φρόνησις is the ἀρετὴ which enables it
 to discharge it. In Mot. An. 700 b,
 25 τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος is distinctly
 called an object of thought (δια-
 νοητόν).

X. §1. σύνεσις. This term was also
 somewhat loosely used by Plato. Cf.
 Phileb. 19 d νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν,
 τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὐτὰ τούτων συγγενῇ,
 and Aristotle himself had enumerated
 it provisionally along with σοφία and
 τέχνη as a διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ (1103 a,
 5). It is therefore important to show
 how it is really related to ἐπιστήμη
 and φρόνησις. The word was very
 popular in the 4th century, as may be
 seen from Demosthenes and Aischines.

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This must surely
 refer to δόξη alone. Everyone has at
 least δόξα.

οὔτε περὶ...ὁπουοῦν, 'not any or
 every γιγνόμενον.' It has nothing to
 do with τὰ φύσει or κατὰ τύχην γιγνό-
 μενα, nor even with such human
 affairs as are beyond our reach.

§ 2. ἐπιτακτικὴ...κριτικὴ. Aris-
 totle here uses the Platonic διαίρεσις.
 Cf. Pol. 260 b ἀρ' οὖν συμπάσης τῆς
 γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος,
 τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείποιμεν,
 ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαίμεν διηρῆσθαι; The
 fact of its being a κριτικὴ δύναμις
 shows that it belongs to νοῦς. Cf.
 Mot. An. 700 b, 20 (App. B).

§ 3. ὥσπερ τὸ μαρθάνειν κ.τ.λ.
 The point is the distinction of the
 two meanings of μαρθάνειν, (1) 'to
 understand,' (2) 'to learn.' Cf. Top.
 165 b, 32 τὸ γὰρ μαρθάνειν ὁμώνυμον,
 (1) τὸ συνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ,
 (2) τὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

ἄλλου λέγοντος. This is the main
 point and marks σύνεσις as subordinate
 to φρόνησις. The πολιτικός need only
 be συνετός, the νομοθέτης must be

4 εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταυτόν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μαυθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μαυθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

XI. Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. 20 σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ μάλιστα φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἕνα συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

2 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· 25 λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται

φρόνιμος. As Stewart well says, σύνεσις is the distinctive ἀρετή of the ἐκκλησία.

XI. § 1. γνώμη. Plato had used this word too in a way which suggested that it was equivalent to ἐπιστήμη. Cf. Rep. 476 d οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην ἀν ὀρθῶς φαίμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος; Aristotle as usual wishes to limit it to the sense it had in actual speech. In that sense it corresponds to our 'feeling,' when we call anyone 'a man of fine feeling' or say some one 'wants feeling.' Cf. the use of the adjectives εὐγνώμων and ἀγνώμων 'unfeeling,' 'harsh.' The συγγνώμων is he who συγγιγνώσκει, 'gives his γνώμη on our side.' It is probable that this meaning of the word is connected with its use in the heliastic oath γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη κρίνειν in cases not provided for by law. "If σύνεσις is especially the κρίσις in the ἐκκλησία, γνώμη is especially that in the δικαστήριον." Stewart.

τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, neuter not masculine, as is shown by the last words of the section.

κριτικῇ. This, therefore, is also a δύναμις of νοῦς. Cf. 1143 a, 10 n.

ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, i.e. τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικοῦς. There is no difficulty in the fact that the definitions given of γνώμη and συγγνώμη are the same; they are related just in the same way as σύνεσις and εὐσυνεσία. Cf. the opening words of cc. 10, 11 and 1143 a, 10. On ἐπιεικεία cf. 1137 a, 31 sqq.

§ 2. πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις. We see from what follows that this means νοῦς, γνώμη, σύνεσις, i.e. all the practical ἔξεις which apprehend their object immediately. Εὐβουλία is not included; for that is μετὰ λόγου.

εὐλόγως, 1096 a, 2 n.

εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι. Cf. 1096 b, 27 πρὸς ἐν συντελεῖν and the note there. All these ἔξεις are πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, sc. πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν.

λέγομεν ... ἐπιφέροντες. The construction is a little mixed; for some of the objects are governed by λέγομεν and some by ἐπιφέροντες. For ἐπιφέρειν cf. φέρειν 1119 a, 34 n. The phrase νοῦν ἤδη is explained by ἡδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει (1143 b, 8).

δυνάμεις. They were called ἔξεις above, but δυνάμεις is the more correct term; for φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα (1143 b, 6) and no ἀρετὴ φύσει παρα-

τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ
 30 κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ [εὐγνώμων
 ἢ] συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάν-
 των ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ 3
 τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον
 δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ
 35 πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' 4
 ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
 1143^b νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις
 τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς
 τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως·

γίνεται. They are *πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα* as all *εὐφύτα* is to its formed *ἔξις* (cf. 1144 b, 4). As a *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή*, *φρόνησις* is gained mainly by teaching (1103 a, 15 n.)—such teaching as we find in the 'Ethics'—but the teaching requires as a foundation (1) *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* and (2) *εὐφύτα*.

[εὐγνώμων ἢ]. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 52.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the sphere of *γνώμη* is really as wide as that of *φρόνησις*.

§ 3. καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. Here we see another difference between these *δυνάμεις* and *φρόνησις*. They are restricted to the particular, *φρόνησις* has to do with the universal besides.

§ 4. καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The difficulties which have been raised about this passage are mainly imaginary. The chief point to remember is that *νοῦς* in its restricted sense (not when it is equivalent to *διάνοια*) is a *δύναμις* which apprehends its object immediately (*τῷ θιγεῖν*) like *αἴσθησις*, not mediately like *ἀπόδειξις* or *βούλευσις*. Now, both in theory and in practice we must assume such a faculty. We have seen that in theory it is called *νοῦς*, and everyone knows that a man

who can see the right thing to do is said *νοῦν ἔχειν*. We need not discuss now whether this is strictly speaking the same *νοῦς*. It is in any case an element in *φρόνησις* and bears the same name as the other.

τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα, for τὰ πρῶτα are *ἔσχατα* viewed from beneath, they are the ultimates of demonstrative analysis.

ὁ κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις, that described 1140 b, 31 sqq.

ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς. Cf. 1147 a, 28 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. These two phrases must surely have the same explanation, and there can be little doubt that in the latter the word *προτάσεσι* is to be 'understood.' As this whole passage really deals with *προτάσεις* also, it does not seem impossible to suppose such an ellipse, especially in so condensed a piece of writing. We can hardly suppose even Aristotle to have meant such a *contradictio in adjecto* as *πρακτικαὶ ἀποδείξεις* would involve.

τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως, 'the minor premiss,' usually called *ἡ δευτέρα πρότασις*. Its formula in the Practical Syllogism is *ἐγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε καὶ τόδε τοιόνδε*, and this is just what the *νοῦν ἔχων* sees.

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα αὐται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ
 5 τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. 5
 διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν
 6 οὐδεὶς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημείον δ'
 ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία
 νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. [διὸ
 καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις 10
 καὶ περὶ τούτων.] ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ
 πρεσβυτέρων [ἢ φρονίμων] ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ
 δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ
 7 τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ
 φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρω τυγχάνει 15
 οὔσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρω,
 εἴρηται.

XII. Διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1139 b, 28 ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου. The universal rules of conduct and the definition of εὐδαιμονία can only be found by a dialectical process which starts from particular moral judgments. We generalise 'I ought to do this' into 'οἱ τοιοῦτοι must do ταῖα ταῖα.'

§ 5. ἔχειν αἰσθησιν, used in the wide sense, like αἰσθάνεσθαι, and including νοῦς. So we say 'I see,' when we mean an intellectual not a sensuous perception. The sense in which αἰσθησις is used here has been explained above, 1142 a, 25 sqq. We were told there that this αἰσθησις ἀντίκειται τῷ νῷ, here that it is νοῦς. But Aristotle is only examining the subject dialectically from every side, and we are left with a very clear and definite idea of a certain aspect of φρόνησις, however vague the terminology may be. And the vagueness is not in Aristotle's own mind, but in the popular language from which he feels bound to start.

§ 6. ταῖς ἡλικίαις ... ἀκολουθεῖν. This puts the acquisition of σύνεσις,

γνώμη and νοῦς (not φρόνησις) on the same level as τὸ πολιούσθαι ἄνθρωπον, which is the example given of τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γιγνόμενα in the sphere of φύσις (An. Post. 32 b, 6).

διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. These words break the argument here, nor do they come in very well after αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς above, where Rassow and Bywater would place them. In that position they would commit us to the strange doctrine that ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ ἀποδείξεις.

ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν κ.τ.λ. This goes closely with ταῖς ἡλικίαις... ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ.

ἢ φρονίμων. These words are suspicious. The φρόνιμος can always put his advice in syllogistic form, and no one can become φρόνιμος merely by getting old. Perhaps, however, the word is used in its popular sense.

§ 7. τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This recapitulation strongly favours the view that there are only two διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί, σοφία and φρόνησις.

XII. § 1. Διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορίαι concerning σοφία

εἰσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων
 20 ἄνθρωπος—οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως—ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο
 μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρό-
 νησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀν-
 θρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν,
 οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναί αὐτὰ ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεις
 25 αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά,
 ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι λέγεται.
 οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμνα-
 στικὴν ἐσμεν. || εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ 2
 τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος.
 30 ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν
 ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ
 καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ
 μανθάνομεν ἰατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δό- 3
 ξιεν εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται.
 35 ἡ γὰρ ποιούσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὲ

and φρόνησις are (1) What is the use of σοφία since it can produce nothing, and of φρόνησις regarded as the power of apprehending τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς? (2) What is the use of φρόνησις even if we regard it as the power of apprehending τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν? (3) How are we to reconcile the imperative character of φρόνησις with its inferiority to σοφία?

εἴπερ ἔξεις αἱ ἀρεταί. The whole ἀπορία turns on this; for ἔξεις inevitably give rise to τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως. If we have the ἔξεις, intellectual knowledge of the ἐνέργειαι which will follow from it is superfluous. They will follow whether we know them or not.

ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. This is added to make it clear that τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ are to be taken in a sense analogous to that of τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά, so called τῷ σημείον εἶναι τῆς ὑγείας καὶ εὐεξίας (τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς

εἶναι 1096 b, 27 n.), as when we speak of a 'healthy complexion,' or a 'healthy tread' (ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν). We do not take them in the sense of τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά till the next ἀπορία.

§ 2. τούτων χάριν, sc. τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως.

τοῦ γίνεσθαι, equivalent to τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ φυλακτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικῶν, the sense in which ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά are used of wholesome diet and exercise.

τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις... τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν. Argyropoulos read τοῖς μὴ οὖσι, which gives a clearer sense. The healthy man does not need to know what produces health, the unhealthy man consults his doctor.

§ 3. χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα, as was shown above 1141 a, 20 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ ποιούσα, i.e. ἡ περὶ γένεσιν. Of course σοφία can have no imperative character; for its objects are

τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἡπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.
 4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετὰς 1144^a
 αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὕσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου,
 5 καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιούσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιούσι
 μὲν, οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως
 ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5
 6 τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον
 ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ
 πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράτ- 10
 7 τειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέ-
 ρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνω-
 θεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ
 δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὐπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον

ἀκίνητα. The τόπος here is εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοιόνδε ἢ ᾧ ἂν ὑπάρχη, μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο (sc. αἰρετόν) ὃ ποτε ποιεῖ ἢ ὃ μὴ ποιεῖ. (Top. iii, 5.)

§ 4. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first λύσις. The τόπος is τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν.

§ 5. ἔπειτα καὶ. The second λύσις. Σοφία is not the efficient but the formal cause of εὐδαιμονία. The λόγος of health as it exists in the soul of the doctor is ἰατρικὴ and an efficient cause, when realised in the body of his patient it is a formal cause.

ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια, sc. τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ποιεῖ.

τῷ ἔχεσθαι, 'by being possessed.' I think we may understand τῷ ἐνεργεῖν as τῷ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα.

§ 6. ἔτι. The third λύσις. The function of Man (which we know to be πρακτικὴ τις ζωὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος) cannot be discharged by ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ alone. Note the positive result which is emerging from these three λύσεις. We begin to see (1) that the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί are necessary to the τελείωσις of Man, (2) that σοφία

is the ἀρίστη ἀρετὴ, and therefore that εὐδαιμονία will be above all ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, and (3) that φρόνησις is ancillary to σοφία. All this will be worked out later.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. While ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ can ensure the rightness of the end (for the βούλησις of the good man is τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτόν), yet this is not enough. Goodness cannot do without Wisdom, which ensures the rightness of τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ. The four μόρια (we are using popular language) are τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν (goodness σοφία), τὸ λογιστικόν (goodness φρόνησις), τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (goodness ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ), and τὸ θρεπτικόν. The point of its being mentioned here is that, as it is not an ἴδιον of Man, its function is not the ἔργον of Man. Cf. 1097 b, 34.

§ 7. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν κ.τ.λ. The fourth and most complete λύσις, involving the other three.

μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον. Cf. 1139 b, 14.

λέγομεν. 1134 a, 17 sqq.

15 τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιούντας ἢ ἄκοντας
 ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράτ-
 τουσί γε ἂν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγα-
 θόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν
 20 πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, 8
 τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σα-
 φέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δει- 9
 νότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα
 25 σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχά-
 νειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾗ καλός, ἐπαινετὴ ἐστίν,
 εἰ μὴ φανῶν, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς
 καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύ- 10
 ναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ
 30 ὁμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς
 εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρα-
 κτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ
 ἄριστον, ὅτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)·

δι' ἕτερόν τι, i.e. κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
 e.g. τιμῆς καὶ δόξης χάριν.

οἷον, 'that is' (not 'for instance').

§ 8. ἐπιστήσασι, sc. τὴν διάνοιαν
 (Met. 987 b, 2), τὴν σκέψιν (Met.
 1090 a, 2), τὸν λόγον. The object is
 often omitted as here, cf. H. A. 487 a,
 12 περὶ ὧν τύπῳ μὲν εἰπώμεν πρότερον,
 ὕστερον δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐπιστή-
 σαντες ἐροῦμεν.

§ 9. δύναμις in the strict sense as
 opposed to ἕξις. Being a μετὰ λόγου
 δύναμις it is τῶν ἐναντίων. See above
 1103 a, 20 sqq. and notes.

ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα, sc. the
 members of the Academy, cf. [Plato]
 Def. 413 a δεινότης διάθεσις καθ' ἣν ὁ
 ἔχων στοχαστικός ἐστὶ τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους.
 This was doubtless suggested by the
 famous discussion in the Theaitetos.

πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπόν. All
 πρακτά are only ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα.

αὐτῶν. Bywater reads αὐτοῦ, sc.
 τοῦ σκοποῦ.

δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους. Cf. Plato,
 Theait. 177 a δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι,
 Dem. Olynth. 1 § 3 πανούργος ὧν καὶ
 δεινὸς πράγμασιν χρῆσθαι. Aristotle
 is referring to the rhetorical device of
 qualifying people by the δύναμις with-
 out reference to the προαίρεσις.

§ 10. ἡ δ' ἕξις, sc. φρόνησις.

τῷ ὁμματι τούτῳ, sc. τῷ νῷ. Cf.
 1096 b, 29. In the face of the constant
 description of νοῦς as ὁμμα τῆς ψυχῆς,
 we can hardly understand this other-
 wise. Nor is there any inconsistency;
 for δεινότης is a δύναμις of νοῦς.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ κ.τ.λ. On the
 practical syllogism see Introd. § 22.

ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες. The two words
 have coalesced into one. The ultimate
 ἀρχή of all practical reasoning is the
 definition of εὐδαιμονία.

τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ
 μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρ- 35
 χὰς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα
 ἀγαθόν. XIII. σκέπτεον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ 1144^b
 γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν
 δεινότητα—οὐ ταῦτόν μὲν, ὅμοιον δέ—οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ
 ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν
 ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ 5
 ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως
 ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον
 τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ
 ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὔσαι.
 πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ 10
 ἄνευ ὀψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ
 2 τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν,
 ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὔσα τότε ἔσται
 κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν

XIII. § 1. σκεπτέον δὴ κ.τ.λ.
 We now see the purpose of the discussion of δεινότης. Just as the δύναμις of δεινότης cannot become the ἔξις of φρόνησις without ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, so—and this is the main point for our present purpose, the λύσις of the ἀπορία,—the δύναμις of φυσικὴ ἀρετή cannot become the ἔξις of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή without φρόνησις. Observe that, with characteristic carelessness, the terms of the ἀναλογία are given in the wrong order.

ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετή. The *locus classicus* on this subject is H. A. 588 a, 18 sqq. ἔνεστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἔχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τρόπων, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει φανερωτέρας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ γὰρ ἡμερότης καὶ ἀγριότης, καὶ πραότης καὶ χαλεπότης, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δειλία, καὶ φόβοι καὶ θάρρη, καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ πανουργίαι, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συνέσεως ἔνεισιν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητες, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐλέγομεν· τὰ

μὲν γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ζώων (ἐνια γὰρ τῶν τοιοῦτων ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐνια δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις μᾶλλον), τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει, ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις οὕτως ἐνίοις τῶν ζώων ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις· φανερώτατον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἡλικίαν βλέψασιν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τῶν μὲν ὕστερον ἔξεων ἐσομένων ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν οἶον ἔχνη καὶ σπέρματα, διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἄλογον εἰ τὰ μὲν ταῦτα τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια τὰ δ' ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις.

σωφρονικοί. The termination conveniently marks the φυσικὴ δύναμις.

ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι. For the predicative object after ζητεῖν, cf. 1132 a, 22 n.

§ 2. ὁμοία οὔσα, i.e. τῷ ὄψιν ἡ νοῦν λαβόντι.

15 εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο
 ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ
 κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασι πά- 3
 σας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν
 ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο
 20 εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρο-
 νήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, 4
 ὅταν ὀρίζονται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἔξιν εἰπόντες
 καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστί, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ
 κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκόασι δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες
 25 ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ 5
 δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἐστί γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρετὴ [ἐστίν]· ὀρθὸς
 δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν. Σωκράτης
 μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι
 30 πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων 6

οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. Above (1144 a, 29) we found that φρόνησις οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἀρετῆς. We may express the relation of the two by saying that ἀρετὴ without φρόνησις is blind, φρόνησις without ἀρετὴ is empty. Our naturally good tendencies cannot become goodness unless φρόνησις is present to show us both the general rules of conduct which must be obeyed if we are to attain the good, and also what particular acts come under these rules. It was this fact which made Sokrates identify goodness and knowledge.

§ 4. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες. In Met. 992 a, 33 and 1069 a, 26 we read that γέγονε τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία, and that οἱ νῦν τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον οὐσίας τιθέασιν. These passages show that οἱ νῦν are certainly not the Peripatetics, but the contemporary Academy. We have been told already (1103 b, 32) that the doctrine of κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον is κοινόν (note *ad loc.*) and we may infer that it belonged to

the Academy.

προστιθέασι, 'after naming the ἔξις and that to which it is relative, add the qualification κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.'

§ 5. δεῖ...μεταβῆναι, 'we must take a little step in advance' (cf. 1097 a, 24 n.). The Platonist κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον implies a merely external standard; we say that the ἀρεταὶ are μετὰ λόγου, and that goodness is inseparably bound up with wisdom.

ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος...ἡ φρόνησις. It is true that the ὀρθὸς λόγος is not an ἀρετὴ nor identical with φρόνησις, but yet this way of speaking is quite Aristotelian. The ὀρθὸς λόγος of health is ἰατρικὴ, and so the ὀρθὸς λόγος of action may be regarded as the form of goodness existing in the soul of the φρόνιμος, and identical with the φρόνησις of the man who 'has the λόγος.' Cf. 1138 b, 31 n.

ἡμεῖς δὲ, opp. to οἱ νῦν above.

ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ
 φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος
 ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλ-
 λήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἀπά-
 σας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὐπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο 35
 γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς
 δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ 1145^a
 7 φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, καὶ
 εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου
 ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ
 φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ 5
 8 τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία
 γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
 τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρικὴ· οὐ γὰρ χρήται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ
 ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἔνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη.
 ἔτι ὅμοιον καὶ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίῃ ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν 10
 ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

§ 6. ὁ λόγος... ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν, 'the dialectical argument that might be used to show—.'

ὅτι χωρίζονται... αἱ ἀρεταί. The doctrine here indicated is that of the ἀντακολουθία τῶν ἀρετῶν, as it was called later in the school. Alexander of Aphrodisias wrote a special treatise upon it (*Scripta minora*, ed. Bruns pp. 153 sqq.), in which he quotes from Theophrastos οὐδὲ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον τῶν ἀρετῶν τὰς διαφορὰς οὕτω λαβεῖν ὥς μὴ κατὰ τι κοινωνεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις, γίνονται δ' αὐταῖς αἱ προσηγορίαι κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον (Heylbut in *Arch.* 1, p. 195). The doctrine of the ἀντακολουθία τῶν ἀρετῶν was fully worked out by Plato, though the term is post-Aristotelian.

οὔσῃ. Bywater reads ὑπαρχούσῃ with K^b.

§ 7. δῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ., a resumption of the first λύσις.

§ 8. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. The λύσις of the ἀπορία stated 1143 b, 33. The ministering function of φρόνησις is well brought out in a fragment of Theophrastos preserved by the scholiast on cod. Vindob. gr. phil. 315 (Heylbut loc. cit.) ὁ δὲ γε Θεόφραστος λέγει τὴν φρόνησιν <ἔχειν> πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν ὥς ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐπιτροπεύοντες δοῦλοι τῶν δεσποτῶν πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας· ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πάντα πράσσουσιν ἃ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἵνα οἱ δεσπόται σχολὴν ἄγωσι πρὸς τὰ ἐλευθέρια ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἢ τε φρόνησις τὰ πρακτέα τάττει ἵν' ἡ σοφία σχολὴν ἄγῃ πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τιμιωτάτων. It is significant that this illustration has been embodied in MM. 1198 b, 9 sqq.

BOOK VII.

WEAKNESS AND BADNESS OF WILL.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We have seen that the efficient cause of human action is Will (*προαίρεσις*) and that Will is the union of an intellectual and an appetitive element. We have seen further that Practical Truth, which gives the standard and measure of all goodness, is the harmony of a true judgment with a right appetite. We know that our task as lawgivers, who aim at creating happiness for the state, will be to produce in the citizens a good will which shall be in harmony with the principles embodied in our laws. But our task will not be complete until we have studied the obstacles in the way of this, and the *ἐκστάσεις* (Phys. 246 a, 17; cf. pp. 70, 71) which thus arise. And this is not quite so simple a matter as might be supposed. We have to deal not only or mainly with the fact of practical falsehood in harmony with a wrong appetite, though that must be considered too.* We have a much more serious difficulty to face, namely the fact that the action may be bad, though the will is good. It is the case that the Good Will may be overmastered by Desire, and this fact, to which we give the name of "Weakness" (*ἀκρασία*) or want of self-control, will require careful consideration as well as the more simple case of actual badness (*κακία, ἀκολασία*). We must also take into account the possibility of "portents" (*τέρατα*) of goodness or badness. The occurrence of a superhumanly good person in our state would alter all its arrangements, as he and he alone would be its ideal ruler. Further, the statesman must know something of the failures of nature, her incomplete (*ἀτελείς*) or mutilated products (*πηρώσεις*) which are more brutes than men, just as the others are rather divine than human.

The result of our inquiry will be that desire for pleasure is the cause of moral weakness. Are we to say, then, that all pleasure is bad? This *θέσις* has actually been maintained, so the refutation of it, though a digression, will not be misplaced.

Η

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, 15
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἦθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία ἀκρα-
σία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριό-
τητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν,
ἥρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ "Ομηρος περὶ "Εκτορος 20
πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός

οὐδὲ ἐώκει

ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ παῖς ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

2 ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς
ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει

I. § 1. ἄλλην...ἀρχήν. Aristotle often speaks of 'making a fresh start' (ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἀρχεσθαι, ποι-
εῖσθαι, λαβεῖν Bon. Ind. III b, 35) to
mark clearly that a new division of
the subject is being approached.

περὶ τὰ ἦθη, i.e. τῶν ἡθῶν. Cf.
Ind. s. v. περὶ.

ἥρωικήν...καὶ θείαν. The idea of
superhuman goodness and wisdom
originated among the mystics of the
6th century B.C. (Early Greek Philo-
sophy, § 33). Plato in his later
works, especially the Statesman, had
speculated on the possibility of a
divine ruler, and Aristotle held (Pol.
1332 b, 16) that εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν
τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων
ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγοῦμεθα

τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν...δῆλον ὅτι
βέλτιον αἰετὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχεῖν
τοὺς δ' ἀρχεσθαι. This would be the
Rule of the Saints; and if there were
one such transcendent man, we should
have the παμβασιλεία.

"Ομηρος. Il. xxiv, 258.

περὶ "Εκτορος. Bywater writes
περὶ <τοῦ> "Εκτορος "in accordance
with Fitzgerald's principle," to which
this is the only apparent exception
(Contr. p. 52).

§ 2. ἐξ ἀνθρώπων...θεοί. This idea
was quite foreign to the primitive and
popular religion of the Hellenes, and
also had its origin in the 6th century
mysticism. Rohde's 'Psyche' contains
the best account of these beliefs.

25 ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία
οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἢ
δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον 3
ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν
ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του—“σεῖος ἀνὴρ” φασιν—οὕτω καὶ
30 ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς
βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἓνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώ-
σεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλον-
τας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως 4

ἀντιτιθεμένη. The use of this present participle (omitted in Bon. Ind.) where we should look for ἀντικειμένη can be paralleled from Plato Soph. 257 ὅ τῳ καλῶ ἀντιτιθέμενον. It may be explained on the same principle as ὁ καλούμενος (=κεκλημένος) and the like.

ὥσπερ οὐδὲ...οὕτως οὐδὲ... For the repetition of οὐδέ in both clauses of the comparison, cf. the note on καὶ below. The idea that Man is intermediate between Beast and God is another survival of 6th century mysticism which strongly influenced both Plato and Aristotle. Cf. the well known passage Pol. 1253 a, 27 ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς. The best commentary is 1101 b, 18 sqq.

ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας, 'a different genus from badness.' Note the hyperbaton; κακίας is governed by ἕτερον, not by γένος.

§ 3. **ἐπεὶ...καὶ...οὕτω καὶ...** The repetition of καὶ in both clauses of a comparison is frequent in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 357 b, 24). For οὕτως after ἐπεὶ cf. Bon. Ind. 546 b, 22.

καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες. This is from Plato, Meno 99 d καὶ αἱ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὧ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας θεῖους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος

(σεῖος Casaubon) ἀνὴρ, φασίν, οὗτος. Bywater inserts οἱ before ὅταν and Susemihl (after Coraes) adds οὗτος from Plato after φασίν. Both corrections are of the probable kind, but Aristotle is very abrupt in his way of quoting. It is characteristic that the old Homeric way of speaking should survive on the lips of women and in aristocratic Sparta. In democratic Athens θεῖος was ironical. Cf. Blass in Müller's Handbuch I, p. 184.

διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις. For the meaning of πήρωσις ('stunted growth' or 'arrested development') in Aristotle's biology cf. 1099 b, 18 n. Bestiality is found in human beings who are either 'morbid' (διὰ νόσους) or *manqués* (ἀτελεῖς), Nature's failures.

καὶ τοὺς...δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is merely an illustrative remark; it does not give another species of bestiality.

ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. This seems to be a ἄπαξ εἰρημένον. The verb δυσφημεῖν means 'to give a bad name to,' to use the opposite of a 'euphemism' (εὐφημία has this sense already in Dem. F. L. §§ 48, 50), and the ἐπι- has the same force as in ἐπικαλεῖν. The meaning is that we sometimes call the extreme (ὑπερβολή) of human badness by a worse name than is really appropriate to it, the opposite exaggeration to the use of θεῖος for σφόδρα ἀγαθός (cf. δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν).

- τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας
 εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυ- 35
 φῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ
 ὥς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἐκα- 1145^b
 5 τέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὥς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ',
 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶ-
 τον διαπορήσαντας οὔτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ
 ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ 5
 κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κατα-
 λείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδευγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
- 6 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων
 καὶ ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν
 φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς 10

§ 4. εἴρηται πρότερον, i.e. in the discussion of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.

περὶ...ἕξεων...ἕτερον γένος. When ὑπολαμβάνειν is qualified by an adverb, it takes *περὶ c. gen.*, otherwise it takes a double accusative (Bon. Ind. 799 b, 50 sqq.). We may say either ἕτερον γένος ὑποληπτέον or ὥς περὶ ἑτέρου γένους ὑποληπτέον. Here we have a mixture of the two constructions. There is no difficulty in the singular ἐκατέραν, for μαλακία καὶ τρυφή are subordinate to ἀκρασία, καρτερία to ἐγκράτεια. The point is that ἀκρασία and κακία (μοχθηρία), ἐγκράτεια and ἀρετή, which are all specifically human, differ εἶδει only; not γένει, as divine goodness and bestiality differ from them (1145 a, 27).

§ 5. δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. A brief sketch of the dialectical method follows, cf. Introd. § 25. Here τὰ φαινόμενα are equivalent to τὰ ἔνδοξα below (cf. An. Pr. 24 b, 11 λήψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου), though properly speaking the term has a wider sense. Not all φαινόμενα are ἔνδοξα, but only τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς and τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς φαινόμενα.

ταῦτα τὰ πάθη. The word πάθος is loosely used here of all states of soul as in De An. i, 1. Really they are ἕξεις.

τὰ δυσχερῆ are identical with αἱ ἀπορίαι, cf. Phys. 225 a, 30 ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει δυσχερῆ. Elsewhere they are called δυσκολίαι as in Phys. 211 a, 7 δεῖ δὲ πειρᾶσθαι τὴν σκέψιν οὔτω ποιῆσθαι, ... ὥστε τὰ τε ἀπορούμενα λύεσθαι καὶ (ὅπως) τὰ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν... ὑπάρχοντα ἔσται, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τῆς δυσκολίας αἴτιον (cf. 1154 a, 23 τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους) καὶ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἔσται φανερόν.

§ 6. Δοκεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ. A string of δοκοῦντα follows.

ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια... τῶν σπουδαίων κ.τ.λ. This needs no illustration. Though obvious, it is not, however, stated for nothing. We shall see that several of the ἀπορίαι arise from an apparent contradiction between this and other δοκοῦντα.

ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ. [Plato], Def. 67^b ἐγκράτεια... ἀκολουθήσεις τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ· δύναμις ἀνυπέρβλητος τοῦ ὑποληφθέντος ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ. ib. 415 d ἐγκρατὴς ὁ κρατῶν ἀντιτεινόντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων τῷ ὀρθῷ

τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατῆς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ.
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος,
ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολου-
θεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ
15 καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ' οὔ,
καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῇ ἀκόλαστον συγκε-
χυμένως, οἱ δ' ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν 7
οὔ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῇ, ὅτε δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους
ὄντας καὶ δεινούς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ
20 θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταύτ'
ἐστίν.

II. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρα-
τεύεται τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἶόν τε

λογισμῷ, 416 a ἀκρασία ἔξισ βιαστική
παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λογισμὸν πρὸς τὰ
δοκοῦντα ἡδέα εἶναι. We are here,
X then, on Academic ground. Cf. also
Isokr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 221 ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὰς ἀκρασίας οὐκ ἐμ-
μένουσι τοῖς λογισμοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀμελή-
σαντες τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
ὀρμῶσιν.

ἐκστατικὸς in this sense comes
from ἐξίστασθαι used as we find it
in Thuc. ii, 61 ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμι
(sc. τῇ γνώμῃ) καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι. So
Rhet. ad Alex. 1429 a, 16 τὰ κοινὰ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάθη, δι' ὧν ἐξιστά-
μεθα τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα. This is really
implied in the phrases αὐτοῦ κρατεῖν,
κρείττων εἶναι (ἡττᾶσθαι, ἡττων εἶναι);
for they imply a struggle in which
our 'better knowledge' is victorious
or vanquished. It is then the proper
etymological sense of the word.

καὶ τὸν σώφρονα κ.τ.λ. In the
σώφρων and the ἀκόλαστος there is
properly speaking no struggle; the
one is bad as the other is good, with-
out an effort. But common language
often used the word promiscuously
(συγκεχυμένως). Even Plato does so,

cf. e.g. Rep. 430 e κόσμος πού τις ἡ
σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ
λυπῶν ἐγκράτεια.

πάντα σώφρονα, 'in all respects
σώφρων,' 'in full possession of σωφρο-
σύνη,' for ἐγκράτεια might be regarded
as partial σωφροσύνη.

§ 7. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. We get
a hint of the λύσις from the addition of
the words καὶ δεινούς (cf. 1144 a, 27).

ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς κ.τ.λ. We find ἀ-
κρατεῖς θυμοῦ in Plato, Laws 869 a,
and Isokrates, Demon. § 21, speaks of
ἐγκράτεια...κέρδους, ὀργῆς. In fact,
ἀκρατῆς may be used wherever ἡττων
εἶναι, c. gen., 'to have a weakness
for,' 'to be incapable of resisting'
may be used. Cf. e.g. ἡττων τοῦ
γελοίου 1128 a, 34.

II. § 1. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις
κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία relates to the
ἐνδοξον that ὁ ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα
πράττει.

ὑπολαμβάνων. This word is sub-
stituted for εἰδὼς because it will cover
φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη and δόξα, all of
which are discussed in the present
passage.

ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The
first form of ὑπόληψις, ἐπιστήμη.

εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὥς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὥς οὐκ 25 οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας— ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει 30 γενέσθαι, φανερόν. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ' οὐ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμο-

ὥς ᾤετο Σωκράτης. This is from Plato Protag. 352 b δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι· οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ ὥς περὶ τοιούτου ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἀρχεῖν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμὸν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. This passage compared with 1147 b, 16 sufficiently justifies the K^b reading αὐτὴν (αὐτόν vulg.) in the next line.

Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 4 προσερωτώμενος δὲ εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τάναντία, σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι, Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἃ ἂν οἴωνται συμφωρότατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν.

ὑπολαμβάνοντα, sc. πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, a characteristic brachylogy.

§2. ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις. It thus becomes a θέσις (cf. 1096 a, 2 n.), but the celebrity of Sokrates still makes it necessary for us to discuss the πρόβλημα it involves. But for this we might let it alone; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφύνα-

μένον φροντίζειν εὐηθες (Top. 104 b, 23). For the phraseology cf. Phys. 253 b, 29 τὸ φάναι συνεχῶς ἀλλοιοῦσθαι λίαν ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἀμφισβητεῖν. 254 a, 8 μάχεται τοῖς φανεροῖς ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, Met. 1091 a, 6 μάχεται... τοῖς εὐλόγοις.

δέον can hardly stand for δέον ἐστὶ, cf. 1107 a, 32 n. Bonitz, therefore, deletes καί, taking δέον as accusative absolute, while Bywater suggests the transposition of γίνεται from the next clause where it is not really wanted. I suspect, however, that Aristotle really meant to say δέον ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ., λίαν ἀπλῶς ἔλεγεν, or something of the sort, but that the sentence was never finished owing to the parenthesis ὅτι... φανερόν.

τίς ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ., equivalent to πῶς ἀγνοῶν ἀκρατεύεται τις. Cf. Gen. An. 740 b, 22 τὸν δὲ τρόπον λέγω τὸ ὥς καὶ ὅτε. Sokrates went wrong, then, because he spoke λίαν ἀπλῶς (cf. Bon. Ind. 77 b, 5).

οὐκ οἶεταί γε, sc. δεῖν πράττειν ἃ πράττει, cf. 1136 b, 8 ὃ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἶεταί δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. The logic of the sentence requires οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, but the phrase οἶεταί δεῖν was so common in the discussion of this subject that it easily slips in, even in an elliptical form. Cf. also 1152 a, 5.

§ 3. εἰσὶ δέ τινες κ.τ.λ. The notes will show that these are Plato's followers rather than Plato himself.

λογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον
 οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασιν οὐκ ἐπι-
 35 στήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν.
 ἀλλὰ μὲν εἶγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπό- 4
 1146^a ληψις ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δι-
 στάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυ-
 μίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν
 ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; 5
 5 αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς
 ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσκει δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φρόνιμον
 εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις

παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον. The aorist
 participle has its full temporal force.
 It would not be admitted that a man
 could act παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν βέλτιον.

§ 4. ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις...ἡρεμαία.
 It is certainly not an adequate ac-
 count of Plato's distinction between
 ἐπιστήμη and δόξα to say that the one
 is 'strong' and the other 'mild.' The
 present discussion will therefore be
 unintelligible unless we suppose that
 the Academy had already come to
 make this purely psychological dis-
 tinction between them. But there
 is, fortunately, sufficient evidence to
 justify us in saying that the Academy
 did now regard ἐπιστήμη as differing
 from δόξα mainly in the strength of
 the πίστις which it implies, and its
 consequent power of resistance. Cf.
 [Plato] Def. 414 b ἐπιστήμη ὑπόληψις
 ψυχῆς ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου,—δόξα
 ὑπόληψις μετὰπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου, de-
 finitions of which the authenticity is
 guaranteed by Ar. Top. 139 b, 32 οἷον
 εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀμετάπτωτον εἴρηκεν,
 130 b, 16 (*et passim*) ὁ θεὸς ἐπιστήμης
 ἴδιον ὑπόληψιν ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου.
 Now in Top. 126 b, 15 Aristotle
 criticises a definition of πίστις as
 σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως and, since ἡρέμα
 is the opposite of σφόδρα, a ὑπόληψις

εὐμετάπειστος (i.e. deficient in πίστις)
 will be an ἡρεμαία ὑπόληψις.

ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα, a Platonic word,
 cf. 1102 b, 18 n. and the Academic
 definition of the ἐγκρατής given above
 1145 b, 10 n.

ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι. This confirms
 the view that the Academy dis-
 tinguished δόξα from ἐπιστήμη by the
 absence of πίστις, which is defined as
 [Plat.] Def. 412 a ὑπόληψις ὁρθὴ τοῦ
 οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς αὐτῷ φαίνεται.

ἐν αὐταῖς, sc. τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τῇ ὑπο-
 λήψει.

τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ. This word usually
 means ἀκολασία as opposed to ἀκрасία,
 hence the addition of the words οὐδὲ
 τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. φρονήσεως ἄρα κ.τ.λ. This
 must depend on the διαίρεσις which is
 given in De An. 427 b, 24 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ
 αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη
 καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τὰναντία
 τούτων. We have seen φρόνησις called
 a ὑπόληψις above, 1142 b, 33. This
 leads us to the ἀπορία raised by the
 contradictory δοκοῦντα that the φρόνι-
 μος cannot be ἀκρατής and that some
 φρόνιμοι are ἀκρατεῖς.

ἰσχυρότατον. Cf. EE. 1246 b, 34
 ὁρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρό-
 τερον φρονήσεως.

δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.

6 Ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ 10 ἐγκρατῆς, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατῆς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατῆς σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαῖον· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' 15 εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα.

7 Ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἶον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστα- 20 τικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἶον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεο- πτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.

8 Ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία—διὰ γὰρ

δέδεικται πρότερον, 1141 b, 14 sqq. 1142 a, 23 sqq. 1144 b, 30 sqq.

§ 6. Ἔτι εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορία raised by the contradiction between the ἐνδοξα that ἐγκράτεια is good, and that the ἐγκρατῆς is the σώφρων.

ἐν τῷ...ἔχειν. Cf. Pol. 1255 b, 31 ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, 'what makes a master a master is not owning slaves.'

τὸ ἄγαν, sc. ἐπιθυμεῖν. This is substituted for τὸ ἰσχυρὰς ἔχειν, probably from a reminiscence of τὸ Χιλῶνιον, μηδὲν ἄγαν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε, sc. ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν φαύλας καὶ ἰσχυρὰς τὸν ἐγκρατῆ. Otherwise ἐγκράτεια would not be τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν (1145 b, 8).

οὐ πᾶσα. This is all that is required for the ἀνασκευή of a universal affirmative πρότασις.

§ 7. Ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία arises from the contradiction between ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῶν σπουδαίων and ὁ ἐγκρατῆς ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ and of their respective ἀντιθέσεις.

ἐκστατικόν, sc. ποιεῖ.

ἔσται τις. This is all that is required for the ἀνασκευή of the universal affirmative πρότασις, ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν.

ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ. "But Odysseus knew that Philoctetes would not listen to him, and would be too proud to return after such treatment. Therefore he had recourse to guile, and persuaded Neoptolemus to second him by false pretences. The interest of the drama lies in the gradual effect produced upon the heart of the boy by the sufferings of Philoctetes, by his frank belief in the fictitious tale, by his open-hearted friendship, and by his unbounded trust in one who is deceiving him; until at length, in spite of the strongest motives, it becomes a moral impossibility for Neoptolemus to persevere in his attempt." L. Campbell.

§ 8. Ἔτι κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία results from an artificial contradiction between the views that the ἀκρατῆς acts εἰδῶς (or ὑπολαμβάνων) ὅτι φαῦλα and the view that ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν.

τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται
 25 γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προῖέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον—συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη 9 μετ' ἀκрасίας ἀρετή· τὰναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκрасίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ
 30 εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει.

Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ 10 προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκрасίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. ὁ
 35 δ' ἀκρατὴς ἐνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ φαμεν “ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ

ψευδόμενος was rightly bracketed by Coraes as a mere dittography of ψευδόμενος above. There can be no reference to the *Mentiens* of Eubou- lides (Ritter and Preller § 233). “What follows this is a digression suggested by the word ἀπορία.” By- water, *Contr.* p. 53.

παράδοξα...ἐλέγχειν. We must take παράδοξα as internal accusative. They desire to frame σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι of a paradoxical kind, i.e. opposed to τὰ ἔνδοξα. An ἔλεγχος is a συλ- λογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως, i.e. a syllogistic proof of the contradictory, in the present case the contradictory of our ἔνδοξα. Note the word βούλεσθαι, it is the προαίρεσις and not the δύναμις that makes the sophist. Cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ‘when they suc- ceed,’ does not seem very pointed. Should we not read ἐντύχωσιν? The proper word for a dialectical ‘en- counter’ is ἐντευξις, cf. *Top.* 101 a, 27 (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ χρήσιμος) πρὸς τὰς ἐν- τεύξεις.

δέδεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Met.* 995 a, 31 ἢ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ (ἡ διάνοια), ταύτη παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις.

ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. This is still a note ex- plaining the meaning of ἀπορία and λύσις.

§ 9. ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκрасίας ἀρετή. In the *Topics* (150 b, 27 sqq.) Aristotle discusses at length this type of definition, which he calls τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε. The example there given is that of ἀνδρεία as τόλμα μετὰ διανοίας ὀρθῆς. It is worth noting that there are two or three definitions of this type in the Platonic *Ὅροι*. So 41E, e 2 χρηστότης ἥθους ἀπλαστία μετ' εὐλογι- στίας, ib. φιλανθρωπία...μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας.

ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην.

§ 10. Ἔτι κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία arises from the contradiction between the identification of the ἀκρατὴς with the ἀκόλαστος and the view that the ἀκρατὴς acts διὰ πάθος, παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν.

τῷ πεπεῖσθαι, ‘from conviction’ (πίστις).

τῇ παροιμίᾳ. This proverb does not seem to be found elsewhere, but its application is obvious. You can- not cure the ἀκρατὴς by giving him

πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, 1146^b
μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ [πεπεισμένος] οὐδὲν ἤττον
ἄλλα πράττει.

11 Ἐτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ
ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας,
φαμέν δ' εἶναί τινας ἀπλῶς. 5

12 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων
δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς
ἀπορίας εὗρεσίς ἐστιν.

III. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ
πῶς εἰδότες· εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ
θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ 10
τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν,
πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν
2 ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῇ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ

right conviction, for he has it already.

ἐπέπειστο, sc. δεῖν πραττεῖν. Bekker reads μὴ ἐπέπειστο with L^b, but see next note.

πεπεισμένος...ἄλλα πράττει. Ramsauer adds ἄλλα before πεπεισμένος, a conjecture adopted by Bywater, who brackets ἄλλα before πράττει, thus making the corruption, if there is one, a simple transposition. The Versio has *non suavis, οὐ πεπεισμένος*. I think it simpler to bracket πεπεισμένος. The meaning is sufficiently given by νῦν δέ, 'as it is.'

§ 11. Ἐτι εἰ κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορία raised by the use of expressions like ἀκρατής θυμοῦ, τιμῆς, κέρδους.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We do, as a matter of fact, speak of ἀκρατεῖς without any qualifying restriction (ἀπλῶς). As we cannot mean by this ἀκρατεῖς πάντων, there must be a proper application of the word to a special class of objects.

§ 12. τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν κ.τ.λ. The meaning is more fully expressed above

1145 b, 6. The λύσις of the ἀπορίαι will leave us with the ἐνδοξα stripped of their difficulties.

III. § 1. Πρῶτον μὲν...εἴτα.... This section gives the two divisions of the following discussion. The *first* is the discussion of the question πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες (cf. 1145 b, 29 τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀγνοίας). This extends from 1146 b, 24 to 1147 b, 19. The *second* is the discussion περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ...θετέον κ.τ.λ. with a number of kindred questions (ὅσα συγγενῇ). This extends from 1147 b, 20 to 1152 a, 36. It is important to observe that the twofold character of this division is clearly marked by the language, see next note.

§ 2. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. This has been regarded as a duplicate of the preceding section, and it has been said that it outlines a discussion which does not exist. This view overlooks the fact of the twofold division made in the last section and the natural reference of this section to

15 τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰσι τῷ περὶ
 ἃ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ
 ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὐ
 ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ
 ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρα-
 20 τής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα
 ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταυτόν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ
 ὥδὲ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων αἰεὶ
 δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μέν, διώκει
 δέ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι 3
 25 παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι
 γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς
 εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον 4

the second part of it only (εἴτα περὶ ποῖα κ.τ.λ.). We have first to deal with the great ἀπορία, πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ; and then we can take all the rest together. As, however, they seem at first somewhat miscellaneous, it is important to find a 'starting-point for the discussion' (ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως), a point of vantage (τόπος) from which we can attack them all. This Aristotle finds in the fact that the states now under discussion are ἐξεις and must be discussed as such (see next note).

πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς κ.τ.λ. We are already familiar from the discussion of the ἀρεταί with this division of the discussion into (1) περὶ ποῖα; and (2) πῶς; Cf. 1115 a, 5 n. We know that it is the proper way to discuss any ἐξεις. I have retained the MS. reading τῷ πῶς (Bywater writes τῷ ὥς) because I hold that the word to be supplied is ἔχειν, and that τῷ ὥς (sc. εἶναι) below is different. The ellipse of ἔχειν with πῶς is common.

εἰσι...ἔχοντες. Cf. 1144 a, 32 ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν.

ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.

If we find that the διαφορά of ἀκρασία is τὸ πῶς ἔχειν and not τὸ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι, we must still go on to ask the question περὶ ποῖα, since ἀκρασία has to be differentiated, not only from ἀκολασία, but from other ψεκτά. The answer to the question is indicated at once. It differs from ἀκολασία τῷ πῶς, i.e. by the absence of προαίρεσις, and from other bad ἐξεις by being limited to the same objects as ἀκολασία.

§ 3. Περὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now begin the discussion of the first main point, πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ. But first we must clear the ground by finding the λύσις of the ἀπορία about δόξα given 1145 b, 36. It is not true to say that δόξα is an ἡρεμαία ὑπόληψις, and so the substitution of δόξα for ἐπιστήμη makes no difference. Observe that Aristotle himself would not call it ἐπιστήμη, but he is here adopting the Academic standpoint for the sake of argument.

οὐ διστάζουσιν, cf. 1146 a, 1 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσιν.

§ 4. εἰ οὖν...πράξουσιν. Note the future, 'If we are going to say

- τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν
διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἥττον
οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. 30
- 5 Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων
μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται
ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ
τὸ θεωροῦντα ἂ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα].
τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. 35
- 6 Ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφο- 1147 a

that it is from the mildness of their conviction that they act etc.'

οὐθὲν διοίσει κ.τ.λ. 'we shall find (by appealing to experience) that ἐπιστήμη is no better than δόξα in respect of πίστις (σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως).' It is important to notice that διοίσει here means 'will surpass.'

δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. One negative instance is enough for the ἀνασκευή of the definition ἡ δόξα ἡρεμαία ὑπόληψις. The Academy will not say that Herakleitos had ἐπιστήμη, and yet he had 'conviction' (πίστις σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως) in the highest degree. For the oracular style of Herakleitos, see my Early Greek Philosophy p. 131.

§ 5. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. These words introduce the first of four distinct λύσεις joined to each other by ἔτι as usual. The first three are dialectical and based upon the theory of 'potential knowledge' which was first worked out by Plato in the Theaitetos. The fourth is the real λύσις and is of a strictly psychological character. We need not expect to find the three first quite consistent with each other or with the fourth. Aristotle is only concerned in the first instance to show the Academy how they may keep to ἐπιστήμη and yet account for ἀκρασία on their own principles. If we compare the successive λύσεις with the

successive definitions of Knowledge in the Theaitetos, we shall see how fundamental and essential a thing τὸ διαλέγεσθαι is in Greek philosophy.

ἔχων...χρώμενος. The distinction between knowledge potential and actual originates in the Theaitetos, 197 b sqq., where, however, ἔχειν is equivalent to χρῆσθαι here, and what is here called ἔχειν is called κτᾶσθαι. For the opposition of χρήσις (= ἐνέργεια) to ἔξις, cf. 1098 b, 33 n. We very commonly find τὸ θεωρεῖν described as the ἐνέργεια of ἐπιστήμη, as in the present passage. Cf. Phys. 255 b, 2 ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων. Met. 1048 a, 32 λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει...ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, εἰάν δυνατὸς ἢ θεωρεῖν. de An. 412 a, 22 λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δὲ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν.

τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 6. Ἔτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. The second λύσις goes a little deeper. A man may know the major premiss actually and the minor premiss only potentially. For the two kinds of προτάσεις see 1143 b, 3 n. It is no valid objection to Aristotle's argument here to say that in the case supposed the act would be ἀκούσιον. We are only considering whether it is possible to act παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, not whether we are responsible for it if we do.

τέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' 5 ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναί μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ 10 θαυμαστόν.

Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν 7

πρακτὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The particular makes its first appearance in the minor premiss; acts are necessarily particular, and therefore there can be no act unless the minor premiss is actual.

διαφέρει...τὸ καθόλου. By τὸ καθόλου (not ἡ καθόλου) is meant the universal which forms the middle term. The general rule παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά contains two universals and therefore requires two minor premisses to connect it with a particular agent and a particular act. The first of these takes as middle term the universal which is predicated of the agent (ἐφ' αὐτοῦ). This minor premiss is obvious and does not detain us, cf. de Mot. An. 701 a, 25 ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτῶντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἐτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δὴλην οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. But the other universal (τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος) is of a different character. Ἐπιστήμη takes us no further than ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε, and this can yield only the conclusion ἐμοὶ συμφέρει τὸ τοιόνδε, not an act. We are in that case left in the position of the doctor who only knows that light food is digestible without knowing what food is light (1141 b, 19 n.). This is a case, then, when a man acts wrongly, though he has ἐπιστήμη of what is right. Of

course Aristotle himself would say such an act was ἀκούσιον and not ἀκрасία, but that is not the question at present. We are only showing how it is possible to act παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, and ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε is ἐπιστήμη while τόδε τοιόνδε is not. Even if the man does 'use' the minor premiss, that will not be enough to make him act rightly.

ἢ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'or (the universal may be predicated of the thing, e.g.) ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε.' This is, of course, a *minor* premiss. The conjunction ἢ introduces the other species of καθόλου.

εἰδέναί, sc. τὸν ἀκρατῆ.

§ 7. Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. The *third* λύσις, which goes a little deeper by recognising two kinds of potential knowledge. When we say a man has knowledge potentially we may mean either that he 'has' it but does not 'use' it, or merely that he is capable of having it (as δεκτικὸν ἐπιστήμης) but does not actually 'have' it at the time. This distinction is best brought out in Gen. An. 735 a, 9 ἐγγυτέρω δὲ καὶ πορρωτέρω (τῆς ἐνεργείας) αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι δυνάμει, ὥσπερ ὁ καθεύδων γεωμέτρης ἐγρηγορότος πορρωτέρω, καὶ οὗτος τοῦ θεωροῦντος. The case considered in this section is parallel to that of 'the sleeping geometer' (cf. οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα), that considered in the two preceding sections was that of

ρήθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἶον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἳ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων 15 καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν 8 λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἳ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, 20 καὶ οἳ πρῶτον μαθάνοντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους.

9 Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ

the geometer ἐγρηγορῶς μὲν μὴ θεωρῶν δέ. Cf. also above 1098 b, 33.

καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν. Cf. Mot. An. 701 b, 29 ὅταν γένηται ἀλλοίωσις περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ... πολλὴν ποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος διαφορὰν ἐρυθρήμασι καὶ ὠχρότησι καὶ φρίκαις καὶ τρόμοις καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἐναντίοις. This brings us to the verge of Aristotle's own physiological λύσις. See the whole passage in App. B.

§ 8. οὐδὲν σημείον, sc. τοῦ ἔχειν (in the sense previously given to the word). Τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως are generally speaking σημεία τῆς ἕξεως, but the ἕξις may be a *mere* δύναμις. The geometer may be talking in his sleep. The ἀποδείξεις here mentioned are probably to be understood as geometrical; for Aristotle cannot mean us to take the word with Ἐμπεδοκλέους. The ἔπη Ἐμπεδοκλέους are just about the last thing Aristotle would call ἀποδείξεις.

καὶ οἳ πρῶτον μαθάνοντες κ.τ.λ. This is another way in which Aristotle more than once describes *merely* potential knowledge. Cf. Phys. 255 a,

33 ἔστι δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως ὁ μαθάνων ἐπιστήμων καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν ... ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν, de An. 429 b, 8 δυνάμει πως (sc. ἐπιστήμων), οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὐρεῖν. Thurot's conjecture μαθάνοντες for μαθόντες seems to me certain. We can hardly identify οἳ πρῶτον μαθόντες with οἳ μαθάνοντες πρὶν μαθεῖν.

τοῦτο...δεῖται. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 9. Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε κ.τ.λ. The *fourth* and real λύσις. We now drop 'potential knowledge' altogether, and the explanation is in perfect harmony with that given in the de Mot. An. (cf. App. B). It should be observed, however, that the three previous λύσεις, though provisional, have gradually prepared us for this one.

φυσικῶς. This word alone implies that the preceding λύσεις are διαλεκτικώτεραι. To consider a thing φυσικῶς is to consider it in the light of its οἰκείαι ἀρχαί, i.e. of φυσικαὶ προτάσεις (Top. 105 b, 21), in the

25 μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἢ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἶον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος

present case, of course, from a psychological point of view. Hence φυσικῶς is regularly opposed to λογικῶς (=διαλεκτικῶς). Cf. Phys. 204 b, 4 λογικῶς μὲν οὖν σκοποῦμένοις ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε δόξειεν ἂν οὐκ εἶναι (τὸ ἀπειρον)...b, 10 φυσικῶς δὲ μᾶλλον θεωροῦσιν ἐκ τῶνδε. Gen. Corr. 316 a, 10 ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες.

ἢ...καθόλου, sc. πρότασις. The major premiss is not ἐπιστήμη, but the other form of ὑπόληψις called δόξα, which is περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, and may be true or false. We have seen already, however, that this does not imply that it is a mere ἡρεμαία ὑπόληψις.

ἢ δ' ἑτέρα, sc. πρότασις, cf. 1143 b, 3 n. In a real practical syllogism, the minor premiss cannot be of the form ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε, which is all that ἐπιστήμη could give us. It must be of the form ξηρὸν τόδε, and that is a matter for αἰσθησις.

ἔνθα μὲν, i.e. ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς προτάσεσιν.

ἐν ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. The simplest way of taking this is to supply προτάσεσι as above (προτάσεις are the subject of the sentence) and to translate 'in the case of practical premisses,' cf. de Mot. An. 701 a, 23 αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ κ.τ.λ. There might, of course, be θεωρητικαὶ προτάσεις, the major a δόξα such as 'The east wind brings rain,' and the minor an αἰσθησις, 'The wind is in the east.' The conclusion is 'It will rain.' Or we may have 'It is bad for a man to get wet,' 'It is raining,' the conclusion of which is that I put on my cloak.

εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος κ.τ.λ. This is an illustration of a case where there is no impediment or conflict. We have a practical major premiss παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ. As a δόξα, this may be true or false, but it is a universal imperative, just as much as παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά. We have to ask, then, (1) whence it derives its universality, (2) whence it derives its epitactic form. Its universality must be due, as universality always is, to the action of νοῦς. It is νοῦς that generalises particular desires for sweet wine into the universal proposition (καθόλου δόξα, λόγος) πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ. It makes explicit the universal implicit in particular ὁρέξεις exactly in the same way as it makes explicit the universal implicit in particular αἰσθήσεις. But this is not all. The verb δεῖ means ἀγαθὸν ἐστι, and the epitactic character of the proposition can only be due to its presentation by νοῦς (or φαντασία) to βούλησις as its ὁρεκτόν. This further implies that the person who has such a major premiss is one whose φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν is τὸ ἡδύ. In other words, this is the major premiss of ἀκολασία. If this καθόλου δόξα is in the soul, and a minor premiss τουτὶ δὲ ἡδύ is supplied by αἰσθησις, the act of tasting necessarily follows as a conclusion. We see, then, that a bad act may be produced by a practical syllogism as well as a good one. The problem of ἀκρασία therefore assumes this form: 'Is it possible for a syllogism the conclusion of which is a bad act to exist side by side with the knowledge of the major premiss or

γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὥς ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἑκαστον, 30
 ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ
 10 πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι,
 ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ),
 τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ'
 ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἑκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· 35
 ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεῦεσθαι, οὐκ 1147^b

practical principle which that act violates?'

§ 10. ὅταν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The answer to the problem proposed at the end of the last note is that it is impossible if the major premiss of the bad act and the major premiss which it violates are contradictory. No one can have in his soul at one and the same time the propositions παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ and οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα. If, then, the latter is present, the possibility of the bad act will depend upon whether it can result from some other major premiss. Now the premiss πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ is not *per se* contradictory to οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα, so they may quite well coexist. The only question, then, is whether the bad act can follow from πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ as well as from παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ.

αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, in the sense explained by the *third* λύσις. The ἐνέργεια is really that of ἐπιθυμία, as we shall see.

τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, 'and when desire (for pleasure) is present at the time,' not βούλησις or ὄρεξις τἀγαθοῦ. It all depends, then, on the state of ὄρεξις at the moment.

ἡ μὲν...λέγει φεύγειν. The syllogism οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ, οὐ συμφέρει τουτὶ may even be completed; but, in the absence of any ὄρεξις to which it can present itself, nothing happens. For διάνοια αὕτη οὐθὲν κινεῖ.

ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει. The presence

of ἐπιθυμία is enough to replace the absence of the epitactic element in πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ. The way in which this happens is explained in de Mot. An. 701 a, 31 (App. B) ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἢ τῆς ὀρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. In itself (καθ' αὐτό) πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ, τουτὶ ἡδύ is quite compatible with the other syllogism; but for ἐπιθυμία it has a different meaning. The object of ἐπιθυμία is just τὸ ἡδύ and so it moves it at once. As it is put in the de Mot. An. (loc. cit.), "Ποτέον μοι, says desire. Τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, says αἴσθησις or φαντασία or νοῦς. Εὐθὺς πίνει."

κινεῖν γὰρ δύναται. As an ὄρεξις (which is κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν) it can set in motion the body (which is κινούμενον and not κινοῦν). This does not mean, of course, that ἐπιθυμία has this power more than any other form of ὄρεξις. The point is that νοῦς cannot move the body except through ὄρεξις. A judgment that something is good cannot move the body unless βούλησις τἀγαθοῦ is present, but the case supposed is one where ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος occupies the soul.

ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης. This is really Aristotle's great contribution to moral psychology. There is an intellectual element in badness as well as in goodness. The bad man and the morally weak man have major premisses as well as the good. The bad man has only one major premiss which is the contradictory of the good man's. The morally weak man has

ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ 11
ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου
5 ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.

Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ 12
ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδον-
τος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιο-
λόγων ἀκούειν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ 13

two. These cannot be contradictory in themselves (καθ' αὐτό), but only κατὰ συμβεβηκός, i.e. ἡ συμβαίνει τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐπιθυμητῷ εἶναι.

§ 11. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο. We have seen already that the lower animals are incapable of goodness or badness just because they have not νοῦς (1139 a, 20). They cannot get beyond an image in the soul of something once felt as sweet (φαντασία) or an association of something now perceived with such an image (μνήμη). Memory is not an intellectual act, but belongs to the same 'part' of the soul as Imagination (φαντασία), i.e. the πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων (sc. ὅσα χρόνον αἰσθάνεται), καὶ οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ φρόνησιν (de Mem. 449 b, 1—450 a, 22). The ὀρεκτόν can only move the lower animals τῷ φαντασθῆναι, not τῷ νοηθῆναι.

§ 12. Πῶς δὲ λύεται κ.τ.λ. This is put in the popular form as the word ἄγνοια shows. The meaning must be 'How does ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος give place to βούλησις τἀγαθοῦ?' For an explanation we are referred to 'the physiologists' and their account of drunkenness and sleep. The drunken man who recites Empedokles gets sober; the sleeping geometer wakes. This is how Aristotle dismisses a question which is φυσικώτερον and goes beyond πολιτική. To us, of

course, it is just the fundamental question; for the answer to it must explain why the ordinary man who is neither good nor bad sometimes does right and sometimes wrong. Now, if we take Aristotle's hint and go to the de Somno for an explanation, we find that the alternation of sleeping and waking is due to the fact that no animal is able συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. Physiologically speaking, what happens is that the warm ἀναθυμίασις from food rises into the head, which it therefore makes heavy. It is then cooled in the brain, whence it returns to the heart. The consequent cooling of the heart produces unconsciousness; for the heart is the πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν. So too μέθη arises τῶν ἄνω θερμανθέντων (Probl. 843 a, 1). The analysis of pleasure will show us that ἐπιθυμία too has a physiological basis. It is caused by the pain produced by ἔνδεια and it ceases with the pleasure produced by ἀναπλήρωσις, both these being σωματικά. Cf. also Phys. 247 b, 13 sqq.

§ 13. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ κ.τ.λ. This section is intended to bring out the truth underlying the paradox of Sokrates. I read ταύτην <δ'> with Ramsauer and make the apodosis go down to ἔσχατον ὄρον.

δόξα αἰσθητοῦ, 'a belief as to an object of perception.' The formula of the minor premiss (τελευταία πρότασις)

κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην <δ' > ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὢν, 10
 ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν
 ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου
 μὴδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν
 14 ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ
 γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται 15
 τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς
 αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδόμενου καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδόμενα
 ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεῦσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

IV. Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ 20
 μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν
 οὖν περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρ-
 2 τερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ

is e.g. *τουτὶ γλυκύ* (1147 a, 29), and this differentiates it from the minor premiss of a scientific syllogism such as *ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε* (1147 a, 6).

ὥς οὐκ ἦν. For the imperfect cf. Ind. s.v. ἦν.

τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον, i.e. the *τόδε* or *τουτὶ* which is ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ὢν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία. This is not καθόλου and therefore not ἐπιστημονικόν, for there can be no ἐπιστήμη of τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

§ 14. τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης, 'ἐπιστήμη in the proper sense,' all the terms of which are necessarily καθόλου.

παρούσης. The text is sufficiently guaranteed by ἐνούσης 1145 b, 23, which also settles the meaning here. Stewart's very ingenious *περιγίνεται τὸ πάθος* is quite unnecessary if the interpretation given above is correct. There can be no κυρίως ἐπιστήμη where the major premiss is given by δόξα and the minor by αἰσθησις.

ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, sc. ἐπιστήμης. This is a new name for the αἰσθησις τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα by which we apprehend the minor premiss ἐγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε καὶ τόδε τοιόνδε. The phrase

is probably used with some reference to the ἐπιστημονικὴ αἰσθησις of Speusippos (cf. Ritter and Preller § 286). That was a doctrine intended to bridge over the gulf between the particular and the universal, much of the same nature as Aristotle's own doctrine that, though we only perceive a particular, yet it is only the universal element in it, the form, that really enters into perception.

IV. § 1. Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. We now come to the second division περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατὴ θετέον (1146 b, 9).

§ 2. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., 'whereas—.' The apodosis is not reached till 1147 b, 31 τοὺς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not meant to be a complete classification of the objects of desire, as we can see at once from the omission of pleasures intrinsically bad. It is only a preliminary statement as to two classes of pleasures, which is sufficient for the purpose immediately in hand, namely the ascertainment of the proper objects of ἀκρασία in its literal sense.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν
 25 καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά—λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ
 τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην—
 30 τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτά—λέγω δ' οἶον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 ἡδέων—τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς,
 35 προστιθέντες δὲ [τὸ] χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ὥς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ Ἀνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα κ.τ.λ. The use of this name for the bodily pleasures arises from such phrases as ἀναγκαῖα τροφή. Plato, Rep. 558 a sqq., speaks in this sense of ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι, and in Phileb. 62 e ἀναγκαῖαι ἡδοναί are mentioned as a recognised class. The present classification is not, however, to be found in Plato.

αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά. These will be the 'higher pleasures,' since τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν is always the best.

ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, 'but admitting of excess.' For this sense of ἔχειν cf. Ind. s.v. The excess of these pleasures will be φευκτόν, but only κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ἔθεμεν, 1117 b, 27 sqq.

τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς. It is necessary to add this; for, unless they had the ὀρθὸς λόγος 'in themselves,' there would be no ὁμοιότης or analogy between the κατὰ τι ἀκρατεῖς and the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς. The ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ etc. must have a true δόξα with regard to the object of θυμός, as well as a false one.

προστιθέντες...ἀπλῶς. For the opposition of ἀπλῶς to κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, cf. 1095 a, 2 n., and for the omission of

τό, Bywater, Contr. p. 55. It enables us to take προστιθέντες as 'absolutely.'

καθ' ὁμοιότητα, cf. Ind. s.v. ὁμοιότης.

ὥσπερ Ἀνθρωπος κ.τ.λ. The imperfects διέφερον and ἦν show that this refers to some previous ἀκρόασις or discussion (cf. Ind. s.v. ἦν). All the Greek commentators except Heliodoros tell us that there was an Olympic victor called Ἀνθρωπος, and this view goes back to no less an authority than Alexander, who says in his exegesis of the Topics (p. 114, 8 Wallies) ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἴδιον ὄνομα τοῦτο τοῦ Ὀλυμπιονίκου πύκτου οὗ ἐν τοῖς Ἡθικοῖς μνημονεύει. This statement is repeated by Alexander on other occasions (see the Index in Wallies) and has just received most remarkable confirmation from a statement made in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus communicated to the Classical Review for July 1899 by Messrs Grenfell and Hunt, "This is a fragment of a list of Olympian victors, written in the third century A.D., and referring, with some lacunae, to a period of about thirty years in the first half of the fifth century B.C. According to this list,

ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, 1148^a
 ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία
 ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις
 3 ἢ ἀπλῶς οὔσα ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδεῖς. τῶν δὲ
 περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν 5
 σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε
 ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων,
 πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν

the general trustworthiness of which is proved by its agreement with Pausanias and other authorities, the name of the winner of the boxing-match at Olympia in the year 456 B.C. was "Ἀνθρωπος. It was doubtless on the evidence of a similar list that Alexander Aphrodisiensis made his statement that "Ἀνθρωπος was a πύκτης." The meaning, then, is 'just as we saw that the Olympic victor was both "Ἀνθρωπος and ἀνθρωπος.' The νικῶν of K^b is much more idiomatic than the vulgate νενικηκώς.

ὁ κοινὸς λόγος. The definition of ὁμώνυμα is ὦν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον. τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἂν γὰρ τις ἀποδιδῷ τί ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῶν εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. In the present case if we give the λόγος corresponding to the κοινὸν ὄνομα ἄνθρωπος, namely τί ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, it will not be quite the same as the λόγος corresponding to the ἴδιον ὄνομα, namely τί ἐστὶν αὐτῷ 'Ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. In the former case, if we adopt the Platonic method of definition, the λόγος will be ζῶον θνητὸν ὑπόπουν δίπουν ἄπτερον, in the latter we shall have to make a πρόθεσις such as Ὀλυμπιονίκης πύκτης. Note that all this is strictly Academic. It is really impossible to define the in-

dividual "Ἀνθρωπος.

σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. The σημεῖον amounts to this, that ἀκρασία, whether it has to do with bodily pleasures *simpliciter* or with some particular bodily pleasures, belongs to the same γένος as κακία (cf. οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος 1145 b, 2), while ἀκρασία θυμοῦ etc. belong to a different genus altogether, which is only called κακία καθ' ὁμοιότητα, as we speak of a 'bad doctor' (1148 b, 7).

§ 3. περὶ ἃς λέγομεν κ.τ.λ. 1117 b, 28 sqq.

μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι. This gives us the differentia. It is quite consistent with the preceding account; for προαιρεσις implies ὀρεξις τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ (βούλησις) as well as βούλευσις, while ἀκρασία is caused by ἐπιθυμία, i.e. ὀρεξις τοῦ φαινομένου ἡδέος, and excludes βούλευσις.

καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, sc. τὰς ὑπερβολὰς. It is only the ὑπερβολή of warmth (for instance) that causes pain, i.e. τὸ μᾶλλον αἰσθησιν ἐμποιοῦν ἐν τῷ θιγγάνειν, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς μετὰ λύπης (Part. An. 648 b, 15).

ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους. It has been argued that this is inconsistent with the doctrine of Book III that the pains shunned by the ἀκόλαστος (and therefore the ἀκρατής) are always those of unsatisfied pleasure, so that τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή (1118 b, 32). But, as a matter of fact, the pleasures of warmth and coolness are to Aristotle

περὶ ἀφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν
 10 διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ
 τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· 4
 καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ'
 οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταῦτόν τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκό-
 λαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῇ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων
 15 οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι·
 οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταῦτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσὶν, ἀλλ'
 οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκό-

pleasures belonging to the sense of touch, and stand exactly on the same footing as the pleasures of nutrition and reproduction. To look at the matter φυσικώτερον, this is because ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὅλη τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν (Part. An. 646 a, 16). We find also that τὸ θερμὸν has the most intimate connexion with τροφή, since digestion depends upon it. The pains of hunger, thirst, warmth and cold are therefore exactly the four we should expect to find mentioned. Another sure sign that ἀλέαι and ψύχη are pleasures of this class is that they are of those ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ. Even oysters and molluscs live at the mouths of rivers; for they seek ἄμα τὴν τ' ἀλέαν καὶ τὴν τροφήν (Gen. An. 761 b, 7), and fish change about from the deep sea to the shore φεύγοντες τὰς ὑπερβολὰς (observe the phrase) τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἀλέας. Lastly, it is only if we suppose that some warmth may be the object of ἀκολασία, that we can see any point in the exception of θερμασία produced by gymnastics (1118 b, 6). We may remember, too, that Philoxenos was κάμινος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.

παρὰ...τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. contrary to the λόγος ὁ ἐνεκά του which διάνοια has affirmed in harmony with βούλησις.

κατὰ πρόσθεσιν...ἀπλῶς. Cf. Ind. s.vv.

καθάπερ ὀργῆς. Cf. Thuc. iii, 84, 2 ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις...ἀσμένῃ ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὔσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου.

§ 4. σημεῖον δέ κ.τ.λ. We cannot say that this is inconsistent with the account of μαλακία given later, as it merely states a fact of language which Aristotle regarded as significant. And it surely is a fact that the word μαλακία is not used of the ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ etc. See Stewart's note.

εἰς ταῦτόν...τίθεμεν. The phrase εἰς γένος (ἐν γένει) τιθέναι is frequent, especially in the Topics.

οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται. The question has been raised how the ἀκόλαστος can have προαίρεσις since his aim is the pleasure of the moment. The answer is that προαίρεσις is not necessarily a σπουδαία προαίρεσις, and the object of βούλησις is τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, which is only the true good to the good man. The difference between the ἀκρατὴς and the ἀκόλαστος is just this, that to the former pleasure appears in its true character, simply as the object of ἐπιθυμία, while to the latter the pursuit of pleasure presents itself as τὸ ἀγαθόν, the object of βούλησις. The major premiss παντὸς γλυκεὸς γεύεσθαι δεῖ, which is that of the ἀκόλαστος, is equivalent to πᾶν

λαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ
 τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσκειν, εἰ προσ- 20
 γένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐν-
 5 δείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδο-
 νῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι <τῶν> τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων—τῶν
 γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ
 μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον—οἷον χρήματα καὶ 25
 κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή, πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν
 ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ

γλυκὸν ἀγαθόν, not to πᾶν γλυκὸν ἡδύ.

διὸ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Stewart is plainly right in taking μᾶλλον with ἂν εἴποιμεν and not with ἀκόλαστον. There is no question of degrees of ἀκολασία. Tr. 'we should rather give the name of ἀκόλαστος to the man who etc.' By **τοῦτον ὅστις κ.τ.λ.** is meant some one of whom we are in doubt whether he is ἀκρατής or ἀκόλαστος, and whom we decide to be only ἀκρατής. It is surely impossible to mistake the profound psychology of making the ἀκόλαστος a man of mild desires. With him pleasure has become the object of βούλησις, the φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, and he pursues it as a 'cool sensualist.'

καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας. The ἀκρατής only shunned τῶν λυπηρῶν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς (1148 a, 7); for they alone are strong enough to produce a violent desire for the opposite pleasures. The ἀκόλαστος shuns all λύπαι on principle.

λύπη ἰσχυρά, i.e. a ὑπερβολή such as upsets the ἀκρατής.

§ 5. **ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This section is no mere duplicate of 1147 b, 23 (where see note), but the necessary introduction to the discussion of the θηριώδης, incidentally recapitulating

and putting in a clearer light what has been said already. We now have for the first time a complete classification of desires into (1) those of things τῷ γένει καλὰ, φύσει αἰρετά, (2) of τὰ ἐναντία τούτων, i.e. those of things τῷ γένει αἰσχυρά, φύσει φευκτά, not previously mentioned, (3) of τὰ μεταξύ, i.e. τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (τὰ σωματικά). These last are properly described as 'intermediate' between τὰ καλὰ and τὰ αἰσχυρά, for they are ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα, the pleasures of τὸ ζῆν, not of τὸ εἶν ζῆν. They are therefore indifferent in themselves, but become good when sought τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. For the punctuation see Stewart's note. The apodosis to the long protasis is not reached till 1148 b, 2 **μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.**, being delayed by the enormous parenthesis 1148 a, 28 **διὸ ὅσοι...b, 2 μωραίνειν.**

οἷον χρήματα κ.τ.λ. These are φύσει αἰρετά, ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν.

τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν, 'for doing so in a certain way, i.e. in excess.'

διὸ ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. There is no verb for this nominative, the construction being forgotten owing to the parenthesis within a parenthesis **καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα...σπουδάζοντες.** The thought requires us to supply **μοχθηροὶ οὐκ εἰσίν**, the place of which is taken by the re-

τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν
 30 καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες
 ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
 ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες—ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι
 τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μά-
 χοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλο-
 1148^b πάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει
 μωραίνειν)—μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταύτ' ἐστὶ διὰ
 τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἵρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό,
 φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσιν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως 6
 5 δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἢ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσ-
 επιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν
 ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν

sumptive apodosis **μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν**
 κ.τ.λ.

ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη, an instance of
 ὑπερβολὴ περὶ τέκνα.

ὥσπερ Σάτυρος, an instance of
 ὑπερβολὴ περὶ γονεῖς, *Aspasios* (158,
 16 Heylbut) says Σάτυρος...ὃς οὐδὲ
 ζῆν εἴλετο ἀποθανόντος τοῦ πατρός.
 The Anonymus (p. 426, 23) says οὗτος
 γὰρ ἐρῶν τινος κόρης καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 μοιχείαν εὐρῶν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα Σώ-
 στρατον συνεργοῦντα, τοσοῦτον ἔκτοτε
 τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα ἐφίλησεν, ὥστε καὶ
 τοῦ πατρὸς τελευτήσαντος ἑαυτὸν κατε-
 κρήμνισε καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀπεστέρησε.
 (This sounds like a reminiscence from
 the New Comedy.) *Heliodoros* on
 the other hand has ὁ Σάτυρος ὡς θεὸν
 ἐπικαλούμενος τὸν πατέρα, as if his
 text did not contain **περί**. It seems
 just possible that this may be right.
 As Stewart reminds us, the kings of
 Bosphoros during the 4th century were
 called Satyros. I would add that
 Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ looks very like
 a royal title, and if the reference were
 to the deification of a dead king by

his son, the parallel to the case of a
 Niobe would be striking. For ἐπι-
 καλεῖσθαι, *invocare*, cf. EE. 1245 b, 33
 ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους.

μοχθηρία, i.e. ἀκολασία, κακία.

φαῦλαι δὲ κ.τ.λ., cf. 1147 b, 25
 ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν.

§ 6. **τῶν ψεκτῶν**. There seems to
 be a slight inconsistency between this
 and 1148 a, 28 ψέγονται...τῷ πῶς καὶ
 ὑπερβάλλειν. The explanation is to
 be found above 1148 a, 3. We may
 say that τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς in such matters
 ψέγεται ὡς ἀμαρτία but not ὡς κακία.
 It is thus not really τῶν ψεκτῶν.

προσ επιτιθέντες κ.τ.λ., 'they call
 it ἀκρασία with the additional quali-
 fication περὶ ἕκαστον, *in a given thing*.'
 Here again περὶ ἕκαστον is virtually =
 ἐκάστου.

οἷον κακὸν ἱατρὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Soph.*
El. 177 b, 13 ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα
 σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; εἴη δ' ἂν τις
 ἀγαθὸς ὢν σκυτεὺς μοχθηρὸς· ὥστ' ἐστὶ
 ἀγαθὸς σκυτεὺς μοχθηρὸς.

κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι
ἐκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι 10
κακεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι
ἣτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ
θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῇ
θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἓνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ 15
μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθνη
γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων
2 ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἔξεις· λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις,
οἷον τὴν ἀνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ 20
παιδιά κατεσθίειν, ἣ οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπη-
γριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώ-
πων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδιά δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐω-
3 χίαν, ἣ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις,
αἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ 25

ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ'...οὕτω κακεῖ. Cf.
1145 a, 25 n.

ἐκάστην, sc. τὴν τοῦ ἱατροῦ καὶ τὴν
τοῦ ὑποκριτοῦ κακίαν.

τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν. The ἀναλογία
is e.g. as the ἀκρατής is to the
ἀκόλαστος so is the ἀκρατής θυμοῦ to
the ὀργίλος, the ἀκρατής τιμῆς to the
φιλότιμος (in the bad sense), the
ἀκρατής κέρδους to the ἀνελεύθερος.

V. § 1. ἡδέα φύσει, the φύσει
αἰρετά of 1148 a, 24.

τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, i.e. the ἐναντία
τούτων of 1148 a, 24. We now see
why these were added to the list.

τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις κ.τ.λ. The
division is not very clear; but the
chief distinction is clearly between
'bestial' people, who have unnatural
desires 'by nature,' or 'habit,' and
'morbid' people who have unnatural
desires from disease, mental or bodily.

παραπλησίας, sc. unnatural.

§ 2. τὴν ἀνθρωπον, 'the female.'
It seems very doubtful, as Fritzsche
says, whether this can be the Lamia
of folk-lore.

τῶν...περὶ τὸν Πόντον. Cf. Pol.
1338 b, 19 πολλὰ δ' ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ
πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπο-
φαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ
τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι
κ.τ.λ. Herod. iv, 18, 106 ἀνδροφάγοι
δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι
ἡθεα, οὔτε δίκην νομίζοντες οὔτε νόμῳ
οὐδενὶ χρεόμενοι.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν. This must surely
refer to the bull. See 1149 a, 14 n.

§ 3. αὗται μὲν...αἱ δὲ... We pass
here from the strictly 'bestial' to the
'morbid.' The instances given seem
to be familiar. They probably come
from the collections made by the
school.

τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου
 τὲ ἥπαρ) αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλ-
 σεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ
 τούτοις ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει
 30 τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ
 παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν 4
 εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύου-
 σιν ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως
 ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν 5
 1149^a ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸ δ'
 ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλὴ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ
 καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα
 5 γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολα-
 σία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις
 εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, καὶ 6
 ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδε-
 δίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλό-
 10 γιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια

αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους.
 This seems to be a third class which
 may arise either from disease, or habit,
 which is a second nature.

τριχῶν τίλσεις. Victorius says
 'huic vitio virgines non paucae affines
 sunt, quae inde nullo pacto absterreri
 possunt.' Aristotle is possibly allud-
 ing to the morbid appetites connected
 with puberty and pregnancy.

§ 4. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. These
 are cases of πῆρωσις. What follows
 is quite in accordance with Aristotle's
 view of the distinction between the
 sexes. Cf. Gen. An. 737 a, 27 τὸ
 θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον,
 775 a, 15 δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὥσπερ
 ἀναπηρίαν εἶναι τὴν θηλύτητα φυσικὴν.

§ 5. ἀκρασία. We expect καὶ
 ἐγκράτεια to correspond with κρατεῖν,
 but Aristotle does not care for formal
 symmetry.

τοῦ πάθους, i.e. θυμοῦ, sc. ἀκρατῇ
 λεκτέον, ἀκρατῇ δ' ἀπλῶς οὐ λεκτέον,
 'We must call him ἀκρατής of the
 feeling, not ἀκρατής simpliciter.'

πᾶσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is the case
 where we apply the word θηριότης to
 excess of badness (ἐπιδυσφημοῦντες).
 Cf. 1145 a, 33.

§ 6. καὶ ψοφήσῃ μῦς. Cf. Pol.
 1323 a, 29 δεδιότα τὰς παραπετομένας
 μύας. The ψοφοδεής has the kind of
 fear we find in certain beasts. Soph.
 fr. 58 ἅπαντα γὰρ τοι τῷ φοβουμένῳ
 ψοφεῖ.

ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν κ.τ.λ. This is
 'morbid,' not 'natural' like the fear
 of the ψοφοδεής. The reference is to
 morbid 'antipathies' to certain ani-
 mals. Stewart quotes a fragment of
 Plutarch, εἰ ἔνιοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες ὁμῶς
 φοβοῦνται φαῦλα ἅττα, οἷον γαλῆν ἢ
 ἀλεκτρούνα ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς φανεράς αἰτίας.

γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπι-
 7 ληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν
 τινὰ ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ
 [Φάλαρις] κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφρο-
 δισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον 15
 8 ἔχειν· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἢ μὲν κατ' ἀνθρώπον ἀπλῶς
 λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ
 νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
 ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς
 δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη. 20

9 "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ
 ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν
 καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον. VI. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦττον αἰσχυρὰ
 ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε 25
 γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ
 οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον
 ἐκθέουσιν, εἴτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες,

τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, e.g. the
 Kelts. Cf. 1115 b, 28.

§ 7. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν κ.τ.λ.
 We are still discussing περὶ ποῖα ὁ
 ἀκρατής;

εἰ [Φάλαρις] κατεῖχεν. I have
 bracketed Φάλαρις on the ground that
 we know no such stories about him.
 I assume that a copyist did not
 understand the use of κατεῖχεν without
 an expressed subject and took the
 nearest name from 1148 b, 24.

§ 8. ὥσπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ. For the
 reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 56.
 The conclusion is that the ἀκρατής
 ἀπλῶς is (1) περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ μοχθηρῷ
 (i.e. ἀκολάστῳ), and therefore (2) only
 περὶ τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπον. This gives us
 another form of ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσ-
 θεσιν, viz. ἢ θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης.
 It also is only ἀκρασία καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

ἢ μὲν μοχθηρία... ἢ δὲ... For the
 'twofold use of the article' cf. 1117 a,
 12 n. The predicate of the second

clause is κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μοχθηρία
 λέγεται. For the partitive genitive in
 the singular cf. 1141 b, 24 n.

§ 9. περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, sc. (1) περὶ τὰ
 φύσει αἰρετά, (2) περὶ τὰ θηριώδη καὶ
 νοσηματώδη.

VI. § 1. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This
 section contrasts ἀκρασία in the strict
 sense (ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν) with ἢ τοῦ
 θυμοῦ. The latter requires special
 consideration; for, while it is only
 called ἀκρασία καθ' ὁμοιότητα, yet
 θυμός is a form of δρεξις coordinate
 with ἐπιθυμία, and therefore we must
 note the points of likeness and un-
 likeness. Four reasons are given to
 show that ἀκρασία θυμοῦ is the less
 disgraceful.

παρακούειν. This word (omitted
 in Bon. Ind.) is explained in de Som-
 no 458 b, 31 τὸ γὰρ παρορᾶν ἢ παρ-
 ακοῦειν ὁρῶντος ἀληθές τι καὶ ἀκούοντος,
 οὐ μέντοι τοῦτο δ' οἶεται.

πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν.
 30 οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως
 ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν
 τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλι-
 γωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ
 τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, εἰ
 35 μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν
 1149^b ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πῶς, ἢ
 δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχύων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς
 τοῦ λόγου πῶς ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, 'if there is only a knock at the door,' *si fores crepuerint*. It seems plain that ψοφεῖν is here used impersonally and that it is used in the sense which properly belongs to κόπτω.

οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας. We see, then, that its παρακούειν consists in its hearing something real, namely a judgment that so-and-so is an insult, but not what it thinks it hears, namely an order.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος...ἐδήλωσεν. Cf. Probl. 949 b, 13 διὰ τί ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μόνον, οὐσης τῆς ἀκрасίας καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργήν; ἢ ὅτι ἀκρατῆς μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τι πράττων, καὶ ἀκрасία ἡ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἀγωγή, εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπιθυμιαί ὡς ἐπίπαν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὸν λόγον, αἱ δ' ὀργαὶ μετὰ λόγου, οὐχ ὡς κελεύσαντος τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὡς δηλώσαντος τὸν προπηλακισμόν ἢ τὴν αἰτίαν.

ἢ ἡ φαντασία. Cf. Rhet. 1378 a, 31 ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὀρεξὶς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν. Like all other ὀρεκτά, τιμωρία can only move τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι. The difference between it and τὸ ἡδύ is that it implies also a φαντασία of the αἰτία which must be some form of ὀλιγωρία (καταφρόνησις, ἐπηρεασμός, ὕβρις all described Rhet. 1378 b, 14 sqq.). Now it is just here that the dependence of θυμός on τὸ

λογιστικόν comes in. Ὀλιγωρία is defined as ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον, and that is μηδενὸς ἄξιον which is not good and contributes little or nothing to what is good (Rhet. 1378 b, 12). All this θυμός must get from νοῦς. The premiss πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ is merely a generalisation of particular desires for sweet things; the premiss 'such conduct is ὕβρις' is no mere generalisation from particular feelings of resentment, but the result of deliberation. But such a premiss is not enough to justify anger. It may be that the man is beneath contempt, or that for some other reason the ὀρθὸς λόγος would prescribe the exercise of πραότης, and this is a matter for further deliberation. What we may call ἀκрасία θυμοῦ consists in not waiting for this; for the φαντασία of ὀλιγωρία is sufficient to move θυμός, and θυμός can move the body. Still the φαντασία which moves θυμός is the result of deliberation, though incomplete.

ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις. There is no contradiction in saying that a λόγος may furnish the motive of ἐπιθυμία. The example already given, πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, shows this. But it is not *the* λόγος, i.e. ὀρθὸς λόγος, which is the sense in which the word is used elsewhere in this passage.

2 ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, 5
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ 5
 πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ
 ἢ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν
 μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτοι “καὶ γὰρ οὗτος” ἔφη “τὸν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κεῖνος τὸν ἄνω- 10
 θεν,” καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας “καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ” ἔφη “ὅταν ἀνὴρ 10
 γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν.” καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ
 παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύ-
 3 σαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβου-
 λότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός,
 ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην 15
 φασίν· “δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς.” καὶ τὸν “κεστὸν
 ἱμάντα” Ὀμηρος· “πάρφασις, ἣ τ' ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ
 φρονέοντος.” ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἢ ἀκρασία
 αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ

§ 2. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς κ.τ.λ. The *second* reason.

ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even among desires the most universal are the most excusable. For the distinction between *κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίαι* and *ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι*, cf. 1118 b, 8 sqq.

τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς, sc. τῶν ἀναγκαίων. The words καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων merely explain this. I do not think that they refer to τὰ φύσει αἰρετά.

ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος κ.τ.λ. The writer of MM. seems to have taken this illustration seriously; for he adds that the plea ‘It runs in the family’ was admitted, καὶ ἀποφυγεῖν δὴ· δοκεῖν γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν. *Απομν. 431, 24 Αδρ. 128, 24*

καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος κ.τ.λ. Zell says that the same story occurs in a German Volkslied and refers to ‘Des Knaben Wunderhorn’ vol. ii, p. 269. Clearly, then, Aristotle is drawing on folk-lore for his illustrations, the stuff

of which Märchen and Fabliaux are made.

§ 3. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι κ.τ.λ. The *third* reason.

δολοπλόκου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The author of this lyrical fragment is unknown. Zell compares Sappho’s Ποικιλόθρον’ ἀθάνατ’ Ἀφρόδιτα | παῖ Δίος δολόπλοκε, λισσομαί σε. The quotations are given in the usual scrappy and abrupt way.

κεστὸν ἱμάντα. Il. xiv, 214—
 ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν ἱμάντα,

ποικίλον, ἐνθα δέ οἱ θελκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτο·

ἐνθ’ ἐνι μὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ’ ἱμερος, ἐν δ’ ὀαριστὺς

πάρφασις, ἣ τ’ ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντων.

περὶ τὸν θυμόν, i.e. τοῦ θυμοῦ. Cf. Ind. s.v. περὶ.

καὶ κακία πως. This is the point to which the whole discussion is meant to lead up. It is not κακία ἀπλῶς because it is ἀνευ προαιρέσεως.

20 κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν 4
 πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς
 ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρα-
 σία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὥς μὲν 5
 τοίνυν αἰσχύων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυ-
 25 μόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυ-
 μίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικές, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς 6
 διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ
 μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
 μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσή-
 30 ματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολα-
 σία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκό-
 λαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τι ὅλως
 ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζώων ὕβρει καὶ σι-

§ 4. ἔτι οὐδεὶς κ.τ.λ. The *fourth* reason. The argument requires that ὕβρις should be an instance of ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, but it is absurd to suppose that ὑβρίζει here means *μολχεύει*, as the old commentators do. The explanation is to be found in Rhet. 1380 a, 34 καὶ τοῖς δι' ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἡττον ὀργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πράξαι, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, ἢ δ' ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης. Now ὕβρις, 'unprovoked insult,' is a species of ὀλιγωρία, the others being καταφρόνησις and ἐπηρεασμός, and, if we substitute ὕβρις for ὀλιγωρία in the above sentence, we get the same statement as that in the text. That ὕβρις arises from ἐπιθυμία appears from another passage (Rhet. 1378 b, 23) ἐστὶ γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ. The ὀρεκτόν, then, is the *pleasure* of humiliating another, and therefore the ὀρεξις is ἐπιθυμία. It is true, of course, as Aristotle says (Rhet. 1378 b, 1) that all anger is accompanied by

the pleasure of hope; but men do not get angry for the sake of that.

εἰ οὖν οἷς κ.τ.λ. For the argument cf. 1119 a, 21 sqq.

§ 6. κατ' ἀρχάς, 1145 a, 15 sqq.

καὶ τῷ μεγέθει. This is added because we call men 'brutal' (ἐπιδυσφημοῦντες 1149 a, 4) though their desires are not generically (γένει) different from those of normal human beings, but only different in scale (μεγέθει), i.e. τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν.

τὰς πρώτας, sc. τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας καὶ φυσικάς.

εἴ τι is Bywater's certain correction of MS. εἴ τινι. Aristotle means that we speak of certain kinds of animals as ἀκόλαστα by analogy, i.e. if their desires are related to normal animal desires as those of the ἀκόλαστος are to normal human desires. This is sufficiently illustrated by the opening chapters of the *de Gen. An.*, where we read of the physiological characteristics of animals ἀ δεῖ σωφρονέστερα εἶναι (717 b, 27).

ὕβρει. Aristotle is doubtless thinking of asses. The phrase τῶν ὄνων ὑβριστότερον was proverbial.

ναμωρία καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι—οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν
οὐδὲ λογισμόν—ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαι- 35
7 νόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβε- 1150^a

σιναμωρία. The verb *σιναμωρέειν* means 'to lay waste' in Herodotos. Aristotle is probably thinking of the boar, which is described as *ἐκστατικός* καὶ *θυμώδης* in Part. An. 651 a, 4.

τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι, especially the pig, which is *εὐχερεστάτη* πρὸς πᾶσαν τροφήν τῶν ζώων. Hist. An. 596 a, 18.

οὐ γὰρ ἔχει...λογισμόν. This abrupt parenthesis adds, as by an afterthought, a reason for the statement that we do not call the brutes *σώφρονα* or *ἀκόλαστα*. It breaks the sentence in an extraordinary way, but it is characteristic of the lecture-style. Aristotle cannot mean to speak only of the exceptional brutes under discussion.

ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε κ.τ.λ. This goes closely with *εἴ τι ὅλως διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.* The negative sense of *διαφέρει* justifies *ἀλλά*. The meaning is that exceptionally lascivious, destructive and omnivorous γένη are *παρὰ φύσιν* or *τέρατα*. For the phrase *ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως* in this sense, cf. Hist. An. 488 b, 19 *γενναῖον τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως*, Rhet. 1390 b, 28 *ἐξίσταται τὰ εὐφύα γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη*. Aristotle is thinking, then, of animals that have 'run wild' or degenerated. He cannot mean to say that all brutes *ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως*, as Stewart says.

§ 7. **ἔλαττον δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This sentence is little more than a series of jottings, and we must supply the missing links as best we may. In the first place, *ἔλαττον* seems to mean *ἔλαττον κακόν* as the old commentators say. 'Brutality is a less evil than badness,' though in a man it is more terrible than in a beast; for in a beast (the words *ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀν-*

θρώπῳ imply that τὸ θηρίον is the subject of *ἔχει*) the 'better part,' i.e. *νοῦς*, is not depraved but wholly absent. It is the presence of a depraved *νοῦς* that makes the brutality of man so much more terrible and destructive than that of animals, just as a living thing, which has its *ἀρχή* *κινήσεως* in itself, is more hurtful than an inanimate thing. It only remains to explain the obscure remark *παραπλήσιον οὖν...ἐκάτερον κάκιον*. The key to this is to be found in Top. 116 a, 23 *ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ ὅπερ τότε τι* (cf. 1140 a, 7 n.) *τοῦ μὴ ἐν γένει* (sc. *αἰρετώτερον*) *οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου*. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν γένει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τὸ δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' οὐ. οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεται ὅπερ τὸ γένος ὃ μὴ τυγχάνει ἐν τῷ γένει ὄν, οἷον ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ χρώμα. Therefore, *per contra*, *ἀδικία* will be worse than ὁ ἀδικὸς ἄνθρωπος, for *ἀδικία* is ὅπερ κακόν τι, while the man is only ἀδικὸς κατὰ συμβεβηκός. In the same way *θηριότης* (which is *ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας* 1145 a, 27) is less bad than *κακία* which is ὅπερ κακόν τι. But we may look at the thing from the standpoint of another *τόπος* also; for the *ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ* is better than τὸ μὴ *ποιητικόν*, and therefore τὸ *ποιητικόν κακοῦ* is worse than τὸ μὴ *ποιητικόν*. Looked at in this way ὁ ἀδικὸς is worse than *ἀδικία*, for that which has its *ἀρχή* in itself is *ποιητικώτερον*. In the same sense *θηριότης* is 'worse' than *κακία*, for a beast can do much harm and a brutal man infinitely more. There are in fact two senses of 'worse.' The first is 'worse *per se*' and in this sense badness is worse than brutality; the second is 'worse *per accidens*' and in this sense brutality is worse than

ρώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ
 ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμ-
 βάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ
 5 φαυλότης αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή—
 παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον
 ἄδικον· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον—μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν
 κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

VII. Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ
 10 λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ ἃς ἢ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ
 σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε
 ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ
 ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡττους· τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατῆς
 ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερι-
 15 κός. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, καὶ εἰ ρέπουσι μᾶλ-
 λον πρὸς τὰς χείρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί 2
 εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ' αἱ
 ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας,
 ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς

badness. But in this sense 'worse' means ποιητικώτερον κακοῦ, and as the ποιητικὸν κακοῦ is τὸ φοβερόν, it is correctly said to be φοβερώτερον.

VII. § 1. Περὶ δὲ τὰς κ.τ.λ. We are still dealing with the question περὶ ποῖα; but now we turn from the ἡδοναί to the λύπαι. It must be borne in mind that the λύπαι in question are the pains of certain unsatisfied bodily desires.

διωρίσθη, sc. εἶναι.

ὧν οἱ πολλοί. For this criterion cf. 1118 b, 23 n.

ὁ μὲν...ὁ δὲ... For the twofold use of the article, cf. 1117 a, 12 n.

§ 2. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι κ.τ.λ. 'Necessary' pleasures, being ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα, are only necessary μέχρι τινός. The ἐπιθυμίαι which are ὀρέξεις of these pleasures, and the λύπαι which arise from these desires not being satisfied, will be characterised accord-

ingly.

ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ. The meaning must be the same as that expressed in 1118 b, 25 καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν (οἱ ἀκόλαστοι) ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. In that case αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν ἡδέων must be the μισητὰ, οἷς οὐ δεῖ χαίρειν, referred to above as οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα (αἱ δ' οὐ), while ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς must be equivalent to μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. We may paraphrase, then, ὁ διώκων τῶν ἡδέων τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἢ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καθ' ὑπερβολήν. It is to be noted that the reading καθ' ὑπερβολὰς is supported as against the more natural καθ' ὑπερβολήν by Alexander, Eth. Probl. (p. 127, 24 Bruns) αἱ μὲν γὰρ μέσαι αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς φαῦλαι.

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαί- 20
 νον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
 ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
 ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύ-
 γων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἦτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προ-
 3 αἶρεσιν.—(τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν 25
 ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπι-
 θυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χεί-
 ρων εἶναι εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν,
 ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτει ἢ
 εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὦν; διὸ ὁ ἀκό- 30
 λαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.)—τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν
 4 μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν. I read καὶ for ἢ with Aspasios. For the meaning cf. 1105 a, 31 ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This justifies the name ἀκόλαστος (lit. 'incorrigible'). It is the presence of προαίρεσις which makes him so (ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει 1150 b, 30).

§ 3. τῶν δὲ μὴ...τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. This passage breaks the continuity of the argument, but that is no reason for its excision. It is a reminder of what we have been told of the distinction between the ἀκόλαστος and the ἀκρατής, such a reminder as often occurs in lectures. It is suggested here by the remark ὥστ' ἀνίατος, which has called to mind the ἀπορία 1146 a, 31 which is now solved.

διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, sc. οἱ προαιρούμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ. The difference is explained in παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε κ.τ.λ.

εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν. Cf. above, 1148 a, 17 sqq.

εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος. This suggests a sort of ἀκολασία θυμοῦ (καθ' ὁμοιότητα of course) leading to ὕβρις.

τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, above 1150 a, 19. τὸ μὲν, i.e. τὸ φεύγειν τὰς (μετρίας)

λύπας διὰ προαίρεσιν, ὁ δὲ, i.e. ὁ διώκων τὰς (ὑπερβάλλουσας) ἡδονὰς διὰ προαίρεσιν.

μαλακίας εἶδος. It is not μαλακία ἀπλῶς, for that is not διὰ προαίρεσιν, as we shall see. Strictly it is μαλακία καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

§ 4. ἀντίκειται δὲ κ.τ.λ. To understand this section we must bear in mind that the ἐγκρατής and ἀκρατής are περὶ ἡδονάς while the καρτερικός and the μαλακός are περὶ λύπας. It has been said that there is no value in the distinction drawn here between the καρτερικός and the μαλακός, since to conquer pleasure (κρατεῖν, νικᾶν) is the same thing as to bear up against pain (ἀντέχειν, μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι). But this criticism assumes that the pain which the καρτερικός bears up against is identical with the pain of ἐπιθυμία felt by the ἐγκρατής, and there is nothing to justify any such assumption. It is true that the pain felt by the ἀκόλαστος and the ἀκρατής is simply caused by the absence of the pleasure which they desire (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή 1118 b, 32), and we could not draw any valid distinction between the victory over pleasure and the resistance

μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια
 35 ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκρά-
 1150^b τεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ 5
 ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ
 γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστίν· ὃς ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα
 μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν
 5 κάμνοντα οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὢν. ὁμοίως 6
 δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκрасίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις
 ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν,
 θαυμαστόν—ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ
 Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ

to pain on the part of the ἀκρατής. But surely pains due to the desire for excessive pleasures are not the only pains. There is a pain of hunger as well as a pain which arises from the unfulfilled desire of eating to excess. It is with this pain, accordingly, that καρτερία and μαλακία have to do. The ἐγκρατής is the man who gets the better of a desire for a positive excess of pleasure, the καρτερικός resists the desire for the absence of a positive pain when it is right to do so. It is strong desire for the excess of a particular pleasant drink (πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ) that overcomes the ἀκρατής, while it is ἡ τυχοῦσα δίψα, as Aspasios rightly says, that proves too much for the μαλακός.

§ 5. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων κ.τ.λ. The object of this section is to show that τρυφή is a form of μαλακία, contrary to the general opinion which represents it as something grand (νεανικόν).

ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, 'lets his cloak trail,' a recognised sign of τρυφή. Cf. Plato Alc. I 122 b, εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλοῦτους ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θ' ἔλξεις κ.τ.λ. Dem. F. L. § 361 διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πορεύεται

θοιμάτιον καθεὶς ἄχρι τῶν σφυρῶν. Academic gowns are sometimes worn so now for similar reasons.

§ 6. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει, i.e. the standard here too is that of οἱ πολλοί.

οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. The apodosis does not begin till 1150 b, 12 ἀλλ' εἴ τις κ.τ.λ.

ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν. For ἀλλά introducing a parenthesis followed by ἀλλά introducing the main statement, cf. 1137 a, 11 n. The examples which follow are not examples of μαλακία, for the pains are such that οἱ πολλοί would not resist them.

εἰ ἀντιτείνων, sc. ἡττᾶται.

ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης. Theodektes of Phaselis, rhetor and tragedian, belonged to Aristotle's own circle, and is often referred to. Like other tragedians of his time, he came from the school of Isokrates, and his chief characteristic was the introduction of rhetorical methods into tragedy. Cf. Haigh, Tragic Drama pp. 424-6. The Aldine scholiast tells us that the breakdown of Philoktetes was marked by the words Κόψατε τὴν ἐμὴν χεῖρα. Cf. Nauck FTG. p. 803².

Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν 10
 πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε
 Ξενοφάντῳ—ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέ-
 χεῖν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ
 φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασι-
 λεύσιν ἢ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ 15
 7 ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι,
 ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἢ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσις ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἀνά-
 παυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης
 8 ἐστίν. ἀκрасίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια. οἱ
 μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ 20
 τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πά-
 θους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται,
 οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προῖδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες
 ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμόν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὗτ'

ὁ Καρκίνου...Κερκύων. Ald. schol.
 ὁ Καρκίνος τραγικὸς ἦν· ὁ δὲ Κερκύων
 εἶχε θυγατέρα τὴν Ἀλόπην, μαθὼν δὲ
 ὅτι ἐμοιχεύθη ἡ αὐτοῦ θυγάτηρ Ἀλόπη,
 ἠρώτησεν αὐτὴν τίς ἦν ὁ μοιχεύσας, λέ-
 γων· Εἰ μοι τοῦτο ἂν εἴποις, οὐδ' ὅλως
 ἂν λυπηθῶ· εἶτα εἰπούσης τῆς Ἀλόπης
 τὸν αὐτὴν μοιχεύσαντα, οὐκ ἔτι ὁ Κερ-
 κύων ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης ἔφερε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀπελέγετο. Cf. Haigh,
 Tragic Drama, p. 431 sq.

ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, 'pent up
 laughter breaks out in one great
 guffaw.' The word ἀθρόος properly
 expresses the sudden taking effect of
 what has been slowly accumulated.
 Cf. Pol. 1307 b, 34 λανθάνει δὲ ἡ
 μετάβασις διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίνεσθαι,
 'political change is unobserved because
 it is not of a sweeping character.' In
 Hist. An. 582 b, 7 κάθαρσις ἀθρόα is a
 purge of everything that has accumu-
 lated in the body as opposed to ἡ κατ'
 ὀλίγον κάθαρσις.

Ξενοφάντῳ. Seneca de Ira ii,
 2 'Alexandrum aiunt, Xenophanto
 canente, manum ad arma misisse.'
 If Xenophantos was Alexander's

musician, this will be a reminiscence
 of court life at Pella.

ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεύσιν. See
 Hippokrates περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων
 c. 106, with Coray's notes. The
 story told by Herodotos (i, 105) was
 doubtless invented to account for
 this.

§ 7. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This
 brings out very well the difference
 between shunning (positive) pain and
 pursuing (positive) pleasure. The
 παιδιώδης does not, as is supposed,
 seek pleasure; for παιδιὰ is ἄνεσις
 (cf. 1127 b, 33 sqq.), rest or relaxation
 from labour. The man who is too
 fond of amusement is not a pleasure-
 seeker, but merely one who cannot
 bear up against the pain of work.

§ 8. ἀκрасίας...τὸ μὲν...τὸ δέ...
 Cf. 1110 b, 22 n. In the case of the
 ἀσθενεῖς (οἱ μὲν), βούλευσις is present,
 though not βούλησις, in the case
 of the προπετεῖς both are absent.

ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες. As
 Stewart says, the reference must be
 to "a tickling-match in which the
 aggressor has the advantage." Cf.

25 ἂν ἡδὺν ἢ οὐτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοί τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

VIII. Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πάς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος ὁ δ' ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἶον ὑδέρω καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς
35 πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.
1151^a αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον
ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ

Probl. 965 a, 11 διὰ τί αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὐθεὶς γαργαλίζει; ἢ ὅτι καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἦττον ἐὰν προαίσθηται, μᾶλλον δ' ἂν μὴ ὀρᾷ; ὥσθ' ἡκιστα γαργαλισθήσεται ὅταν μὴ λανθάνῃ τοῦτο πάσχω. The προπετεῖς are like those who are tickled unawares; if they had known the πάθος was coming it would not have affected them.

μελαγχολικοί, 'excitable,' 'hot-headed.' According to early medical theory excitability of this kind was produced by the heating of the 'black bile.' The word μελαγχολᾶν was quite common in the sense of 'to be crazy' (cf. Aristophanes, Birds 14, Ploutos 12, 366, 903). Aristotle uses it in the popular sense. The theory of the 'four temperaments,' which makes its appearance first in Galen, in time gave the word a different meaning. Here it corresponds to the 'choleric' and 'sanguine' as opposed to the 'bilious' and 'phlegmatic.' We may gather the explanation of the προπέτεια of μελαγχολικοί from de Memor. 453 a, 19 τούτους γὰρ φαντάσματα κινεῖ μάλιστα. Now-a-days we say

'nervous,' but Aristotle had never heard of nerves.

VIII. § 1. Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ. We now pass from the first question περὶ ποῖα ὁ ἀκρατὴς; to the second question πῶς ἔχων (1115 a, 5 n.). If we take this as the subject of the present chapter, it will be found that the connexion of thought is sufficiently clear.

ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, 1150 a, 21.

ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, 1146 a, 31 sqq. λανθάνει, sc. τὸν ἔχοντα.

§ 2. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, sc. τῶν ἀκρατῶν, to be supplied from ἀκρασία. The connexion is quite straightforward; for the subject of the chapter is πῶς ἔχων ἀκρατεύεται τις.

οἱ ἐκστατικοί, i.e. οἱ προπετεῖς, οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1145 b, 11 n.

οἱ...μὴ ἐμμένοντες, i.e. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς.

ἡττῶνται, sc. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς.

ὅμοιος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The ἀσθενής, then, possesses the characteristics of the ἀκρατὴς in the most distinct form and is the typical ἀκρατὴς. The προπετῆς is not the ἀκρατὴς we are studying just now.

ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου
 3 οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ 5
 ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως). τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν
 ἀλλ' ὁμοίον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μι-
 λησίους "Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ
 ἀξύνετοι," καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῦσι δέ. 10
 4 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν
 τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωμα-
 τικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος
 διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὐ·

1151 a, 11. Cf. EE. 1227 b, 12. τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων,
 λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ
 τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισι,
 τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια. αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν
 λόγον. ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. λεκτέον δ' ὕστερον περὶ
 αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέχειν ἡ ἀρετὴ, τοῦτο
 αἷτιον. ἡ μὲν <γὰρ> ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δ' ἡ
 ἐγκράτεια. λέγομεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν
 ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν. ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν
 σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ
 μηδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν
 σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλ-
 λογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὔτε
 γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε
 ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή. ὁμοίως δ'
 οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους. ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἰ
 ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.
 ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ
 ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν

§ 3. ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως, cf. κακία πως
 1149 b, 20. By πῇ we must under-
 stand ἡ πρακτικὴ τῶν κακῶν.

ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου. Bergk-
 Crusius p. 47,—

Καὶ τόδε Δημοδόκου· Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι
 μὲν

οὐκ εἰσίν· δρῶσιν δ' οἷαπερ ἀξύνετοι.

§ 4. ὁ μὲν, sc. ὁ ἀκρατής.

διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. It is his
 ἦθος that makes them his φαινόμενον
 ἀγαθόν.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν, 'it is, on the
 contrary, the former that—.' The
 corrective particles μὲν οὖν mark this
 as the direct answer to the ἀπορία.

15 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ

νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἢ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἶη τὸ τέλος ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἔνεκα τινός. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἢ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἔνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἔνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως [οὐ] ἢ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκα πράττει ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δὲ τις, ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὃν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακτεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά, τοῦναντίον ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἢ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκούσια.

1151 a, 17. EE. 1227 a, 8 περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλευέται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις.

We have only to change the acts of the ἀκρατής and not his character. Therefore he can be cured.

ὥσπερ...αἱ ὑποθέσεις, sc. ἀρχαί. The second interpretation suggested by Professor Stewart, though with some doubt, seems to be certainly right. An ὑπόθεσις in mathematics is certainly the assumption of the thing to be proved or the thing to be done from which an analytical proof starts. Cf. 1112 b, 20 ἀναλύειν... ὥσπερ διάγραμμα and the note there. It should be added that Eudemos (loc. cit.) certainly took the words in

this sense; for he gives as an example εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. We have seen already that in the phrase τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν (1144 a, 24) and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον (1139 b, 23 n.) the ὑπόθεσις is the Q. E. F. of the problem, which has to be analysed till we come to a construction which is in our power. Similarly in a theorem the ὑπόθεσις is the Q. E. D. assumed as true and analysed till we come either to something already demonstrated or to an axiom, or to something contradictory of these ("absurd"), in

ἡ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ
 5 τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκ- 20
 στατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν
 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦ-
 του οἶον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδο-
 νὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων <ὦν> τοῦ
 ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπλῶς· σφύζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, 25
 ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενεντικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικός
 διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία
 ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

ΙΧ. Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ
 ὁποιοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατής δὲ 30
 ὁ ὁποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ
 τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ
 ἠπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιοῦν,

which case the contradictory of the hypothesis is proved. This method was first formulated by Plato (Cantor, *Vorlesungen* I p. 189 sq.).

οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Professor Stewart thinks this sentence "may be thought to point the other way," i.e. to favour the interpretation of *ὑπόθεσις* as equivalent to definitions and axioms. But the word ἀρχή, 'starting point,' is wide enough to cover the hypothesis of an analytical proof (cf. last note), and such an hypothesis is not based upon any 'ground' (λόγος). The figures into which the *διάγραμμα* has to be analysed are given by mathematical intuition (cf. 1142 a, 28 n.).

ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή, grammar requires us to supply *διδασκαλική ἐστι*, but nothing more is really meant than *κυρία ἐστίν*. There is nothing unusual in a zeugma like this, and the sentence does not force us to believe that ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ is able *διδάσκειν*. As to *φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ* cf. 1144 b, 1 sqq. People are born with a tendency to aim at the right end, the right ἀρχή

naturally presents itself to them, but ἐθισμός is required to fix ὀρεξις in a certain ἦθος.

§ 5. ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἶον πεπεῖσθαι...δεῖν. This sums up admirably Aristotle's teaching as to the relation between ἦθος and διάνοια. It is ἦθος (τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι) that makes pleasure the *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* of the ἀκόλαστος. Then διάνοια formulates this as a λόγος ἐνεκά τινος, δεῖν τούτου ἐνεκα πάντα πράττειν (cf. 1140 b, 18).

ΙΧ. § 1. Πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The λύσις of the ἀπορία raised 1146 a, 16 sqq.

τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ κ.τ.λ. I have followed Bywater in adopting the reading of L^b. For another view, see Stewart's note.

κατὰ...συμβεβηκός. The ἐγκρατής may abide by a λόγος which as a matter of fact is false (ὃ συμβαίνει ψευδεῖ εἶναι), but only because he thinks it true. He abides by something which happens to be untrue, but only because he thinks it leads to something which he is seeking καθ' αὐτό.

καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
 35 ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ
 1151^b αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται,
 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
 καθ' αὐτό. ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιαοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει
 ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἀληθεί. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ 2
 5 ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσὶν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον
 δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἱ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχουσι
 τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς
 τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
 πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἐγκρατής], ἐπεὶ
 10 εὐπείστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἱ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ
 λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες 3
 καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι'
 ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μετα-
 15 πείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὥσπερ
 ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εἰκότασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγ-
 κρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' 4

εἰ γάρ τις κ.τ.λ. Suppose, for instance, that a man thinks he ought to work a certain number of hours every day, which is really too much for him, are we to call him ἐγκρατής for sticking to his resolution though the λόγος is false? The answer is in the affirmative; for the number of hours he works is merely a means to an end, and it is really the true λόγος of the end that he abides by καθ' αὐτό.

§ 2. ἰσχυρογνώμονας. The word does not occur in earlier literature.

ἐπεὶ εὐπείστος κ.τ.λ. You may change the views of the ἐγκρατής, on occasion, by argument; it is desire that he cannot be changed by. On the contrary, it is just argument that has no effect on the obstinate; to desires and pleasures they are much more susceptible.

§ 3. ἰδιογνώμονες. Cf. Phrynichos

(com.) Μονότροπος fr. 1, Ζῶ δὲ Τίμωνος βίον | ἀγέλαστον, ἀδιάλεκτον, ἰδιογνώμονα.

οἱ ἄγροικοι. Cf. Rhet. 1395 a, 6 οἱ γὰρ ἄγροικοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι καὶ ῥαδίως ἀποφαίνονται.

ἄκυρα...ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα. Cf. e.g. Dem. c. Aristocr. § 92 ἄκυρόν ἐστι τὸ ψήφισμα· προβούλευμα γὰρ ἐστίν, ὁ νόμος δ' ἐπέτεια κελεύει τὰ τῆς βουλῆς εἶναι ψηφίσματα. In Attic law ἄκυρος means "null and void."

ὥστε μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Obstinance is rather a form of ἀκρασία than of ἐγκράτεια, for the obstinate are those who cannot resist the desire for the pleasure of victory.

§ 4. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες κ.τ.λ. We have seen that there are cases of τὸ ἐμμένειν which are not ἐγκράτεια, we now see that there are cases of τὸ μὴ ἐμμένειν which are not ἀκρασία.

ἀκрасίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεο-
πτόλεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ
γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσ- 20
σέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὗτ'
ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὗτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχροῦ.

- 5 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σω-
ματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ [τοιοῦτος]
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρα- 25
τῆς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ
τὸ ἦττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον με-
ταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέ-
ρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἔξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνον-
ται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι 30
φανερὰν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον
6 εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκрасίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ
σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὃ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατής
οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς 35
ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων 1152^a
φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδεσθαι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἡδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες,
ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ 5
οἶόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶόμενος. X. οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ

καίτοι δι' ἡδονήν. We know already that to the good man αἱ καλαὶ πράξεις are ἡδεῖται καθ' αὐτάς (1099 a, 7 sqq.); we shall see presently in what sense the good man may be said to act δι' ἡδονήν.

§ 5. ὁ [τοιοῦτος] τούτου. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 57. The discussion of the question πῶς ἔχων; ends as usual with an examination of the relation between the mean and the extremes (πῶς ἀντίκεινται;) Cf. 1108 b, 11 n.

διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι...διὰ τὸ ἦττόν τι, sc. τοῦ δέοντος τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν.

This new type of character is the man who knows that he ought to take more bodily pleasures, but whose desires are not strong enough. Of course οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον is the regular Attic idiom for δι' οὐδέτερον.

διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν κ.τ.λ. For this αἰτία, cf. 1109 a, 10 n.

§ 6. ἠκολούθηκεν, 'it is a natural consequence that we speak of the ἐγκράτεια of the σώφρων.' This is the λύσις of the ἀπορία raised by the fact that some use the terms συγκεχυμένως (1145 b, 16).

X. § 1. οὐδ' ἅμα κ.τ.λ. The

ἀκρατῇ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ
 σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὧν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον 2
 φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατῆς οὐ πρακτικός
 10 —τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῇ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν
 ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δει-
 νότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς
 πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, δια-
 φέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν—οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεω- 3
 15 ρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρό-
 πον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ·
 ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικός οἷς ἂν
 βουλευέσθαι, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικός ὅλως. καὶ
 20 ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατῆς πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ
 δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρήται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ
 Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένη. 4
 25 ἔστι δ' ἀκрасία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν

λύσις of the ἀπορία caused by some people using the word φρόνιμος of the ἀκρατῆς (1145 a, 17).

δέδεικται, 1144 b, 30.

§ 2. τῷ πρακτικός, sc. εἶναι.

τὸν δὲ δεινὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 a, 23 sqq. This is one of Aristotle's long parentheses. And yet the parenthesis contains the λύσις.

κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον, 'in definition.' The difference is that the one is a mere δύναμις, while the other implies προαίρεσις. If we define the φρόνιμος in the same way as the δεινός, we lay ourselves open to the ἐνστασις, εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἔθηκεν (Top. 126 b, 4). For δύναμις and προαίρεσις cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 3. οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ., closely with ὁ δ' ἀκρατῆς οὐ πρακτικός above.

ἐκὼν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has already refused to allow that τὰ δι' ἐπι-

θυμίαν are ἀκούσια.

ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής. Difficulties have been made about this, but really there is none; for προαίρεσις does not mean only an isolated act of choice, but is often used in the sense of ἔξις προαιρετική. Now, in this sense, the προαίρεσις of the ἀκρατῆς is good; but it is prevented from becoming an efficient cause of action by the fact that ἐπιθυμία is for the time stronger than βούλησις.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος. Cf. 1135 b, 20.

ὁ μὲν γάρ, sc. ὁ ἀσθενής, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός, i.e. ὁ προπετής.

χρήται δὲ οὐδέν. This is a standing complaint in the comic poets and Demosthenes. Cf. 1141 b, 27 n.

Ἀναξανδρίδης, fr. incert. 16.

§ 4. τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως, cf. 1118 b, 23 n.

πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἥττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν ἦν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος 30 χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐηνος λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

5 τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλ- 35 λήλας, εἴρηται.

XI. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολι- 1152^b τικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς 2 λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ 5 λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι

τῶν φυσικῶν, i.e. τῶν φύσει, which Ramsauer reads.

τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, cf. de Mem. 452 a, 27 ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος ('habit is a second nature').

Εὐηνος. Cf. Bergk-Crusius p. 134.

XI. § 1. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ. That Eudemos regarded a discussion of pleasure as a necessary supplement to the discussion of ἀκρασία is proved by EE. 1231 b, 2 ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. From this it has been inferred that the present book is 'Eudemian,' but it may also be inferred that Eudemos followed Aristotle's order of treatment. And the latter inference is far more probable; for, as we shall see, the views criticised are distinctly those of Speusippos, which must have lost some of their 'actuality' by the time of Eudemos. The connexion of thought I take to be this: We have found that ἀκρασία

and ἀκολασία are bad, and that they are due to desire for pleasure. Are we to say, then, that pleasure is bad?

τοῦ...φιλοσοφοῦντος. The discussion opens, however, with a general statement that the political philosopher must consider pleasure and pain. This is quite in Aristotle's way. He is always anxious to show that he is keeping in view the practical end of this ἀκράσις, and discussions which are necessary for other reasons are introduced by a series of remarks as to their practical bearing on statesmanship. A notable instance is the beginning of Book III (where see notes).

ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς. If we say a thing is 'good' *simpliciter*, we mean good in relation to the chief end. If we mean 'good' for anything else, we must 'add' what it is good for. It is then ἀγαθὸν κατὰ πρόσθεσιν.

§ 2. ἔθεμεν, 1104 b, 8 sqq.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν
 ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι 3
 ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι
 10 ταῦτόν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ
 πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν,
 ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν 4
 οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή,

ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, ὅλον ὡς ἂν εἴποις
 μάλα χαίροντα (Asp. 142, 7). It is
 quite possible that Aristotle had this
 etymology in his mind; for it is quite
 in his style (cf. 1132 a, 32, 1140 b,
 11, Bon. Ind. s.v. Etymologica).

§ 3. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is
 not the Cynic view, as is commonly
 said. In spite of his catchword
μανεῖην μάλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην (RP. 217 A),
 Antisthenes said *ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς*
πόνους διωκτέον ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν
πόνων, and *τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι*
φάσκων προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον
 (Athen. 513). He would therefore
 admit that *ἡδονή* might be incidentally
 good. It was Speusippos who first
 held pleasure and pain to be two
 evils opposed to each other and to
 the good (1108 b, 13 n.). Aulus
 Gellius ix, 5 'Speusippus vetusque
 omnis academia voluptatem et do-
 lorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita
 inter sese.'

τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι κ.τ.λ. This second
ἐνδοξον seems to be meant for that of
 Plato in the *Philebos*, where 'pure' or
 'unmixed' pleasures (i.e. pleasures
 not implying pain) are distinguished
 from 'mixed' or 'impure' pleasures.

εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι κ.τ.λ. This is the
 conclusion to which Aristotle himself
 comes in Book X, and is in agreement
 with the conclusion of the *Philebos*.
 Cf. 1172 b, 28 sqq.

§ 4. ὅλως μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Six
 arguments (each introduced as usual
 by ἔτι) for the *first* view, that no
 pleasure is good. The arguments

cannot be those of Antisthenes; for
 they are Platonic in character and
 presuppose the *Philebos*. On the
 other hand they are not the arguments
 of the *Philebos* itself. Therefore they
 must be the arguments of a follower
 of Plato.

γένεσις...εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, 'a felt
 process to a normal state.' Fritzsche's
 conjecture ('rationem habet alius
 philosophi, Platonis asseclae cuiusdam
 (Speusippi?), qui erat hostis volup-
 tatum et non solum res, sed verba
 etiam multa a Platonis *Philebo* in sua
 scripta transtulerat') evidently hits
 the mark. So too Grant: "In all
 probability the school, and perhaps
 the actual writings, of Speusippus are
 here referred to." Plato did not
 regard all pleasures as *γενέσεις*, but
 only the 'impure' or 'mixed.' On
 the other hand the definition is
 evidently based on the *πληρώσεις αἰσ-*
θηταί of *Phileb.* 51 b. We find the
 definition given as sufficient for rhe-
 torical purposes in *Rhet.* 1369 b, 33
ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν
κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν
ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν
φύσιν. So too *Probl.* 878 b, 11 *ἢ εἰς*
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδύ ἐστιν, ἐὰν ᾗ
αἰσθητή.

εἰς φύσιν. The use of *φύσις* in the
 sense of 'normal state' also points to
 Speusippus. Cf. *Clem. Strom.* ii, 21
 (RP. 288 A) *Σπεύσιππος...τὴν εὐδαι-*
μονίαν φησὶν ἔξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς
κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν...ἧς δὴ καταστά-
σεως ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους ὁρεξιν ἔχειν.

οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος 15 τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία 5 καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, 20 ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραί·

οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενῆς κ.τ.λ.

This argument is taken from Plato with just such modifications of terminology as we should expect from Speusippos. Cf. Phileb. 53 c ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὥς αἰετὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς;... 54 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται ἂν... τό γε μὴν οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον αἰετὶ γίγνεται ἂν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ (i.e. γένει) ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὧς ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

οἷον κ.τ.λ. Cf. the illustration in Phileb. 54 b πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας;

ἔτι ὁ σώφρων κ.τ.λ. That Speusippos used this argument has already been shown to be highly probable (1104 b, 24 n.), and, if he did, the necessity for discussing his view of pleasure at the present stage becomes apparent.

ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος κ.τ.λ. Cf. Clem. Strom. (loc. cit.) Σπεύσιππος φησι... στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀσχλησίας, [Plat.] Def. 412 c ἀλυπία ἔστι καθ' ἣν ἀνέμπτωτοί ἐσμεν εἰς λύπας.

ἔτι ἐμπόδιον κ.τ.λ. This really comes from Plato, Phd. 65 a τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὗ; κ.τ.λ. 66 c (just after ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν.) ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων

παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. The similarity of language is too striking to be accidental, and yet in the Phaedo it is not specially pleasure that is ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν, but the body. The natural inference is that a follower of Plato made use of the Phaedo in drawing an indictment against pleasure.

ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is just as clearly based on the Gorgias 462 b sqq., where rhetoric and other arts which aim at τὸ ἡδύ instead of τὸ βέλτιστον are declared not to be arts, but merely ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή... χάριτος τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας. Here again a Platonic argument, which has a different purpose in Plato, is used as part of an indictment against pleasure.

ἔτι παιδία κ.τ.λ. Here again we may compare Gorgias 464 d ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιὸν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν... πότερος ἐπατεῖ περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρὸν. The general impression, then, which we get from these six arguments is that they are Platonic materials worked up into an indictment against pleasure, and some of the arguments seem safely attributable to Speusippos.

§ 5. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας κ.τ.λ. An argument for the *second* ἔνδοξον.

νοσώδη γὰρ ἓνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταύτ' ἐστίν.

- 25 XII. "Οτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι
30 τινὶ δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἵρεται τῷδε, ἓναι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἵρεται, <ἀπλῶς> δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἔνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, 2 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεΐαι

ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον κ.τ.λ. An argument for the *third* ἔνδοξον. These two are dismissed shortly; for they do not immediately concern us at present. Our task now is to examine the thesis that all pleasure is bad *per se*.

XII. § 1. "Οτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. We have now three ἐνστάσεις to the *first* argument, οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσι. As usual, the first two are mainly dialectical, but lead up to the third, which is the real λύσις.

μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον. This is added for dialectical purposes. If the argument fails even to disprove that pleasure is the best, it fails *a potiori* to disprove that it is good. This point is taken up 1153 b, 7 sqq., and is the real reason why the *third* ἔνδοξον is mentioned at all.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. The position that no pleasure is good because it is a γένεσις and not a τέλος is first attacked by the τόπος of τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον. The word 'good' is ambiguous and therefore, even if we are justified in saying 'no pleasure is good' in one sense of the word, we may be wrong if we take the other sense of it. It may be true that no

pleasure is ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, but it does not follow that no pleasure is ἀγαθόν τινι, and even pleasures which are not ἀγαθόν τινι may possibly be ἀγαθόν ποτε.

ἀκολουθήσουσιν, 'it will follow that they also are called good in an ambiguous sense.' If a term is ambiguous, it will be predicated ambiguously of every subject. 'Good' is ambiguous, so therefore will 'good ἕξις' and 'good γένεσις' be.

αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί κ.τ.λ. This is a different point. Certain γενέσεις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθηταί which are obviously not good are not pleasures at all, though τῷδε (τῷ κάμνοντι) and ποτέ (ἐν ταῖς νόσοις) they appear to be so.

§ 2. ἔτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This argument is not so dialectical as the last. It depends upon the view of the good as an ἐνέργεια as opposed to the definition of it by the Academy as a ἕξις (cf. 1098 a, 6 n.). Besides the form of κίνησις which is merely γένεσις (κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν), there is another, namely ἐνέργεια, which implies that the ἕξις is complete.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κ.τ.λ. The pleasures which Speusippos takes as typical are only pleasant *per accidens*.

εἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου 35
 ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν
 ἡδοναί, οἷον ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν [ἐνέργεια], τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς 1153^a
 οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρου-
 μένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας
 μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις·
 καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ 5
 οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλ-
 3 ληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ
 τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέ-
 σεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμ- 10
 βαίνουνσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι,
 ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ

αἱ καθιστᾶσαι. This term was used by Speusippos (Clem. Strom. loc. cit. ἥς δὴ καταστάσεως... ὁρεξιν ἔχειν) and he took it from Plato, cf. Phileb. 42 d *εἰς δὲ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῇται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀποδεξόμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.*

τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως (i.e. φυσικῆς ἕξεως), 'the normal state which remains unimpaired.' The best commentary is the phrase τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιούς 1154 b, 18. The desires which are gratified by the pleasure of restoration to a normal state are the desires of so much of us as has remained normal.

ἐπεὶ καί, 'for that matter,' 'for the matter of that.' We shall see that there are pleasures which are independent of desire and do not therefore imply pain or a disturbance of the normal state.

ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, sc. ἡδονή. K^b has ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργεια and L^b αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι. But Aspasio says οἷον αἱ θεωρητικαί (sc. ἡδοναί).

§ 3. **ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ.** The third and decisive ἐνστασις. We must substitute ἐνέργεια for κίνησις. We

need not discuss whether this is or is not 'inconsistent' with Book X, where the ἡδονή is distinguished from the ἐνέργεια which it accompanies. Aristotle is dealing here with the argument of Speusippos, and he only modifies his statement so far as is necessary for his immediate purpose.

ἕτερόν τι... βέλτιον, sc. τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν.

τὸ τέλος, sc. βέλτιον εἶναι.

οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, e.g. αἱ θεωρητικαί. Aristotle does not deny that some pleasures are accompanied by a γένεσις, though he does deny that any pleasure is a γένεσις.

χρωμένων, sc. ἡμῶν. We have seen that χρήσις (opp. ἔξις) is equivalent to ἐνέργεια (cf. 1098 b, 32 n.), and that it was an Academic term.

τῶν... ἀγομένων, i.e. τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν ἀγομένων, 'the pleasures of those who are being led etc.'

τὴν τελέωσιν... τῆς φύσεως. Here again we have the terminology of Speusippos. Cf. Clem. Strom. (loc. cit.) ἔξις τελεία ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι.

οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως,
 15 ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τισιν
 εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται
 εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια 4
 ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν.
 ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο,
 20 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἐμποδίζει 5
 δὲ οὔτε φρονήσκει οὔθ' ἔξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ'

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον. The reasons for altering the genus in the definition of Speusippos have been given in full. We expect, of course, that this will involve a change in the differentia; for there is no reason to suppose that the differentiae of the genus ἐνέργεια will be the same as those of the genus γένεσις. No reason, however, is given for the choice of the particular differentia ἀνεμπόδιστος. The word only occurs elsewhere in Pol. 1295 a, 35 εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Now, as Stewart points out, ἀνεμπόδιστον there is equivalent to τέλειον, and τελεία and ἀτελής are often used as differentiae of ἐνέργεια. This must have been in Aristotle's mind, but the full meaning of the τελείωσις of an ἐνέργεια is not worked out till Book X.

δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show what a very ambiguous thing the γένεσις argument is. Some, and (if Grant is right in thinking the Cyrenaics are meant) just the very thinkers from whom Plato took the view that ἡδονή is a γένεσις, had asserted it to be a γένεσις just because it was good. The reference of this to the Cyrenaics seems to me certain (cf. also Zeller, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. I, 176). It is in Plato's ironical way to take his argument against pleasure from the hedonist Aristippos, and it is characteristic of Aristotle to insist on the

equivocal nature of the argument. According to the Cyrenaics the good was to be found only in the feeling of the moment, and feeling is motion rising into consciousness (κίνησις εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένη). Since, then, pleasure is the good it must be a κίνησις. But pain is also a κίνησις, so pleasure must be what the Cyrenaics called the λεία κίνησις and compared τῷ λείῳ κύματι, τῷ οὐρίῳ ἀνέμῳ. This Plato interprets as κίνησις εἰς φύσιν or κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν, by the help of the (Megarian) distinction between γένεσις and οὐσία. It is therefore quite correct to say that the Cyrenaics held pleasure to be a γένεσις just because it was the good. Aristotle points out that what they were trying to express was that it is an ἐνέργεια. It is worth noting that Speusippos had written against Aristippos. Cf. D. L. iv, 4 καταλέλοιπε δὲ πάμπλειστα ὑπομνήματα καὶ διαλόγους πλείονας, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀριστιππον τὸν Κυρηναῖον.

§ 4. τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. The answer to the *fourth* argument, preceded by a remark of even wider application.

τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'is the same as (to say that wholesome things are bad) because (ὅτι) some wholesome things stand in the way of making money.'

κατὰ γε τοῦτο, 'this does not prove them bad in themselves.'

§ 5. φρονήσκει...ἔξει. These words are of course used in the sense given

αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον
 6 ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι
 ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλ-
 λης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· 25
 καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδο-
 7 νῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον
 διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὰ παῖδιά καὶ τὰ θηρία διώ-
 κειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ
 ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας 30
 καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παῖδιά διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἄλυπίαν
 ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωμα-
 τικάς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται), καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ'
 ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας,
 ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρωνος. XIII. ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅτι καὶ 1153^b
 ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς
 κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον

to them by the Academy. Writing in his own person Aristotle would have substituted σοφία...ἐνεργεία.

§ 6. τὸ δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ. The ἐνστασις to the *fifth* argument. No art produces an ἐνέργεια but only a δύναμις. The art of medicine makes a man able to heal, but it does not produce the act of healing. For that προαίρεσις also is required. Cf. MM. 1208 b, 1 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τὴν χρῆσιν παραδίδωσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἕξιν. For the relation of δύναμις to προαίρεσις in art, cf. 1127 b, 14 n. It is a favourite τόπος in dialectical arguments, which this is shown to be by the words εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν (cf. 1099 b, 12 n.).

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle too remembers the passage in the Gorgias. Cf. 1152 b, 18 n.

§ 7. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορίαι raised by the *second, third* and *sixth* arguments are all solved by the same λύσις, namely our distinction between pleasures good in themselves

and pleasures which are not so. It is the excess of the latter alone to which the statements in question really apply.

εἴρηται, above 1148 a, 22 sq. 2

XIII. § 1. ἀλλὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The main position of Speusippos is now attacked from the τόπος of τὸ ἐναντίον. The position is thus stated in Aulus Gellius ix, 5 'Speusippus...voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse...opposita inter sese, bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret.' It is admitted, then, that pain is an evil.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. All pain is ἀπλῶς κακόν, though some pain may be ἀγαθόν τινι, e.g. the pain of a surgical operation. Even that, however, though incidentally good, is bad τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική (sc. εἶναι), i.e. κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ κ.τ.λ. The argument is based on the rule given in Top. 123 b, 5 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει, ἅπερ ἡ ἐναντίον τι τῷ γένει. Now κακόν is a genus,

ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν
5 ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ
λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ
γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τᾶριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἐνίαι 2
φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων

and it has a genus opposite to it, namely ἀγαθόν (see next note), therefore the opposite of every κακόν τι will be ἀγαθόν τι.

ἢ φευκτόν τι κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to add this; for of course both pleasure and pain are opposite to ἀλυσία as στέρησις and ἔξις (see next note), but that means merely that ἢ πάθη they are opposed to ἀπάθεια.

ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν κ.τ.λ. This λύσις, though without the name of Speusippos, is more fully stated in Book X (1173 a, 6 sqq.).

ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον κ.τ.λ. This illustration is inapplicable because τὸ μείζον, τὸ ἴσον and τὸ ἐλάττον are not instances of ἐναντία in the strict sense. They are not contraries, but 'relative opposites' (ἀντικείμενα ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι), i.e. αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων λέγεται (Cat. 6 a, 36). Thus τὸ μείζον is μείζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος and τὸ ἐλάττον is ἐλάττον τοῦ μείζονος, and it is only in that sense that they are opposites. The opposition of the greater or less to the equal is of another kind still. Together they make up τὸ ἀνισόν and are opposed as ἔξις and στέρησις (on the whole subject, see Met. x, 5). It is in this way that badness is opposed to badness and also to goodness (cf. 1108b, 11 n.); but pointing to cases like this does not get us out of the difficulty; for they do not show that the same thing can have more than one opposite κατὰ ταῦτόν, i.e. ἢ φευκτόν τι ἢ κακόν as in the present case.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη κ.τ.λ. To make his λύσις complete, he would have to say that τὸ κακόν was predicated of

pleasure ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι (on ὅπερ...τι cf. 1140 a, 7 n.), i.e. that it was its genus. For pleasure cannot be in contrary opposition to the good unless it is either (1) ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, (2) ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει, (3) αὐτὸ γένος. The second possibility is alone in question here, and so unless pleasure is a species of τὸ κακόν it cannot be the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν. But Speusippos will not say this; for he would then have to say also that pain is ὅπερ ἀγαθόν τι. Further Speusippos himself gives γένεσις as the genus of pleasure, and the same species cannot be in two genera neither of which contains or is contained in the other (cf. 1140 a, 5 n.). To make κακόν the genus either of pleasure or pain would be to take the διαφορά for the γένος.

§ 2. Τᾶριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 58. This is an argument *a fortiori* and is strictly *ad hominem*. So far from the definition of ἡδονή as a γένεσις proving that it is not good, it fails even to prove that it is not the highest good. Indeed if we substitute, as we must, ἐνέργεια for γένεσις, it will be hard to resist the inference that pleasure is the highest good. We shall find Aristotle's own teaching about this in Book X. At present we are only getting rid of the idea, which the account given of ἀκρασία might suggest, that all pleasure is bad.

ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'just as there is nothing to prevent some form of knowledge being the highest good.' The Platonists say that the highest

οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν 10
 ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαι-
 μονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἡ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἵρετωτάτην
 εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ
 ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν,
 ἀπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον 15
 εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως·
 οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία
 τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι
 ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζεται
 3 ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις 20

good is a kind of knowledge, though they admit that some kinds of ἐπιστήμη are bad. This is distinctly *ad hominem*; for Aristotle would not admit that any ἐπιστήμη as such is bad. As a δύναμις, it is of course τῶν ἐναντίων, but the προαίρεσις must be taken into account. In itself (καθ' αὐτό), ἐπιστήμη is always of the good (1094 a, 1 n.), and only of the bad κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. The first argument. Εὐδαιμονία is some form of unimpeded activity, all pleasure is unimpeded activity, therefore εὐδαιμονία is some form of pleasure. The purpose of this argument is to show that, if we substitute ἐνέργεια for ἕξις in the Academic definition of εὐδαιμονία, as we must (cf. 1098 a, 5 sqq.), and also substitute ἐνέργεια for γένεσις in the definition of pleasure (cf. 1152 b, 13 sqq.), we shall be driven to the conclusion that εὐδαιμονία is ἡδονή τις. The clause εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν...εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν is added to show that the conclusion is necessary even if we define εὐδαιμονία as the ἐνέργεια of only one ἕξις, i.e. as ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀρετὴν (1098 a, 17).

εἰ ἔτυχεν, 'if you like.' Cf. 1113 a, 19.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. The second

B. A.

argument. Εὐδαιμονία is a τέλειος ἐνέργεια, τέλειος ἐνέργεια is ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια, therefore εὐδαιμονία is ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια, i.e. ἡδονή. It is just for this reason that external goods are necessary to happiness; for they insure that the activity will be 'unimpeded.'

πάντες...οἴονται. Cf. 1099 a, 7 sqq. ἐμπλέκουσι. This word is only used here in Aristotle, though συμπλέκειν is common (1119 b, 30 n.).

εὐλόγως, cf. Ind. s. v.

τῶν τελείων. Cf. 1097 a, 28 sqq.

προσδεῖται, cf. 1099 a, 15 n. 7.

ταῦτα, accusative, 'that he may not be impeded in these ways.' Cf. for the internal accusative Ar. 'Wasps' 333 τίς γάρ ἐσθ' ὁ ταῦτά σ' εἰργων;

§ 3. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον κ.τ.λ. We do not know who proposed this θέσις. Cicero (Tusc. v, 9) tells us that Theophrastos in his work *de vita beata* (i.e. περὶ εὐδαιμονίας) 'multa disputat quamobrem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non potest. in eo etiam putatur dicere *in rotam beatam vitam non escendere*; non usquam id dicit omnino, sed quae dicit idem valent.' This probably went with the story of Perikles quoted on 1100 b, 29 n. We may reasonably assume that it was a Cynic paradox.

περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς 4 τύχης δοκεῖ τισι ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως 25 οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώ- 5 πους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημείον τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·

φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἣν τινα λαοὶ πολλοὶ . . .

30 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἔξις ἢ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἐστιν 6 οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἰ σωματικαὶ 35 ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι 1154^a ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ 7

The τροχός is often mentioned in Aristophanes and the Orators (ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἀναβῆναι, ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ στρεβλοῦσθαι).

§ 4. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. note on ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται κ.τ.λ. (1099 b, 9).

ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. On the meaning of ὅρος cf. above 1138 b, 23 n. The standard by which we determine whether τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ really constitute εὐτυχία is their relation to εὐδαιμονία.

§ 5. καὶ τὸ διώκειν κ.τ.λ. This is the argument of Eudoxos, as we shall see in Book X.

πως. Aristotle himself might allow that pleasure was τὸ ἄριστόν πως. Exactly how, we shall see in Book X.

φήμη δ' οὔτις κ.τ.λ. Hesiod, Works and Days 763. The end of the second line is φημίζουσι· θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή. The verse expresses one of Aristotle's deepest convictions. Cf. 1098 b, 28.

§ 6. φύσις...ἔξις ἀρίστη. Observe that these are treated as equivalents, as they are in Academic terminology.

ἔχει τι θεῖον. This is a Platonic idea. Cf. Laws 950 b θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὐστοχον ἐνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς. Cf. also below 1173 a, 4.

τὴν...κληρονομίαν. On the metaphor here implied, cf. 1125 b, 17 n.

παραβάλλειν. This verb was originally a nautical metaphor, παραβάλλειν (sc. τὴν ναῦν) 'to heave to,' 'come alongside.' Bodily pleasures are the port for which most men steer.

§ 7. φανερόν δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The main point of this argument is as follows. It is admitted that the εὐδαίμων βλος is pleasant; but, if pleasure is not good, it is not a necessary part of εὐδαιμονία. It is also admitted that the wise man seeks ἀλυπία, i.e. that he shuns pain. But if pleasure is not good, pain is not bad, so why should he shun it?

ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα—
 τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν;—ἀλλὰ
 καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν. οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ
 λύπη, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ 5
 ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι
 αὐτοῦ.

XIV. Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
 τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ
 2 καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος, διὰ τί 10
 οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λύπαι μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον.
 ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν
 ἔστιν; ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων
 ὅσων μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων
 δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν 15
 ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἔστιν,

καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, sc. ἡ ἀνεμπόδιστος.
 The words are explanatory of ἡδονή.

τίνος γὰρ...ἀγαθόν; I take these
 words as parenthetical. If pleasure
 is not good, what good will it be to
 the happy man? Then with ἐνδέχεται
 ζῆν we must supply τὸν εὐδαίμονα.

XIV. § 1. Περὶ δὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. We
 come now to the view that, though
 some pleasures are good (the 'un-
 mixed' pleasures), yet most (i.e. the
 'mixed' or 'necessary' pleasures) are
 bad (1152 b, 10).

διὰ τί οὖν κ.τ.λ., closely with
 ἐπισκεπτέον (see Stewart's note).
 Those who say that bodily pleasures
 are bad *simpliciter* must explain the
 fact that their opposite pains are bad.
 If the pleasure of eating is bad as
 such, how can we account for hunger
 being bad too?

κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. Cf.
 1153 a, 1 sqq.

ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ κ.τ.λ. Two λύσεις
 are suggested, (1) that the opposition
 between bodily pains and bodily
 pleasures may be merely that of
 ἀπόφασις and κατάφασις, in which

case we may call bodily pleasures
 'good' in the sense of 'not bad,' and
 (2) that bodily pleasures are *positively*
 good up to a certain point, and only
 become bad beyond that point. The
 second alternative is as usual the one
 that Aristotle adopts; but the first
 contributes an important element to
 the solution.

τῶν...ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων. The
 terminology is Academic, but Aris-
 totle's meaning is clear. No ἕξις ἐν
 μεσότητι οὔσα can admit of excess;
 for it is something τέλειον. There
 cannot be excess, mean and defect in
 the mean itself (1107 a, 20 sqq.). From
 this it follows that no κινήσεις which
 belong to such a ἕξις, i.e. the ἐνέργειαι
 which are ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως, can admit of
 excess either. We cannot exceed
 what is good in performing e.g. just
 acts, and therefore the pleasure of
 performing just acts cannot be ex-
 cessive. We can eat too much, and
 therefore the pleasure of eating may
 be excessive.

ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν...ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.
 'It is not the pursuit of necessary

ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις
καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ'
ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως·
20 οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι
τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τὰληθές εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον 3
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν—
ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθές οὐκ ὃν
25 ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον—ὥστε λεκτέον
διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἰρετώτεραι. πρῶτον 4

pleasures that makes a bad man, but the pursuit of them in excess.'

ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης κ.τ.λ. This important doctrine is stated very briefly here, but its real meaning comes out more and more in the sequel. The opposite of excessive bodily pleasure is not positive pain, but merely the negative pain of the absence of that excess (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή 1118 b, 32), which is not pain at all to any one else. We can now solve the difficulty about the opposition between bodily pleasure and bodily pain stated above (1154 a, 10) by the help of the two λύσεις there given. In the case of the normal man the pain which is opposite to the right amount of bodily pleasure is positively bad, and the pleasure is positively good. In the case of the bad man, the excess of positive pleasure which he seeks is positively bad, and the opposite pain which he shuns is only the negation of that pleasure and therefore not positively bad.

§ 3. Ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a slight anacolouthon in this sentence. The long parenthesis (τοῦτο γὰρ...μᾶλλον) breaks the construction, which is resumed by ὥστε λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. as if ἐπεὶ had not preceded.

οὐ μόνον δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The necessity of showing the cause of error is especially cogent for Aristotle in view

of the conviction which he has just expressed as to the value of popular opinion (so EE. 1216 b, 30 ἔχει ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Cf. Eucken, Methode der Ar. Forschung p. 10.

ὥστε λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. I take it that the ψεύδος of which we have to discover the αἴτιον must be the view that *all* pleasure is bad, and I think that this is borne out by the sequel. We have done for the present with the view that some pleasures are good while others are bad, and return to the main subject of discussion, namely the θέσις of Speusippos that *all* pleasure is bad. Now we have seen already that this view is only made plausible by restricting the inquiry to bodily pleasures (1152 b, 33 sqq.), and that again is only possible because most people know no other (1153 b, 33 sqq.). Therefore, in order to explain the origin of the error, we must first show what makes most people give this preeminence to bodily pleasures. Two reasons are given for this, (1) that they are *λατρεῖαι* of pain and therefore appear strong by contrast, (2) that, if the pain is excessive, the *λατρεία* has to be excessive too.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The *first* reason is simply that they remove pain, which the 'unmixed pleasures'

μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
 τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὕσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερ-
 βάλλουσιν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται
 αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον 30
 φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἢ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα,
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις (ἢ
 ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων
 ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ
 γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκός 1154^b
 5 οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ
 τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας
 τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον,
 ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς 5

do not, seeing they do not imply a previous pain. The mere contrast with the opposite pain makes them appear stronger than they really are; for we estimate their strength by their distance from the opposite pain and not by their distance from the neutral state.

ἐκκρούει, cf. 1119 b, 10 n.

καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ. This is the *second* reason. The first merely explains why bodily pleasures seem stronger than others; this is the reason why the excess of bodily pleasures seems good. It is because they are regarded as ἰατρεῖαι, and it is the practice of some doctors to cure one excess by its opposite. Cf. Probl. 358 a, 2 ὅταν πολὺ ἐκστῇ τις...ἐνίων ἰατρῶν τοιαύτη ἢ τέχνη· ὑπερβολαῖς γὰρ ἰῶνται οἶνου ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἄλλης ἢ σίτου ἢ λιμοῦ. This is fallacious, as we know, but it accounts for the popular error.

ὡς οὕσης ἰατρείας, sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς.

διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον κ.τ.λ., 'from being seen in contrast with the opposite.'

καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ κ.τ.λ. We see here that the real question is how

all pleasure has come to be thought bad. It is because bodily pleasures, and bodily pleasures in excess, are commonly supposed to be the only pleasures. Now (1) ὑπερβολαὶ show a φαύλη φύσις and are therefore bad altogether, while (2) ἰατρεῖαι show an ἐνδεὴς φύσις and are therefore bad in themselves, even though they may be regarded as good κατὰ συμβεβηκός. They are ἀγαθὰ τινι, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ. On the reading and interpretation see Bywater, Contr. p. 56.

ἐκ γενετῆς, the case of θηριότης. The 'morbid' nature is here omitted.

δι' ἔθος, the case of ἀκολασία.

αἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Bywater loc. cit.

§ 5. ἔτι διώκονται κ.τ.λ. Another reason why bodily pleasures are supposed to be the only ones, and all pleasure is therefore supposed to be bad.

δίψας. I see no reason for taking this metaphorically. As Aspasios suggests, a thirst acquired by eating salt fish is βλαβερά, while one acquired by bodily exercise is ἀβλαβής. For 'innocuous pleasures,' cf. Plato, Rep. 357 b αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς. Pol. 1339 b, 25 ὅσα ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων.

χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρόν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. αἰεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὥς φασιν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ 6
 10 νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται αἰεὶ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσιν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ᾗ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ
 15 ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν 7 οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὐταὶ δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπο-
 μένοντος ὑγιоῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι·
 20 φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πράξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. οὐκ 8

τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον κ.τ.λ. The neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain, though merely negative, appears to many as positive pain. Cf. 1150a, 32n.

αἰεὶ...πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον. Aspasios says ὁ γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρας ἔλεγεν αἰεὶ πονεῖν τὸ ζῶον διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, and the reference to Anaxagoras is confirmed by Theophrastos, de Sensibus § 29 (Diels, Dox. p. 507, 21) ἅπασαν δ' αἰσθήσιν μετὰ λύπης (Ἀναξαγόρας φησίν). This is a very interesting anticipation of modern views as to the sub-conscious. All vital processes involve πόνος, but in a well-regulated organism this does not rise above the 'threshold of consciousness' as λύπη.

§ 6. ὁμοίως...ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι. We have seen already that μέθη arises τῶν ἄνω θερμανθέντων (cf. 1147 b, 8n.), and the 'sanguine temperament' of youth is also due to its 'hot-headedness.' Cf. Probl. 954 b, 39 τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὸ περὶ τὸν τόπον ᾧ φρονούμεν καὶ ἐλπίζομεν ποιεῖ εὐθύμους καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύμως, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολλὸς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας.

ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι,—opposed to οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ...αἰεὶ.

οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1150 b, 25 n.

ἐξελαύνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aspasios quotes from the Ἠθικά of Theophrastos ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ γε (surely τε) ἐναντία, οἷον ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ διψῆν, καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τουτέστιν ἡτισοῦν ἂν εἴη ἰσχυρά, ὥστε ἐνίοτε πείναν ἐξελαύνει καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅταν ᾄσμασιν ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀκούσμασι διαφερόντως χαίρωμεν. This shows that Aristotle either wrote this passage or something uncommonly like it. Cf. Introd. § 4, n. 5.

§ 7. τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιоῦς. Cf. above 1152 b, 35 τῆς ὑπολοίπου φύσεως καὶ ἔξεως. It is the unimpaired part that πράττει and therefore feels the pleasure; but, as the ἰατρεία is going on at the same time, we think that it is pleasant.

ἃ ποιεῖ πράξιν κ.τ.λ. Things which stimulate the activity of a given ἔξις (or φύσις) are pleasant by nature, e.g. music is naturally pleasant to a musical nature.

ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὼ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἂν τι θάτερον πράττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἢ φύσις ἀπλὴ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἢ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. 25 διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστίν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιος, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη 30 μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλὴ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.

- 9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, 'when the two elements are equally balanced.'

Διὸ ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 1072 b,

15 διαγωγὴ δὲ ἐστίν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν.

μεταβολὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eur. Or. 234.

BOOKS VIII—IX.

FRIENDSHIP.

Introductory Note.

As usual, several good reasons are given why a discussion of *φιλία* should form part of a course on *πολιτική*, but we are left to guess why it should come between the discussion of Will and Desire and the final account of the Good for Man. That this is characteristic of the method we have seen already (cf. Book III. Introductory Note p. 108, 1152 b, 1 n.); otherwise we might be tempted to think that the proper place for the treatment of *φιλία* was just after that of *δικαιοσύνη*, with which it has so many points of contact, and it might be urged that a transposition of VI—VII and VIII—IX would have the further advantage of bringing the two discussions of Pleasure together. The hypothesis, however, is excluded by the fact that *φιλία* was taken up at the same point of the course by Eudemos. This shows that the present arrangement is not due to any accident of editing, so there must be some connexion of thought, other than that given in the text, which made this the right place for the discussion. Following a hint of Teichmüller's (*Neue Studien* III, p. 129), we may, I think, give the following account of the matter. According to Aristotle, the growth of *φιλία* keeps pace with the growth of *φρόνησις*. The lowest animals care for their young at least at the time of birth, and the higher we rise in the scale of animal *φρόνησις* (cf. 1140 a, 27 n.) the wider and more permanent does *φιλία* become, till at last in man it appears as the feeling of union with his kind upon which the family, the state, and all other human associations rest. Cf. Gen. An. 753 a, 7 *ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἰσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ (1) τοῖς μὲν χεῖροσιν*

τοῦτ' ἐμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκεῖν μόνον, (2) τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελείωσιν, (3) ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφὴν, (4) τοῖς δὲ δὴ μάλιστα κοινωνοῦσι φρονήσεως καὶ πρὸς τελεωθέντα γίνεται συνήθεια καὶ φιλία, καθάπερ τοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων ἐνίοις, τοῖς δ' ὄρνισι μέχρι τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ ἐκθρέψαι· διόπερ καὶ μὴ ἐπωάζουσαι αἱ θηλεῖαι ὅταν τέκωσι, διατίθενται χεῖρον ὥσπερ ἐνός τινος στερισκόμεναι τῶν συμφύτων. Here we have the different stages of φιλία clearly traced, and these stages are made to depend upon the degree of φρόνησις, or knowledge of the good for one's own kind, which is present at each. In fact φιλία is, we may say, the altruistic use of φρόνησις, a use which is its 'natural' use in spite of public opinion to the contrary (cf. 1141 b, 29 sqq.). We can see, then, how the treatment of φιλία is quite in its right place here, and we shall see later how it leads us naturally through the stages of love for the good as such, and love for our own 'best self,' to its highest manifestation, the *amor dei intellectualis*. It is, in fact, φιλία and φιλία alone that can bridge the gulf between φρόνησις and σοφία, the practical and the theoretic life.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι
 γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν
 5 βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ
 ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας

1155 a, 3. EE. 1234 b, 18 Περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι,
 καὶ τίς ὁ φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἢ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ πλεοναχῶς, καὶ

I. § 1. ἔστι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reasons
 given for discussing φιλία are (1) that it
 is καλόν, (2) that it is ἀναγκαῖον. This
 is the literary form of the distinction
 between τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, τὸ οὐ
 ἔνεκα and the *conditio sine qua non*,
 οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὔ. The distinction
 between καλαί and ἀναγκαῖαι πράξεις
 plays a great part in the Politics, and
 is derived from Plato, cf. Rep. 493 c
 τὰναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν
 δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν
 ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακῶς
 εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. To say
 φιλία is an ἀρετὴ is equivalent to
 saying it is καλόν. The two points
 are then taken in the reverse order:
 (1) τὸ ἀναγκαῖον §§ 1—4, (2) τὸ καλόν
 § 5.

ἀρετὴ τις. There is an ἀρετὴ
 which, for want of a better name,
 we called φιλία, but that is not what
 we are going to speak of now. It
 was not based on feeling (πάθος) or
 affection (τὸ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ), and

we are now going to discuss φιλία as
 a feeling (cf. 1126 b, 19 sqq.). In
 this sense it may or may not be
 strictly an ἀρετὴ itself; it is certainly
 μετ' ἀρετῆς, for in its truest form it
 can exist, we shall see, only between
 the good.

ἀναγκαιότατον. The proofs that
 φιλία is (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖον to
 the good life may be reduced to three:
 (1) it is necessary as supplying its ὕλη
 and also its ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά,
 (2) it is necessary because it is natural,
 and 'nature makes nothing in vain,'
 (3) it rather than justice is the bond
 of the state, and the good life is
 possible only in the state.

ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων κ.τ.λ. It supplies
 the ὕλη (the ἐν οἷς) for good activities.

καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι κ.τ.λ. These
 are taken as examples because they
 can choose freely (cf. 1095 b, 21 n.).
 If we find, then, that they would not
 choose to live without friends to
 benefit, we get a strong ἐνδοξον.

κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ ὄφελος
 τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἢ γίγνεται
 μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθείη
 καὶ σῶζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφα- 10
 2 λεστέρα. ἐν πενία τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην
 οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ
 ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλ-
 λείπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ
 πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· “σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένῳ.” καὶ γὰρ 15
 3 νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε
 πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν
 τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνεσι

εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πόσα ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πῶς χρηστέον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τί τὸ
 δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν, ἐπισκεπτέον οὐθενὸς ἤττον τῶν περὶ τὰ ἡθῆ καλῶν
 καὶ αἰρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι
 φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ
 ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἔτι
 τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν,
 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία ἠθική τις
 εἶναι ἕξις. καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ποιῆσαι ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν, †ἀλλ' εἰς
 (ἄλκις Jackson) φίλους ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ ἀληθινοὶ φίλοι οὐκ ἀδικοῦσιν.

εὐετηρίας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n.

ἢ πῶς ἂν κ.τ.λ. We pass from
 the ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ as ἐν οἷς, to the ὧν
 οὐκ ἄνευ as ποιητικά καὶ φυλακτικά.

§ 2. πρὸς θεραπείαν κ.τ.λ. This
 clause is obscure owing to the fact
 that πρὸς has to do duty twice over
 by a sort of brachylogy. The full
 construction would be πρὸς θεραπείαν
 καὶ πρὸς βοηθείας πρὸς τὸ ἐλλείπον τῆς
 πράξεως. For the plural βοηθῆναι and
 for βοηθία πρὸς τι see Bon. Ind.
 139 a, 2 sqq. The old editors took
 βοηθείας as gen. sing. (*ob infirmitatem*
auxilii Zell), Bekker reads βοηθεῖ
 on inferior authority, Susemihl and
 Bywater both restore the reading of
 the best mss. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii, 4, 6

ὁ ἀγαθὸς φίλος ἑαυτὸν τάττει πρὸς πᾶν
 τὸ ἐλλείπον τῷ φίλῳ.

σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένῳ. The first
 words of the famous passage, Il. x,
 224—

σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένῳ, καὶ τε πρὸ δ τοῦ
 ἐνόησεν,

ὅππως κέρδος ἔη· μῦθος δ' εἶπερ τε
 νοήσῃ,

ἀλλὰ τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτή δέ
 τε μῆτις.

Plato also refers to this passage by its
 first words only (Symp. 174 d, etc.),
 so it was already proverbial.

§ 3. φύσει κ.τ.λ. If a thing exists
 φύσει, it must be ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγ-
 καῖον, for nature aims at the good and
 οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ. The fact that the

καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλ-
 20 ληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους
 ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον
 ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πό- 4
 λεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν
 σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίον τι τῇ
 25 φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στά-
 σιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν· καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων
 οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας,
 καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον 5
 δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐὰν δίκαιοι ᾖσιν, οὐκ ἀδικήσουσιν· ἡ ταῦτόν ἄρα ἡ ἐγγύς
 τι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν
 τὸν φίλον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν
 δεινότατον, ὅτι ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ ἡ ἐκούσιος ὁμιλία μετὰ τούτων· μετ'
 οἰκείων γὰρ ἡ μετὰ συγγενῶν ἡ μεθ' ἐταίρων συνδιημερεύομεν, ἡ τέκνων
 ἡ γονέων ἡ γυναικός. καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτῃται, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

hen-bird is uneasy if not allowed to sit (cf. Gen. An. quoted on p. 345) is already a sign that φιλία is a necessary condition of the good life.

τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι, 'animals of the same race.' Eudemos says ὁμογενέσι (p. 380). Cf. Rhet. 1371 b, 12 ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῇ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῇ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ. Fritzsche quotes Theokr. ix, 31 τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, | ἱρῆες δ' ἱρῆξιν· ἐμὴν δ' Ἀμῶσα καὶ ὠδά.

ἐν ταῖς πλάναις. This is one of the few places in Aristotle where we see a sign of the coming cosmopolitanism. He was himself an ἄπολις.

οἰκεῖον, opp. ἀλλότριον. Cf. below 1171 a, 16 οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνειν.

§ 4. ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. The good life is impossible without the πόλις,

φιλία is the bond of the πόλις, therefore φιλία is ἀναγκαῖον.

οἱ νομοθέται, cf. 1103 a, 3 n.

ὁμόνοια. Cf. below 1167 a, 22 sqq. Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 16 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι.

τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα, sc. δίκαιον, 'justice in the fullest sense.' I do not think there is any reference to special forms of justice, either τὸ ἐπιεικές (Zwinger) or τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον (Aspasios), but simply to the general principle αὐξέσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (1160 a, 7).

§ 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν. For the opposition between τὸ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖον and τὸ καλόν, cf. 1120 b, 1 n. Friendship is not only a means but an end.

τοὺς φιλοφίλους. Cf. Rhet. 1381 b, 26 φιλοῦσι τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας.

ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἔν τι εἶναι· 30
καὶ ἔτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.

6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους,
ὅθεν ‘τὸν ὁμοῖον’ φασιν ‘ὡς τὸν ὁμοιον,’ καὶ ‘κολοιὸν ποτὶ
κολοιόν,’ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ’ ἐξ ἐναντίας ‘κεραμεῖς’ πάντας 35

1155 a, 32. EE. 1235 a, 4 ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς
φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ ἔξωθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν
λέγοντες· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν
εἴρηται

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον·

καὶ γὰρ κολοῖος παρὰ κολοιόν·

ἔγνω δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα, καὶ λύκος λύκον.

οἱ δὲ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὸ

οἴονται. The reference is probably
to the provisional result reached in
Plato's *Lysis* 214 e,—a passage which,
as we shall see, Aristotle had before
him in composing this part of his
lecture—“Ἐχομεν ἄρα ἤδη τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ
φίλοι· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οἱ
ἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί.

§ 6. Διαμφισβητεῖται κ.τ.λ. The
first two ἐνδοξα are taken from Plato's
Lysis 214 a sqq. and together form a
dialectical πρόβλημα. The first is
that φιλία is of the like, cf. *Lysis* l.c.
λέγουσι δὲ (οἱ ποιηταί)...“αἰεὶ τοι τὸν
ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον” καὶ
ποιεῖ γνῶριμον. ἥ οὐκ ἐντετύχηκας
τούτοις τοῖς ἔπεσιν; Ἐγωγε, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγ-
γράμμασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτα αὐτὰ
λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ
ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶ δὲ πού
οὔτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου
διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες. The
second ἐνδοξον is that φιλία is of the
unlike, cf. *Lysis* 215 c, ἤδη ποτέ του
ἤκουσα λέγοντος...ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὁμοιον τῷ
ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολε-
μιώτατοι εἴεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον

ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς ἄρα “καὶ
κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς
ἀοιδῷ, | καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ κ.τ.λ.

τὸν ὁμοῖον φασιν κ.τ.λ. *Od.* xvii,
218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν
ὁμοῖον, quoted by Plato l.c. with a
slight verbal difference. *Theophr.*
Char. xxix, καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς
παροιμίας τὸ ὁμοιον πρὸς τὸν ὁμοιον
πορεύεσθαι.

κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν. *MM.* 1208 b,
9 κολοῖος παρὰ κολοιὸν ἰζάνει. *Rhet.*
1371 b, 15 ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται,
ὡς “ἦλιξ ἦλικα τέρπει” (cf. 1161 b, 34)
καὶ “ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον,” καὶ “ἔγνω δὲ
θῆρ θῆρα” καὶ “αἰεὶ κολοῖος παρὰ
κολοιόν,” καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Here
Aristotle seems to be quoting from
Doric source (Epicharmos?).

κεραμεῖς. From *Hesiod*, *Works*
and *Days*, 25
καὶ κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι
τέκτων,
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς
ἀοιδῷ.

also quoted in the *Lysis* l.c. with
verbal differences.

1155^b τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων
 ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων
 “ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν” ξηρανθεῖσαν, “ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν
 πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν,” καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ
 5 “ἀντίξουν” συμφέρον καὶ “ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην

τὸ ὅμοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, διὸ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν’ ἔφη
 καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραμίδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλείστον ὅμοιον. οἱ μὲν οὖν
 οὕτω τὸ φίλον λέγουσιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασὶν εἶναι
 φίλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν πᾶσιν εἶναι φίλον,
 ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, ἀλλ’ ὑγροῦ, ὅθεν εἴρηται

ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖα

καὶ τὸ

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ εἰς τοῦναντίον. τὸ δ’ ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν τῷ ὁμοίῳ· καὶ γὰρ
 κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει,

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλοις ζῶα. αὗται μὲν
 οὖν αἱ ὑπολήψεις τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον,
 τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον πολέμιον,

τῷ πλέονι δ’ αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται
 τοῦλασσον, ἐχθρᾶς θ’ ἡμέρας κατάρχεται,

ἀνώτερον, sc. ‘in serie causarum’ (Bon. Ind. 68 b, 47); for φυσική is ἡ ἀνω ἐπιστήμη with regard to πολιτική, just as ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία is with regard to φυσική (Met. 1005 a, 33 ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω). They take φυσικαί instead of ἠθικαί προτάσεις (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.). This explains the use of ἀνωθεν above 1144 a, 12.

Εὐριπίδης μὲν κ.τ.λ., fr. 898 Nauck, beginning Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅση θεός; The lines more immediately referred to here are—

ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖ’, ὅτε ξηρὸν πέδον
 ἄκαρπον αὐχμῷ νοτίδος ἐνδεῶς ἔχῃ.
 ἐρᾶ δ’ ὁ σεμνὸς οὐρανὸς πληρούμενος
 ὄμβρου πεσεῖν εἰς γαῖαν Ἀφροδίτης ὑπο.

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος κ.τ.λ. Cf. ‘Early Greek Philosophy’ pp. 158 sqq. In

the Lysis 215 e Plato quotes some sayings which are clearly of Herakleitean origin (Kratylos?) ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου (τοῦ ἐναντίου) ἕκαστον ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκέος, τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλήρες δὲ κενώσεως...τροφὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολαῦσαι.

τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον κ.τ.λ., fr. 46 Bywater. It seems to be fairly well made out (Zeller I, p. 657 n. 1 ed. 5) that the primary reference of this fragment was to pieces of wood used in building and supporting each other by leaning in opposite directions. The stability of the building is due to opposite strains or, as Chrysippos

ἁρμονίαν" καὶ "πάντα κατ' ἔριν" γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ
τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου
7 ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ
γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ
καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἡθῆ καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον 10
πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε μοχθηροὺς
ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν

ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ δὲ φιλία δοκεῖ
συνάγειν· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ
ποιήσαντι

ὥς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ
θήλεως καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων.

1155 b, 8. EE. 1235 a, 29 δύο μὲν αὗται δόξαι περὶ φιλίας
εἰσὶ, λίαν τε καθόλου <καὶ> κεχωρισμένοι τοσοῦτον· ἄλλαι δὲ ἤδη
ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκεῖαι τῶν φαινομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι
δοκεῖ τοὺς φαύλους εἶναι φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· τοῖς δ'
ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
θηρίοις ἐνοῦσα φιλία· προαποθνήσκειν γοῦν αἰροῦνται τῶν τέκνων)·
τοῖς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ
διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν·
ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς
ὄνυχας παραβάλλον, καὶ τὰ μόρια ὅτι ῥιπτοῦμεν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος

puts it (ap. Aul. Gell. vii, 1, 2)
'opposita inter se et quasi mutuo
adverso quaeque fulta nixu consistere.'
But in any case the point lies in the
pun 'The hostile is good for us,'
'what disagrees with us agrees with
us.'

ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων κ.τ.λ. This is
the παλίντονος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου
καὶ λύρης (fr. 46, 56) on which see
'Early Greek Philosophy' pp. 158,
159. Cf. fr. 48 ἁρμονίη ἀφανῆς φανε-
ρῆς κρέσσων.

πάντα κατ' ἔριν. Cf. fr. 44 πόλεμος
πάντων μὲν πατήρ κ.τ.λ., and especially
fr. 43 quoted in EE. 1235 a, 26 (above).
Early Greek Philosophy p. 162.

Ἑμπεδοκλῆς. For the meaning of
his doctrine of "like to like," cf.
Early Greek Philosophy, p. 245 sqq.

§ 7. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. These
φυσικαὶ προτάσεις are not relevant to
the present enquiry; we shall confine
ourselves to ἀπορίαι raised by ἡθικαὶ
προτάσεις.

οἷον πότερον κ.τ.λ. This also
comes from Lysis 214 d τοῦτο τοίνυν
αἰνίττονται, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ ἐταῖρε,
οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες,
ὥς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ
φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὐτ' ἀγαθῷ οὐτε
κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρ-
χεται.

πότερον ἐν εἶδος κ.τ.λ. We shall

ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἱκανῶ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ

τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ· ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός. οἷς δὲ χρήσιμον, φυλάττουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα δοκεῖ μὲν ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. τό τε γὰρ <ὁμοιον> ἄχρηστον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ ἐναντιότης ὁμοιότητος ἀπέχει πλείστον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· φθαρτικὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον. ἔτι δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ κτήσασθαι φίλον· τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γινῶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄνευ ἀτυχίας (τοῖς γὰρ εὖ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες

find that the answer to this πρόβλημα will furnish the λύσις of all the ἀπορίαι.

ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται κ.τ.λ. The question at issue here is whether difference in degree excludes specific difference. According to Plato, Phileb. 24 e ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνεται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ἥρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένους ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι. This doctrine Aristotle fully accepts, and it follows from it that difference in degree can never constitute specific difference, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον is not εἰδοποιόν, cf. Pol. 1259 b, 36 οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἶόν τε διαφέρειν...38 τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδὲν (sc. εἶδει διαφέρει). But it does not follow from this that difference in degree will exclude specific difference, though it may exclude generic, cf. Part. An. 644 a, 18 ὅσα διαφέρει...κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, ταῦτα ὑπέξευκται ἐνὶ γένει. If anything can be 'more or less' something, it must be that thing, but there is nothing to prevent the 'more' being a different species from the 'less' under certain conditions.

δέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον cannot be εἰδοποιόν, this can only be in cases where, as Plato would say, τὸ πέρας is 'mixed' with

τὸ ἄπειρον, i.e. where there is some λόγος or determinate ratio constituting a 'form' (εἶδος). The most instructive example of this is furnished by musical 'intervals.' It is true that the genus φθόγγος admits of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, and we might conclude from this that it can have no specific differences. But this is to leave out of account the fact that αἴσθησις, the δύναμις κριτική, cannot distinguish any interval less than the δίεσις. The μεσότης of ὀξύ and βαρύ may be a little 'more' or 'less,' the note may be slightly 'flat' or 'sharp'; but it remains specifically the same note. So too with colours. They are all generically one, and their genus has the ἐναντίωσις white and black corresponding to ὀξύ and βαρύ in the musical scale. But αἴσθησις cannot distinguish an infinite number of colours between white and black. There are a certain definite number of λόγοι or proportions of white and black which sight can distinguish, and mixtures a little more or a little less are referred to these λόγοι, which therefore constitute the εἶδη χρώματος. Red is specifically different from green, in spite of the fact that it is whiter. In de Sens. 446 a, 1 Aristotle illustrates this by the old puzzle of the grain of millet. We do not hear the fall of one grain, nor does it make the sound louder if we add one grain to a bushel.

τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. εἴρηται δ' 15
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

II. Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γγνωρισθέντος
τοῦ φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν,
τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε δ' ἂν χρή-
σιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ 20
2 ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τὰ ἀγαθόν

δοκεῖν φίλοι εἶναι). οἱ δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς συνδιαμένουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις
ἀξιοῦσι πιστεύειν, ὥς ἐξαπατῶντας καὶ προσποιουμένους, ἵνα κτήσωνται
διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτυχούντων ὁμιλίας πάλιν εὐτυχούντων φίλιαν.

1155 b, 17. EE. 1235 b, 13 ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν
ἅμα τά τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας
λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνεται τὰ
ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος
τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι <μὲν>
ὡς ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον
τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ τὸ φιλούμενον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦμεν οὐ
ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον—οὐθεὶς γὰρ

ἐραστῆς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ—

ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτῃ μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδύ, εἰ δὲ ὁ
βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

τῷ εἶδει. Things γένει ἕτερα do not.
ἔμπροσθεν. It is vain to ask
where.

II. § 1. περὶ αὐτῶν, quite general.
'The subject may be cleared up.'

γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. So
προαίρεσις was defined after an en-
quiry into τὸ προαιρετόν, βούλευσις
and βούλησις after an enquiry into
τὸ βουλευτόν and τὸ βουλητόν. This
dialectical method is σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν
πτώσεων, and is here applied to
the πρόβλημα, πότερον πολλαχῶς ἢ
μοναχῶς τῷ εἶδει λέγεται; (Top. 106 a,
9), the rule being ὅταν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς
λέγεται, καὶ ἡ πτώσις ἢ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἡ πτώσις,
καὶ αὐτό (ib. b, 38). It is more
obvious that τὸ φιλητόν has different

species than that *φιλία* has; for τὰ
φιλητά have actually different names
(τοῖς ὀνόμασι διαφωνεῖ), and this makes
it clear that *φιλία* is not specifically
one.

ἀγαθόν ... ἡδύ ... χρήσιμον. Cf.
1104 b, 30 τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς
τὰς αἰρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος.
δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ., for τὸ χρήσιμον
is always ἄλλου χάριν (1096 a, 7).

§ 2. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. the
precisely similar question about βούλη-
σις above 1113 a, 15 sqq. There we saw
that the object of βούλησις was always
τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, but that in the
case of the good man this coincides
with τὸ φύσει or κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν.
The solution in the present case would
be the same: we always love τὸ φαι-

φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἐκάστω δὲ 25 τὸ ἐκάστω· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὄν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύ- 3 χων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ—γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἶνῳ βούλε-

περὶ δὴ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε. τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλευτὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὀρεκτόν· φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται καὶ μὴ δοκῇ. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. ὅτι μέντοι φίλον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, δῆλον.

τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἐτέραν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐ. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντί φαμεν σώματι συμφέροντα ἀπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὐ, οἷον φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἀπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ ὀλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ὄρᾶν καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκότει· καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλμιῶντι ἐναντίως. καὶ οἶνος ἡδίῳν οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν ὑπὸ οἶνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ οὐτε ὀξὸς παρεγχεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἃ τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλ' ἃ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν. ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν μεμνημένοι

νόμενον φιλητόν, but this does not affect our inference from different species of φιλητά to different species of φιλία. For, if we say φαινόμενον φιλητόν instead of φιλητόν, to allow for all cases where τὸ ἀγαθόν or τὸ ἡδύ is not the really good or pleasant, we still keep the πτώσις required for the argument. Eudemos works this out with reference to health as a normal state, cf. above 1113 a, 22 sqq. with the notes.

§ 3. ἐπὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Three characteristics of φιλία are inferred from the use of the word in current language. Though we use the verb φιλεῖν of our

feeling towards inanimate objects (it is a φίλησις), yet we do not call that feeling φιλία. This is because φιλία is (1) βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ, (2) ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, to which we must add, (3) μὴ λανθάνουσα.

ἀντιφίλησις, cf. ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι below.

ἐκείνῳ. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 59.

τῷ οἶνῳ. The illustration is suggested by the word φίλοινος in Plato, Lys. 212 d οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποι εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλωσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ' αὖ φιλόκυνες γε καὶ φίλοινοι. The problem here is not so

σθαι τὰγαθὰ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σφύζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς 30
 ἔχῃ—τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
 τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ
 ταῦτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὖνοϊαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι
 4 φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν; πολλοὶ γάρ
 εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς 35
 εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνων τις πάθοι 1156^a
 πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὕτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φί-
 λους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ
 ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας
 δι' ἐν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

5

ταῦθ' αἰρούμεθα. ὥς δ' ἔχει παιδίον καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθ-
 εστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φρόνιμον.
 τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἑξείς· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλά.

1155 b, 27. EE. 1236 a, 7 sqq. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς
 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδ' εἶναι λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον καὶ
 χρήσιμον), ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινὶ καὶ
 φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων δι' ἕκαστον τούτων
 ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον. τὸν μὲν
 γὰρ <τῷ> τοιόνδε καὶ δι' ἀρετήν, τὸν δ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν
 δ' ὅτι ἡδὺς καὶ δι' ἡδονήν. φίλος δὲ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφιλήῃ,
 καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς.

obvious to us because we have the
 verb 'to like' for this sort of φίλησις.
 Cf. French *aimer le vin*, but not *une*
amitié pour le vin.

εἴπερ, 'if at all.'

ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. This is merely a
 popular belief the mention of which
 is suggested by the problem of the
 φίλοινος. We must not press it or
 make it part of the definition; for, as
 we shall see, it does not strictly hold
 of all or indeed any species of φίλια.
 The truth which underlies this ἐνδοξον
 is otherwise expressed by Aristotle.

εὖνους. On εὖνοια see below
 1166 b, 30. Here it is defined as
 βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, but
 something more is required to differ-
 entiate φίλια from it.

ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, i.e. ἐν ἀντιφι-
 λοῦσι. Here, as in commercial ex-
 change, supply and demand, action
 and reaction (τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον,
 cf. 1133 a, 15 n.) must be equal.

§ 4. μὴ λανθάνουσιν. This is added
 to meet the possibility even of re-
 ciprocal and disinterested well-wishing
 which is unknown to *both* parties. If
 A may entertain such a feeling towards
 B without B's knowledge, it is equally
 possible that B may be entertaining it
 towards A without A's knowledge.
 This may be common enough, for
 instance, between writers of different
 nationalities.

δι' ἐν τι τῶν εἰρημένων, sc. τὸ
 ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον. Cf.
 the definition in Rhet. 1380 b, 35

ΙΙΙ. Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὲ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις
 10 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινος εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς

1156 a, 6. Cf. EE. 1236 a, 16 sqq. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἐν ἀπάσας μὴδ' ὡς εἶδη ἐνὸς γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινος λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἱατρικόν. καὶ <γὰρ> ψυχὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ' οὐ λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. οἷον ὄργανον ἱατρικόν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἱατρὸς χρήσαιο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἱατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου. ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι [τὸ] πρῶτον λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται πάντ' ἀποδιδόναι τὰ φαινόμενα. οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόττοντος ἐνὸς λόγου οὐκ

ἔστω δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαι τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος. οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

ΙΙΙ. § 1. ταῦτα, sc. τὰ φιλητά, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ χρήσιμον. The inference from the πτώσις is marked by the particles ἄρα, δῆ.

οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the different species of φιλητά furnish us with a διαφορά of the genus βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐν ἀντιπεπονητόσι μὴ λανθάνουσα. There cannot be three εἶδη φιλίας unless they are differentiated by διαφοραὶ which are διαφοραὶ of this γένος. So Aristotle proceeds to show that each species of φιλία is βούλησις τις ἀγαθοῦ etc.

ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν, i.e. the φιλία

which has τὸ ἡδύ for its object is, if we may coin the phrase, βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀγαθῶν. On the other hand, if the φιλητόν is τὸ ἀγαθόν, it will be βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀγαθῶν.

οὐ καθ' αὐτούς is explained by κατὰ συμβεβηκός below. We wish such a friend to be rich, for instance, not because we believe such riches to be a necessary χορηγία for the full development of his nature, but for what we hope to get out of him.

οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινος εἶναι κ.τ.λ. We must supply οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες as subject to ἀγαπῶσι, for it would be quite possible to love witty people διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Wit is an ἀρετή, a part of καλοκάγαθία, and might therefore be *pro tanto* φιλητόν ἢ ἀγαθόν. In that case we should love the wit τῷ ποιόν τινος εἶναι.

2 αὐτοῖς. οἳ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς
ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ 15
οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ
συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἔστιν ὅσ-
περ ἔστιν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ πορίζουσιν
3 οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί
εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς 20
ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾧσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ
διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ

οἴονται <τὰς> ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι· αἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσίν·
οἱ δ' ὅταν ἢ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμότῃ, ὡς οὔσαν καθόλου ἄν, εἴπερ ἦν
πρώτη, οὐδ' εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασίν· ἔστι δὲ πολλὰ εἶδη φιλίας.
τῶν γὰρ ῥηθέντων ἦν ἡδὴ, ἐπειδὴ διώρισται τριχῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν.
ἢ μὲν γὰρ διώρισται δι' ἀρετὴν, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.

τούτων ἢ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἢ [διὰ] τῶν πλείστων φιλία
—διὰ γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ μέχρι τούτου,
ὥσπερ ἢ παροιμία

Γλαῦκ', ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τόσον φίλος ἔσκε μάχεται,
καὶ

οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας—

ἢ δὲ δι' ἡδονὴν τῶν νέων—τούτου γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετά-
βολος φιλία ἢ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἡθῆ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας
μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ—ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.

§ 2. ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν. Bywater (Contr. p. 59) thinks the article, which is omitted in K^b “would be better away” and refers to EE 1237 a, 40 (p. 363). But that passage simply states that τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (not specially τὸ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν) τὸ φιλούμενόν ἐστι χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον τῷ φίλῳ ἢ φίλος, which is another point. The reading ἢ φιλούμενός ἐστι would surely be equivalent to ἢ φιλεῖται, and we have just been told that *all* friends βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. The meaning must be the same as that of ἢ ἔστιν ὅσπερ ἔστιν ὁ φιλούμενος just below,

that is, practically equivalent to τῷ ποιούς τινος εἶναι above. But there is no need to read ἔστιν <ὅσπερ ἔστιν> here with Bonitz; for ἢ...ἔστιν can very well mean “on the ground of what he is,” in accordance with the principle of abbreviating subordinate relative clauses illustrated in Kühner § 557. When φιλία is διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, we love our friend “for what he is,” not for his usefulness or agreeableness to ourselves.

§ 3. δι' ὃ, i.e. τοῦ δι' ὃ, cf. 1117 b, 30 n. This abbreviation is really similar in principle to that of ἢ explained in the last note.

φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὥς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας
 πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δο- 4
 25 κεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ
 συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ'
 ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται
 τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ᾖσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 30 γὰρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύ-
 τας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' 5
 ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα

φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐστὶν
 ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ
 φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν. αὕτη
 μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία—μόνον γὰρ αἰσθάνεται
 προαιρέσεως—αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ
 μικρόν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς
 ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸν τροχίλον φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὥς οἱ
 μάντις τὰς συνεδρείας καὶ διεδρείας λέγουσιν. καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἂν εἶεν
 φίλοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. οἱ δ' ὅτι ἡ πρώτη οὐχ
 ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὐ φασὶ φίλους εἶναι· ἀδικήσει γὰρ ὁ γε φαῦλος τὸν
 φαῦλον, οἱ δ' ἀδικούμενοι οὐ φιλοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦσι μὲν,
 ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ τὰς γε ἑτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει. δι'

§ 4. ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις, cf. Rhet. 1389 b, 36 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοί εἶναι, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. The ἡθοποιῖα here reminds us once more of the New Comedy with its typical old men and young men.

οὐ πάνυ...συζῶσι, 'are not much given to συμβίωσις.' Cf. Ind. s. v. οὐ πάνυ.

τὴν ξενικὴν. A merchant will not necessarily introduce his 'correspondent' from a foreign country to his family or his club. A Hellene called his ξένοι by the name of φίλοι, but clearly this is διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον.

§ 5. τῶν νέων. For the ἡθος cf. Rhet. 1389 a, 2 οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἡθῆ εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοὶ καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πείναι...καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἡθεὶ ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ...καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους.

διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μετα-
πιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται
φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπί- 35
πτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρω- 1156^b
τικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ
τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολ-
λάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ
συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν 5
φιλίαν οὕτως.

- 6 Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ

ἡδονὴν γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλήλους βλαπτόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὦσιν ἀκρατεῖς·
οὐ δοκοῦσι δ' οὐδ' οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν
κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ πρώτη. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βέβαιος, αὕτη
δὲ ἀβέβαιος. ἡ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δέ, ἀλλ'
ἀπ' ἐκείνης. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν, τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ
φαινόμενά ἐστι, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθ' ἓνα δὲ λόγον
πάσας ἀδύνατον. λείπεται τοίνυν οὕτως, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μόνη <ἡ>
πρώτη φιλία, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι, οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχον ἔχουσιν
πρὸς ἑαυτάς, οὔτε καθ' ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἓν.

1156 b, 7. EE. 1236 b, 27 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς
ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἅμα, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ, ὃ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἀπλῶς
ὁ πρῶτός ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς αἰρετός (ἀνάγκη δ'
εἶναι τοιοῦτον· ὡς γὰρ βούλεται τις δι' αὐτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθὰ, ἀνάγκη καὶ

§ 6. Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. The
friendship of the good is distinguished
from the other two by being τέλειον
τι. We have seen that φιλία exists
φύσει (1155 a, 16 n.) and is therefore
capable of growth or evolution. By
calling the friendship of the good
τελεία, Aristotle means to say, in
accordance with the strict use of the
word, that the growth is complete
and that the 'form' (εἶδος) of φιλία is
realised in it so that none of it is left
out (τὸ τέλειον = οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω). It is,
in fact, 'full-grown' φιλία, as a τέλειος
ἀνὴρ is a 'full-grown' man. We can

now see why the ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι were
shown at length to be characteristic
of youth and age; the one is un-
developed, the other is past its prime.
Eudemos has worked out this point
more fully. Cf. 1236 a, 16 sqq.,
quoted on p. 356.

καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. As φιλία
is ἐν ἀντιπεπονησσι (1155 b, 33), it is
necessary to make it clear that the
τελεία φιλία implies the goodness of
both parties. It is only then that the
βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοί can be
reciprocal.

ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ
 10 τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὐτοὺς γὰρ
 οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων
 φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾖσιν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν
 ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

αὐτὸν αἰρεῖσθαι εἶναι), ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδύς ἐστιν ἀπλῶς· διὸ
 δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὁπωσοῦν φίλος ἡδύς. ἔτι δὲ διοριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον·
 ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν πότερον τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον,
 καὶ πότερον τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν
 ἡδύ, ἢ οὐ. ἄμφω γὰρ εἰς ταῦτ' οὐ συνακτέον· τά τε γὰρ μὴ ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἀπλῶς <ἂν> τύχῃ φευκτά· καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν
 οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὃ ζητεῖται, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως
 εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἔστι γὰρ αἰρετὸν μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ
 ἀγαθόν· ἃ δεῖ συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ
 ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. * * εὐθέτως δὲ καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ
 ἄνθρωπος ὢν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐφυῆς ἀφυοῦς, διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἢ ὁδός· ἀνάγκη

καθ' αὐτούς, 'essentially,' not merely κατὰ συμβεβηκός or in so far as they may be 'some good' to one another. The disinterested character (ἐκείνου ἔνεκα 1155 b, 31) of true φιλία depends upon the φιλητὸν being something which belongs to the φιλούμενος, not in relation to the φιλῶν (τῷ φιλοῦντι), but καθ' αὐτόν, for βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν (1156 a, 9).

δι' αὐτούς, here as often a *reciprocal* reflexive pronoun, more emphatic than δι' ἀλλήλους. They love (οὕτως ἔχουσι i.e. φιλοῦσι) 'for each others' own selves,' in other words each loves ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστι, 'for what the object of his love is' (1156 a, 16).

διαμένει οὖν κ.τ.λ. A thing cannot be 'complete' unless it has sufficient time to develop fully (cf. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ 1098 a, 18 n.); for all κίνησις is in time. We now see why it was shown above that the ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι are

εὐδιάλυτοι (1156 a, 19). That which is really τέλειον must be τέλειον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον (1156 b, 33).

ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. Cf. 1100 b, 11 sqq., and contrast 1156 a, 21 τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται, a, 34 τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα.

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This continues the proof that such φιλία is 'complete.' Since τὸ τέλειον is οὐ μηδὲν ἔξω, 'complete' φιλία must include the incomplete or undeveloped forms of φιλία. The good, therefore, must be (1) good, (2) good for one another, (3) pleasant, (4) pleasant to one another.

καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι, i.e. (2) good for one another. This φιλία therefore includes the advantages of φιλία διὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, i.e. both (3) ἀπλῶς and (4) τῷ φίλῳ.

ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστω 15
 γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
 7 τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἢ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία
 μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα
 τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
 ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά 20

εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὕτω σπουδαῖον τελέως·
 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκрасίαν· τῷ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τὰγαθὸν τῷ
 ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκрасία ἐστίν.

1156 b, 17. EE. 1237 a, 10 ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία κατ'
 ἀρετήν, ἔσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοί. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὅτι χρήσιμοι,
 ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον· διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῷδὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν.
 καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ
 ἀπλῶς ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον <οἶον τὸ> γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς
 τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ <ἐστίν>. ἔστω
 γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου
 ἀρετὴ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ὁμοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
 ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιστατέον καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φιλία, καὶ

καθ' ἡδονήν, equivalent to ἡδεῖαι,
 more often πρὸς ἡδονήν.

αἱ οἰκεῖαι...καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, 'his
 own acts, and (therefore) acts like
 them.' If a colour is pleasant, it will
 be pleasant when reflected in a mirror.

αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. The acts of one
 good man are 'the same as or similar
 to' those of another, and therefore
 pleasant to him. This friendship,
 then, includes the advantages of φιλία
 διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.

§ 7. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ κ.τ.λ. If I am
 right in my interpretation of this
 section, it is not a duplicate of the
 last. It puts the whole matter in a
 more scientific form and shows that
 all four advantages of friendship not
 only belong to the friendship of the
 good, but belong to it καθ' αὐτήν,
 and that this is the reason of its
 permanence.

συνάπτει, intrans. 'join,' 'meet,'
 cf. 1157 a, 34.

πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία κ.τ.λ. It is not
 necessary to mention τὸ χρήσιμον, for
 it is not φιλητὸν ὡς τέλος. It is
 sufficiently provided for by the quali-
 fication τῷ φιλοῦντι.

ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά
 τινα, 'either for pleasure simply or
 for pleasure to the lover, i.e. pleasure
 depending on a similarity.' I delete
 the comma after φιλοῦντι with Grant,
 though I do not adopt with him the
 interpretation of Aspasios. The mean-
 ing, I think, is that friendship is
 either δι' ἡδονήν ἀπλῶς, as for instance
 the friendship of kings for εὐτράπελοι
 (cf. 1156 a, 13 n.), or it may be
 δι' ἡδονήν τινι, i.e. it may be based on
 the fact that activities 'the same as or
 similar to' our own are pleasant, for
 instance the friendship of bad men
 who 'rejoice in each other's badness'
 (cf. 1159 b, 10). The first kind is based
 upon pleasure as such, and may exist
 between the most unlike persons; the

τινα· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοιοι, καὶ τὰ λοιπά—τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς—ἔστιν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ' 8

τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ φιλεῖν, [καὶ] πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθός, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡδύς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο, διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται. δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθήσεις αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς, καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ. διὸ εὐθὺς τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡδιστον ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντι· ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γνωρίσεως, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὅλως

second is based on a pleasure which can only be felt by a like person on recognising acts like his own. Aspasios, followed by Grant, takes καθ' ὁμοιότητα in the sense of 'metaphorically,' 'by analogy' (cf. Ind. s.v. ὁμοιότης), but this would imply the doctrine that friendship δι' ἡδονὴν ἀπλῶς was true friendship, whereas from 1158 b, 6 we see that *all* friendship based on pleasure is only φιλία καθ' ὁμοιότητα. On the other hand, to put a comma after φιλοῦντι with the other editors would make Aristotle say that *all* friendship is based on similarity, which would be to prejudge the λύσις of the ἀπορία stated 1155 a, 32 sqq., and that in a manner inconsistent with the λύσις actually given below.

ταύτη... καθ' αὐτούς. Strict grammar would require either ταύτη... καθ' αὐτήν or τούτοις... καθ' αὐτούς, but the change from the abstract to the personal is in complete accordance with Greek idiom, being in principle the same as the use of αὐτοί in reference to the name of a town. All the four advantages belong to this φιλία, and

that too essentially and therefore permanently.

ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοιοι, sc. ἡ ἀγαθοί. Both being good they will be ἀγαθοί ἀλλήλοις, as shown above. The reading I have adopted has far the highest authority (K^b Γ Asp.), and makes excellent sense if we only put a comma after it. The other reading ταύτη δὲ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά ('and the remaining εἶδη φιλίας are like it') is mentioned by Aspasios and is plainly accommodated to his erroneous interpretation of καθ' ὁμοιότητα above. For the sense given to ταύτη ὅμοιοι, cf. 1157 b, 2 where it can hardly mean anything else.

καὶ τὰ λοιπά, 'the remaining two' of the four advantages enumerated above, explained by τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς. Hitherto καὶ τὰ λοιπά has been taken either as an accusative limiting ὅμοιοι, or as the subject of ὅμοια.

ἔστιν. My interpretation of course makes it necessary to give ἔστιν the full force of ἐνεστιν or ὑπάρχει. This is quite in accordance with Greek idiom, which repeats a compound verb by the corresponding simple one.

εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ 25
 προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ
 οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας συνα-
 ναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους,
 9 πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ
 δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν 30
 φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν·
 βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ.

IV. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ
 λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια

ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, ὅτι
 ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις.
 τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δ' οὐκ ἔξω ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ
 φιλοῦντι, δυνάμει δὲ πάσης ἔξω· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ <ἡ> ἕτερον. διὸ
 τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι
 φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν
 ἀψύχῳ· φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν
 τὸ φιλούμενον [ὅ] ἐστι χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον
 τῷ φίλῳ ἢ φίλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἢ μουσικὸς ἢ ἢ ἰατρικὸς· ἡδονὴ τοίνυν ἢ ἀπ'
 αὐτοῦ, ἢ αὐτός, αὕτη φιλική. αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος. ὥστ'
 ἂν μὴ χαίρῃ ἢ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φιλία. οὐδὲ δεῖ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθὲν
 τῶν συμβεβηκότων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνειν. εἰ γὰρ σφόδρα
 δυσώδης, λείπεται· ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τῷ εὐνοεῖν, συζῇ δὲ μή.

Cf. Plato, Phd. 59 b, where *παρῆν* is repeated by *ἦν*.

§ 8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Another reason for the rarity of such *φιλία*. The verb *προσδεῖται* is properly used of the *conditio sine qua non* which is not itself a part of the thing. Cf. 1099 a, 31 n.

τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας, EE 1238 a, 2 διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθε ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἀλῶν. In this precise form the proverb does not seem to occur earlier; but the phrase *ἄλας καὶ τράπεζα* was commonly used of 'eating one's salt and sharing one's board.'

ἀποδέξασθαι, *probare*, cf. 1157 b, 18. 1165 b, 13. 1169 a, 8.

§ 9. βούλησις...φιλίας, i.e. *εὐνοια*, cf. 1155 b, 33.

IV. § 1. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. A comparison between the *ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι* and *τελεία φιλία* gives the answer to the question whether there are more *εἶδη φιλίας* than one. Strictly speaking there is only one; the rest are only *φιλία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*. But, as current language calls these *φιλία* also, it will be best for us to do so too. There are then three *εἶδη φιλίας* in the popular sense of the word.

καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπά, the remaining *ὑπάρχοντα*, viz. good and pleasure both *simpliciter* and τῷ φιλοῦντι.

35 ἐκατέρω παρ' ἐκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν. ἡ δὲ
 1157^a διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς
 ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦ-
 τοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φι-
 λίαί μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον
 5 ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον
 τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκείνον, ὁ
 δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας
 ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ
 10 ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία). πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμέ-
 νουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἡθῆ στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις
 ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαπτόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ 2
 χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἡττον φίλοι καὶ δια-
 μένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμ-

καὶ κατὰ πάντα κ.τ.λ., 'and in respect of them all each gets from each the same and similar things.'

ὁμοίωμα...ἔχει, but only in the sense of having ταύτόν τι, the sense in which παιδιά is said in Pol. 1339b, 35 ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν τῷ τέλει, because both imply pleasure. It is not even a ὁμοίωμα like that between things which are εἶδει ἔν, but admit of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον (cf. 1155b, 14 n.), they are not 'like' in the sense that white lead is 'like' snow. For we must not infer from Aristotle's mention of εἶδη which admit of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον that he meant to apply this to φιλία. They were only adduced to show that the argument adduced (by Speusippos?) was insufficient.

καὶ ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν τοῖς καθ' ὁμοιότητα φίλοις.

μένουσι. L^b has διαμένουσι, but the compound is referred to by the simple verb, cf. 1156b, 23 n.

ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται κ.τ.λ. The forms of φιλία in which the two parties do not get the same thing from one

another are discussed in Book IX and there for the first time get the name of ἀνομοειδεῖς φιλίαί (1163b, 32). All the φιλίαί discussed in this book are ὁμοειδεῖς and are further subdivided into φιλίαί (1) ἐν ἰσότητι, (2) καθ' ὑπεροχήν.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The ὁμοίωμα to true φιλία is most complete when there is reciprocity not only of pleasure but of the same pleasure.

ληγούσης δὲ κ.τ.λ., suggested by Plato, Symp. 183e πονηρὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν ἅτε οὐδὲ μονίμου ἐρῶν πράγματος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἀνθεὶ λήγοντι, οὐπερ ἡρα, οἴχεται ἀποπτόμενος, πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις καταισχύνας. ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἡθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου μένει ἅτε μονίμῳ συντακεῖς.

§ 2. ἡττον φίλοι, less even than those who exchange different pleasures. Of course ἡττον goes with διαμένουσι as well as φίλοι.

φέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ 15
 τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ
 φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς
 φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι
 3 μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φι- 20
 λία ἀδιάβλητος ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ
 τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ “πι-
 στεύειν” ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ “μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι,” καὶ ὅσα
 ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλία ἀξιούται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐτέραις
 4 οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι 25

1157 a, 16. EE. 1237 b, 8 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν
 πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δι' αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦνται. βέβαιον γάρ τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία· μόνη δ' αὕτη βέβαιος. τὸ γὰρ
 κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥαδίως [οὐ] ποιεῖ τὴν

μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν, ‘one who is
 neither good nor bad to a person of
 any character you please.’

ἐαυτοῖς, the reciprocal reflexive, an
 emphatic ἀλλήλοις. Cf. 1156 b, 10 n.

ἀδιάβλητος. The proper meaning
 of διαβάλλειν is ‘to set at variance,’
 ‘to estrange.’ The meaning ‘to mis-
 represent,’ ‘slander’ is secondary.

τὸ πιστεύειν κ.τ.λ., ‘the sayings
 πιστεύω (“I trust him”) and οὐδέποτ'
 ἂν ἀδικήσῃς (“He would never do me
 wrong”).’

ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

§ 4. ἐπεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘I say ἐν
 ταῖς ἐτέραις (sc. φιλαῖς); for, since
 people call them φιλαί, we may do
 so too,’ though strictly speaking only
 the friendship of the good, as τελεία
 φιλία, deserves the name. But, if we
 use the word in this comprehensive
 way, we must allow more εἶδη φιλίας
 than one. Eudemos is at pains to
 point out exactly where the unity of
 these different φιλαί lies. They are
 not καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα or συνώνυμα

as the εἶδη of one γένος, since the
 γένος is only predicated of one of
 them καθ' αὐτό. Nor are they mere
 chance ὁμώνυμα (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.);
 for they are all called φιλία in
 virtue of a common element. They
 are πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, just as the
 ἀρετή of a παῖς is so called πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος (Pol. 1260 a, 32), i.e. in the
 light of what it will be when fully
 developed. Now this relation between
 the ἀτελές and the τέλειον is just τὸ
 ἀνάλογον. For instance the less
 highly developed animals have not
 blood but something ‘analogous,’ Hist.
 An. 489 a, 21 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν
 αἷμα καὶ φλέψ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον
 τούτων· ἔστι δ' ἀτελὴ ταῦτα, οἷον τὸ
 μὲν ἴς τὸ δὲ ἰχωρ (for the biological
 theory see Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. Trans.
 ii, 24 sqq.). The different φιλαί are
 therefore τῷ ἀνάλογον ἐν or καθ'
 ὁμοιότητα, for this is the only kind of
 unity that can exist between the
 undeveloped and the developed, just
 as it is the only kind that can exist

λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἔνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς
 30 τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὁμοίον τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι.

κρίσιν ὀρθήν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος· ἢ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. δεῖ γὰρ πείραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θεόγνις·

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,
 πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑπόζυγιον.

οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος, ἀλλὰ βούλονται φίλοι, καὶ μάλιστα λανθάνει ἢ τοιαύτη ἔξις ὡς φιλία. ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχωσι φίλοι εἶναι, διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλοις, οἴονται οὐ βούλεσθαι φίλοι, ἀλλ' εἶναι φίλοι. τὸ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας.

between different γένη. We see then that Aristotle does not adopt the suggestion he made that the difference is one of μάλλον καὶ ἥττον, for that difference is expressly contrasted with τὸ ἀνάλογον. Cf. Hist. An. 588 a, 25 τὰ μὲν γὰρ (sc. ζῶα) τῷ μάλλον καὶ ἥττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον...τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει. The true doctrine is that the other φιλίαι are so called because they show in a rudimentary and undeveloped way the characteristics of true φιλία, and it is only to avoid unnecessary conflict with current language that we speak of them as εἶδη φιλίας at all.

ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις...ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες. People talk of 'friendly states' and of children 'playing with their friends,' and we must respect the *usus loquendi* if possible. Strict grammar would require ὥσπερ τὰς πόλεις...ὥσπερ τοὺς παῖδας (it is quite wrong to supply λέγουσι or ὀνομάζουσι); but Greek idiom can use the nominative after ὥσπερ without regard to the structure of the sentence.

πρώτως καὶ κυρίως, opp. δευτέρως καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μεταφοράν. Cf. Bonitz on Met. 1015 b, 11.

ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι, sc. φιλοῦσι, to be supplied from φίλοι. Τὸ ἡδύ is their φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, and therefore holds an 'analogous' position in their φιλία to that of τὸ ἀγαθόν in true φιλία.

καὶ ὁμοίον τι, sc. φιλοῦσι. This is another point of 'analogy.' Their φιλία is based, like that of the good, on the fact that ἐκάστῳ καθ' ἡδονὴν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται. The acts of (e.g.) the εὐτράπελος are pleasant to the εὐτράπελος, just as the acts of the good man are pleasant to the good man. Again, however, we have a variety of interpretations due, as above 1156 b, 20, to the two senses in which τὸ ὅμοιον and ὁμοιότης are used throughout this passage. In L^b τι after ὅμοιον is omitted, and this shows that the passage was understood to mean 'in so far as it is something good and like the good.' But this loses sight of one point in the analogy.

5 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὖται
συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμ- 35
βεβηκός.

6 Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν 1157^b
φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτη
ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί.
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι τούτοις. V. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν 5
οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω

οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ὑγιαίνειν, ὑγιαίνουν, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ φίλοι βούλονται,
ἡδὴ καὶ φίλοι εἰσίν. σημεῖον δέ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ οἱ διακείμενοι ἄνευ
πείρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πείραν δεδώκασιν ἀλλήλοις,
οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ ὧν δὲ μή, πεισθεῖεν ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ
διαβάλλοντες. ἅμα δὲ φανερόν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αὕτη ἡ φιλία·
ἄπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας· αὐτῷ γὰρ μετρῇ τοὺς
ἄλλους. διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ἂν μὴ διὰ πείραν
ἀπιστῶσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι αἰροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλου,
καὶ οὐθεὶς φιλεῖ μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα. ὥστ' οὐ φίλοι. οὐ
γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς

§ 5. οὐ πάνυ...συνάπτουσι, 'are not very apt to coincide.' It is a mistake to suppose that οὐ πάνυ means 'not at all' in classical Greek, in spite of Cobet's contention to that effect. Where it seems to mean 'not at all,' it is only by a litotes; just as οὐχ ἥκιστα may seem to mean μάλιστα. The friendship of the good is necessarily both pleasant and useful (1156 b, 18), but a friendship for pleasure is not very likely to be useful, nor a friendship for use very likely to be pleasant.

οὐ...πάνυ συνδυάζεται, cf. 1121 a, 16. Pleasure and profit belong to the friendship of the good essentially, but there is nothing to bind pleasure to profit nor profit to pleasure. As 'accidents' they are 'not much found

in combination.' Cf. Met. 1027 a, 11 οἶον οὕτ' αἰεὶ οὕθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁ λευκὸς μουσικὸς ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεται ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔσται. The phrase, then, excludes the συνδυασμός of pleasure and profit from τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

§ 6. ταύτη ὅμοιοι ὄντες, cf. 1156 b, 22 n., and 1157 a, 32 ἢ...ὁμοίον τι, sc. φιλοῦσι.

δι' αὐτούς, i.e. δι' ἀλλήλους, cf. 1156 b, 10 n.

τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι, i.e. καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

V. § 1. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1098 b, 33 τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ εὖ πράξει.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλή-
 λους καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισ-
 μένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ'
 10 ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν
 ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. εἰ δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία
 γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
 “πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.” οὐ φαίνονται 2
 δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ
 15 γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν
 τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαί-
 νεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ 3

πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις. οὐ γίνεται ἄρ' ἡ φιλία ἢ
 πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πείραν λαβεῖν· ἐκάστω γὰρ ἂν
 ἔδει συζῆσαι. οὐδὲ δὴ αἰρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ ἱματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτοι
 ἐν πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν
 τῷ χείρονι πάλαι ἐχρήτο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω, τοῦθ' αἰρετέον, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου τὸν ἀγνώτα εἰ βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνευ
 πείρας οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ. διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν
 ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἀλῶν· ἅμα δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοί, εἰ δὴ φίλος ἔσται σοὶ φίλος. ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός, ἀπλῶς <δ>
 ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτ' ἄμφω, ὥστε ὁ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθόν, τὸ τούτου ἄλλῳ, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλῳ δ'
 ἀγαθός, ὅτι χρήσιμος. τὸ δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν
 κωλύει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.

ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν. It is not necessary
 to insert ἂν with Ramsauer and
 Susemihl. Their ἔξις is such as to
 become active at once when brought
 into contact with the object.

τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, sc. τὴν ἔξιν.

πολλὰς δὴ κ.τ.λ. We do not know
 the author of this version of “out of
 sight, out of mind.” The word
 ἀπροσηγορία occurs nowhere else in
 classical literature. We expect it to
 mean want of ‘affability’; but Aristotle
 seems to take it as simply “lack of

converse” (Peters).

§ 2. οἱ στρυφνοί, ‘sour.’ The
 εἶδη τῶν χυμῶν are given in de An.
 422 b, 11. They form a series between
 the opposites sweet and bitter, differing
 τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον like sounds and
 colours (cf. 1155 b, 15 n.). In this
 series τὸ στρυφνόν comes between τὸ
 αὐστηρόν, ‘dry’ (as we say ‘dry
 sherry’) and τὸ ὀξύ, ‘acid.’ It is the
 taste of unripe fruit. In its meta-
 phorical use as applied to ἦθος we
 have it in Ar. Wasps 877.

δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὖνοις εἰκόασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν — ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ 20 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσ- ἡκει — συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μὴδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ 25

1157 b, 25. EE. 1238 a, 11 ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν βεβαίων, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων. καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται

ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα.

πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύναι τὸν φιλούμενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχιῶν. τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ ᾧ αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἰροῦνται μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι). ἡ δὲ ἀτυχία δηλοῖ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόντας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δῆλος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἡδὺς μᾶλλον. πλὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺς ταχύ. ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς οἴνοις καὶ ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὀριστέον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὁμολογήσαιεν δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόματος καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον οὐχ ἡδύ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξαπατᾷ.

§ 3. ἀποδεχόμενοι, *probantes*, cf. above 1156 b, 28.

οἱ μακάριοι, *beatī*, as opposed to οἱ ἐνδεεῖς, those who are in need of nothing. It is not necessary, however, to limit the meaning so far as to make it merely equivalent to οἱ πλούσιοι.

μονώταις, cf. 1097 b, 9 n.

ἡ ἐταιρική, sc. φιλία.

§ 4. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The connexion of thought here seems to be this. The distinction just drawn between the *ἐξις* and the *ἐνέργεια* of

φιλία suggests another important distinction which still further brings out the nature of the *τελεία* φιλία. Although it is true that something more than the *ἐξις* is necessary for it, we must distinguish the *ἐνέργεια* which comes from the formed *ἐξις* and the mere *πάθος* of *φίλησις* which is the material out of which the *ἐξις* is formed. The *ἐνέργεια* of true φιλία is not a *πάθος*, but an *ἐνέργεια* which is *ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξεως* and implies *προαίρεσις*. The distinction is just like that between the *κινήσεις* which make up

πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἶρετὸν τὸ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ'
 ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ' ἢ μὲν φί- 5
 λησις πάθει, ἢ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἢ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἦττον
 30 πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
 ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἔξεως· καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς
 φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔξιν.
 καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ
 ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὧ φίλος. ἐκάτερος
 35 οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
 τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ εἶδει· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, μά-

έθισμός and the good activities which arise when the έθισμός is complete.

τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον, sc. ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ.

δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα, (1) διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς, (2) διὰ τὸ αὐτῷ.

§ 5. ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Three σημειᾶ are given which show that true φιλία is a ἔξις, (1) ἀντιφίλησις implies προαίρεσις, (2) the βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ is ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, (3) the φιλητὸν is τὸ ἀγαθόν. Ultimately this means that φιλία is not an ἀλλοίωσις but a τελείωσις of the soul. Cf. 1103 a, 25 n.

ἢ γὰρ φίλησις κ.τ.λ. We can now explain why the word φιλία has a more restricted application than φίλησις (i.e. the verb φιλεῖν, cf. above 1155 b, 29 n.). It is just because ἀντιφίλησις implies προαίρεσις and προαίρεσις implies a ἔξις. For the presence of προαίρεσις as a means of distinguishing ἔξεις from πάθη cf. 1106 a, 3, where it is given as one of the arguments to show that ἀρετή is not a πάθος but a ἔξις, that the ἀρεταί are προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. Now it is clear that the reciprocation of φίλησις must be 'deliberate' or μετὰ λόγου—no mere ἀλλοίωσις of τὸ ὁρεκτικόν could amount to reciprocation—and it therefore implies the union of the intellectual with the appetitive, i.e. προαίρεσις,

and that implies a ἔξις.

καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται κ.τ.λ. The fact that the βούλησις is disinterested (ἐκείνων ἔνεκα) also shows that it can be no mere πάθος.

καὶ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. The fact that the βούλησις, so far as it is self-regarding, is of the true ἀγαθόν also shows it is no mere πάθος. It always requires a determinate ἔξις to make τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, the object of all βούλησις, coincide with τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

τῇ βουλήσει, the βούλησις ἀγαθῶν is reciprocal (ἀνταποδίδωσι, cf. ἀντιφίλησις, ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι above).

καὶ τῷ εἶδει. This φιλία is (1) ἐν ἰσότητι, cf. τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι, and also (2) ὁμοειδής as explained below 1158 b, 1 τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν (cf. 1157 a, 4 n.) καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις as contrasted with the ἀνομοειδεῖς φιλίαι in which ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας (1158 b, 2). This point is as important as the other and could hardly be omitted here. The K^b reading καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ seems to me to spoil the argument, though it is no doubt true that they give each other equal pleasure.

φιλότης ἰσότης. This is said to be a Pythagorean formula.

λιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτῃ ὑπάρχει. VI. ἐν δὲ τοῖς 1158^a
 στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἦττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ
 δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἦττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα
 γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ
 νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ γί- 5
 νονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυ-
 φνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται
 γὰρ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ
 πάννυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις,
 2 ἂ δὴ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον 10
 κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν
 πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα
 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν
 3 σφόδρα οὐ ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμ-
 πειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. 15
 διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχε-
 ται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπη-
 4 ρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν

1158 a, 1. EE. 1238 a, 30 ἢ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ
 ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐστι, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ

VI. § 1. ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς
 κ.τ.λ. This is not a duplicate of
 1157 b, 13 sqq. It is true that the
 same facts are referred to, but it is
 for a different purpose. In the first
 passage it is stated that the "sour and
 elderly" do not produce the ἐνέργεια
 of φιλία, which is one sign among
 others that true φιλία is a τελείωσις
 and therefore, though it cannot suffer
 ἀλλοιώσις, it may be lost ἀλλοιουμένων
 τινῶν (cf. 1103 a, 25 n.). Here we are
 speaking of the κινήσεις (ἀλλοιώσεις,
 πάθη) called φιλήσεις which are the
 ποιητικὰ φιλίας, and it is pointed out
 that they too are absent from natures
 past their prime.

§ 2. ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ. This is

really another σημεῖον that true φιλία
 is τελεία. Like love, it cannot have
 many objects, and the reason is that,
 like it, it is an ὑπερβολή. Now one
 of the definitions of τὸ τέλειον is τὸ
 κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερ-
 βολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος (Met. 1021 b, 15).
 οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, sc. πολλοὺς
 ῥάδιον.

§ 3. πολλοὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The two
 things which make τελεία φιλία rare
 are (1) the small number of the good,
 (2) the time it takes to form.

§ 4. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. The two
 ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι are now contrasted with
 each other.

ὅταν ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1157 a,
 4 sqq.

ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς
 20 αὐτοῖς, οἶαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν
 ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων.
 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ·
 συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονται τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν
 χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ
 25 τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζη-
 τοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς·
 οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς 5
 ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοι φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι
 γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσι χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἅμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ

εἴρηται πρότερον· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἐγγίνονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις
 καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις. ὅθεν λέγεται, “ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει” καὶ

21 κακὸς κακῷ <δὲ> συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ ἢ φαῦλοι ἢ
 μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ' οἷον ᾠδικοὶ ἅμφω, ἢ ὁ μὲν φιλωδὸς ὁ δ' ᾠδικός ἐστιν,
 καὶ ἢ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἔτι
 χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν
 προαίρεσιν, ἢ <ἢ> οὐδέτεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φαύλῳ εἶναι
 φίλον. καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαῦλος
 πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ πρὸς τὴν
 ὑπάρχουσαν, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ
 ἀγαθὰ, ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἢ πενία

ἐλευθέριον...ἀγοραίων. These words
 are properly contrasted, cf. below
 1162 b, 26.

καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δέ, opp. οἱ ἐνδεεῖς
 1157 b, 20.

οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν. I do not
 know why Grant should doubt that
 Aristotle was capable of meaning this
 as a joke. It may be true that he
 jokes with difficulty, but he was
 certainly not above a little banter of
 the Academy.

τοιούτους ὄντας, sc. ἡδεῖς, καὶ ἔτι
 αὐτοῖς, sc. ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἡδεῖς. This
 gives all four ὑπάρχοντα.

§ 5. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. Asp.
 λέγει...τοὺς τυράννους, cf. 1095 b, 21 n.
 The obvious fact that princes and
 potentates have two sets of friends
 confirms our doctrine. They wish to
 have all the advantages that can be
 derived from friendship; but, as οὐ
 πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
 (1159 a, 35 n.), they cannot as a rule find
 pleasant friends who are also useful.
 So they have both 'agreeable people'
 (poets, philosophers, musicians, wits)
 and also 'able henchmen' (men, for
 instance, who can poison a trouble-
 some brother) at their courts. Aristotle

οὐ πάννυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους 30
 εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιεμένοι,
 τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάννυ γίνεται
 6 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπου-
 δαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ
 καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον 35
 ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάννυ δ' εἰώθασιν τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

συμφέρει ἢ νόσος, <καὶ> ταῦτα τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἔνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ
 αὐτὸ τὸ φάρμακον πικρὸν· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται * *, ἀλλὰ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα
 βούλεται. ἔτι καθ' οὓς τρόπους καὶ ἀλλήλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶεν ἂν
 φίλοι. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὺς οὐχ ἢ φαῦλος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν κοινῶν τινος μετέχει,
 οἷον εἰ μουσικός. ἔτι ἢ ἐνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές· διὸ ἔνιοι ὁμιλητικοὶ εἶεν
 ἂν καὶ σπουδαῖω. ἢ ἢ προσαρμόττουσιν ἐκάστω· ἔχουσι γάρ τι πάντες
 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

knew all about this from personal experience in Macedonia. We may see the same thing in the case of Frederick the Great.

τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους...τοὺς δὲ... For the "twofold use of the article" cf. 1117 a, 12 n. We must take δεινοὺς as a secondary predicative object after ζητοῦσι. 'They seek others who shall be skilful at executing orders.' For the predicative object after ζητεῖν cf. 1132 a, 22 n.

§ 6. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This section answers the question 'why do tyrants not avoid the necessity of having two sets of friends by taking good men as their friends?'

ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι κ.τ.λ. 'But such a man (τοιοῦτος = ὁ σπουδαῖος) does not become a friend to one who exceeds him (in power, i.e. τῷ τυράννῳ), unless he (the good man) is exceeded (by the tyrant) in goodness as well as (καὶ) in power. Unless this is so, the good man is not equalised to the tyrant by being exceeded in power (only) in proportion to the amount by which he is exceeded in goodness. Such tyrants

are not found every day' (on οὐ πάννυ see Ind. s.v.). This is how recent editors (Grant, Stewart) take the passage. The old view, according to which ὁ ὑπερέχων and not ὁ σπουδαῖος is the subject of ὑπερέχεται is grammatically improbable and morally absurd. It would make Aristotle say that the good man would find it easier to be the friend of a tyrant the worse the tyrant was! This sentence is really the close of a long debate. Plato had suggested in the 'Laws' that, even if philosophers could not be kings, a philosopher might do something as the friend of a young tyrant. Aristotle, who knew what court life was, renounces the idea. It is better to lecture on πολιτική with the hopes of training a νομοθέτης.

οὐκ ἰσάζει. For ἰσάζειν intransitive cf. 1154 b, 24. 1162 b, 2. Aristotle has not yet explained what he means by ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος, and he has only been led into mentioning it here by the case of the tyrant. We shall see from the next section that the principle is the same as that of Distributive Justice. If the tyrant is

1158^b Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ 7
 αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον
 ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας·
 ὅτι δ' ἡττόν εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται.
 5 δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταύτου
 εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς
 κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει
 ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κακείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν
 μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως

1158 b, 1. EE. 1238 b, 15 τρία μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν
 πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις κατ' ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία. καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ'
 ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πως εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις. ἄλλη δὲ
 διαφορὰ τούτων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ὥσπερ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον.
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅλως ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου,
 καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον· κατ' ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀριθμὸν
 δ' οὐκ ἴσον. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατήρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς
 τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων διαφοραὶ εἰσιν· ἄλλη πατὴρ πρὸς
 υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἢ
 δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα. ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἢ οὐχ
 ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. γελοῖον γὰρ εἴ τις ἐγκαλοῖ τῷ θεῷ ὅτι οὐχ
 ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ.
 φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. καὶ
 ἡδονὴ διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἢ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδί,
 καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν
 χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἡδονὴν οἱ μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ
 καθ' ὑπεροχήν. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν, εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως
 χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. δῆλον δ' ἐν τοῖς

as much better than the philosopher
 as he is more powerful, there will be
 a proportionate equality between them,
 and therefore the possibility of *φιλία*,
 though not *φιλία* of the kind we have
 been discussing hitherto, but a *φιλότης*
κατ' ἀξίαν in which *γίνεται πως*
ισότης (1158 b, 27).

§ 7. Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now
 pass from *φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι*, which is
ἐν ἀντιπεπονητόσι and resembles τὸ

διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον, to *φιλία καθ'*
ὑπεροχήν, which is *κατ' ἀξίαν* and
 resembles τὸ *διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον*. It
 is of great help in the interpretation
 of this Book to keep this analogy in
 view.

τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται, sc. ἐν ταῖς
 ὁμοειδέσι, ἢ...καταλλάττονται, sc. ἐν
 ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσιν.

αὗται, 'the latter,' sc. αἱ ἀνομο-
 ειδεῖς.

μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φι- 10
λίας, δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης. VII. ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας
εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσ-
βυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρ-
χοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων·
οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρ- 15
χομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα,
οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα
γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι'
ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
2 ταῦτά μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ 20
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς
γεννήσασιν, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος
ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν

ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις. ἀγνοεῖ
γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν. διὸ
εὐρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ (εἶρηκεν Εὐνίκος Jackson) “ἐρώμενος τοιαῦτ’ ἂν οὐκ
ἐρῶν λέγοι.” οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

b, 20. EE. 1239 a, 1 ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, τριῶν ὄντων εἰδῶν φιλίας,
κατ’ ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὐταὶ πάλιν διήρηνται
εἰς δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἱ δὲ καθ’ ὑπεροχήν εἰσιν. φιλίαι μὲν
οὖν ἀμφότεραι, φίλοι δ’ οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητά· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ
ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν
δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, εἰ δὲ φιλῇ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον φιλῶν. τῇ γὰρ
ἀξία τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καὶ τινι ἴσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν δι’ ἡλικίας ἔλλειψιν
ἀνάξια ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην
τοιαύτην ὑπεροχήν. δεῖ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἥττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιοῦν,
καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδέϊ καὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς
μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται ἀμφισβητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν
ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐν χρυσίῳ· ἀλλὰ

VII. § 1. καθ’ ὑπεροχήν, in the
mathematical sense of the word,
cf. Ind. s.v.

καὶ ἀλλήλων, as well as from the
φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι.

§ 2. ταῦτά μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Friend-
ship ἐν ἰσότητι may or may not be

ὁμοειδής, friendship καθ’ ὑπεροχήν is
always ἀνομοειδής.

ἀνάλογον...καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ
γίνεσθαι. I do not think we should
press the meaning of καί, as if there
were anything other than the φίλησις
which is ‘in proportion.’ Rather

πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν
 25 δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν,
 καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστον ὁμοίως·
 ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἢ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεται πως
 ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ 3
 30 φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον
 πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
 τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν
 δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς 4
 ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν
 35 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιούσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν·
 πλείστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ
 1159^a καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιούσιν εἶναι φίλοι
 οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ
 μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν 5

τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ
 ἐγγὺς μέγα, τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν· ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ ᾖ,
 οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι,
 οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν. φανερόν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ,
 τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δ' ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι.

Aristotle has in his mind two forms of statement (1) καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, (2) ἀνάλογον τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι. Even an English writer might say loosely "if there is excess on either side, the affection must be in proportion *as well*."

τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστον, e.g. τὸν ἡδῖω.

κατ' ἀξίαν, cf. 1131 a, 24 n.

πως ἰσότης, for τὸ ἀνάλογον is ἰσότης λόγων, cf. 1131 a, 31 n.

§ 3. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. In spite of the parallelism between ἡ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλία and τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον, there is really a great difference. In the latter the *proportion* is everything and it does not matter how great the excess may be;

in the former *equality* in the strict arithmetical sense is the norm, and if the excess goes beyond a certain limit φιλία ceases altogether. The δίκαιον of a democratic state is only one form of justice among others, the friendship of equals is the typical friendship from which all others are variations. Eudemos (l.c.) goes so far as to say that, though they are φίλαι, you cannot call the parties φίλοι.

§ 4. ἢ τινος ἄλλου, e.g. τοῦ ἡδέος.

§ 5. ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι, sc. φίλοι, 'up to what point friends are still friends.' This is a 'brachylogy' of the type illustrated in Kühner § 597 f. Cf. especially Plato, Meno 89 a οὐκ

ὀρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι
 6 μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἶον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ 5
 ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ
 μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἶον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι
 ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά· εἰ
 δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ
 ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ 10
 δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά· ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα·
 αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰγαθὰ. VIII. οἱ πολ-
 λοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
 φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ
 φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον 15
 φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ

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1159 a, 12. EE. 1239 a, 21 δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον
 οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ' ἰσότητα· ἅμα γὰρ
 ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή· διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ'
 ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου· ἅμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ
 κολακευομένῳ. μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι

ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί, sc. ἀγαθοί.
 I do not therefore think it necessary
 to read ἡ φιλία as Bywater proposes
 (Contr. p. 60). Nor is there any
 difficulty in the singular μένει which
 follows.

ἀφαιρουμένων, 'subtracted' from
 the one party. Aristotle might
 equally well have said προστιθεμένων,
 'added' to the other; for ὑπεροχή
 arises from ἀφαίρεσις and πρόσθεσις.

§ 6. ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ, 'there
 is a difficulty as to whether perhaps...'

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ. The point is
 that in wishing a friend to become a
 god, you are wishing to deprive him
 of something good, namely your own
 friendship.

αὐτῷ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We shall come
 to the question of φιλαυτία presently.

VIII. § 1. οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.
 We have said that φιλία in the
 primary sense is ἐν ἰσότητι, but we

have to account for the fact that the
 mass of men prefer φιλία καθ' ὑπερο-
 χήν. It is because they prefer to be
 loved rather than to love, and this is
 due to their love of esteem. It is
 easy to account for the love of flattery;
 the common run of men like to feel
 their superiority. It may seem more
 strange to say that men seek friend-
 ships in which the other party exceeds
 them, but this also is true. They love
 the friendship of the great because of
 the expectation of favours to come,
 and the friendship of the wise and
 good as a testimony to their own
 worth. In all these cases, however,
 the φιλία is only αἰρετὸν κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκός and not καθ' αὐτό, whereas the
 friendship of equals is αἰρετὸν καθ'
 αὐτό and therefore better.

προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος. Cf. Dem.
 de Cor. § 125 ὅρα μὴ τούτων μὲν
 ἐχθρὸς ᾗς, ἐμὸς δὲ προσποιῇ.

τιμᾶσθαι, οὐ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δι' αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόασιν 2
αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι
γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι
20 διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν ἂν του
δέωνται· ὥς δὲ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ).
οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπικεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βε-
βαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι
δή, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.
25 τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖτ-
τον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ
εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι 3
εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔναι
γὰρ διδόασιν τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι,
30 ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται,
ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς εἶκεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας,
καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὦν μητρὶ προσ-

ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι.
φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ
φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι
τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός. ἔνεστι
γὰρ ἡ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ
λανθάνειν φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δ' οὐ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ
φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν.
σημεῖον δέ· ἔλοιτ' ἂν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄμφω, γινώ-
σκειν ἢ γινώσκεισθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ
ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἢ Ἀντιφῶντος. καὶ γὰρ εἶκεν τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεισθαι
αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν
τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἕνεκα. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν
πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκονται.

§ 2. ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. Cf. 1095 b, 21 n.

βεβαιῶσαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1095 b, 18²⁶ sqq.

§ 3. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ. Another reason why φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχὴν is not φιλία in the true sense. Whether we regard the ὑπερέχων or the ὑπερεχό-

μενος, such φιλία is always διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, cf. 1159 a, 12 n.

σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες κ.τ.λ. This σημεῖον derives its force from the fact that φιλία is φύσει. We shall expect to find the characteristics of true φιλία in a rudimentary form (ἵχνη) even in purely instinctive feelings.

4 ἡκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας
 οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων
 ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, 35
 5 οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ 1159^b
 ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
 καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
 μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, 5
 ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ'
 αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μο-
 χθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμέ-
 νουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
 6 χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς 10

1159 a, 33. EE. 1239 b, 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας,
 καὶ πόσοι τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ
 φίλοι διαφέρουσιν, οἳ τε κατ' ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, εἴρηται· ἐπεὶ
 δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη,
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπεριλαμβανόντων (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίον φασιν εἶναι
 φίλον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον), λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσι πρὸς τὰς
 εἰρημένας φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ
 ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ
 ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὅμοιος αἰεὶ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἦθος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ
 ἄφρων οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἔωθεν καὶ ἐσπέρας. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ
 φαῦλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ δίστανται· ἡ δ' οὐ βέβαιος φιλία οὐ
 φιλία. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, ὅτι <τὸ> ἀγαθὸν ὅμοιον, ἔστι
 δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις ταῦθ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ

§ 4. τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων.
 Cf. above 1155 a, 29. This is another
 σημείον. No one is praised for being
 loved.

§ 5. οὕτω δ' ἂν, sc. τῷ φιλεῖν (not
 merely τῷ φιλεῖσθαι) κατ' ἀξίαν or
 ἀνάλογον. The ὑπερεχόμενος may
 make up for his inferiority by the
 strength of his affection.

τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν, sc. ὁμοίων.

μόνιμοι...καθ' αὐτούς, virtually

διαμένουσιν ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καθ' αὐτούς,
 from which it follows that they are
 permanently ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
 their activities being 'the same or
 similar' 1156 b, 17.

οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς, much less ἀλλή-
 λοις. We cannot be sure that the
 activities of one bad man will be the
 same or similar to those of another,
 as we can in the case of the good. See
 the fuller account in EE. loc. cit. above.

ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὲς ὢν, τούτου ἐφιεμένος ἀν-
 15 τιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστήν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιοτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐν-
 20 αντίου καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἢ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

φύσει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ἔξεις καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν ἡδίσται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις· καὶ ταύτῃ ἐνδέχεται καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν.

κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.

τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον ὡς τὸ χρήσιμον· αὐτὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ ὅμοιον ἄχρηστον. διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται καὶ δοῦλος δεσπότου, καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ὡς χρήσιμον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τέλει ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τύχη οὗ ἐπιθυμῇ, ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὁρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ. ἔστι δέ πως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὁρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολα γὰρ ὁρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσον. ἔτι κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος. ὁρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλήλων τὰναντία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερψυχθέντες γάρ, ἐὰν θερμανθῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερθερμανθέντες, ἐὰν ψυχθῶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ χαίρει ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσει ἡδέεσιν, οἱ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξιστάσι τῆς φύσει ἔξεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστίν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ᾗ ἐπὶ τῶν

§ 6. οἷον πένης, cf. 1157 b, 21 n.

ἀλλοτριώτερα, i. e. φυσικώτερα

§ 7. οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ κ.τ.λ. Cf. the 1155 b, 2.
 quotation from Euripides 1155 b, 3.

ΙΧ. Ἐοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτά καὶ 25
ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἀπάσῃ
γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσ-
αγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρα-
τιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ'
ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ 30
δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,” ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοι-
2 νωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταῖροις
πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλ-
λον αἱ δ' ἥττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ 35
ταῦτά γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 1160^a
οὐδ' ἐταῖροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
3 φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ
αὕξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρή-
ματα ἀποστερηῆσαι ἐταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ 5

ἐμψύχων. διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις
καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥαθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

1159 b, 25. EE. 1241 b, 11 δοκεῖ δὲ τό τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἴσον
τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἰσότης [ἡ] φιλότης. αἱ
δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ
τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν, ὥστε ὅσα εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας,
καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐγγὺς ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς.

ΙΧ. § 1. Ἐοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. We
pass now to the discussion of φιλία ἐν
κοινωνίᾳ, especially in the state. It
is here that the parallelism of φιλία
and δικαιοσύνη comes out most clearly.

ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1155 a, 22 sqq.

περὶ ταῦτά, the things which are
its matter, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, the persons
who are its object. Cf. 1111 a, 1 n.

τι δίκαιον. Cf. Plato Rep. 351 b,
sqq.

προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν κ.τ.λ. The
usual confirmation from current lan-
guage necessary to set up an ἐνδοξος

πρότασις. So in English, 'My learned
friend,' 'My Right Hon. friend.'

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, often quoted by
Plato. It is said to be a Pythagorean
maxim. Cf. especially Gorg. 507 e
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἐνὶ κοινωνίᾳ, φιλία οὐκ ἂν
εἴη.

§ 2. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς κ.τ.λ. This
is an implied criticism of Plato's
Republic.

§ 3. αὕξησιν λαμβάνει, virtual
passive of αὔξεται. Fritzsche com-
pares ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει Soph. El.
183 b, 21.

βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντινούν
 ἄλλον. αὖξασθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δί-
 καιον, ὥς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα. αἱ 4
 δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις εἰκάσι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπο-
 10 ρεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοί τι τῶν
 εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος
 χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου
 γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι
 τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη 5
 15 τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν
 πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται
 δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πό-
 λεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται.
 ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασω-
 20 τῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας
 [πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκάσιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ
 τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς

1160 a, 14. EE. 1241 b, 24 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι εἰσὶν [ἡ]
 μόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν φρατέρων ἡ τῶν ὀργίων, ἡ
 αἱ χρηματιστικαὶ ἔτι πολιτεῖαι.

ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, masc. of the persons,
 ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα = περὶ ταῦτά 1159 b,
 25.

§ 4. τῆς πολιτικῆς, sc. κοινωνίας.

συμπορεύονται, sc. οἱ κοινωνοί, cf.
 below a, 25, especially οἱ σύμπλοι and
 the like.

ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, 'the condition
 upon which they make a journey in
 common is profit of some kind.' For
 the sense of ἐπὶ cf. 1110 a, 23.

τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν. Pol.
 1278 b, 23 sq. τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συν-
 ἀγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ
 τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. We see from this
 that τὸ συμφέρον includes τὸ εὖ ζῆν as
 well as τὸ ζῆν.

φασιν. For the ἔνδοξον cf. Plato,

Rep. 369 c. Ar. Pol. 1279 a, 17.
 1282 b, 17.

§ 5. ἡ πόλεως, Ramsauer under-
 stands this as referring either to exiles
 trying to recover their city or colonists
 seeking for a new one. But surely it
 is more natural to think of a πολιορκία.
 For εἴτε...εἴτε...ἡ... cf. 1112 a, 24.

ἔνιαι δὲ...συνουσίας. It is clear
 that Bywater is right in holding that
 b, 23 θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες κ.τ.λ. is
 continuous with this. I think it safer,
 however, to assume an interpolation
 than a dislocation, and b, 21 πᾶσαι...
 b, 23 βίον is not wanted here. It is
 repeated in substance at the end of
 the chapter.

ἅπαντα τὸν βίον] θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας
 συνόδους, τιμὰς <τε> ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀνα-
 παύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ 25
 σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκο-
 μιδὰς οἶον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον
 6 τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς
 πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς
 τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις. 30

Χ. Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβά-
 σεις, οἶον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασι-

ποιοῦντες, agreeing with *κοινωνοί* implied in *κοινωνίαι*. Cardwell compares Thuc. iii. 79. Eur. Or. 38. Hdt. i, 151, γ. Cf. also above a, 9.

τιμὰς τε κ.τ.λ. They combine the honour of the gods (the *θυσίαι*) with their own relaxation (the *σύνοδοι*).

ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες. This is the important point, for it shows how these *κοινωνίαι* are not merely for the sake of pleasure but for the sake of the good life. That they are for the sake of *ἀνάπαυσις* is proved by the fact that the original festivals were during the time of *σχολή* after the hard work of the harvest. On *ἀνάπαυσις* see 1127 b, 33 n. Lambinus compares Hor. Epp. ii. 1, 139.

φαίνονται γίνεσθαι, i.e. in Aristotle's own time. Cf. the argument in 'Ath. πολ. c. 3 where the relative antiquity of the *ἄρχοντες* is proved from the nature of the festivals they managed. The *ἄρχων* must be more recent than the *βασιλεύς* and the *πολέμαρχος* because he only manages τὰ ἐπίθετα. Of course *ἀρχαῖαι* does not mean 'in ancient times' (*παλαιαί*), but 'coming down from ancient times,' 'original' as opposed to ἐπίθετα.

§ 6. ἀκολουθήσουσι, cf. above 1152 b, 28 n.

Χ. § 1. Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. For classifications of constitutions, cf.

Plato Rep. 301 a, sqq. 544 c, sqq. Ar. Pol. 1279 a, 22 sqq. Rhet. 1365 b, 29.

παρεκβάσεις, 'deflections.' The name is taken from music where certain scales were called 'deflected.' Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 386. The fullest explanation of the meaning is given in Pol. 1290 a, 13 sqq., where we are told that oligarchy and democracy are commonly regarded as the typical constitutions, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις. People make aristocracy a kind of oligarchy and the *πολιτεία* a kind of democracy just as they make the west wind a deflection of the north and the east wind of the south. He goes on ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας, ὥς φασί τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται εἶδη δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ τὴν φρυγιστὶ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δώρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. But the true doctrine is δυοῖν ἢ μιᾷ οὐσῃ τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας (the well tempered scale) τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ' ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικὰς. We shall therefore best realise Aristotle's meaning if we think of the *παρεκβάσεις* as 'out of tune,' remembering at the same time that

λεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν
 τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν
 35 εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ 2
 βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασι-
 1160^b λείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ
 πλείστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ,
 ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς
 ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ
 5 τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ

vulgar people at Athens preferred scales which were not natural, cf. Pol. 1342 a, 22 εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχὰι παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ, καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα (see Susemihl and Hicks p. 636). The ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι are based on the natural notes of the scale.

Βασιλεία ... ἀριστοκρατία. Pol. 1279 a, 32 καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν, πλειόνων δ' ἑνός, ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἣ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς.

ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. Plato calls this ὀλιγαρχία. Rep. 550 c Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν;—Τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἦ δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν. Isokrates, who only allows three constitutions, speaks (Panath. § 131) of δημοκρατίαν...ἀριστοκρατίαν χρωμένην, ἣν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ χρησιμωτάτην οὖσαν ὥσπερ τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀριθμοῦσιν.

τιμοκρατικὴν. Plato uses the word in a very different sense (see Rep. 545 b, sqq.). He dissociates it from its natural connexion with τιμήματα and uses it of states like Sparta whose ruling principle is honour.

πολιτείαν. This refers to the πάτ-

ριος πολιτεία which the moderate party tried to restore after the Peloponnesian War. Its ideal was that political power should be confined to οἱ τὰ ὄπλα παρεχόμενοι, and that is why it is here called τιμοκρατικὴ. In the Politics Aristotle calls it πολιτεία simply and says (1279 a, 37) ὅταν τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. But he means exactly the same thing as he does here. That he is not thinking of a 'timocratic' state, in which there are several classes based upon a property qualification, is shown by b, 18 ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι.

§ 2. βελτίστη...βασιλεία. This is only to be understood, however, of the ideal ruler in the παμβασιλεία, the man of ἡρωϊκὴ καὶ θεία ἀρετή. The whole question is thoroughly discussed in the Third Book of the Politics.

χειρίστη...τιμοκρατία. The reason is given Pol. 1279 a, 39 ἓνα μὲν διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος κ.τ.λ. Pol. 1279 b, 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. 1311 a, 2 ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς μὲν τυραννικὸς τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν.

ἂν σκοποίῃ, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρω-
 τὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτη·
 τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύ-
 τῃς ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ.
 3 μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότῃς γάρ 10
 ἐστὶ μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννὶς, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραν-
 νος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν
 ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ
 πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
 αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι 15
 δὲ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ
 τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσιν αὗται·

1160 b, 12. EE. 1241 b, 33 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν
 τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς
 κοινωνίας. κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ <δημοκρατικὴ> κοινωνία καὶ ἡ
 ἑταιρική φιλία, τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὄρῳ μετρεῖται· κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ
 ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἀρίστη καὶ βασιλική. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὸν δίκαιον τῷ
 ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. καὶ ἡ φιλία δὲ
 ὁμοίως πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.

κληρωτὸς...βασιλεύς. Ramsauer
 refers to Plato, *Polit.* 290 e sqq. καὶ
 δὴ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν...τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεῖ
 φασὶ τῇδε τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα
 πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιῶν ἀποδε-
 δόσθαι. 291 a τούτους τε τοῖνυν τοὺς
 κληρωτοὺς βασιλέας ἅμα καὶ ἱερέας.
 The reference, then, is primarily to
 the βασιλεὺς at Athens and, as Mr. J.
 Solomon has shown (*Cl. Rev.* iii,
 294), the meaning is practically 'a
 merely titular king.' Mr Solomon
 quotes two further passages in illus-
 tration (1) *Ar. Pol.* 1318 a, 2 περι-
 αεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ
 αἰρετῶν κληρωτοὺς ποιεῖν (as a means
 of reducing a magistracy to insigni-
 ficance) and (2) Plato, *Laws* 692 a
 οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ (i.e. the
 ἀρχή of the Spartan kings) τὴν τῶν
 ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς

ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως, which, as he rightly
 says, must practically mean 'reducing
 it to an almost nominal kingship.'

φανερώτερον, sc. ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς τιμο-
 κρατίας (a, 36).

κάκιστον δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the τόπος
 see *Top.* 117 b, 2. Cf. *Pol.* 1289 a,
 39 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ
 θειοτάτης πολιτείας παρέκβασιν εἶναι
 χειρίστην.

§ 3. μεταβαίνει, impersonal, 'the
 transition is from—.'

εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. *Pol.* 1306 b, 25
 ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες,
 οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτ' ὀλίγοι. 1290 b,
 19 ὀλιγαρχία δ' (ἐστίν) ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι
 καὶ εὐγενέστεροι (κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ᾧσιν),
 ὀλίγοι ὄντες. 1279 b, 7 ὀλιγαρχία
 πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων (συμφέρον ἐστίν)
 (Fritzsche).

εἰς δημοκρατίαν. *Pol.* 1290 b, 17

πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ
 20 δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα 4
 δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασι-
 25 λείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐν-
 τεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πα-
 τρική γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις
 δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς
 υἱέσιν. τυραννική δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ
 30 τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν
 ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόν-
 των γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρι- 5
 στοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ

1160 b, 32. EE. 1241 b, 27 αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι ἐν οἰκίαις συννύπάρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ

ἔστι δημοκρατία ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι, πλείους ὄντες, κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν. 1279 b, 8 ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία (ἔστι) πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων.

σύνοροι, 'conterminous.'

πλήθους ... βούλεται ... εἶναι. Cf. 1132 a, 21 n. 'The ideal of timocracy too is to be the rule of the majority.' If the *τίμημα* were so high as to exclude the majority, we should have an oligarchy.

οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι, e.g. the 5000 at Athens, οἱ τὰ τιμήματα παρεχόμενοι.

ἥκιστα μοχθηρόν. Cf. Pol. 1289 b, 2 ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν..., μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

τῆς πολιτείας, sc. τῆς τιμοκρατικῆς.

§ 4. τῷ πατρὶ μέλει, so that his ὅρος is τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων συμφέρον. Cf. Pol. 1259 b, 10 ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων

ἀρχὴ βασιλική. Here too Homer's *Ζεὺς πατὴρ* is referred to.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1132 a, 21 n.

ἐν Πέρσαις κ.τ.λ. This is in striking contrast to Xenophon's ideal picture.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν, i.e. the 'tyrannical' relation between master and slave, as opposed to that between son and father.

τῶν διαφερόντων. How they differ we learn from Pol. 1260 a, 9 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός· καὶ πᾶσιν ἐννύπρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐννύπρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἀτελές.

§ 5. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικός, sc. κοινωνία. In Pol. 1259 b, 1 we have γυναικὸς μὲν (sc. ἄρχειν) πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς.

περὶ ταῦτα ἂν δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἀρμόζει, ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλι- 35 γαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖ 1161^a οὔσαι· οὐ δὲ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλού- 6 του καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρα- τικῇ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, πλήν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις 5 διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδеспότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις). βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δ' ἡ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, πολιτεία δ' ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννὶς ὀλιγαρχία δῆμος. καὶ τὰ δίκαια δὴ τοσαῦτα.

ΕΕ. 1242 a, 1 λέγονται δὲ φιλίαι συγγενικὴ ἑταιρικὴ κοινωνικὴ ἢ λεγομένη πολιτικὴ. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα εἴδη, ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἢ δ' ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν (καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ἢ πατρικὴ, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμόν, οἷον ἢ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἑταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρέσβειον). ἢ δὲ πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐταρκεῖν δοκοῦσι συνελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ συνῆλθόν γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ συζῆν χάριν. μόνη δ' ἢ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἢ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέκβασις οὐ μόνον φιλίαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καθ' ὑπεροχὴν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ τῶν χρησίμων φιλίᾳ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνῆλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινού τινος (οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχὴ) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου ἕνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἥς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ τρυπάνω εἶναι διττόν, ὥν τὸ κυριώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἢ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ εἶδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

μεθίστησιν, sc. τὴν κοινωνίαν, i.e. εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν.

ἐπὶ κληροῖ οὔσαι. Cf. the well-known lines of Menander—

"Ὅστις γυναῖκ' ἐπὶ κληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λα-
βεῖν

πλουτοῦσαν, ἥτοι μῆνιν ἐκτίνει θεῶν,
ἢ βούλετ' ἀτυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

§ 6. τῶν οἰκήσεων, 'habitations.' As Stewart points out, the word is often used of the habitations of wild beasts: "Dicuntur autem haud male οἰκήσεις quae non sunt οἰκίαι, nedum οἶκοι," Ramsauer. The word οἰκία implies an organised family, οἰκησις is a mere place to live in.

γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἐκάστω ἐξουσία.

10 ΧΙ. Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέ-
15 μνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική, 2 διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἷτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευ-
20 μένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται 3 οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς 4 γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλεον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκά-
25 στῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐται- 5 ρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιωταί, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ
30 καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δί- 6 καιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν

1161 a, 30. EE. 1241 b, 17 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν οὐκ

XI. § 1. Καθ' ἐκάστην κ.τ.λ. We may compare the modern ideas of (1) Loyalty, (2) *Noûlesse oblige*, (3) Fraternity.

ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. How far that is is explained above, 1134 a, 26 sqq.

ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων. Here again Aristotle is thinking of Plato's *Politikos*.

§ 2. ἡ πατρική, sc. φιλία. διαφέρει, sc. ὁ πατήρ.

§ 3. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. The son or the subject ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος.

§ 5. βούλονται...εἶναι. 'The ideal of the *πολιτεία* is that the citizens should be equal and good.' Here ἐπιεικεῖς = ἀγαθοί, cf. 1136 a, 35 n.

τῇ χειρίστη· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς
 γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ
 φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ
 ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται 35
 μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ 1161^b
 ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ
 βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν·
 ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦ-
 7 λος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἐστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' 5
 ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς
 πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ
 8 φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς
 τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρα-
 τίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν. 10

XII. Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ
 εἴρηται. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν
 ἐταιρικὴν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί,
 καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ

ἐστι κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δύο ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἓν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ενός [οὐδέν].
 οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ενός οὐ ἕνεκά
 ἐστιν. τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ
 δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ
 δοῦλος ἄψυχος.

§ 6. δοῦλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον. Cf. Pol. 1253 b, 27 τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἷαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶτος ἐμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτήσις πλήθος ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἐμψυχον.

§ 7. ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Ulpian 'Quod attinet ad ius civile servi pro nullis habentur, non tamen iure naturali; quia, quod ad ius naturale pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequales.' Pol. 1255 b, 12 διὸ καὶ συμφέρον

ἐστὶ τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένοις.

XII. § 1. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. 'We might make συγγενικὴν καὶ ἐταιρικὴν φιλία into separate species' from κοινωνικὴν φιλία in the strict sense. Eudemos (loc. cit. p. 387) actually does so.

πολιτικά, 1161 a, 10 sqq. φυλετικά 1160 a, 18.

συμπλοϊκά, 1159 b, 28. 1160 a, 15. καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, e.g. ἡ τῶν συστρατιωτῶν.

15 καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τά-
 ξειεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνε- 2
 ται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς·
 οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
 τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον
 20 δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ
 τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ
 τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκείον τῷ
 ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὁδοὺς θρῖξ ὀτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐδὲν
 τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἡττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν
 25 γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου
 τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ
 δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν 3
 τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι
 αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πε-
 30 φυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέ-
 ναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῦτοποιεῖ·
 ὅθεν φασὶ ταῦτόν αἷμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ
 δὴ ταῦτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν 4
 καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἡλιξ γὰρ ἡλικά,

τὴν ξενικὴν. 1156 a, 31.

§ 2. μᾶλλον συνωκείωται κ.τ.λ.,
 i.e. οἰκειότερον ἔχει, 'feels it more its
 own.'

φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. Mure-
 tus quotes Eurip. frag. incert.—

μήτηρ φιλότεκνος μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ
 πατρός·

ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶδεν ὄνθ', ὁ δ' οἶεται.

Menander Καρχ. 2—

αὐτὸν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οἶδε τοῦ ποτ' ἐγένετο,
 ἀλλ' ὑπονοοῦμεν πάντες, ἢ πιστεύομεν.
 Homer, Od. i, 215—

μήτηρ μὲν τ' ἐμέ φησι τοῦ ἔμμεναι,
 αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε
 οὐκ οἶδ'· οὐ γὰρ πῶ τις ἐδν γόνον αὐτὸς
 ἀνέγνω.

§ 3. τῷ κεχωρίσθαι, i.e. they are
 ἕτεροι in virtue of their separation, just
 as they are οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ αὐτῶν τι εἶναι.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. The following ἐκεῖνα
 shows that this is neuter.

ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κ.τ.λ., 'their
 identity with their parents identifies
 them with one another.' Cf. Met.
 1018 a, 7 ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἡ ταυτότης
 ἐνότης τίς ἐστὶν ἢ πλείονων τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ
 ὅταν χρῆται ὡς πλείοσιν, οἷον ὅταν λέγῃ
 αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ταῦτόν· ὡς δυοὶ γὰρ χρῆται
 αὐτῷ.

ταῦτόν αἷμα. This idea is expressed
 by the word ὁμαιμος. Cf. Aisch.
 Eum. 89 αὐτάδελφον αἷμα.

ρίζαν, sc. τὴν αὐτήν. Cf. Eur. Ion
 1576 παῖδες γενόμενοι τέσσαρες ρίζης
 μιᾶς.

καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις, i.e. κεχωρισ-
 μένοις. Cf. EE. 1245 a, 35 βούλεται
 ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος.

§ 4. τὸ σύντροφον, 'being brought

καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἐταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ 35
 ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων 1162^a
 συνφκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ'
 οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω
 5 τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις,
 καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· 5
 εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆ-
 6 ναι αἵτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ
 ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων,
 ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἔστιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ
 ἀδελφικῇ ἄπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς 10
 ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ
 γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοιό-
 στεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες
 ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ
 7 βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγε- 15
 νῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
 φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
 μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία
 πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν
 ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον 20

up together,' τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν, sc. εἶναι, their 'being of an age.'

ἡλιξ γὰρ ἡλικα. Cf. EE. 1238 a, 33, Rhet. 1371 b, 15. The proverb is quoted by Plato, Phdr. 240 c ἡλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἡλικα.

ἐκ τούτων, sc. ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν.

§ 6. τῶν ὀθνείων, i.e. τῆς τῶν ὀθνείων.

§ 7. ἀνάλογον, 'in proportion' (to the closeness of their relationship).

τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικόν. Cf. Pol. 1252 a, 26 ἀνάγκη δὲ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἔνεκεν, (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι οἷον αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν

ἕτερον).

πρότερον (sc. χρόνῳ) καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον (sc. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως). But in another sense the state is πρότερον καὶ κάλλιον. Cf. Pol. 1253 a, 19. The addition of καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον shows what kind of priority is meant.

κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις, a sure sign that a thing is φυσικόν, in the sense of ἀναγκαῖον. Cf. Introductory Note.

ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, i.e. ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τεκνοποιία. Cf. Gen. An. 753 a, 7 quoted in the Introductory Note. See also Oecon. 1343 b, 13 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἀλόγως τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον μετέχουσι τῆς φύσεως (surely φρονήσεως), ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τεκνοποιίας μόνον χάριν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ φρονιμωτέροις διήρθρωται μᾶλλον

τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν
βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς
καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέν-
τες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ
25 καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν,
εἰ ἐπιεικέις εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετὴ, καὶ χαίροιεν ἂν
τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θάπτον
οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμ-
φοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς βιωτέον ἀνδρὶ 8
30 πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον
φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται

1162 a, 29. EE. 1242 a, 19 τὸ δὴ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ
ὀμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν δίκαιόν τί ἐστιν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς
φίλον. τό τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τισι καὶ κοινωνοῖς, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός, ὁ
μὲν γένους, ὁ δὲ βίου. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ
οἰκονομικὸν ζῶν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τᾶλλά ποτε συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ
τυχόντι [καὶ] θήλει καὶ ἄρρενι † ἀλλ' αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν † (ἄλλο
δὲ δὴ μοναυλικόν?), ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πρὸς οὓς φύσει
συγγένεια ἐστίν· καὶ κοινωνία τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πόλις
εἴη· οἰκία δ' ἐστὶ τις φιλία. δεσπότου μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλου ἥπερ καὶ
τέχνης καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται οὔτε φιλίαι
οὔτε δικαιοσύναι, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ'
ἀνάλογον· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία· πατρὸς
δὲ καὶ υἱοῦ ἢ αὐτὴ ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος
πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχό-
μενον· ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐταιρικὴ μάλιστα ἢ κατ' ἰσότητα.

οὐ γάρ τι νόθος τῷδ' ἀπεδείχθην·
ἀμφοῖν δὲ πατήρ αὐτὸς ἐκλήθη
Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἄρχων.

ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. διὸ ἐν οἰκίᾳ πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ
καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δικαίου.

(φαίνονται γὰρ μᾶλλον βοήθειαι γινόμε-
ναι καὶ εὐνοιαὶ καὶ συνεργίαι ἀλλήλοις),
ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ μάλιστα, ὅτι οὐ μόνον
τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι συνεργὰ
ἀλλήλοις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστί.

διήρηται τὰ ἔργα. Fritzsche quotes

Oecon. 1343 b, 26 οὕτω προωκονόμεται
ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑκατέρου ἢ φύσις, τοῦ τε
ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικός, πρὸς τὴν
κοινωνίαν, κ.τ.λ.

§ 8. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται, sc. τὸ
δίκαιον.

τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

XIII. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ 35 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσι- 1162^b μον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. 2 γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ 5 τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνη ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἂν ἢ χαρίεις, ἀμύ- 10 νεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, τυγχάνων οὐκ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγε- 3 ται. οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὐκ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἔξον μὴ 15 4 συνημερεύειν. ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ'

συμφοιτητήν, 'schoolfellow.' Plato, Euthyd. 272 c οἱ συμφοιτηταί μου, Phdr. 255 a.

XIII. § 1. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν κ.τ.λ. We come now to certain practical rules about φιλία. We always make a point of drawing practical conclusions from our theories, even if they interrupt the main argument. They serve also, however, to bring out the true nature of Friendship.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, κ.τ.λ., i.e. they may be equally pleasant or useful, or one more pleasant or useful than the other (ἰσάζοντες...ἢ διαφέροντες).

κατ' ἰσότητα closely with ἰσάζειν.

καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς, sc. τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῷ ἡδεῖ or τῷ χρησίμῳ.

τῷ...ἀποδιδόναι sc. δεῖ ἰσάζειν. The reading τῷ is probably a conjecture by the corrector of cod. Par. 1417 (τό K^b L^b), but it seems necessary to make a proper antithesis to κατ' ἰσότητα.

§ 2. ἀμύνεται, Spengel quotes Rhet. 1398 a, 24 διὸ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνεσθαι ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα. Cardwell refers to Isokr. 86 d χαριέντως αὐτοὺς ἡμυνάμεν, Thuc. iv, 63 τὸν εὖ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα ἐξ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνόμεθα.

§ 3. οὐ πάνυ δέ, sc. ἐγκλήματα γίνεται. Ind. s. v. οὐ πάνυ.

ὠφελεία γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις αἰεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται,
καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται
ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ
20 δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πά-
σχοντες δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, 5
τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον φιλίας ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται
οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συν-
25 ἀλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ 6
ρήτοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ
δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ
τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφίλογον,

1162 b, 21. EE. 1242 b, 22 ἡ δὲ κατ' ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πο-
λιτικὴ. ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐστὶ μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις
ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως

οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας,

καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἡ
φιλία· ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε
τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου ἔνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῇ ὁ
θεός, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἴσον ᾗ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας. κατ' ἰσότητα δὲ
βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας εἶδη
δύο, ἡ μὲν νομικὴ ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ
εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηται

μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.

ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν <ᾗ> ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, [καὶ] νομική·

§ 5. κατὰ νόμον. The opposition is not quite correctly stated, for a νομικὸν δίκαιον may quite well be unwritten, nor is an ἄγραφον δίκαιον necessarily φύσει δίκαιον. But the expression is natural, for τὰ γεγραμμένα δίκαια are περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν (Rhet. 1374 a, 19).

φιλίας. So K^b and Asp. This reading is guaranteed by Eudemos (loc. cit.), otherwise we might be

tempted to adopt the reading of L^b ὠφελείας.

ἠθικὴ. We still speak of a 'moral' as distinct from a 'legal' obligation, though the associations are different.

ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν, sc. φιλίαν, συναλλάξωσι ... διαλύωνται, 'when they contract and dissolve the friendship.'

§ 6. ἡ μὲν...ἡ δὲ...A further sub-division of ἡ νομικὴ.

φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων
 δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλά- 30
 7 ξαντας. ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται
 ἢ ὅτιδ' ἕποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν,
 8 ὡς οὐ δεδοκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλ-
 λάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει
 διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, 35
 προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ
 9 ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ 1163^a

ὅταν δ' ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἐταιρική.
 διὸ μάλιστα ἔγκλημα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν.
 ἕτεραι γὰρ φιλίαι ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν· οἱ δ'
 ἀμφοτέρω βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου ἕνεκα,
 ἠθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικέις, διὸ ὡς πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν.
 ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλείστα ἔγκλήματα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀρετὴ ἀνέγκλητος, οἱ δ' ἡδέεις ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται· οἱ δὲ
 χρήσιμοι οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἐταιρικῶς προσ-
 φέρωνται)· ὅμως δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἢ νομικὴ ἀνέγκλητος. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν
 νομικὴ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἴσον), ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ
 ἐκούσιος. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι
 δίκας τῶν ἐκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὀρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ
 πέφυκε δίκαιον εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττουσιν. ἔστι
 δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἔγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρω,
 πῶς ἐκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν.

φιλικὸν...ἔχει, 'the postponement is the friendly element in it.'

διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. Stewart quotes Theophrastos *Περὶ συμβολαίων* from Stobaeus *Χαρώνδας καὶ Πλάτων* ...*παραχρήμα κελεύουσι διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ἐὰν δέ τις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ εἶναι δίκην, αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς ἀδικίας.*

§ 7. ὅτιδ' ἕποτε ἄλλο, sc. ὠφελεῖ. This seems the only verb we can supply.

§ 8. οὐχ ὁμοίως, 'not so well.' 'If he does not come out of the business on as good terms as he went

in.' The phrase cannot be equivalent to *μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν* above; for it refers exclusively to *ἠθικὴ φιλία*.

βούλεσθαι ... προαιρεῖσθαι. The appetitive element is sound, but the intellectual and deliberative is not.

§ 9. δυναμένῳ δὴ κ.τ.λ. The words *καὶ ἐκόντι* can hardly be translated 'willingly (i.e. without waiting to be asked)' (Stewart), for *ἐκόν* means 'voluntarily' (i.e. without being forced). Nor can *ἐκόντι ἀνταποδοτέον* naturally mean anything else than 'one must give back to the man who is willing to take it.' I

δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν [καὶ ἐκόντι] (ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' 5 αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος—καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον). καὶ ὁ ὁμολόγησεν ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδούς ἠξίωσεν ἄν. ὥστ' εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν 10 10 δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ

καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθέν, πόσον, ἢ ποῖον ἦν τῷ πεπονθότι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θεόγνις·

σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοῦναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δ' εἴρηται τὰ ἐγκλήματα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας, ὅτι δεομένῳ ἐποίησεν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο, λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἠδύνατο, ἀλλ' οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ· ὁ δὲ τοῦναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσον αὐτῷ. ὅτε δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ὁ δ' ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα ἐδύνατο, οἷον εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον ὠφέλησεν, ὁ μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὁ δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα

suspect the interpolator meant it so, not seeing the drift of the next clause. Aspasio, as well as K^b, omits the words.

ἄκοντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A long 'digressive parenthesis' (Bywater). We must not assume that our benefactor meant to be a friend to us.

ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα κ.τ.λ. There is an anacolouthon here caused by the parenthesis within a parenthesis οὐ γὰρ...δρῶντος. We expect ἀποδοτέον, but the sentence is resumed by καθάπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ὁ ὁμολόγησεν ἄν, sc. ἀνταποδοτέον. I have adopted Bywater's conjecture here. We must join closely τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν καὶ ὁ ὁμολόγησεν

ἄν. 'He must repay the equivalent of the benefit received and what he would have agreed to repay if he could' (but for the misunderstanding).

οὐδ'...ἠξίωσεν ἄν. He is entitled to assume that it is not a mere commercial transaction and that the giver is so much his friend that he would not have asked him to pay if he were unable.

ἐπὶ τίνι, 'on what terms.' ὑπομένη, sc. εὐεργετούμενος.

§ 10. ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει, 'there is room for difference of opinion,' and therefore ἐγκλήματα may arise. Ind. s.v. ἔχειν.

πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαν-
τος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν
παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἂν μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ'
ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέ-
γιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἂν παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν 15
11 κινδύνους ἢ τοιαύταις χρεΐαις. ἄρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον
τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος
γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν
ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγέννηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέλη-
ται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· 20
κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ
ἐστίν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἢ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς
ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

περὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότε ἦν, ὁ δὲ πῶς
νῦν, ἂν μὴ διεΐπωνται. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν
καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον
τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστί, καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλική. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι,
διότι καλλίων μὲν ἢ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἢ χρησίμη. οἱ δ'
ἄρχονται μὲν ὡς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δ' ἀντικρυσ
ἦ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν. ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ
διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλόν· διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν. ὥστε
φανερὸν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν
προαίρεσιν βλεπτέον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιοτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ
θατέρου· εἰ δ' ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει ὁμολογοῦσιν·
ἂν δ' ὁ μὲν φῇ ὥδε ὁ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν ἀντιποιῆσαι, δέον τοὺς
καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ διεΐ-
ποντο ὡς ἠθικῶς, δεῖ κρίνειν τίνα, μηδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον αὐτῶν
ἐξαπατᾶν. ὥστε δεῖ στέργειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ
κατὰ προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδώῃ δι'
ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύναμιν
λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας. ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔξει, ἂν μὴ
φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.

οὐκ ἦν, sc. λαβεῖν.

§ 11. ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. The regular formula in a tentative answer.

ἐπαρκεῖ, sc. ὁ εὖ ποιῶν.

ἢ καὶ πλέον. Fritzsche quotes

Hes. "Εργ. 349 Εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι, | αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ, καὶ λῶϊον, αἶ κε δύνηαι. This is the rule of the ἐπίμετρον.

XIV. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις.
 25 ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλεόν ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται,
 διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἶεται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων προσήκειν
 αὐτῷ πλεόν ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεόν· ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσον
 ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ
 30 κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴονται
 γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλείον λαμβάνουσιν
 οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ
 δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι
 τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ
 35 ἢ δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μηδέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν;
 1163^b ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιούν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλεόν 2
 νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερ-
 έχοντι τιμῆς τῷ δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς

1163 a, 24. EE. 1242 b, 2 ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίας τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετήν, κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, τούτων δὲ ἑκάστης δύο διαφοραὶ (ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἡ δὲ κατ' ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων δηλόν), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιούται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος ὥσπερ ἄρχων πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν, ὅτε δὲ λόγῳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον ἀριθμῷ εἰσῆνεγκον ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσον, ἀνάλογον. ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τοῦναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἢ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. δεῖ ἄρα τινὲς ἐτέρῳ

XIV. § 1. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ., i.q. ἐγκαλοῦνται ἀλλήλοις.

ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, and therefore in the Family and the State.

νέμεσθαι, sc. προσήκειν.

οἴονται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The ὑπερέχων wishes to regulate the friendship on the principles of Distributive Justice, while the ὑπερεχόμενος regards it as falling under the head of an exchange

of services for honour, and therefore, as Eudemos puts it, συζεύγνυσιν τὴν διάμετρον. Cf. above 1133 a, 6 n.

§ 2. ἔοικε δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle solves the difficulty by applying τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον. We must find τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον and apply the rule of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός. Then only will 'diagonal conjunction' be fair.

καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἢ τιμὴν γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία
 3 τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαί- 5
 νεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων·
 τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἢ τιμὴν δὲ
 κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν
 καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει·
 τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ 10
 τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ
 σφάζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνί-
 σοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς
 ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.
 4 τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ 15
 γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς
 καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη, εἰς
 δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ καὶ δό-
 ξιεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν·
 ὀφείλονται γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν 20
 ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
 ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς ποτ'
 ἂν ἀποστήναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίας· χωρὶς
 γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ
 διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, 25
 μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ
 δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

ἀνισάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀνάλογον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἢ τιμὴν, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ
 ἄρχοντι φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ ἴσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος
 πρὸς τὴν τιμὴν.

§ 4. τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In this φιλία differs from δικαιοσύνη.

ἔστιν, sc. τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

εἰς δύναμιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. for the ἐνδοξον Xen. Mem. i, 3, 3 ἐπαινέτης ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπους τοῦδε (Hes. Ἔργ. 336) Καὶ δύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἱερ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν.

ἀπείπασθαι. Cf. Plato Laws 928 e

for the ἀποκήρυξις of a son. Dem. Boiot. § 39 ὁ νόμος τοὺς γονέας ποιεῖ κυρίους οὐ μόνον θέσθαι τοῦνομα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν ἐξαλεῖψαι ἐὰν βούλωνται καὶ ἀποκηρύξαι.

τῶν ὑπηργμένων, sc. τῷ υἱεῖ παρὰ τοῦ πατρός.

τὴν ἐπικουρίαν, sc. τὴν γηροτροφίαν.

Ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον
 ἰσάζει καὶ σφάζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ
 ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοι-
 35 βὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς.
 1164^a ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ 2

1163 b, 32. EE. 1243 b, 15 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς
 φιλίαις ταῖς μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥάδιον. χαλεπὸν
 γὰρ μετρηῆσαι ἐν τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἐρωτικῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὡς [τὸν] ἡδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὁ δ' ἐκείνον
 ἐνίοτε ὡς χρήσιμον. ὅταν δὲ παύσῃται τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἄλλον γινομένον ἄλλος
 γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται παντί τινος, καὶ ὡς Πύθων καὶ Παρμένης

I. § 1. Ἐν...ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσι φι-
 λίαις, i.e. ὧν μὴ ταῦτ' ὁ εἶδος. The
 reading of L^b ἀνομοειδέσι deserves the
 preference over the ἀνομοειδέσι of K^b
 (cf. Bon. Ind. s.v. ὁμοειδέσι); for what
 is meant is friendships in which the
 φιλητόν of the one party (ἀγαθόν, ἡδὺ
 or χρήσιμον) is τῷ εἶδει ἕτερον, not
 merely ἀνόμοιον, from that of the
 other. In other words, they are
 friendships in which ἕτερον ἀντ' ἑτέρου
 ἀντικατάλλονται οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠ-
 φελείας. They must not be con-
 fused with αἱ κατ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλῖαι.
 Eudemos (loc. cit.) describes friend-
 ships of this kind as μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν,
 by which he means apparently friend-
 ships in which the φιλητά differ not
 merely by attaining a higher or lower

degree along the same line, but in
 which they are wholly disparate. So
 in Met. 994 a, 2 the αἷτια τῶν ὄντων
 are said to be ἀπειρα neither κατ'
 εὐθυωρίαν (as an infinite series) nor
 κατ' εἶδος.

εἴρηται. The reference, if genuine,
 must be to 1132 b, 31 sqq., the account
 of justice ἐν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις συναλλάγ-
 μασιν.

καθάπερ εἴρηται. It has not been
 said, though it has been implied in
 1163 b, 1 sqq.

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ, sc. κοινωνία, as we
 see from Eudemos loc. cit. The
 point of the illustration is that here
 too the parties are ἀνομοειδέις.

§ 2. ἐνταῦθα, sc. ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ
 κοινωνίᾳ. Cf. 1133 a, 19 sqq.

πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστής ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, 5
 3 πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ 10
 τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα, διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φι-

διεφέροντο καὶ ὅλως διλάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἐνὶ μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Πρόδικος (Ἡρόδικος Spengel) ὁ ἱατρὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθόν, καὶ ὡς ὁ κιθαρωδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδεῖ, ὁ δ' ὡς χρησίμῳ ὠμίλει· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἐκείνον ἄσαντα εὐφρᾶναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνῳ. ὅμως δὲ φανερόν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστέον· ἐνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθ', ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅρῳ ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογον γὰρ μετρητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία. πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσῃ γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθῇσεται τὰ ἔργα; τοῖς δὲ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὁ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἴτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς ἐκάτερον. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἡμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ. ἔστι δὲ κἀνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῇ ὁ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὁ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.

ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ, sc. κοινωνία, where ἡδεῖα ὄψις is exchanged for θεραπεία. Cf. 1157 a, 7 sqq.

ἐνίοτε μὲν κ.τ.λ. 1159 b, 16 sqq.

εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν. Cf. 1113 a, 19, 22. 1114 a, 15. 1153 b, 13.

§ 3. ταῦτα δὲ μὴ...ὑπάρχει, 'and they have not both these attributes.' So a, 11 ταῦτα ὑπάρχοντα, 'their attributes.' The case supposed is that described above (ληγούσης τῆς ὥρας, when the θεραπεία ceases).

αὐτούς, i.e. ἀλλήλους καθ' αὐτούς, cf. above 1156 b, 10 n. Contrast the

good, who δι' αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (1156 b, 10). The mss., however, have αὐτούς.

ἡ...τῶν ἡθῶν. Victorius seems clearly right in referring to 1157 a, 10 πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἥθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. It is not necessary to suppose with most editors that ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλία is meant. Affection founded on character is καθ' αὐτήν, even if the character is not an ideally good one; for the friend is loved καθ' αὐτόν, not merely for his ὑπάρχοντα.

λίου. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὕσα μένει, καθάπερ
εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ 4
μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
15 οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνη, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγ-
γελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς
ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀπο-
δεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς
ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει
20 ὁ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἶη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν
γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, καὶ κείνου
γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστὶ, 5
τοῦ προῖεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προῖεμένος ἔοικ'
ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·
25 ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν
ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν
τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." οἱ δὲ 6

καθ' αὐτὴν, i.e. in it καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν. This is a striking example of the way in which καθ' αὐτόν has come to be treated as a simple adjective without regard to its literal meaning.

§ 4. ἐφίεται. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρωδῷ κ.τ.λ. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 401 (where αὐτόν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν means 'adopted the rôle of a friend διὰ τὸ ἡδύ'), and Plutarch, Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης 333 f. Διονύσιος γοῦν ὁ τύραννος, ὥς φασι, κιθαρωδοῦ τινὸς εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἀκούων ἐπηγγέλατο δωρεὰν αὐτῷ τάλαντον. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀπαιτοῦντος, Χθές, εἶπεν, εὐφραίνόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ παρ' ὃν ἦδες χρόνον, εὐφρανα καὶ γὰρ σὲ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ὥστε τὸν μισθὸν ὧν ἔτερπε ἀπελάμβανες εὐθὺς ἀντιτερόμενος. Note the loose, conversational way in which Aristotle alludes to the story.

καὶ κείνου γε χάριν, sc. οὗ δεόμενος τυγχάνει. ταῦτα, sc. ἃ ἔχει. Muretus conjectured τὰ αὐτοῦ.

§ 5. τοῦ προλαβόντος, not merely τοῦ πρότερον λαβόντος, as the editors say, but (as often) 'the one who has got the start,' 'the advantage.' He is called ὁ προέχων below 1164 b, 9. This rendering makes the aorist tense (suspected by Bywater) natural and right. The second alternative introduced by ἢ is preferred, as shown by the following clause with γάρ. Cf. 1156 b, 34.

ὅπερ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Prot. 328 b ἐπειδὴν γὰρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν δ' ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον, ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερὸν ὁμόσας, ὅσου ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

ποιεῖν, imperf. inf. 'used to do.'

τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." Hesiod, "Erg. 368—

μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω,

καὶ τε κασιγνήτῳ γελάσας ἐπὶ μάρτυρα θέσθαι·

πίστεις δ' ἄρα ὁμῶς καὶ ἀπιστίαι ὤλεσαν ἀνδρας.

προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μηδὲν ποιούντες ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἢ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο 30 δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθὸν μὴ ποιούντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι—τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ' 35 ἀρετὴν φιλία—τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαί- 1164^b ρεσιν—αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἢ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ 5 8 ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκούσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου 10 τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ' ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-

Even among friends things should be done on a business footing.

§ 7. **τοῦτο**, i.e. to have a fixed charge payable in advance.

δι' αὐτούς, 'for the sake of their friends themselves,' not for what they hope to get out of them. **εἴρηται**, 1162 b, 6 sqq.

κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. It is not a case for 'payment by results.' It is the will (*προαίρεσις*) rather than the power (*δύναμις*) that is essential.

καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1164 b, 5.

§ 8. **ἐπὶ τινι**, 'for some return,' 'on the understanding that a return has to be made.' The context shows that we are still dealing with 'understandings,' not with 'agreements.' So **ἐπὶ τινι** is not equivalent to **ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς**.

τὸν προέχοντα, 'the one who has the start.' Cf. the note on **τοῦ προλαβόντος** 1164 a, 23. The editors appear to think that **ὁ προέχων** can mean **ὁ πρότερον σχών**. Even Zell says "is qui prior habet, id est, qui prior accepit."

οὗτος, sc. **ὁ προέχων**.

ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου κ.τ.λ. The pleasure has to be calculated in terms of **τὸ ὠφέλιμον**.

ἔξει, sc. **ὁ προέμενος**. **τὴν παρὰ τούτου**, sc. **τοῦ προέχοντος**.

ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις, 'in the case of things offered for sale.' The seller will take as much as he can get, but the just price is the value of the article to the buyer. Aristotle is still thinking of **χρεία** as the only standard of value. He forgets that there is a Normal Value determined by Cost of Pro-

νον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας 9
μὴ εἶναι, ὥς δέον ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον
15 καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἶεται δι-
καιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ
γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια·
ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάτ-
20 τωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν ὅσου
ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

II. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ
πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα
μὲν ἰατρῷ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολε-
25 μικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον,
καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ προετέον,
ἐὰν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται. ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκρι- 2
βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας

1164 b, 22. EE. 1244 a, 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατ'
ἀρετὴν φίλου σκεπτέον πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ
βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ ἀντιποιοῦντι καὶ δυναμένῳ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημά
ἐστι, πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ἂν μὲν
γὰρ <ὁ> φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπόν, ἂν μή τις τὸ μὲν
αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποιῶν, ἐπιεικῇ δὲ ἡρέμα·
εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὁ
δὲ ἔσται, οὐπω δέ, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δ' οὐ, ὁ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δέ

duction. If the seller does not get this, he will withdraw his wares from the market, unless indeed they are perishable.

§ 9. ἐνιαχοῦ τε κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1162 b, 29.

τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων. Cf. above 1131 a, 2 sqq. and the notes.

οἶεται. There is no difficulty in the third person singular which Aristotle uses very freely without a definite subject (cf. 1110 a, 14 n.). Here we may supply ὁ νομοθέτης from οἱ νόμοι if we like.

ἀλλ' ὅμως κ.τ.λ. However high the seller's estimate may be, it is the buyer's estimate that is decisive.

δεῖ δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. A reservation in favour of the seller. When the article has been bought its apparent value to the purchaser is lowered, for he is no longer conscious how much he wanted it. Of course, if he wishes to sell it again, its apparent value to him rises again.

II. § 1. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. These ἀπορίαι form a sort of casuistry of Friendship. For ἔχει cf. Ind. s. v.

ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ
 3 ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδη- 30
 λον· καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
 μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἐταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφεί- 01
 4 λει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ'
 αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσά-
 μενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, καὶν ὅστισοῦν ἦ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐαλωκότι 35
 ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε 1165^a
 5 γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, 21
 καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ
 δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον·
 ἐνίστε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὔπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, 5
 ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀντ-

οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ἐργωδέτερον. μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης,
 ποιήσας

λόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,

ἔργον δ' ἐκείνος ἔργον <ὅς> παρέσχετο.

καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἃ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι
 βελτίων ὁ πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδ' ἔχει πάσας τὰς
 τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινάς· ἴσως οὖν ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἀλλὰ δὲ τῷ
 ἀγαθῷ. οἷον οὐκ εἰ σίτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ·
 οὐδ' ᾧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος.
 ἀλλ' οἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες τούτῳ πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον,
 οὐδενός εἰσιν ἄξιοι.

καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μὲν πῶς εἰσι φιλίας,
 ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ
 καὶ τῷ εὖ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ
 ὀρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ'
 ἡδονὴν τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν· πάντες δ' οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι κατὰ

§ 4. μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα, sc. δεῖν
 λύεσθαι. The point is that, as it is
 right to ransom your father rather than
 yourself, it will be right to ransom him
 rather than the man who has ran-
 somed you, and still more if the man
 who ransomed you is not himself a

captive but is merely claiming repay-
 ment of the money he spent.

§ 5. τὴν προὔπαρχήν, 'the original
 benefit.' The word comes from ὑπ-
 ἀρχεῖν as opposed to ἀμύνεσθαι. Cf.
 1124 b, 12 n.

απόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ
 δανείσαντι ἐνίστε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομι-
 εῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι
 10 παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον
 τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δό-
 ξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ 6
 πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὠρισμένον
 τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταῦτ' ἀποδοτέον,
 15 οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ
 ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἐταίροις 7
 καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα
 ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους
 μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος
 20 καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ'
 οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταυτό. δόξειε δ' 8
 ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὥς ὀφείλον-
 τας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὢν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς
 ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ

φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ' οὐδεῖς. διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσι, καὶ
 ἕκαστος μιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὦν, οἶον ἢ τοῦ εἶναι προαίρεσις.
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ * * βούλεται τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ
 αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ
 συζῆν οὐ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ.

ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἐνιοι· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἀλλ'
 οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κακείνους οἶον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον
 εἴλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἴλετο· χρησιμώτερος γάρ. διὸ
 <οὐ> δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον εἴλετο ἀντὶ ἡττονος. οἱ δ'
 ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητήσαντες
 τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.

τὸ ἀξίωμα, 'the claim.'

οἴονται δέ, 'but they think (or rather 'he thinks') it is so.' The number changes, but it is still the good man who does not wish to lend his money. It is quite natural that he should not lend to a man who he thinks (rightly or wrongly) will not

pay back.

§ 6. εἴρηται. Cf. I 104 a, 1 etc.

θύεται, sc. πάντα.

§ 7. κήδη, funerals.

§ 8. τροφῆς, partitive genitive. The allusion is to the Hellenic duty of γηροτροφία.

πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ 25
τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν,
9 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ
τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσσει καὶ τοῖς
τοιούτοις· πρὸς εἰσὶν δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν
καὶ ἀπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ 30
πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν αἰεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον
ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ'
10 οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων
ἡ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ
γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω διοριστέον. 35

III. Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς
φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ 1165^b
τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχω-
σιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὦν
ἀπολιπόντων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἂν τις,
εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ 5
τὸ ἦθος· ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπομεν, πλείσται διαφοραὶ
γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὧσι
2 φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖ-
σθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιούτου ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν
αἰτιῶντ' ἂν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, 10
δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ
νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία.

§ 9. ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσσει,
'rising and giving them a seat.' Cf.
Plato, Rep. 425 a σιγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων
παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ὡς πρέπει, καὶ
κατακλίσσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.

καὶ συγκρίνειν κ.τ.λ., 'and com-
pare the claims of each in respect of
closeness, goodness and usefulness.'
I cannot feel convinced of Professor
Bywater's view (Contr. p. 62) that
συγκρίνειν is here used in the sense of
συνδυάζειν (or συνάγειν) and that the
reference is to "combining the persons
and their respective dues." These, I

take it, would be προσήκοντα, not
ὑπάρχοντα.

§ 10. ἡ κρίσις, i.e. ἡ σύγκρισις
according to the usual practice of
repeating a compound by the simple
word (1156 b, 23 n.). Ruelle's σύγ-
κρισις is therefore unnecessary.

III. § 1. ἐν ἀρχῇ, probably 1162 b,
23.

§ 2. ἡ τοῖς...κιβδηλεύουσιν.
Zwinger quotes Theognis, v. 200— 119
Χρυσοῦ κιβδήλοιο καὶ ἀργύρου ἄνσχετος
ἄτη,

Κύρνε, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν ῥάδιον ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ.

εἰ δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ 3
 δοκῇ, ἄρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλη-
 15 τὸν ἀλλὰ τὰγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ †φιλητέον† πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ·
 φιλοπόννηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρη-
 ται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἄρ' οὖν εὐθύς διαλυ-
 τέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
 ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἡθος ἢ τὴν
 20 οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ'
 ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ
 φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται.
 εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ 4
 διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;
 25 ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν
 ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διά-
 νοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι
 μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπού-
 μενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ
 30 δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν
 τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς 5
 αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ
 μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις
 μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς

εἰ δὲ φίλου νόος ἀνδρὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι
 λέληθε

ψυδρὸς ἐών, δόλιον δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ
 ἔχει,

τοῦτο θεὸς κιβδηλότατον ποίησε βρο-
 τοῖσι,

καὶ γινῶναι πάντων τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότατον.
 Camerarius adds Dem. Lept. § 167—
 θαυμάζω δ' ἐγωγε εἰ τοῖς μὲν τὸ νόμισμα
 διαφθείρουσι θάνατος παρ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶν ἢ
 ζημία, τοῖς δ' ὅλην τὴν πόλιν κιβδηλον
 καὶ ἄπιστον ποιοῦσι λόγον δώσετε.

§ 3. οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον κ.τ.λ. There
 is clearly something wrong. Stahr
 reads οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν <τὸ> πονηρὸν,
 and so Bywater. Stewart supposes
 the original text to have been ἢ οὐ

δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ
 τὰγαθόν, οὐδὲ δεῖ. φιλοπόννηρον γὰρ
 κ.τ.λ., the words οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον
 πονηρὸν being due to a dittography of
 οὐδὲ δεῖ φιλοπόννηρον.

φιλοπόννηρον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We have
 perhaps an echo of this in Theo-
 phrastus, Char. 14 (Περὶ φιλοπονῆρας)
 καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοπονῆρία ἀδελφή ἐστὶ
 τῆς πονηρίας καὶ ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς
 παροιμίας τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον
 πορεύεσθαι.

ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι, 'capable of
 reform.' For ἔχειν cf. Ind. s. v.

§ 4. ἦν. For the imperfect cf.
 Ind. s. v. ἦν.

συμβιοῦν. Cf. 1126 a, 31 n.

γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, 35
ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσιν γένηται.

IV. Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλῖαι 1166^a
ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τι-
θέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ
ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ
ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκ- 5
να πεπόνθασιν, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ
τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγούντα

1166 a, 1. EE. 1240 a, 5 πόσα μὲν οὖν εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες
διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμε-
νοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν
αὐτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις
μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι
κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ
τὰ δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δ' ὅμοια
φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γὰρ πῶς κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη ἢ φιλία, ἀπλῶς δ'
οὔ. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διηρημένοις τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν· δι' ἃ μᾶλλον
οὕτως αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, <ὡς> ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται
πῶς ἐκὼν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς,
καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ
ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὐτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ ταῦτα καὶ διηρημένοις· ἢ δὴ

IV. § 1. Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.
We now come to what is really the
important part of the discussion of
φιλία so far as regards the main argu-
ment. It is φιλία alone, in the sense
of the higher self-love, that can lead us
from the practical to the theoretic life.
Cf. Introductory Note p. 345.

πρὸς τοὺς πέλας (so K^b for vulg.
πρὸς τοὺς φίλους). Friendship as a
feeling πρὸς ἕτερον is, in its highest
form, an externalisation and trans-
ference to others of the good man's
relation to himself.

ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν. We must not
supply φιλικῶν, for Aristotle does not
intend to assume yet that there is such

a thing as self-love. That question is
raised only to be dismissed below
(a, 33). There is no definite ellipse.
Eudemos says more clearly ἀπὸ τῆς
πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑξεως (loc. cit. p. 410).

τιθέασι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Five φιλικὰ are
enumerated and shown to be charac-
teristic of self-love, viz. (1) βούλησις
ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, (2) βούλησις τοῦ
εἶναι τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, (3) τὸ
συνδιάγειν (=τὸ συζῆν), (4) τὸ ταῦτα
αἰρεῖσθαι (τὸ ὁμογνωμονεῖν), (5) τὸ
συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν.

οἱ προσκεκρουκότες, 'who have
quarrelled' (perhaps about a trifle)
and 'never see each other now,' so
that their friendship is clearly dis-

καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ
τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν
10 ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρ- 2
χει—τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἧ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι
(ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ
ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)—οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν 3
αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ βούλεται
15 δὴ ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει—τοῦ

δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα, ἧ δ' οὐ διηρημένα, οὐχ
ὑπάρχει.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἕξεως [ὡς] οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν
διωρισμένοι, καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ
φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τὰγαθὰ ἢ οἷα οἶεται ἀγαθὰ, μὴ δι' αὐτὸν,
ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκείνον καὶ
μὴ δι' αὐτόν, καὶ εἰ μὴ διανέμων τὰγαθὰ, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε
μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἰρεῖται δι' αὐτὴν τὴν
ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις,
συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς, οἱ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται
φιλεῖσθαι. ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι [ἀγαπᾶν
θήσομεν], οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες,

interested (αὐτοῦ χάριν). Cf. Pol. 1263 a, 18 οἱ πλεῖστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις.

ὀρίζονται. They are not, of course, scientific ὀρισμοί, but only dialectical ὀρικά (Top. 102 a, 9 sqq.) τῆς φιλίας.

§ 2. τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, i. q. τῷ ἀγαθῷ, and ὁ σπουδαῖος below i. q. ὁ ἀγαθός.

ἧ...ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, 'in so far as they fancy themselves good.' The point is more fully explained below 1166 b, 2. Here the remark is quite parenthetical.

καθάπερ εἴρηται. Cf. 1113 a, 22 sqq.

§ 3. οὗτος γὰρ, sc. ὁ ἐπιεικής (a, 10). The *fourth* φιλικόν shown to be true of the good man's relation to himself. Cf. 1167 b, 4.

κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, i.e. there is no variance between his ὀρέξεις, his ἐπιθυμία and θυμός have the same objects as his βούλησις. It is not true of him that τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται (1099 a, 12); πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ (1102 b, 28). We must avoid the Paraphrast's error of saying τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ τε λογικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλογον. The λόγον ἔχον has no ὀρεξεις.

καὶ βούλεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. The *first* φιλικόν, viz. βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα.

καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα. Of course to the good man these are identical with τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὰ, but Aristotle inserts the words lest we should forget that ὀρεξις is οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας.

γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν—καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα—τοῦ
 γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ.—καὶ ζῆν
 δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σφύζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ
 4 φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ'
 ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἰρεῖται οὐ- 20
 δεῖς πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον—ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ

ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες
 ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστα γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπείσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ
 φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχeto,
 ὅτι [μὴ] ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν. <τὸ γὰρ
 χαίρειν> μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν. ἔτι τὰ
 τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ [μὴ] μίαν ψυχὴν
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα.
 καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς
 αὐτὸν εὖ ποιεῖ διὰ τι ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριτος. οὐδὲ λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ εἰς.
 δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλεῖν.

1166 a, 20. EE. 1240 b, 8 καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν

581 a sq
588 c
Michael
 ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ, 'which
 each of us is believed to be.' We
 need not seek far for the author of
 this ἔνδοξον. Plato in Rep. ix. had
 already represented τὸ φιλόσοφον in
 the likeness of a man, while θυμός and
 ἐπιθυμία are in the image of a lion
 and a many-headed monster. We
 need not yet consider whether, or in
 what sense, Aristotle himself could
 accept the formula. Cf. 1168 b, 30
 sqq. 1178 a, 2 sqq.

καὶ ζῆν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The second
 φιλικόν.

τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ, in the Platonist
 sense of the word φρόνησις. Cf. above
 1140 a, 24 n.

§ 4. γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος κ.τ.λ.
 Stewart is evidently right in trying
 to explain this sentence by the light
 of the ἀπορία about βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ
 raised above (1159 a, 5 sqq.). There
 we saw that a man will not wish his
 friend to be a god, here we see that

he will not wish to be a god himself.
 We are coming closer to the idea of
 Self.

γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος, 'by becoming
 another.' The sentence "No one
 chooses by becoming another that the
 thing he has become should have all
 good things" is not logical; but the
 thought does not lend itself to clear
 expression. If we bracket ἐκείνο τὸ
 γενόμενον with Vermehren, the sen-
 tence is smoother; but I am inclined
 to think the confusion of two in-
 consistent thoughts is intentional.

καὶ νῦν, 'as it is,' so he would be
 wishing for something which already
 exists. Cf. Leibniz's "A quoy vous
 serviroit-il de devenir Roy de la
 Chine à condition d'oublier ce que
 vous avez esté? Ne seroit-ce pas la
 même chose que si Dieu en même
 temps qu'il vous détruisoit, créoit un
 Roy dans la Chine?"

θεὸς τὰγαθόν—ἀλλ' ὦν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν
 ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ 5
 βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμέ-
 25 νων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνεῖαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
 ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ
 τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ·
 πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ
 ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς
 30 αὐτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὐτόν (ἐστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ
 φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερον ἐστίν ἢ 6
 οὐκ ἐστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν

καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὴ
 δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν. οὕτω γὰρ
 ἔχει ὁ εἷς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ
 ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πονηρῷ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἐχθρόν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι· ἢ δ' εἷς καὶ
 ἀδιαίρετος, ὁρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας
 ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος. ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς
 τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γὰρ πῃ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός,

ἀλλ' ὦν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, 'remaining just what he is,' sc. αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν. A will not accept bliss on condition of becoming B. It is nothing to A that B is blessed.

§ 5. συνδιάγειν τε κ.τ.λ. The *third* φιλικόν.

μνεῖαι. I prefer this, the reading of K^b, to the more commonplace μνήμαι. The *poeticus color* is quite in place here. Cf. 1165 b, 33.

συναλγεῖ τε κ.τ.λ. The *fifth* φιλικόν.

ἀμεταμέλητος. Zwinger compares Epicharmos (fr. 280 Kaibel), οὐ μετανοεῖν ἀλλὰ προνοεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν

σοφόν.

τῷ δὲ...ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. Men's views of the characteristics of φιλία are entirely derived from the good man's relation to himself. His relation to himself is transferred to his relation to his friend; for the friend is "another self," and that is why men regard the points enumerated as φιλικά.

§ 6. πρὸς αὐτόν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is introduced as an entirely fresh point. We have seen that our view of what friendship is based upon the good man's relation to himself; can we put it the other way and say that the good

ταύτη εἶναι φιλία, ἣ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ- 35
νων] καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιού- 1166 b
ται. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν,
καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἄρ' οὖν ἡ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ
ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτη μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;
ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ' 5
8 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύ-
λοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦ-
σιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ
ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλα-
βερά ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται 10

ταύτη αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ ὀρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ πονηρὸς
παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς οὐθ' ἅμα λοιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής,
οὔτε ὁ ὕστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἔμπροσθεν
τῷ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψεύστης. ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ
διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος. δῆλον γὰρ

man loves himself? This is precisely parallel to the question in Book V. whether a man can wrong himself.

ἡ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω. This has been taken in two ways, (1) 'in so far as he is two or more,' (2) 'in so far as two or more of the characteristics mentioned are present.' With regard to (2) I would ask why 'two or more' are mentioned. Surely the good man has them all and the bad man fancies he has. EE. 1240 a, 17 sqq. (loc. cit. p. 409) seems to me decisive in favour of (1). We have there τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, and below a, 20 ἡ δὲ δύο πῶς καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὑπάρχει πῶς ταῦτα. This is an authoritative explanation. Eudemos also (loc. cit.) refers to the parallel question πότερον ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ. If we follow this hint and turn to 1138 b, 5, we find κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ ὁμοιότητα

ἐστὶν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν. Here as there we have a reference to the Platonic view. This Aristotle regards as a metaphor, so we may be sure that the argument here is still purely dialectical.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. Bywater (Contr. p. 63) puts a comma before ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων to show that it goes closely with δόξειε δ' αὖν. I do not see how it follows from what has been said, and prefer to believe the words have crept in from the paraphrase. We see from the next sentence that τὰ εἰρημένα most naturally means the φιλικὰ which have been enumerated, and it is therefore likely that they are introduced here to support the interpretation we have rejected.

§ 8. ἑτέρων μὲν κ.τ.λ. Observe that the διαφορά is entirely in the ὀρεκτικόν, not between δρεξις and διάνοια.

τοῦ πραττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ
 καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ
 φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσὶ τε οἱ 9
 μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν.
 15 ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν καὶ τοιαῦθ'
 ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἐτέρων δ' ὄντες
 ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν
 πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλ-
 γοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ,
 20 καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ
 δ' ἡδέεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ δια-
 σπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἶόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι, 10
 ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἡσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
 ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ
 25 οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς
 ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ
 δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθη-
 ρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῇ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ
 καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

ὥς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὐτοῖς,
 ἀποκτιννύουσιν αὐτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός. ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ
 ἀπλῶς ὦν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δύ'
 ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ἃ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἀδύνατον. διὸ
 ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
 ζώων <οὐ>, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ * *, οὐκ ἄρα φίλος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ
 παιδία, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡδὴ ἔχη προαίρεσιν· ἡδὴ γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς
 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἔοικε δ' ἡ φιλία ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ κατὰ συγ-
 γένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφέρωνται, ὅμως
 οὗτοι μὲν ἔτι συγγενεῖς, ὁ δὲ ἔτι εἷς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ.

καὶ ... μισοῦνται, 'and who are
 hated' (the relative cannot be re-
 peated in Greek), καὶ φεύγουσι,
 'actually shun.'

φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν, opp. ζῆν βούλεται
 ἑαυτὸν (1166 a, 17).

§ 9. ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν, opp.
 συνδιάγειν ἑαυτῷ βούλεται κ.τ.λ. (1166
 a, 23).

οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν κ.τ.λ. opp.
 συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνῆδεται ἑαυτῷ (ib.
 27).

V. Ἡ δ' εὐνοια φιλία μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· 30
 γίνεται γὰρ εὐνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φι-
 λία δ' οὐ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταύτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φί-
 λησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει
 2 δὲ ταύτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ
 δ' εὐνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστάς 35
 συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμ- 1167^a
 πράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι
 3 γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας
 εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ
 προησθείς τῇ ιδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐδὲν 5
 μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρου-
 σίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ
 εὖνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βού-
 λονται γὰρ μόνον τὰγαθὰ οἷς εἰσιν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ'
 ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη 10

1166 b, 30. EE. 1240 b, 38 ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν
 λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ
 τῶν εἰρημένων· οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμοιοῦς καὶ
 εὐνοίας. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων.
 ἔστι δ' ἡ εὐνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον οὔτε ταυτόν. διη-
 ρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὗτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὗτ' ἐν
 τῇ καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐστίν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰγαθὰ,
 οὐ δι' ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν βούλοισι' ἂν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ <ἡ φιλία> καὶ

V. § 1. καὶ πρότερον, 1155 b, 32.
 We here begin an examination of
 cognate ἔξεις and δυνάμεις like that in
 Book VI., 1142 a, 31 sqq.

διάτασιν, *animi intentionem*. The
 word is originally a medical term.
 Cf. Plato, Rep. 407 c κεφαλῆς τινες...
 διατάσεις, *migraines*.

ἀκολουθεῖ. Cf. Ind. s. v.

§ 2. περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστάς. Cf.
 Lat. *favor*.

§ 3. ἀρχὴ φιλίας. Cf. EE. (loc.

cit.), which proves that ἀρχή here
 means simply 'beginning.'

τῇ ιδέᾳ...τῷ εἶδει. There is no
 difference of meaning.

οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, 'is not in love for
 all that.'

ἀπόντα ποθῇ, *absentem desiderat*;
 for πόθος (*desiderium*) is always τοῦ
 ἀπόντος, Plato, Krat. 420 a.

μεταφέρων, 'in a metaphor.' Cf.
 Ind. s. v.

τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς
 συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ
 χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοια ἐπὶ τού-
 τοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν
 15 ἀπονέμει τὴν εὖνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός
 τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ'
 εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ
 φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινὰ χρήσιν. ὅλως δ' ἡ εὖ- 4
 νοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ
 20 καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

VI. Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν
 ἂν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὅτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φα-
 25 σίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ
 τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασιν, ὅταν
 περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτά προαι-

ἡ εὖνοια οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὖνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ εὐνοεῖ· εἰ
 δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος φιλίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνόουν. ὥστε δῆλον
 ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὖνοια ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος
 βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν αὐτῷ βούλεται. ἔστι
 γὰρ ἡ εὖνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὖνους, ὁ δ' εὖνους οὐ
 πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας,
 ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.

1167 a, 22. EE. 1241 a, 15 δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἳ τε φίλοι
 ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες φίλοι εἶναι. ἔστι δ' οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ
 ὁμόνοια ἢ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα
 εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν (ἔστι
 γὰρ τὰναντία τὸ κινεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ διαφωνεῖ
 τοῦτο), οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

ἀργήν. The metaphor is probably
 from fields that lie fallow or mines
 that are unworked. Contrast ἐνέργεια.

τὰ δίκαια δρῶν. He is δίκαιος rather
 than εὖνους, in the proper sense.

VI. § 1. ὁμόνοια, *concordia*, a
 political term.

περὶ ὅτουοῦν. As the writer of
 MM says (1212 a, 15) we do not call
 it ὁμόνοια to agree with Empedokles
 about the elements. As Eudemos put
 it, it is neither κατὰ διάνοιαν nor yet
 κατ' ὄρεξιν solely. Hence its relation to
 προαίρεσις.

2 ρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ
 δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδε-
 χόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν 30
 πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακε-
 δαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν
 δ' ἐκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις,
 στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν
 ὁδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος 35
 καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γί- 1167^b
 νεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμό-
 νοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι
 3 καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια· οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι
 καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ φιλία· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πρώτη καὶ
 φύσει σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθ'
 ἣν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν
 ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι
 ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὗ ὀρέγονται. ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται ὃ μὴ
 ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ' οὐ μαχοῦνται. ἔστι δ'
 ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾗ, μὴ
 τοῦ ἐκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία
 πολιτική.

§ 2. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ κ.τ.λ. There are three things to note in answering the question περὶ ποῖα; (1) it has to do with πρακτά, (2) on a large scale, (3) in which it is possible for the desires of all parties to be satisfied. Cf. Eudemos loc. cit.

ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν. The illustration is to the point, for (1) Pittakos was an *elected* tyrant (Pol. 1285 a, 35), and (2) he resigned against the wishes of the citizens. Accordingly ὁμόνοια prevailed only during the period when he consented to rule (ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν).

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις. Eteokles and Polyneikes in Euripides. Cf.

“Was mein Bruder Karl will, dass will ich auch.”

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ‘in the same person.’

οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς. These are the same as οἱ ἀριστοι.

πολιτικὴ δὴ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. If it has to do (1) with πρακτά on a large scale and (2) with things as to which the desires of all may be satisfied, it will be political.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται. Ὁμόνοια is used technically by Thucydides of agreement as to the constitution. So in viii. 93 ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.

5 ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ
 ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων
 γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὐριπος),
 βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ
 καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν 4
 10 πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας
 ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς
 λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα
 τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοι-
 νὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους
 15 μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια
 ποιεῖν.

VII. Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον
 φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ
 λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαί-
 20 νεται ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν

1167 b, 17. EE. 1241 a, 34 περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας
 εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες
 εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὖ τοὺς ποιήσαντας. δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον
 εἶναι τοῦναντίον. τοῦτο δ' ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἂν τις διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ
 αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀφείλεται, τὸν δ' ἀποδοῦναι

§ 3. ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν, sc. ἐν τοῖς
 ἀγαθοῖς, opp. ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις, without
 the political significance which the
 word has above (b, 1).

ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, 'being of one
 mind.' The phrase ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς
 γνώμης εἶναι, γίνεσθαι, μένειν is
 common in Demosthenes, and can be
 replaced by ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι,
 γίνεσθαι, μένειν in the same sense
 (see Rehdanz Ind. s.v.). There is no
 reference whatever to the proverb ἐπὶ
 τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμεῖν.

ὥσπερ εὐριπος. "Significantur hoc
 nomine omnia maris loca angustiora
 in quibus contrarii sunt fluctuum
 motus," Zell. For the simile cf.

Aischines (p. 66. 27) πλείους τραπό-
 μενος τροπὰς τοῦ Εὐρίπου παρ' ὃ ᾤκει.

§ 4. τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει. Cf. the
 complaints of Demosthenes in the
 Philippics.

VII. § 1. Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται κ.τ.λ.
 This ἀπορία too serves to bring out
 some important points about φιλία.

παρὰ λόγον, i. q. ἄλογον, opp. κατὰ
 λόγον, εὐλογον.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις. Fritzsche
 compares Thuc. ii, 40 βεβαιότερος ὁ
 δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι'
 εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σφύζειν· ὁ δ' ἀντοφεί-
 λων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν ἀλλ'
 ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων.

ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς
 ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν
 ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βού-
 λεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας,
 τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος 25
 μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς "ἐκ πονηροῦ
 θεωμένους," ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῶ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί,
 2 καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν
 φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον, καὶ οὐδ' ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς
 δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 30
 σῶζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες
 φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας καὶ μηδὲν ὥσι
 3 χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἂν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· 35

δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια
 αἰρετώτερον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὅ δ' εὖ
 παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἡ περὶ τὰ
 τέκνα σπουδὴ ἔστι, καὶ τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ <τὰ> γεννώμενα σῶζειν. καὶ
 φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ τέκνα [καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων] ἢ
 φιλοῦνται· καὶ οὗτοι πάλιν τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον· καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον
 οἶονται αὐτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διο-
 ρίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.

ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους. Epicharmos
 fr. 146 Kaibel, where *θαμένους* is
 restored. I do not think the in-
 terpretation given by Koraes "as if
 from a bad seat in the theatre" is
 adequate. It seems more likely that
 ἐκ πονηροῦ should be understood on
 the analogy of ἐκ δεξιᾶς, ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς,
 ἐξ ἐναντίας, so that the meaning will
 be 'looking at the thing on the bad
 side' or, as we say, 'the seamy side'
 (metaphor from tapestry). Cf. the
 Latin *in malam partem*.

ἀνθρωπικῶ. Cf. 1111 b, 1 n.

§ 2. φυσικώτερον. Cf. 1147 a,
 24 n. In 1155 b, 8, 9 φυσικὰ ἀπορή-
 ματα are opposed to ἀνθρωπικά.

οὐδ' ὅμοιον, 'is not even analogous.'
 Cf. 1105 a, 26. Bywater (Contr. p. 64)
 reads τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας, a
 decided improvement.

περὶ ἐκείνους, sc. τοὺς δανείσαντας,
 'there is no φίλησις in them' (for
 their debtors).

τοῦ σῶζεσθαι βούλησις κ.τ.λ. Cf.
 1155 b, 30.

κομιδῆς. Cf. κομίζεσθαι 1162 b, 32.

1168^a μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπερ-
 αγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεία ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ
 τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὲ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ 4
 πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ
 5 τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν
 αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμέν δ' ἐνεργεῖα—τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ
 πράττειν—ἐνεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ πῶς· στέργει
 δὲ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ
 ἐστὶ δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ 5
 10 τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πράξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν
 ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι,
 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἦττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν.
 ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος 6

§ 3. περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς. Cf. 1120 b, 13 n.

§ 4. ἐνεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the syllogism is that τὸ ἔργον is φιλητόν, and this is reached through the middle term τὸ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι (τὸν ποιήσαντα). Thus

τὸ ἐνεργεῖα is φιλητόν

τὸ ἔργον is τὸ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι

∴ τὸ ἔργον is φιλητόν.

From this it follows that τὸ ἔργον must be the subject (or predicate) of the sentence which contains the minor premiss, the article being added to both subject and predicate because the terms are convertible (cf. 1097 b, 22 n.). 'The product is (in a sense) its producer in activity.' If we write ἔστι for ἐστὶ and translate 'the producer of the product (ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον) is (in a sense) actively,' we could only conclude that he loves production, not that he loves the product, and the word πῶς becomes meaningless. It is clear, then, that here Aristotle is really trying to show that the love of an ἔργον is a form of self-love, and this helps the main argument considerably. Further, the doctrine that the ἐνέργεια of the ποιῶν is embodied in the πάσχον is thorough-

ly Aristotelian, cf. De An. 426 a, 4 ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται, and especially Phys. 202 a, 13 sqq. where the whole problem suggested by the fact that ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ is discussed. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 419.

ἐστὶ πῶς. The meaning of this reservation is clear from De An. 424 a, 25 (of the αἰσθητικόν and the αἰσθητόν) ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον (1130 a, 12 n.), compared with 418 a, 3 τὸ αἰσθητικόν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητόν ἤδη ἐντελεχεία. We may say, then, that τὸ ποιῶντι εἶναι is not the same as τὸ ἐργῶ εἶναι, but the producer is potentially the product and the product is the producer actualised. Therefore the producer loves the product; for he loves τὸ εἶναι, and τὸ εἶναι in the primary sense is τὸ εἶναι ἐνεργεῖα.

ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, i.e. τῷ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, 'the object of the act.' Cf. 1117 b, 30 n. The τόπος of τὸ καλόν is now applied.

§ 6. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. We now look at the question from the τόπος of τὸ πολυχρόνιον, which is applied to the πρόβλημα of πότερον αἰρετώτερον in Top. 116 a, 13.

ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγεννημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ
τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι 15
μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι
τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα,
τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἥττον· ἡ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπα-
λιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φι-
λεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πράξιν 20
7 ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως
γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα
οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ
πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργώδες. διὰ ταῦτα
δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἢ γέν- 25
νησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ
τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

VIII. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μά-
λιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ'
ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε 30
ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον—ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ αὐτῷ ὅτι
οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει—ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ
ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἔνεκα,
2 τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα δια- 35
φωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν 1168^b
μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται
τάγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ'
ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ'
οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ 5

καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις κ.τ.λ. For the
τόπος cf. De An. 430 a, 18.

§ 7. οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα κ.τ.λ. Cf.
above 1168 a, 1 and Plato Rep. 330 b.

VIII. § 1. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.
We now approach the question of
φιλαυτία more directly. It is to this
that the whole discussion has been
tending.

οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'that he does

nothing of himself.' I do not see how
the phrase can mean 'he does nothing
without an eye to his own interest.'
But the self-lover is emphatically the
man who does nothing 'unless he has
to.' Cf. Dem. Chers. § 5 τὰ γ' ἀφ'
ὑμῶν ἔτοιμ' ὑπάρχοντα ὁρῶ, Eur. Tro.
74 ἔτοιμ' ἃ βούλει τὰπ' ἐμοῦ.

§ 2. ἐκείνου ἔνεκα. Cf. 1155 b, 31.

φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ
 πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ “μία ψυχὴ” καὶ “κοινὰ
 τὰ φίλων” καὶ “ἰσότης φιλότης” καὶ “γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον.”
 πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστ’ ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα
 10 γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ’ ἑαυτόν. ἀπο-
 ρεῖται δ’ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων
 τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν 3
 καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ’ ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ
 λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ’ ἂν γένοιτο
 15 δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι 4
 τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς
 καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέ-
 γονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ
 περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται
 20 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς
 ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία
 γεγέννηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὲ τοῖς
 οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ’ αὐτοῖς 5
 ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδη-
 25 λον· εἰ γὰρ τις αἰεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς
 μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ
 τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς
 30 ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ’ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 6
 μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα
 καὶ μάλιστ’ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ,
 καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώ-

μία ψυχὴ. Eur. Or. 1045 ἔχων...
 ψυχὴν μίαν.

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. 1159 b, 31.

ἰσότης φιλότης. 1157 b, 36.

γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον. Theokr. xvi,
 18 ἀπωτέρω ἢ γόνυ κνήμα.

ποτέροις, ‘which set of ἔνδοξα.’
 This is a regular dialectical πρόβλημα.

§ 3. λάβοιμεν, cf. 1123 a, 35 n.
 For the τόπος of τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον, cf. Top. 110 a, 23 sqq. It is

specially applicable to the case of
 φιλοτοιοῦτοι. Cf. 1125 b, 14 n.

§ 4. οἱ πολλοί. For the restriction
 of a word’s application by the be-
 haviour of οἱ πολλοί, cf. 1153 b, 33.

§ 6. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ., ‘Just as
 the sovereign is held to be the state
 in the fullest sense, and in any com-
 posite whole the ruling part is taken
 to be the whole, so the ruling part of
 a man is the man.’

τατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαντος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὥς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πε- 35
πραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. 1169^a
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαντος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέ- 5
7 γεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν 10
ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαντον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν 8
ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν 15 καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς

τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή. For the construction cf. 1118 b, 23. This is not, of course, Aristotle's own theory. We are dealing with *ἐνδοξα*.

τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος (cf. 1178 a, 2. 7), 'implying that mind is each one of us.' The ἐγκρατὴς is κρείττων τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, a phrase which implies that he himself is νοῦς and not ἐπιθυμία. We are not yet entitled to say that this is Aristotle's own view, but it certainly was Plato's. Here it is only inferred from an *ἐνδοξον*.

τὰ μετὰ λόγου, i.e. τὰ προβεβουλευμένα (1112 a, 16). The intellectual element is essential to προαίρεσις.

ἢ μάλιστα. Now that the doctrine νοῦς ἐστιν ἕκαστος is more positively stated, a reservation is added.

κατὰ λόγον...κατὰ πάθος. Cf. 1095 a, 10 n.

καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι closely with τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν. There is no difficulty in saying that the good man κατὰ λόγον ὀρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Some MSS., however, omit ἢ before τοῦ καλοῦ from a desire to avoid this. The meaning will then be 'as much as τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ differs from τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν.' But it is not true that ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν ὀρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν, his ὄρεξις is surely τοῦ παρόντος ἡδέος.

§ 7. ἀποδέχονται, cf. 1156 b, 28 n.

τοιοῦτον, sc. ἀγαθόν.

§ 8. πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. Ramsauer quotes Rhet. 1362 a, 24 (ἀγαθὰ

πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν 9
 φίλων ἔνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, καὶ δέη
 20 ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς
 καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ
 καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ'
 ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ βιώσαι καλῶς ἑνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη
 τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πράξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς
 25 καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει·
 αἰροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ'
 ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ
 μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μείζον
 ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀρχᾶς ὁ 10
 30 αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· κα-
 λὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπου-
 δαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται
 δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ
 αὐτὸν πράξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς 11
 35 ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον
 1169^b νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται·
 ὥς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

IX. Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα εἰ δεήσε-
 ται φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γὰρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακα-
 5 ρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· αὐτάρ-
 κεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον
 αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν “ὅταν ὁ

1169 b, 3. EE. 1244 b, 1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας καὶ
 φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις
 πότερον, εἴ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ * * φίλος. εἰ
 κατ' ἐνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς αὐταρκέστατος, εἰ ὁ μετ'

δ' ἐστὶ) ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἐκάστω ἀποδοίη,
 καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἑκάστον νοῦς (i.e. ὁ
 ἐκάστου νοῦς) ἀποδίδωσιν ἐκάστω.

IX. § 1. Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ
 κ.τ.λ. This πρόβλημα brings us still
 closer to the question how *φίλια* is
 related to the Self.

ἕτερον αὐτόν, cf. above 1161 b, 29,
 1166 a, 32.

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων κ.τ.λ. Euripides,
 Orestes, 665—

τοὺς φίλους
 ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρή τοῖς φίλοισιν ὠφελεῖν·
 ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

- 2 δαίμων εὖ διδῶ, τί δεῖ φίλων;” ἔοικε δ’ ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ’ ἀπονέμοντας τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον 10 ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ’ εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὁθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὥς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν 15
- 3 εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ’ ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ’ ἂν καθ’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ’ ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ’ ὥς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιει- 20 κῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ’ ὁθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν.
- 4 δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, 25 ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὃν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι

ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν· αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο φανερόν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὥς οὐδενὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδ’ ἔσται αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν ἰδεσπότου. ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐλάχιστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως ὦσι φίλοι, ἀλλ’ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ συζῆν αἰρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε φανερόν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν ὥς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ’ ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπολαυσομένους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς

§ 3. μονώτην. Cf. above 1097 b, 9.
καθ’ αὐτόν, here in its ordinary

sense ‘by himself,’ ‘alone.’

§ 4. οἱ πολλοί. Cf. 1168 b, 17 n.

φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται 5
 ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι
 30 γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτήμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαι-
 μονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέρ-
 γεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ
 εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον
 τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ
 35 τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων
 1170^a ἡδεῖται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα).
 ὁ μακάριος δὲ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προ-
 αἰρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οἴονται τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα.
 5 μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν
 ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον. ἔσται 6
 οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ

ποιήσοντας. ἀμείνω δ' ἔχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετ' ἐνδείας,
 ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν ἀξίων δεόμεθα φίλων.

περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον, μή ποτε τὸ μὲν τι λέγεται
 καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν. δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ
 ζῆν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
 καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ
 συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν
 γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτατον ἐκάστω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ
 ὄρεξις· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γινώσιν τινα. εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμοι καὶ
 ποιήσῃ τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ * * (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν
 λανθάνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἔστι μὴ
 λανθάνειν), οὐθὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ· τὸ δ'
 ὁμοιον τοῦ ζῆν ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλον. εὐλόγως δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι
 καὶ γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτερον. δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι
 τε τὸ ζῆν [καὶ] αἰρετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ

§ 5. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1098 a, 16.

ὥσπερ κτήμά τι. Cf. the antithesis
 of χρήσις and κτήσις.

ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1099 a, 21.

τὸ οἰκεῖον, 'what is his own.' Cf.
 1156 b, 15 καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς

καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστω γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν
 εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι.

ἄμφω, sc. τὸ σπουδαῖον and τὸ
 οἰκεῖον.

περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς
κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραί-
νει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεταί, ἐπὶ δὲ 10
7 τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς
ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεόγνις
φησιν. φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φί-
λος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει
ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' 15
αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζώοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,

† τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. εἰ οὖν ἐστὶν αἰὲ τῆς τοιαύτης
συστοιχίας ἢ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ
αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὠρισμένης φύσεως·
ὥστε τὸ αὐτοῦ βούλεσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ βούλεσθαι
ἐστὶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐσμεν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος
μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ πρότερον αἰ-
σθάνεται, καὶ ἢ καὶ οὐ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)· ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν
αἰὲ βούλεται, ὅτι βούλεται αἰὲ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ
γνωστόν. τὸ δὲ συζῆν αἰρεῖσθαι δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοπουμένοις πως
εὐηθες (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθίειν
ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὐσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ
χωρίς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ
τυχόντος ἑτερον τοιοῦτον· ἅμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μαθάνειν τοῖς
αὐταρκέσι φίλοις οἷόν τε· μαθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ,
διδάσκοντος δ' ὁ φίλος, ἢ δ' ὁμοιότης φιλία)· ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γέ,
καὶ πάντες ἡδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθ' ὅσον

§ 7. Θεόγνις, v. 35,

Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεται,
ἣν δὲ κακοῖσι

συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

φυσικώτερον κ.τ.λ. If we consider
this πρόβλημα in the light of φυσικαὶ
προτάσεις (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.), we are
landed once more in the psychology of
the Self, and this is in fact the real
motive of the inquiry. The argument
is intricately stated; but it may, I think,
be worked out as a series of syllogisms,

the first of which is supported by two
prosyllogisms. If these are disen-
tangled, the repetitions and paren-
theses can easily be referred to their
proper place in the argument.

τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται κ.τ.λ. Cf. De
An. 413 b, 1 τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν
ἀρχὴν ταύτην (sc. τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐ-
ξητικὴν) ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζώοις, τὸ δὲ ζῶον
διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν πρῶτως. 414 b, 18
ἐτέροις δὲ (ὑπάρχει) καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν
τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις.

ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὲ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν
20 καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὠρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὠρισμένον τῆς ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ

ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστου, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς, τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας. καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ. διό φησι “μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι,” ὥστ' οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τούτου γινομένου. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλία ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰσθησιν.

1170 a, 19. EE. 1245 a, 26 ὁ μὲν τοίνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παρακρούεται πῶς ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν. σκεπτέον ἔνθεν τὰληθές. ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησὶν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός. διέσπασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφ' ἐνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὅμοιος ἕτερος, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μῶριον ἕτερος ἕτερον. ἀλλ' οὐθέν

εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. For ἀνάγειν see 1113 a, 6. ‘The capacity is reduced to (or ‘traced up to’) the activity’ as its ἀρχή. For the ἐνέργεια as the ἀρχή (οὐ ἔνεκα) of the δύναμις cf. Met. 1050 a, 8 sqq., and especially 1051 a, 29 τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὐρίσκεται. As a capacity is always a capacity of some activity, if a capacity is the differentia of a thing, that thing will be the corresponding activity.

τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ‘the primary ἀρχή,’ ‘that which makes the δύναμις what it is lies in the ἐνέργεια which is its final cause.’ When applied to ἀρχαί, τὸ κύριον is practically the same as τὸ πρῶτον (cf. Bonitz on Met. 1015 b, 11). We now have

Prosyllogism A.

The differentia of human life is the capacity of Sensation and Thought.

Every capacity is referred to its activity as primary.

∴ Human life is primarily the activity of Sensation and Thought.

ὠρισμένον γάρ. This gives us the middle term of—

Prosyllogism B.

The determinate is good by nature.

Life is determinate.

∴ Life is good by nature.

For the view that the ‘determinate’ or ‘limited’ is good, cf. 1106 b, 30. As we shall see later, this means that life is τέλειόν τι, that its form is completely realised.

τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. This gives us—

Syllogism I.

Life is Sensation and Thought. (Prosyll. A.)

Life is good by nature and therefore pleasant in itself to the good man. (Prosyll. B.)

∴ Sensation and Thought are good by nature and pleasant in themselves to the good man.

8 τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν
9 τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' 25
αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι 30
τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῖμεν ἂν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἢν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆν, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό (φύ- 1170^b
σει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωὴ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγα-

τε ἦττον βούλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ <τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ> αὐτόν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήδεσθαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου ἅμα αἰσθησις αἰεῖ), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας ἡδονάς. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι αἰεῖ ἡδίων ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις. In the first part of Book X we shall see that such lives do not fulfil the requirements of τὸ ὀρισμένον. They are ἀτελεῖς, 'incomplete.'

§ 9. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has compressed the whole argument into one of his enormous protases, the apodosis of which does not come till b, 8 οὕτω. We can disentangle first
Syllogism II.

Sensation and thought are good and pleasant in themselves to the good.

Self-consciousness is consciousness of Sensation and Thought.

∴ The Self-consciousness of the good is consciousness of something

good and pleasant in itself.

ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται κ.τ.λ. For this way of expressing what we call 'self-consciousness,' cf. De An. 425 b, 12 ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὀρώμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὁψεί ὅτι ὁρᾷ ἢ ἐτέρῳ. De Somno 455 a, 15 ἔστι δὲ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὁψεί ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ. This consciousness of sensation as distinct from sensation is called by Eudemos συναίσθησις. We are not told here what it is that αἰσθάνεται ὅτι νοεῖ. We shall see that it is νοῦς itself in its highest function, νόησις νοήσεως.

θοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ—συναισθανό-
 5 μενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονταί—ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν 10
 ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ
 φίλος ἐστίν· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω,
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν
 αἰρετόν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη
 10 αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ
 φίλου ὅτι ἐστὶν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν
 λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων
 τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρε-

πάθος, ὅτε δὲ πρᾶξις, ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι. εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὕτω
 καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν συνεργεῖν, ἢ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει
 μάλιστα γε. διὸ <δεῖ> συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευχεῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ
 τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ τοιαῦται * * ὁμιλῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 ἀπολαύσεις· ἀλλ' ἕκαστος οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ
 βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων
 αἰροῦνται μάλιστα.

συναισθανόμενοι...τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ
 ἀγαθοῦ κ.τ.λ. The verb *συναισθάνομαι*
 is very appropriate for the
 consciousness of sensation or thought
 as distinct from either. Just as from
σύννοιά σοι we get *σύννοια ἐμαντῷ*, we
 might get *συναισθάνομαι ἐμαντῷ* from
συναισθάνομαί σοι to express the mean-
 ing *αἰσθάνομαι ἐμαντοῦ αἰσθανομένου ἢ*
νοοῦντος. Eudemos already has the
 word *συναίσθησις* in the primary sense,
 and in the secondary it is technically
 used by Alexander.

§ 10. ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κ.τ.λ. This
 has been proved above 1166 a, 1 (note
 how these apparently unconnected dis-
 cussions fit in with one another) and
 gives us the major premiss of

Syllogism III.

The good man is related to his
 friend as to himself.

The good man's consciousness of
 himself is good and pleasant.

∴ The good man's consciousness
 of his friend's self is good and pleasant
 in itself. Q.E.D.

The doctrine is, then, in modern
 phrase, that the possibility of sym-
 pathy depends upon the presence of
 self-consciousness, that is, of a self
 which distinguishes itself from its
 sensations and thoughts and can there-
 fore relate itself to the sensations and
 thoughts of a friend in the same way
 as to our own. It is thus that *φιλία*
 widens the self.

ἐν τῷ συζῆν. The *συναίσθησις τοῦ*
φίλου can be fully realised only in
 intellectual communion. This follows
 from all that has been said, and is
 gradually leading us up to the ideal of
 the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*.

εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle
 feels the need of a clearer and more
 succinct statement of the argument.

τόν ἐστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὃν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλή- 15
σιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν
εἴη. ὁ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἰρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ
ταύτῃ ἐνδεὲς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσουσι φίλων
σπουδαίων.

X. Ἄρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ 20
ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρήσθαι δοκεῖ “μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ'
ἄξεινος,” καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἀφιλον εἶναι
2 μήτ' αὐτὸν πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρή-
σιν κἂν πάννυ δόξειεν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ
ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ [τοῦτο] 25
πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν
περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ
αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν
3 τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἡδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους
κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ 30

1170 b, 13. EE. 1245 b, 9 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ
ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος
μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερόν· ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο, καὶ
τοῦτ' εὐλόγως συνέβαινε λέγοντος ἀληθῆ. κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς
παραβολῆς ἀληθοῦς οὔσης ἢ λύσις <οὐκ> ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ
τοιοῦτος οἷος δεῖσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἀξιοῦμεν. καίτοι κατὰ
τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ νοήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ
ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ' αὐτὸς αὐτόν. αἴτιον δ'
ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἔστιν.

1170 b, 20. EE. 1245 b, 20 καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὐχεσθαι
πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθὲς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἅμφω
λέγεται ὀρθῶς. ἐνδεχομένου γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι
ὡς πλείστοις αἰρετώτατον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττωσιν ἀνάγκη
τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ
πολλοὺς κτήσασθαι (πέρας γὰρ δεῖ), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὔσι χρήσασθαι.

X. § 1. Ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. This
problem as to the number of friends
prepares us for the view that the
highest life can be led only by a
chosen few.

ἐμμελῶς. Cf. 1123 a, 22 n.
μήτε πολύξεινος κ.τ.λ. Hesiod
Ἔργ. 660.

§ 3. ὥσπερ πόλεως. Pol. 1326 a,
35 ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον

πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὠρισμένων. καὶ φίλων
 1171^a δὴ ἐστὶ πλήθος ὠρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν
 δύναιτό τις συζῆν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι—ὅτι 4
 δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδη-
 λον. ἔτι δὲ κακείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι
 5 πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν
 πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν 5
 καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα
 τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ
 ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ
 10 συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι
 φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ
 τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα· καὶ τὸ σφό-
 δρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρα- 6
 γμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν
 15 φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι
 καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι,
 πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν

ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζώων, φυτῶν, ὀργάνων. καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως, ὅτε δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίον, εἰς δὲ τί μέγεθος ἐλθὼν ὅτε μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσῃ τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτε δὲ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν. The principle is that the πόλις has an ἔργον, τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην. If it passes this limit it ceases to be a πόλις and becomes an ἔθνος like Babylon (1276 a, 28), which is αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ ζῆν but not πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

τὸ δὲ ποσὸν κ.τ.λ. This is a principle which applies to all μεσό-

τητες (cf. above 1155 b, 14 n.), and it is this which makes an ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων necessary. Here the ὅρος is συμβίωσις.

§ 5. βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1119 b, 34 n.

καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ κ.τ.λ. The argument is that as the ὑπερβολή of it is limited to one, it will be limited to fewer as it approaches the ὑπερβολή.

§ 6. αἱ ὑμνούμεναι. Fritzsche quotes Plutarch, Περὶ πολυφιλίας 93 e τὸν μακρὸν καὶ παλαιὸν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα ἅμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ σύμβουλον λάβωμεν, ἐν ᾧ κατὰ ζεῦγος φίλοι λέγονται, Θησεὺς καὶ Πειρίθοος, Ἀχιλλεὺς καὶ Πάτροκλος, Ὀρέστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φιντίας καὶ Δάμων, Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας.

πλὴν πολιτικῶς. For πολιτικὴ φιλία cf. 1161 b, 13 sqq.

οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῇ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους. 20

XI. Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἳ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον 25 δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν τις πότερον 30 ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἢ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὔσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται,

1171 a, 21. EE. 1245 b, 26 καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἀπεῖναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν. ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο πάντες αἰροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ ἴσως ἂν ἢ μήτηρ εἴλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴπειεν καὶ ὃν ὁ Λάκων ἔσκωψεν, ἐπεὶ τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς συμμεθέξεως τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα συμβαίνει εὐλόγως. δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μὴθὲν εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὡς <μὴ> ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον· δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὐτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὐτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπούμενου τοῦ φίλου. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά.

ἀγαπητόν. Cf. 1094 b, 9.

XI. § 1. Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις κ.τ.λ. This πρόβλημα also bears on the relation of *φιλία* to the ideal life.

ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν...κάλλιον δέ... Cf. 1155 a, 3 n.

§ 2. ὥσπερ βάρους. Victorius

quotes Xen. Mem. ii, 7, 1 Σωκράτης Ἀρίσταρχόν ποτε ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα· Ἔοικας, ἔφη, βαρέως φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βαρέος μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τί σε ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.

ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δ' 3
 35 ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν
 1171^b τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις
 ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι—παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, εἰ ἢ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἡθος
 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδεται καὶ λυπεῖται—τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθά- 4
 5 νεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει
 λύπης αἷτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν
 φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, καὶ μὴ
 ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπία, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπο-
 μένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς
 10 εἶναι θρηνητικός· γυναῖκα δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συ-
 στένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας.
 μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασιν δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν 5
 ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν
 ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἡδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.
 15 διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους
 προθύμως—εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν—εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυ-
 χίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν,
 ὅθεν τὸ “ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.” μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον

ἐπεὶ δ' αἰρετὸν τό τ' εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετ'
 ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερόν πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος. ἐπεὶ δὲ
 ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἥδη διαφέρονται καὶ οἴονται τὸ
 μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, [καὶ] ὥσπερ συνδειπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν
 ἡδίων ταῦτα ἔχοντας· οἱ δ' ἂν μέντοι οὐ βούλονται. ἐπεὶ δ' εἴ τις
 ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσῃ, * * ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ
 εὖ σφόδρα χωρίς. * * παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας.
 ὅτε μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπεῖναι οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μὴθὲν
 μέλλωσι ποιήσῃν πλέον· ὅτε δὲ αὐτοὺς ἡδιστον παρῆναι. τὸ δὲ τῆς
 ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλ' εὐλογον. διὰ γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο
 συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἔξει τὸν φίλον
 θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δ' ὁρᾶν τὸν φίλον

§ 4. καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπία.
 Tr. 'even if he is not exceptionally
 insensible to pain.'

§ 5. διαγωγὴν. Cf. 1127 b, 34 n.
 τὸ “ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.” We do
 not know where this comes from.

ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσιν.
 6 ἵεναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας 20
 ἄκκλητον καὶ προθύμως—φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα
 τοὺς ἐν χρεῖα καὶ μὴ ἀξιόσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον
 καὶ ἥδιον—εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως
 —καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων—πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχο-
 λαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν 25
 δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίστε γὰρ
 συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὲ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ
 φαίνεται.

XII. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν
 ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπάς, 30
 ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου,
 οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία
 γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν
 φίλον· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἰρετὴ, καὶ περὶ
 τὸν φίλον δὴ· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, 35
 2 ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ 1172^a
 εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φί-
 λων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ
 συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν

ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴ
 κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός· ὥστε ὁπότερον ἂν τούτων ἢ μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν
 ῥοπὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρῆναι ἢ μή. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων
 συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτι-
 μοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδ' εἶναι ἀνάγκαι * * αὐτοῖς
 κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίστε τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποκτιννύασι. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ
 οἰκείου αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ποτὲ εὖ
 ἔπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν.

§ 6. μὴ ἀξιόσαντας. For the read-
 ing see Bywater, Contr. p. 66.

XII. § 1. Ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. The
 discussion is concluded by some
 remarks upon τὸ συζῆν which is
 the ἐνέργεια τῆς φιλίας and there-
 fore the ὅρος of all φιλικά. This

is really a summary of the whole
 argument.

περὶ αὐτόν = αὐτοῦ. Cf. Ind. s.v.
 περὶ.

αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς συναισθήσεως (the
 phrase is used in EE. loc. cit. p. 431).
 Aretinus reads αὐτοῖς.

5 ἡ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅτι
 περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμε-
 νοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν
 ὥς οἶόν τε [συζῆν]. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία 3
 μοχθηρά—κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μο-
 10 χθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις—ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
 ἐπιεικῆς, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελ-
 τίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάτ-
 τονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν “ἐσθλῶν
 μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά.” περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 4
 15 εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

§ 2. ὥς οἶόν τε. I think this read-
 ing (that of K^b) is established by EE.
 1245 a, 20 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον
 καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστου. When οἶόν τε
 became οἶονται, συζῆν would be added
 as the most obvious verb.

§ 3. ἀπομάττονται. ‘They take
 the impress of those things in
 one another they are pleased with.’

The verb is properly used of wax
 taking the impress of a seal.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Theognis 35
 ‘Εσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά μαθήσεται·
 ἦν δὲ κακοῖσιν

συμμίσγης, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.
 ταῦτα μαθὼν ἀγαθοῖσιν ὁμίλει· καὶ ποτε
 φήσεις

εὖ συμβουλευεῖν τοῖσι φίλοις ἐμέ.

BOOK X.

THE GOOD FOR MAN.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started, but first we must clear up a point which we have left unsettled. In our discussion of the view that pleasure was bad we left it quite an open question whether it might not even be the highest good. This view has often been held, and its most recent and authoritative exponent is Eudoxos who substituted Pleasure for the Platonic Form of the Good. The arguments directed against his position by Speusippos and other members of the Academy are altogether inadequate, and we must therefore come to some understanding on the point before we go any further.

What, then, is pleasure? Contrary to the view received in the Academy it is certainly not a motion. All motions are incomplete and pleasure is something complete in any given moment, just like vision. We can use the present and the perfect tense at once of it. There is not less pleasure in any moment of its presence than there is in its whole duration. It is completely present or not at all, and this shows that it is no motion; for every motion is incomplete till it reaches its end and then it ceases to exist as motion altogether. Pleasure then must be an activity or rather the completion of an activity. Pleasure is the completion of the activity of a subject at its best acting upon an object at its best.

§ 2. It is clear, then, that we can hardly distinguish the pleasure of the highest life from the highest life itself, and in this sense it is true that pleasure is the highest good. But this is not hedonism. Just because the pleasure and the activity which it

completes are so closely bound up together that they can only be distinguished by an effort of thought, it follows that pleasures must differ specifically just as the activities do which they complete. There is therefore no sense in saying that pleasure in the abstract is the end. There is no such thing as pleasure in the abstract; but only pleasures that are inseparably bound up with certain activities. We must therefore continue to look for human good in some form of activity, which will of course, as we saw long ago, be essentially pleasant. And we must decline to separate the activity from its pleasure and discuss which of them is really the end of life.

§ 3. What activity, then, is it that constitutes human good? We know that it must be one which is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, and therefore it cannot be the life of action, the life of the man who possesses goodness of character without anything higher. Of the "three lives" with which we started it can clearly be none other than the life of the onlooker, the disinterested spectator. Now there are at first sight two lives which seem to fulfil this character. There is the life of amusement and there is the life of the philosopher, the life of artistic, scientific or religious "contemplation." But though some people may make amusement their end, this is not its proper function. Amusement is properly speaking a form of rest or relaxation and is a means to an end. We rest in order that we may be the better able to act. There remains, then, the "contemplative life," the life of the thinker. And this is in complete accordance with the results we have reached already: for we saw that, if there were more forms of goodness than one, the good life would be an activity in accordance with the highest and most complete of these. We have seen too that the highest and most complete form of goodness is *σοφία*, and from this it follows that human happiness consists in an *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*.

§ 4. Such happiness is possible, however, for man only to a small extent, and is indeed not strictly speaking human but divine. The greater part of man's life belongs to the province of goodness of character. Our study of self-love has shown us, however, how these two are related. Self-love, in the sense of the love of that which is highest in us, is necessary and right, and so we see that the more properly human life which we live for the

most part, our everyday life, must be ordered with a view to making possible so far as may be the life of Thought which is in some sense the life of our true selves. Now we see what is the true "standard of the means" (*ὄρος τῶν μεσοτήτων*), or, as Eudemos calls it, the *ὄρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας* (i.e. *τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς*). It is the theoretic life which the *φρόνιμος* keeps in view when he determines the mean; for he knows that his own practical wisdom is only ancillary to the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. Eudemos expresses exactly the same thought in a definitely religious form when he says that the standard which regulates goodness is *τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν*, "to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever."

§ 5. We now know what the good for man is, and we know also how it is to be produced. If we wish to attain to the blessedness of the contemplative life, we must first of all be good in the everyday sense of the word. And we become good by performing good acts. But our aim at present is not merely to secure this blessed life for ourselves even if that were possible. The object of our science is to secure the good for the citizens of a state so far as they are capable of it. How, then, are we to produce in our citizens the character from which good acts arise? Education is of course the only way to produce character, but the education of the family has too little authority to be sufficient. It is true that in the present state of things the state does not discharge this its most important function, and all that the father of a family can do is to become in some sort a domestic lawgiver, but this is clearly only a makeshift. What we have to do is to learn what constitution will really secure the performance of its function by the state, and to train ourselves to be lawgivers who can legislate with this end in view. The details of this constitutional legislation form the subject of the Politics.

K

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. μά-
 20 λιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνφκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσιν
 τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς
 τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ
 μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥο-
 πὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα
 25 βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύ-
 γουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, 2
 ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ

I. § 1. ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. This formula of transition, for which cf. 1155 a, 3, is repeated at the beginning of Book X, though Book IX ends with the words ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς. So far as it goes, this fact favours the view that these transitions are a trace of editorial work.

μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The usual enumeration of more or less irrelevant reasons for the discussion.

συνφκειῶσθαι, 'to be most closely bound up with.' For the word cf. 1161 b, 21 and for the thought 1105 a, 1 ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται (sc. ἡ ἡδονή).

διὸ παιδεύουσιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b, 11 n. This seems to be the earliest instance of the metaphorical use of οἰακίζοντες (= κυβερνῶντες), though οἰαξ for the 'helm of government' occurs from Aischylos onwards. The

same idea is expressed in Plato's image (Laws 644 d sqq.) of man as a "puppet of the gods" (θαῦμα τῶν θεῶν) whose movements are controlled by the two strings (σμήρινθοι) of pleasure and pain pulling opposite ways.

πρός. For μέγα πρὸς cf. 1161 b, 33.

ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα, cf. 1094 a, 23.

προαιροῦνται. Strictly speaking this is true only of οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, but the word is doubtless used in a popular sense as equivalent to διώκουσιν.

§ 2. ὑπέρ. Cf. 1096 a, 4 n. Here, by a characteristic brachylogy, ἥκιστα παρετέον takes the construction of λεκτέον which it implies.

ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν, cf. Ind. s.v. ἔχειν.

οἱ μὲν...οἱ δέ... The two parties are represented in the Ethics by Eudoxos and Speusippos.

τάγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνουσιν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν 30 φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύουσιν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοῦναντίον 3 ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν 35 διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τὰληθεῖς προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁφθείς 1172^b ποτ' ἐφίεμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην 4 οὔσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εἰ-
κασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῶδοι γὰρ 5 ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις· τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

II. Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθὸν ᾧετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ

διὸ δεῖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1109 b, 4 sqq.

§ 3. μή ποτε. 'It may be that...' Goodwin MT. § 269. From signifying 'it is to be feared that' *μήποτε* came to mean 'perhaps.'

περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι κ.τ.λ., i.q. *περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν*, cf. 1105 b, 16. The *ἐν* as usual (Ind. s.v.) indicates the ὅλη.

τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, i.e. τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. Met. 1063 b, 2 οὐχ ὁμοία φαίνεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις.

ὡς τοιαύτην οὔσαν ἅπασαν, sc. ἀγαθὴν implied in ἐφίεμενον.

II. § 1. Εὐδοξος. Eudoxos of Knidos, mathematician and astronomer, had belonged to the Academy. He was, it would seem, one of the most original of its members, and developed Plato's theories on lines of his own. The scholiast of L^b tells us that he held τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, which amounts

to saying that he identified it with the Form of the Good. Cf. Rep. 509 b ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία... ὑπερέχοντος. In his sketch of Aristotle's life, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff says "The geographer and astronomer Eudoxos is probably the only one of his associates who had a real influence on Aristotle. That he should take notice of his ethical doctrines, which after all are not of any great significance, can hardly be explained apart from some personal relation to him. Now Eudoxos was just the right man to introduce the natural science of the Ionians to Aristotle; and we certainly require some such intermediary when we look at Aristotle's life as a whole" (Ar. und Ath. i, p. 333).

διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. This implies the definition of the Good as οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται (1094 a, 3).

10 πάνθ' ὅρᾱν ἐφίεμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι
 δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον·
 τὸ δὴ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὥς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄρι-
 στον ὄν—ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τροφήν—τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγα-
 15 θὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύονται δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν
 μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι·
 οὐ δὴ ὥς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως
 ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἡττον δ' ὥς εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ 2
 ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι,
 20 ὁμοίως δὴ τούναντίον αἰρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετὸν ὃ μὴ
 δι' ἕτερον μὴδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογου-
 μένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνοσ ἐνεκα
 ἡδεται, ὥς καθ' αὐτὴν οὔσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. προστιθε-
 μένην τε ὁπωοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ

ἔλλογα. Aristotle himself never uses this word for λόγον ἔχοντα, nor is it found in Attic writers. This makes it probable that Grant is right in his view that this is a quotation from Eudoxos. If so, the definition of τὸ ἀγαθόν at the beginning of the Ethics will be his. Cf. also Top. 116 a, 19.

τὸ ἐπιεικές, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν.

φέρεισθαι, an unusual word in this connexion, but natural in the mouth of an astronomer.

τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. The argument is thus given by Alexander (Top. p. 6 Wallies) ἂν λάβωμεν ὅτι ὃ πάντα τὰ ζῶα αἰρεῖται ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, τοῦτο μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν τελικώτατον, καὶ συλλογισάμενοι ὅτι ὃ πάντα τὰ ζῶα ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἰρεῖται, τοῦτό ἐστι τελικώτατον, εἴτα προσλάβωμεν ὅτι τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν πάντα ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἰρεῖται... (ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν) ἐσόμεθα συλλελογισμένοι.

§ 2. ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. For the τόπος cf. Top. 117 b, 3 ἔτι ἐκ τῶν

φθορῶν καὶ τῶν ἀποβολῶν καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν λήψεων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων... οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀποβολὴ ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον φευκτότερον, αὐτὸ αἰρετώτερον.

ὁμοίως δὴ, sc. καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσιν.

μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν κ.τ.λ. For this τόπος cf. Top. 116 a, 29 καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον αἰρετοῦ αἰρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι.

οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν. This certainly sounds like direct quotation.

προστιθεμένην τε κ.τ.λ. This is from the τόπος of πρόσθεσις, for which cf. Top. 115 a, 26 ἔτι δ' ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως. ἐὰν ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον προστεθὲν ποιῇ ἀγαθὸν ἢ λευκόν, μὴ δὲ πρότερον λευκὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, τὸ προστεθὲν ἔσται λευκὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν οἷον περ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχον (sc. ἀγαθὸν ἢ λευκόν) προστεθὲν τι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον ὑπῆρχε, καὶ αὐτὸ ἔσται τοιοῦτον. The present case is of course the second. As Aristotle goes on to observe, it only proves that pleasure is *a* good, not that it is *the* good.

δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὖξασθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ. 25
 3 ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαί-
 νειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ
 αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων
 ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι
 τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτόν 30
 κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστε-
 θέντος αὐτῷ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ'
 ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ
 4 ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιούτον, οὗ καὶ
 ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιούτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστά- 35
 μενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. ἃ
 γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν 1173^a

§ 3. πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου κ.τ.λ. Top. 117 a, 16 ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων.

Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ. Phileb. 60 d λεγέτω...εἰ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τινων ἡδονῶν, ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὐτίνος.—Οὐκ ἔστιν...—Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἰρετόν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη; That is, the πρόσθεσις of wisdom also makes pleasure better, and therefore neither is *the* good.

τὸ μικτόν. The phrase is Plato's. Phileb. 22 d ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ. 27 d νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτόν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

οὐδενὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'There is nothing the addition of which can make *the* good more worth having.' I prefer the αὐτῷ of L^b to the αὐτὸ of K^b. *The* good does not admit of πρόσθεσις, for all other good things are desired for the sake of it. This is given in the Topics as an ἐνστασις (objection) to the τόπος ἐκ προσθέσεως. Cf. 117 a, 16 ἐνστασις εἴ που θάτερον θατέρου χάριν· οὐδὲν γὰρ

αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἄμφω τοῦ ἐνός, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ὑγείας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τῆς ὑγείας ἔνεκεν αἰρούμεθα.

τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν. Cf. 1096 b, 16 καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; Even these we desire τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, and therefore εὐδαιμονία + pleasure is not more worth having than εὐδαιμονία alone.

§ 4. τοιούτον, sc. οἷον μὴ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι, or, in other words, μὴ συναριθμούμενον (1097 b, 17 n.).

οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν. As Rodier says, this is added to show that Aristotle does not mean to approve of Plato's theory of the good, except in so far as the above argument goes.

ἐνιστάμενοι, An. Pr. 69 a, 37 ἐνστασις δ' ἐστὶ πρότασις προτάσει ἐναντία.

μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. See Kühner § 394, §. 7

ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, sc. ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. There is no sense in saying a thing is not good if it is thought good by all.

πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται
 αὐτῶν, ἣν ἂν τι λεγόμενον, ἡ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν
 ἂν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι [φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν]
 5 κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε 5
 δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ
 ἡ λύπη κακὸν ἐστὶ, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι
 γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῶ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδέτερον—λέγοντες
 ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὲν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.
 10 ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τὸ
 μηδέτερον δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν
 μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακὸν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω
 δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται. III. οὐ μὲν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰ τῆς
 15 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι 2
 δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὀρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. So Bywater for MS. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., cf. Contr. p. 66. The emendation had been anticipated by Michelet.

ἔστι τι κ.τ.λ. Thurot deleted ἀγαθόν, which Michael does not seem to have had, and Bywater would delete φυσικὸν too. We cannot speak of a φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν aiming at an οἰκεῖον ἀγαθόν. For the thought cf. 1153 b, 31. This is the θεῖόν τι of 1153 b, 32. Introd. § 25.

§ 5. οὐ γάρ φασιν κ.τ.λ. The argument is that of Speusippos and has been discussed in Book VII (1153 b, 1 sqq. and the notes).

τῷ μηδέτερον. Stewart points out that this, the MS. reading, can be defended by Plato, Rep. 583 e ἡ καὶ δυνατόν τὸ μηδέτερον ὄν ἀμφοτέρω γίγνεσθαι;

ὄντων κακῶν. For another reading (ὄντων <τῶν> κακῶν) cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 66.

τὸ μηδέτερον δέ. This correction of MS. τῶν μηδετέρων δέ is due to Professor Butcher. 'That which is

neutral ought to be (ἔδει) neither shunned nor sought or both alike.'

οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται, 'so the antithesis is of this kind.'

III. § 1. οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων κ.τ.λ. From this it appears that the Platonists (Speusippos) regarded all good things as qualities. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἴσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι, 'is predicated in all the categories' (1096 a, 23). 'Activities according to goodness' are κινήσεις, and so therefore is εὐδαιμονία itself. But Speusippos, who defined εὐδαιμονία as ἕξις τελεία, of course regarded it as a ποιότης.

§ 2. τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον. Cf. 1170 a, 20 and the argument of Plato's Philebos 24 e ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνεται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι... 31 a ἡδονὴ δὲ ἀπειρὸς τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἔξοντος γένουσι. The word ἀόριστος,

δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν καὶ <πράττειν> κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται ταυτό· δίκαιοι 20 γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ 3 λέγουσι τὸ αἷτιον, ἂν ὧσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. καὶ τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὕσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ 25 συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. 4 τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν 30

however, is never used by Plato in the sense of ἀπειρος, and this makes it likely that Aristotle is criticising a contemporary form of the Platonic doctrine. With Xenokrates ἀόριστος was the technical term.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι κ.τ.λ. It does not follow from the fact that τὸ ἡδεσθαι admits of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον that ἡ ἡδονή does so too. If it did, we should have to say that goodness also is ἀόριστον, for people may be more or less good.

εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, sc. τοῦτο κρίνουσι. We have seen above (1152 b, 13) that Speusippos, in making all pleasure a γένεσις, ignored Plato's distinction between 'mixed' and 'unmixed' pleasures. In the same way he here ignores Plato's view that ἀμετρία was to be found in the mixed pleasures only, while the pure pleasures possessed ἐμμετρία. Cf. Phileb. 52 c οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὁρθῶς ἂν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τούναντίον, ἐμμετρίαν.

§ 3. καὶ τί κωλύει. A fresh point. The reading τί γὰρ κωλύει has inferior authority and does not make the argument clearer.

καθάπερ ὑγίεια. For ὑγίεια as a συμμετρία cf. Top. 139 b, 21, where συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν is quoted as a definition obscure from its ambiguity. The illustration here is taken from Plato, Phileb. 25 e.

ἐν πᾶσιν...ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Masculine. The proportion of health varies in different persons and in the same person at different times.

ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός. Cf. 1170 b, 32 n. There is always some latitude in a μεσότης. We cannot distinguish (κρίνειν) very minute intervals, and so a note may be flat or sharp and still be the same note. Aristotle is never tired of arguing against the abstract use of the formula of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον.

§ 4. τέλειόν τε κ.τ.λ. This is all from Plato's Philebos. Cf. especially 54 d ἀρ' οὖν ἡδονὴ γε εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὁρθῶς θήσομεν;

πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκότασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ
 1173^b ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτήν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. γένεσις τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; 5
 5 δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἢ ἡδονή, τούτου ἢ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν 6

οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν, 'not even a motion,' and therefore *a fortiori* not a γένεσις, which is a species of κίνησις.

οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου. Here κόσμος = οὐρανός. Cf. De Caelo, 288 a, 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ ὅτι ὁμαλῆς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνώμαλος...λέγω δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς πρώτης φορᾶς. The κύκλῳ φορά of the πρῶτος οὐρανός is an absolutely uniform motion. It has no ἐπίτασις or ἀνεσις, acceleration or retardation. We cannot therefore call it slow or quick in itself (καθ' αὐτήν), for we have no slower or quicker motion of itself with which to compare it. But if we compare it with the derivative motions like that of the planets, we can call it rapid πρὸς ἄλλο.

οὐδέτερον, sc. οὔτε τὸ καθ' αὐτήν οὔτε τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο.

ἡσθῆναι. The ingressive aorist expresses the κίνησις or γένεσις which ends in feeling pleasure, ἡδεσθαι. So we may 'get angry' quickly, but we cannot 'be angry' quickly.

οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, 'not even relatively.'

βαδίζειν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Walking and growing are εἶδη κινήσεως, in all of which there is acceleration and retardation, quick and slow. For the εἶδη κινήσεως cf. below 1174 a, 30.

μεταβάλλειν...εἰς τὴν ἡδονήν, i.e. ἡσθῆναι.

§ 5. γένεσις τε κ.τ.λ. If it is not a κίνησις, it cannot be a γένεσις, but there are some special reasons against this as well.

οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος. Cf. Phys. 204 b, 33 ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ οὗ ἔστι, καὶ διαλύεται εἰς τοῦτο. The reason is that γένεσις is the process to ἐνέργεια of the form contained δυνάμει in a thing, and the δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are strictly correlative. A thing can only become actually what it is potentially. The reverse process (φθορά) is determined in the same way. What is the thing of which pleasure is the γένεσις, while its φθορά is pain?

§ 6. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This seems to be an attempt to meet the last argument. The form of which pleasure is a γένεσις and pain a φθορά is τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἕξις. This doctrine the Platonists derived from the Philebos. Cf. 42 c εἴρηται που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει καὶ πληρώσει καὶ κενώσει καὶ τισιν αὔξαι καὶ φθίσει λυπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύνη καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα. We must remember that Plato himself did not explain all pleasure

τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρῳσιν. ταῦτα δὲ
σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλή-
ρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρῳσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοιτο· τὸ 10
σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρῳσις ἡ ἡδονή,
ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοιτ' ἂν τις, καὶ τε-
μνόμενος λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ
τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενο-
7 μένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' 15
οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ
τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς
ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι
καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς
8 γὰρ ἐνδεια γεγένηται, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρῳσις. πρὸς δὲ 20
τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονιδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν

in this way. Aristotle meets the argument by pointing out that if ἡδονή is ἀναπλήρῳσις, it must be in the body, not in the soul.

τεμνόμενος. Aristotle is probably referring to some passage in which surgical operations (τέμνειν καὶ κἀειν) were referred to as examples of violent alterations of the normal state. Grant refers to Tim. 65 b, where αἱ καύσεις καὶ τομαὶ τοῦ σώματος are given as examples of things which ἀπαλλοτρι-οῦται ἄθροα and therefore cause great pain, while the recovery causes little pleasure because κατὰ σμικρὰ μόγις τε εἰς ταῦτόν πάλιν ἑαυτοῖς καθίσταται. The opposite class is represented by the pleasures of smell (εὐωδαί), the satisfaction of which is ἄθροα, while the κένωσις is not perceived. There is therefore no reason to conjecture κενούμενος (Spengel), δεόμενος (Zeller) or ἐνδεής γενόμενος (Bywater).

§ 7. ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1152 b, 36 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί. Plato, however, also explained these as πληρώσεις, though the κένωσις preceding them

was gradual (κατὰ μικρὰ) and imperceptible (ἀναίσθητος), while the κατάστασις to the normal state was ἄθροα. Cf. the passage quoted in the last note as to εὐωδαί. See also Rep. 584 b εἰ 'θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὁσμάς ἡδονάς· αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπη-θέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσι. Phileb. 51 b (ἡδονάς) τὰς περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητάς καὶ ἡδέας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.

§ 8. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now turns to the argument given above 1152 b, 20 τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχυραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι.

λέγοι τις ἂν. The first answer is simply the old one that culpable pleasures are not (φύσει) ἡδέα at all. For ὑγιεινά, γλυκέα, πικρά, cf. above 1113 a, 28—29, and for τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν, see ib. 26 n.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις
 ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ
 οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ
 25 λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν. ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἂν, 9
 ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἵρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὀτιοῦν
 φαγόντι. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ 10
 ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι
 30 τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ
 ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ 11
 δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οὔσαν ἀγαθὸν
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμι-
 λεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ'
 1174^a ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν 12
 παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία
 ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων,
 μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιη-
 5 σαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἶον ὁρᾶν,
 μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν
 ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε 13
 τὰγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἵρετὴ, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ

§ 9. ἢ οὕτω κ.τ.λ. A second tentative answer. The pleasures are good in themselves, but not from these sources. For λέγοι τις ἂν see Bywater, Contr. p. 67.

§ 10. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν. The third answer. Here this is only shown dialectically; below (1175 a, 21 sqq.) it is discussed φυσικώτερον.

§ 11. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The point seems to be this. The friend is said πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν, the flatterer πρὸς ἡδονήν. This suggests *prima facie* that ἡδονή is not ἀγαθόν, or, if we insist that the friend after all gives pleasure too, we must say that it is a different species of pleasure. If pleasure were μονοειδής, we could

not draw any distinction at all.

§ 12. οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο κ.τ.λ. EE. 1215 b, 22 (p. 20). This again indicates that there is some difference in species. Simply as pleasure, a child's pleasure may be greater than a man's, and yet no one would wish to have it over again. So, again, no one would wish to have the pleasures of shameful conduct, though, if pleasure were ὁμοειδής, they would be just as much worth having as any others.

περὶ πολλά τε κ.τ.λ. This is the other side of the argument. We are coming to see that it is the character of the activities, and not the pleasures as such, that decides our choice.

ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἵρεται καθ' αὐτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

IV. Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ' ὄντιν οὖν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς δ' εἰς ὕστερον 15 γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείῳ χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ 2 εἶδος· διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστίν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομία, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ 20 οὐ ἐφίεται. ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς

ἡ ἀφ' ὧν, i.e. ἡ τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν. Cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

IV. § 1. Τί...ἡ ποῖόν τι. For this formula cf. 1106 a, 15 n.

ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, almost equivalent to ἀνωθεν in the sense explained 1155 b, 2 n. The phrase means practically φυσικώτερον ἐπισκοποῦσιν.

ἡ μὲν ὄρασις κ.τ.λ. Seeing is taken as the type of an ἐνέργεια which is complete in every instant as opposed to a κίνησις or 'process' which is ἀτελής. Aristotle's favourite way of expressing the completeness of an activity in any instant of it is by saying that the present and the perfect tense can be simultaneously used of it. If I look at a thing for some time, I can say both ὁρῶ and ἐώρακα at any moment; but if I am building a house, I cannot say ὡκοδόμηκα till the process (κίνησις) is finished. Cf. Top. 178 a, 9 ἄρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; οὐ, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁρᾶν γέ τι ἅμα καὶ ἐωρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται. Met. 1048 b, 29 πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυασία, μάθησις, βάδισις, οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ὡκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν, ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται...

ἐώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. 1066 a, 20 ἡ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελής δέ. If we see a thing at all, we see it just as much one moment as the next; there is no process. So even if we feel the same pleasure for a time, it is no more a pleasure in one moment than another; it is complete in every νῦν. The essence of a process (κίνησις) is that it is completed in time; a complete ἐνέργεια is independent of time.

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. and τὸ τέλειον is οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω (Introd. § 27).

§ 2. οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομία. I agree with Professor Stewart's suggestion that the MS. reading οἰκοδομική is due to the following καὶ which has disappeared from all MSS. but K^b. We do not want the art here, but the process.

ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'A process, then, is complete either in the whole of the time it takes or in the instant that it attains its end.' L^b omits ἡ before τούτῳ, but this makes the connexion awkward. Of course, strictly speaking, the process ceases to exist as a process in the same instant as it is completed.

μέρεσι [τοῦ χρόνου] πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς
 ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς
 τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ
 25 ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία—οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς πρὸς τὸ προκείμε-
 νον—ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους
 γὰρ ἑκατέρω. τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν
 ὁπωῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν
 τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ 3
 30 γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ
 κατ' εἶδη, πτήσις βάδις ἄλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον
 δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ
 οὐ ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει
 καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κακείνην·

τοῦ χρόνου. This is awkward, as the sequel shows Aristotle is speaking of the parts of the construction, not of the time. The reading of K^b is καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ, from which Bywater infers that the original reading was καὶ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς. The vulgate reading looks decidedly conjectural.

ῥαβδώσεως, 'fluting.'

τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως, 'the construction of the temple as a whole.' Cf. above τῆς ὅλης (sc. κινήσεως) καὶ ἀλλήλων. With the ποίησις τοῦ ναοῦ the κίνησις becomes τελεία and therefore ceases. If we can say τὸν ναὸν πεποίηκεν, we can no longer say τὸν ναὸν ποιεῖ. But we can still say ὁρᾷ even when we can also say ἐώρακεν.

τὸ προκείμενον, *propositum*, 'the task in hand.' Cf. δ προτιθέμεθα.

κρηπίδος, 'the base.'

§ 3. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The case of locomotion is just like that of building. It has its specifically different parts just as building has, and each is incomplete in itself. The process of locomotion is only complete when the body in motion has reached its destination and then the process is over. If you can say βεβάδικεν, you

cannot still say βαδίζει.

ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, Phys. 243 a, 6. There are three species of κίνησις, (1) locomotion or φορὰ (ἡ κατὰ τόπον), (2) qualitative motion (ἀλλοίωσις, alteration), and (3) quantitative (αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, growth and diminution). Here πόθεν ποῖ is substituted for κατὰ τόπον as the emphasis is on the ποῖ, the goal of the locomotion.

καὶ ταύτης διαφοραί. These correspond to the λίθων σύνθεσις, κίονος ῥαβδῶσις etc. For the εἶδη τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως cf. Part. An. 639 b, 1 οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται μία τῷ εἶδει (ἡ τῶν ζώων πορεία)· διαφέρει γὰρ πτήσις καὶ νεύσις καὶ βάδις καὶ ἔρψις. Mot. An. 698 a, 5 τὰ μὲν γὰρ πτήσει κινεῖται τὰ δὲ νεύσει τὰ δὲ πορείᾳ τῶν ζώων, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους τοιοῦτους.

οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως κ.τ.λ. Not only are there different εἶδη κινήσεως, but if we take any one εἶδος, e.g. walking, every step is ἕτερον τῷ εἶδει from every other.

ἐν τῷ μέρει, sc. τοῦ σταδίου.

τὴν γραμμὴν. The γραμμὴ in the race-course is 'the scratch.' But the meaning seems to be more general here. You may draw a line across

οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ 1174^b
οὔσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ
κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ
τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσιν τῷ
4 εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτῳ 5
χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλ-
λήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἢ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν
τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδε-
σθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ
ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς. οὐ 10

any part of the race-course, and the crossing of each successive line brings the process of running nearer its completion. The crossing of each line is specifically different; for the differentia of *φορά* is *κατὰ τόπον* (*πόθεν ποῖ*), and the lines differ *κατὰ τόπον*.

ἐν ἄλλοις, i.e. in the Physics.

ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ, 'in any given time.' There can be no difficulty in taking this as equivalent to *ἐν ὅτῳ* above. The equivalence of *πᾶς* (*ἅπας*) and *ὅστις* is normal, e.g. *ὅτι οὖν φαγόντι* (1173 b, 28) is the same as *παμφάγῳ ὄντι* (cf. 1149 b, 34), and *πᾶν ποιεῖν* is the regular phrase for *ὅτι οὖν ποιεῖν* (1128 a, 29 n.). Cf. also *πάντως* = *ὁπωσοῦν* (1124 b, 9). I only mention this because some editors wish to read *οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ*, adopting the interpretation of Michael, for which see next note.

αἱ πολλαί. This must surely mean 'the many motions' into which it may be cut up, *τὰ μέρη*. I do not think we can translate 'most motions,' i.e. all but the *κύκλῳ φορά* of the *πρῶτος οὐρανός*, as Michael supposes. It is true, no doubt, that Aristotle regarded this as complete and *ἐν ἀδιαφόρῳ κατ' εἶδος*, but it seems irrelevant.

εἴπερ...εἰδοποιόν. If the specific difference of *φορά* is *κατὰ τόπον* (*πόθεν ποῖ*), then each part of it will be in a

specifically different *τόπος*, and from a different *πόθεν* to a different *ποῖ*.

§ 4. *ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.* Phys. 234 a, 34 *ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐθὲν πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι*. This is demonstrated from the indivisibility of τὸ νῦν. The conclusion is *ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἡρεμεῖν τὸ ἡρεμοῦν*.

ἐν τῷ νῦν, Phys. 220 a, 18 *φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν μόνον τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου... ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς*. 233 b, 33 *ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν... ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι*.

δῆλον καί. A fresh point. Not only is pleasure not a process, but we cannot even say there is a *κίνησις* or *γένεσις* of pleasure. I think the context requires Ramsauer's *τῆς ἡδονῆς* (the mss. have *τὴν ἡδονήν*). He compares for the phraseology Phys. 246 b, 11 *τὰ πρὸς τι οὐτ' αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις, οὐτε αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδὲ ὅλως μεταβολή*.

οὐ γὰρ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Met. 1044 b, 21 *ἐνια ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐστι, οἶον αἱ στιγμαί, εἴπερ εἰσὶ, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἶδη καὶ αἱ μορφαί*. Nothing indivisible can strictly speaking be said to come into being or pass away. A process implies that one part of the thing has changed while the rest remains in its original state. Now pleasure, as we have seen, is an indivisible whole, complete at every

γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ
 ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονά-
 δος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς·
 ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, 5
 15 τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ
 τὴν αἴσθησιν—τοιούτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέρ-
 γεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἣ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, μὴθὲν διαφε-
 ρέτω—καθ' ἐκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα
 διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. αὕτη δ' ἂν
 20 τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἐστὶν
 ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τε-
 λειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιό-
 τατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ 6
 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε

moment. It can no more go through a process of becoming than a point. If it is not complete, it is not there at all. In the same way we may say τὸ ξύλον λευκὸν γίγνεται, but we cannot say τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται. Whiteness is or is not there, it cannot 'become' (Met. 1044 b, 21). What we call the γένεσις of pleasure is not pleasure, but a certain process in us which leads up to it. The pleasure is not there at all till the process is complete. Then it is all there, and no more in one moment than another. Wherever you make a section it is complete.

ταῦτα, sc. κίνησις καὶ γένεσις.

§ 5. αἰσθήσεως δὲ κ.τ.λ. We are now in a position to see the real relation between ἐνέργεια and ἡδονή. The ἡδονή simply is the τελείωσις of the ἐνέργεια, not something wholly different from the ἐνέργεια.

πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν, for αἴσθησις is essentially relative (πρὸς τι).

ἐν ᾧ ἐστι. The δεκτικὸν τῆς αἰσθήσεως is the αἰσθητήριον. It is ultimately the ψυχὴ that ἐνεργεῖ.

§ 6. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ.

We have seen that the activity of the best sensation in relation to the best object is the most perfect and the most complete. But the completeness consisting in the relation between the sensation and its object must be distinguished from the further completeness of the pleasure. To understand this passage, we must bear in mind that τὸ αἰσθητόν is the efficient and ἡ αἴσθησις the formal cause of the ἐνέργεια. According to Aristotle, sensation consists in a sentient being taking into itself the form without the matter of its object. It must, therefore, itself be that form potenti-ally (De An. 431 b, 21 ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα). Hence it is that ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταυτόν αὐταῖς (II30 a, 12 n.), the ἐν-έργεια is one, though it can be analysed into αἴσθησις and αἰσθητόν. Further it is complete, and the pleasure which supervenes is something different from its efficient or formal cause.

καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ 25
 7 ἰατρός [ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν].—καθ' ἐκάστην δ'
 αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαμέν γὰρ ὀράματα καὶ
 ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα). δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἡ
 τε αἰσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ'
 ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονή 30
 8 ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου.—τελειοῖ
 δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ'
 ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. ἕως
 ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρίνον ἢ
 θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ 1175^a

ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρός,
 sc. τελειοῖ. Health is the formal cause
 and the doctor the efficient cause of
 being healthy. The two are therefore
 illustrations of the difference between
 αἰσθησις and αἰσθητόν, not of the
 difference between these and pleasure.
 The parallelism is exact; for, just as
 it is the form of the object that makes
 actual the potentiality of it in the soul,
 so it is the form of health in the
 doctor's soul that is the efficient cause
 of health in his patient. Cf. Met.
 1070 b, 30 τὸ κινεῖν...ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ
 διανοίας τὸ εἶδος...ὑγίεια γὰρ πῶς ἢ
 ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἢ οἰκοδομική.
 Neither ὑγίεια nor ἰατρός illustrates
 the way in which pleasure completes
 the activity; the illustration of that
 is deferred by the characteristically
 awkward parenthetical recapitulation
 καθ' ἐκάστην...τοῦ πεισομένου. We
 must, I think, bracket ὁμοίως αἰτία
 ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, which confuses
 the argument.

§ 7. καθ' ἐκάστην κ.τ.λ. This
 parenthesis gives the proof of what
 was said 1174 b, 20 sqq.

πρὸς τοιοῦτον, sc. πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον.

ποιήσοντος...πεισομένου. The αἰσ-
 θητόν ποιεῖ, the αἰσθησις πάσχει.
 The ἐνέργεια may be analysed into
 action and reaction, but it is really
 one and complete. Cf. Phys. 255 a

34 αἰεὶ δ' ὅταν ἅμα τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ
 παθητικὸν ὦσι, γίνεται ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ
 δυνατόν.

§ 8. τελειοῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note the
 awkward resumption.

οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, 'not
 like its immanent formal cause.' The
 ἔξις here must correspond to ὑγίεια,
 and it is parallel to the form which is
 made actual in the soul by αἰσθησις.

ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, 'as a
 superadded completion' or 'perfec-
 tion.' It is not like health, but like
 the bloom of youth, something which
 supervenes upon the activity when the
 action and reaction are both at their
 best. The illustration is now com-
 plete, and the parallelism may be
 exhibited thus—

Formal Cause	ὑγίεια	αἰσθησις.
Efficient Cause	ἰατρός	αἰσθητόν.
Supervenient	ὥρα	ἡδονή.
Perfection		

τὸ κρίνον ἢ θεωροῦν, i.e. τὸ αἰσ-
 θανόμενον ἢ νοοῦν. In An. Post. 99 b,
 35 αἰσθησις is called δύναμις σύμφυτος
 κριτική. Hitherto we have been
 speaking of αἰσθησις, but of course all
 that has been said applies equally to
 νοῦς. We shall see that the ἐνέργεια
 of νοῦς is the highest.

ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ. The agent
 and patient, the action and reaction,
 are similar and similarly related in

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ
καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς 9
συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυ-
5 νατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ
τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καὶνὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως
διὰ ταυτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ
διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ
ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ
10 παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ 10
τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες
ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα
καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἅ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς
τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ
15 θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελει-
οῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὐ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ
τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἶρετὸν ὄν.
πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν 11
ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεξεύχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα

νόησις and αἴσθησις, so the same result will follow.

§ 9. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes Met. 1050 b, 22 διὸ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστροι καὶ ὁλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στή, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἢ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις οὔσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου.

οὐ γίνεται, sc. συνεχῶς, which can easily be supplied from what precedes.

παρακέκληται, 'the mind is stirred up.' Cf. Plato, Rep. 523 a τὰ...οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν. Isokrates regularly uses παρακαλεῖν and προτρέπεσθαι as synonyms.

οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, 'as when people look and do not merely see,' is, I suppose, the meaning.

τοιαύτη, sc. διατεταμένη.

ἀμαυροῦται, 'is dimmed.' At Athens this word was only poetical, but it is frequent in the κοινή. It may have been in common use at Stageira.

§ 10. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The fact on which Eudoxos relied, namely that all aim at pleasure, is now explained. It is really life, i.e. activity, they aim at, and the pleasure is its τελείωσις.

καὶ τούτοις, 'and with these faculties' as shown by the examples τῇ ἀκοῇ and τῇ διανοίᾳ. The pleasure each man pursues is not any pleasure, but that which is the natural completion of the activity which is best in his eyes.

§ 11. πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This question has now become almost meaningless. Cf. Introductory Note.

συνεξεύχθαι. Cf. 1178 a, 16.

φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ 20
 γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἢ ἡδονή. V. ὅθεν
 δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἐτέρων
 οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι—οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ
 τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἶον ζῶα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἄγαλμα
 καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς δια- 25
 2 φερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. δια-
 φέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ
 αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.
 φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνωκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκά-
 στην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ 30
 οἰκεία ἡδονή· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν
 οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἶον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαί-
 ροντες τῷ γεωμετεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ· 35

χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι. Cf. 1175 b, 35 διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι. Cf. 1102 a, 30 ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα and the note there.

V. § 1. ὅθεν δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ. We now see what is meant by saying that pleasures differ specifically. Aristotle has to deal with the view that pleasure *qua* pleasure is the same though from different sources, for which cf. Plato, Phileb. 12 d εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὃ Σώκρατες, αὐταὶ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι.

τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα κ.τ.λ. As Alexander puts it (Hθ. προβλ. 120, 4 sqq. Bruns) αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνδιαίρουσινταὶ τὰς ἐνεργείαις.

φαίνεται, sc. τελειούμενα. Natural products like animals or trees are τέλεια when they have reached their full development of size and structure; the products of art are τέλεια when they have been finished so far as to serve the end for which they are made.

§ 2. αὐταί, 'these in turn,' i.e. the

pleasures of thought and the pleasures of sense differ specifically among themselves as well as from one another. Cf. below 1176 a, 3 καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνωκειῶσθαι, 'from their adaptation.' Cf. 1161 b, 21. Not only do the pleasures differ specifically τῷ ἐπὶ διαφερούσαις γίνεσθαι ἐνεργείαις, but also in their own nature as being οἰκεῖαι τὰς ἐνεργείαις ἐφ' αἷς γίνονται (Alexander loc. cit.).

συναύξει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1177 b, 21. That the specific difference between pleasures is intrinsic and not due solely to their association with certain ἐνεργείαις, is shown by the fact that the ἐνέργεια is increased by its οἰκεῖα ἡδονή. The latter must, then, have some specific character of its own. All this depends upon Aristotle's theory of growth, cf. Gen. Corr. 322 a, 26 ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ προσιὸν δυνάμει ποσὴ σὰρξ, ταύτῃ μὲν αὐξητικὸν σαρκὸς κ.τ.λ.

συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύζοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς
 1175^b ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. ἔτι δὲ 3
 μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμπο-
 δίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς
 λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαί-
 5 ροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλη-
 τικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως 4
 δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο
 ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ ἡδίῳ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, καὶ πολὺ δια-
 φέρη κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ
 10 τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁπποῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν
 ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἶον
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ
 ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾧσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ μὲν 5
 οἰκεῖα ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ
 15 βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺν
 διεστᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ
 οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι,
 οἶον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι·
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὕσης τῆς
 20 ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦναντίον ἀπὸ
 τῶν οἰκεῖων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ
 ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρη-
 ται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ,
 πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. διαφορουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεῖα 6
 25 καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἵρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν

§ 3. ἐκ τοῦ...ἐμποδίου...εἶναι. Alexander (loc. cit.) ἔτι εἰ αἱ ἐπ' ἄλλαις ἐνεργείαις ἡδοναὶ ἐμποδίζουσι τὰς ἐπ' ἄλλαις γινομέναις...εἶεν ἂν ἡδοναὶ ἡδονῶν φθαρτικά. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ ἡδονῶν φθαρτικά, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ὁμοειδεῖς, ἔχουσαί γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἀλλήλας δ' ἔχει τάναντία πρὸς ἀλλήλα.

§ 4. ἐνεργῇ, 1110 a, 14 n. ἐκκρούει. Cf. 1119 b, 10. 1154 a, 27.

§ 5. πολὺ διεστᾶσιν. They are like

ἐναντία, as Alexander says, and *a fortiori* they must be εἶδει ἕτερα, for ἐναντία are the εἶδη that are furthest apart in any γένος.

καθ' αὐτήν. This brings out the meaning of οἰκεῖαι. The pleasures are not attached to the activities in an accidental way; they are essentially the pleasures *of* the activity. They therefore differ καθ' αὐτάς, not merely κατὰ συμβεβηκός or ἢ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεσθαι.

τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικῆς, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμιαί τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσchrῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὁρέ- 30
ξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
7 οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις—ἀτοπον γάρ—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν. 35
ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὁσφρησις γεύσεως· 1176^a
ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν
8 διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ζῶν

§ 6. τῶν ὁρέξεων, 'than the appetitions, from which they arise.' Alexander (loc. cit.) καὶ γὰρ εἰ πλέον ἀφέστηκεν τὸ ἐφίεμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν τινος καὶ μηδέπω ἔχον αὐτὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία πλέον ἀφεστῶσα τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς ἐνεργείας, ἐφ' ἣ ἡ ἡδονή. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔφεσις ἐστίν ἡδονῆς, τῇ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ σύνεστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ παρακολουθεῖ· ὥστ' εἰ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις συνδιαίρουνται αἱ ἡδοναί, πολὺ ἂν μᾶλλον ταῖς ἐνεργείαις συνδιαίρουντο.

αἱ μὲν γάρ, sc. αἱ ὁρέξεις. Desire is both antecedent in time and different in its nature from the activities. It is the efficient cause (Mot. An. 700 b, 35 ἡ δ' ὁρεξις καὶ τὸ ὁρεκτικὸν κινούμενον κινεῖ), while pleasure is the superadded perfection of the activity itself.

§ 7. διάνοια...αἴσθησις. The typical ἐνέργειαι. It is said that this is inconsistent with Book VII where pleasure is defined as ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια. But that is purely dialectical. The γένεσις αἰσθητῆ of Speusippos is there developed dialectically into ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια,

and it is not necessary to go further for the purpose of the argument there. Here we have a further step but no inconsistency.

καθαριότητι. This appears to be because sight, hearing and smell are independent of contact, while taste is a form of touch. Cf. De An. 434 b, 14 αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι' ἐτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὁσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή. 435 a, 14 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα...πάντα...τῷ δι' ἐτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ διὰ τῶν μεταξύ, ἡ δ' ἀφῆ τῷ αὐτῶν ἄπτεσθαι ἐστίν. Further (ib. 435 b, 17) ἄνευ γὰρ ἀφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῶν, ...τὰς δ' ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει...οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἶναι. In other words, touch (and taste) are ἀναγκαῖα, the rest are καλά. We have learnt already that ἀκρασία and ἀκολασία in the proper sense have to do only with ἀφῆ and γεύσις.

αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. αἱ τῆς διανοίας (Ind. s. v. περί) ἡδοναί.

καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. Cf. 1175 a, 27 καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων. The pleasures of each class (pleasures of sense and of intellect) differ among themselves. This has already been shown of the

καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέρ-
 5 γειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα
 γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλει-
 τὸς φησιν ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἡδιον
 γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἶδει
 διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι.
 10 διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ 9
 αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ
 καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων
 δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι
 καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ
 15 εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ 10
 δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.
 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου
 μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἧ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν
 ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ
 20 τούτῳ δυσχερὴ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολ-
 λαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμο- 11
 λογουμένως αἰσχροὺς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν
 τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ
 25 τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον;
 ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους
 αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδο-

pleasures of sense, and it is equally true that the pleasures of σοφία are higher than other pleasures of intellect.

§ 8. ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον. Cf. 1097 b, 24 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, sc. ἡδονὴ οἰκεία ἐκάστῳ. It is the ἔργον which determines what is the οἰκεία ἐνέργεια of each, cf. Pol. 1253 a, 23 πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὥριστα.

καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν. Fr. 51 Bywater. σύρματα τὸν χόρτον Ἡράκλειτος λέγει Michael.

ἀδιαφόρους, sc. κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. The technical term for things identical in species.

§ 9. διαλλάττουσι, i. q. διαφέρουσι, cf. 1161 a, 5. Among the lower animals we do find that each kind has its own pleasures; among men alone do we see that pleasures specifically different are pursued by different individuals.

ἐπὶ γλυκέων κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1113 a, 28 n.

§ 10. δοκεῖ δ' κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1113 a, 25 sqq.

μέτρον...ὁ ἀγαθός. Cf. 1166 a, 12.

ναὶ κυρίως λέγουιντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

VI. Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ 30 ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προει-
2 ρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἵπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοντι ἂν, φυ-
τῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα 35 μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθά- 1176^b
περ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρ- 5
3 κης. καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρε-
τὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον 10 ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονι-
ζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκимоῦσιν

§ 11. δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, 'in a secondary and even a far lower degree.' Cf. Plato, Phileb. 44 e οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτόν.

VI. § 1. περὶ εὐδαιμονίας. We are at last in a position to explain the real meaning of our ἀρχή, the definition of Happiness.

§ 2. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις. The doctrine of Speusippos dismissed 1098 b, 31 sqq.

καθεύδοντι...φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον. Cf. 1095 b, 31 sqq., 1098 b, 31 sqq. EE. 1216 a, 3.

τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα, e.g. τῷ Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπεσόντι 1101 a, 6. Cf. 1100 a, 8. 1100 b, 28.

ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, 1098 a, 5.

αἱ μὲν...ἀναγκαῖαι, sc. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, i.e. those which have some ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (cf. 1094 a, 3), which are the *conditio sine qua non* of something higher.

τῶν καθ' αὐτάς...τῶν δι' ἄλλο. Of course there are some things αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά and also δι' ἄλλο (1096 b, 17), but εὐδαιμονία belongs to the class of things which are οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο.

οὐδενὸς...ἐνδεῆς, i.q. τελεία. Cf. 1097 a, 30 sqq.

§ 3. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to discuss the claims of amusement to be the end of life for the reason given in Book I.

παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις. Cf. 1095 b, 17. 1158 a, 27.

οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται,
 15 ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιού-
 των. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν 4
 δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολλάζειν, οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημείον
 οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς,
 ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες
 20 ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς κατα-
 φεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ
 γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται
 εἶναι. εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαί-
 νεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν 5
 25 πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ
 τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἰρετω-
 τάτῃ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ 6
 ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
 30 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὥς εἰπεῖν ἐτέρου
 ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
 σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾷς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ
 λῖαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν,
 ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνα-
 35 τοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὲ τέλος
 1177^a ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ
 εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς,
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίῳ τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν 7
 γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾷς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ
 5 μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ
 βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ
 τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ

ἐφίενται, sc. οἱ τύραννοι.

§ 4. τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις, 1095 b, 21 n.

§ 5. πολλάκις εἴρηται, 1063 a, 1 sqq., 1113 a, 25 sqq., 1254 a, 36, etc.

§ 6. ἡ ἀνάπαυσις. On the theory of ἀνάπαυσις ἀνεσις τῆς ψυχῆς) see

above 1127 b, 33. 1150 b, 17.

It will not seem strange to us that Aristotle insists so strongly on the truth that amusement is not the end of life if we bear in mind that θεωρία is a form of διαγωγή and is therefore liable to be confused with ἀνάπαυσις. Cf. Pol. 1337 b, 33.

ἦττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδω μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ 10 πρότερον εἴρηται.

VII. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὃν 15 καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' 2 ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ 20 τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς. ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν 3 γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. οἴομεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν 25 καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζή- 4 τούντων ἡδίων τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἢ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται 30

§ 7. εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. The slave, being an ἐμψυχον ὄργανον (1161 b, 4), has no βίος of his own. He is the instrument of another's life. Cf. Pol. 1280 a, 32 δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων...οὐκ ἔστι (sc. ἡ πόλις) διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν.

καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται. Cf. 1098 a, 15.

VII. § 1. εἴρηται. Strictly speaking it has not been said, though it is perhaps implied in 1095 b, 14 sqq. where all other lives than the θεωρητικὸς βίος are shown to be inadequate while its consideration is reserved

(1096 a, 4). In any case it follows at once from the proof given in Book VI that σοφία is the highest form of goodness.

§ 2. τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν. Cf. 1138 b, 7 n. θεωρεῖν...δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς. The reason is that θεωρία is the ἐνέργεια of a δύναμις which is so high as to be almost an ἐνέργεια. The only reason why it is not continuous is that it is still a δύναμις, not the *actus purus* of νόησις. Met. 1074 b, 28 εἰ μὴ νόησις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὐλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῇ τῆς νοήσεως.

§ 4. κεχορηγημένων, cf. 1101 a, 15.

πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώ-
 φρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς
 καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος
 ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως
 1177^b αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶ- 5
 σθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ
 δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλείον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ
 τὴν πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχο- 6
 5 λούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην
 ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
 δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς·
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ
 10 παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μισοφόνος
 τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ
 φόνοι γίνοντο. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ
 παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τι-
 μὰς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν
 15 οὔσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὔσαν.
 εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ 7
 πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἀσχο-
 λοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταί εἰσιν,

συνεργοὺς ἔχων. Cf. 1170 a, 5. From the beginning Greek science was organised on cooperative principles (Early Greek Philosophy, *Introd. ad fin.*), and the Peripatos itself was so in a high degree. The Greek thinks of scientific inquiry as the give and take of independent minds (*διαλεκτική*). But of course it is possible for the wise man's soul to commune with itself.

§ 5. οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. At the beginning of the *Metaphysics* it is shown that science arises after everything necessary to life has been secured. Its origin is in Wonder and it serves no end but the satisfaction of our

natural desire to know. Cf. 982 b, 24 δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν ἑτέραν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὧν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη, μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὔσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκὲν ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτήσις.

§ 6. δοκεῖ τε κ.τ.λ. This is the truth which underlies the perverted view that amusement is the end of life. *Εὐδαιμονία* is ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή, though it is not mere ἀνάπαυσις ('rest') or ἀνεσις ('relaxation').

§ 7. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis begins at b, 24 ἡ τελεία δὴ.

ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὔσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν 20 οἰκείαν—αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν—καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι 25 8 τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος 30 θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον 1178^a 9 πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ

σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν, sc. τῶν ἐν σχολῇ, e.g. τῶν παιδιῶν.

συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. 1175 a, 30.

μῆκος βίου τέλειον, 1098 a, 15 n.

§ 8. τοῦ συνθέτου, 'man as a composite being.'

ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν. Cf. Nauck FTG. p. 690 where we have the verse—

ἀνθρώπον ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπινα.
In Rhet. 1394 b, 24 Aristotle quotes—
θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα
τὸν θνατόν φρονεῖν.

So Pindar, Isthm. v, 20 θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει, Sophokles, Tereus fr. 515 θνητὰ φρονεῖν χρὴ θνητὴν φύσιν, Antiphanes ap. Stob. Flor. i, 316 εἰ θνητὸς εἰ βέλτιστε θνητὰ καὶ φρόνει.

ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν. Aristotle did not believe in individual immortality. Noῦς alone is immortal and it is not individual. But by

identifying ourselves so far as may be with it we escape to a certain extent from mortality. The thought was originated by Plato in the Phaedo, and remained in one form or another to the end. Cf. Tim. 90 b τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι...πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθ' ὅσον δ' αὐτὸ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτου μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν. Cf. also the ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν of Theait. 176 b.

τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. Cf. 1138 b, 7 n.

τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν. Giphanius compares Soph. El. 183 b, 22 μέγιστον γὰρ ἔσως ἀρχή...ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὃν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατον ἐστὶν ὀφθῆναι. Of course the expression is figurative.

§ 9. εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο. Cf. 1169 a, 2.

εἴπερ τὸ κύριον. Cf. 1168 b, 31.

τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστω τῇ φύσει κρᾶτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

VIII. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ 10 κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πρᾶττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίοις ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ 2 15 τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνωκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ 3 ἡθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἡθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἡθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρτημένοι δ' αὖται καὶ 20 τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον 4 25 δεῖσθαι τῆς ἡθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ

τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Here we see the real sequence of the whole argument. For *φιλία* in its highest form is the love of the higher self, and it is good, as proved above 1170 a, 13 sqq., for it is just the self-consciousness of the activity of thought (*νόησις νοήσεως*).

VIII. § 1. Δευτέρως δὲ κ.τ.λ. As the *κύριον* in man is *νοῦς*, the best human life will be *κυρίως καὶ πρώτως ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν* (cf. 1157 a, 31 n.). But we must also take the *σύνθετον* into account.

§ 2. ἔνια δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 b,

3 sqq.

§ 3. συνέζευκται. Cf. 1175 a, 19.

εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 a, 22 sqq.

τὸ ὀρθόν, i.e. the *ὀρθότης* of the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*.

αὖται, sc. αἱ ἡθικαὶ ἀρεταί.

περὶ τὸ σύνθετον, i.q. τοῦ συνθέτου, cf. Ind. s.v. *περί*.

διακριβῶσαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Neither is a note on the *Ethics* the proper place to discuss the *χωρισμός* of *νοῦς*.

§ 4. δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. It is true that this section contains repetitions, but that is no reason for suspecting it.

πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέροι—
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ
 δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ
 δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, 30
 προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν),
 τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ
 5 οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριώτε-
 ρον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν 35
 οὔσης· τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ 1178^b
 τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ
 6 καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων
 πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεῖα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι
 πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ, 5
 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεῖσεται οὖν τῶν τοιού-
 7 των πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἢ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρη-
 τικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς
 γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι·
 πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δι- 10
 καίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακατα-
 θήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους**
 ὑπομένοντες τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντες ὅτι καλόν; ἢ
 τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται
 αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; 15
 ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας;
 διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ
 καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν
 αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν
 Ἐνδυμῖωνα. τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ 20

ἐξουσίας, sc. τοῦ ἀκολασταίνειν (Koraes).

§ 5. ἀμφισβητεῖται τε κ.τ.λ. EE. 1288 a, 15.

§ 7. ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους; sc. πράξεις. I read ὑπομένοντες with K^b and κινδυνεύοντες. The accusatives of our other authorities seem due to assimila-

tion to ἀνδρείους. Some such words as ἀλλ' ἄτοποι seem to have fallen out before ὑπομένοντες.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν. Met. 1074 b, 17 εἴτε γὰρ μηθὲν νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς), τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων.

μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, 8
 25 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλ-
 30 λον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπων ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ 9
 αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα
 35 ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.
 1179^a οὐ μὲν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαι-
 μονήσουντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον
 εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις,
 δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν 10
 5 τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν τις πράττειν
 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶ-
 ται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἡττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ
 βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων 11
 10 δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως
 τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς
 ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια

§ 8. τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 1072 b, 14 διαγωγή δ' οἶον ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν.

§ 9. εὐημερίας. Cf. 1099 b, 3 n.

§ 10. τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν, sc. μέτρια.

§ 11. καὶ Σόλων δὲ κ.τ.λ. From Herod. i, 30. Cf. especially Τέλλω τοῦτο μὲν τῆς πόλεως εὐ ἡκούσης παῖδες ἦσαν καλοὶ τε καὶ ἀγαθοί, καὶ σφι εἶδε ἅπασιν τέκνα γενόμενα καὶ πάντα

παραμείναντα· τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ βίου εὐ ἦκοντι, ὡς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν, τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου λαμπροτάτη ἐπεγένετο· γενομένης γὰρ Ἀθηναίοισι μάχης πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυ-
 γείτονας ἐν Ἐλευσίνι βοηθήσας καὶ τροπὴν ποιήσας τῶν πολεμίων ἀπέθανε κάλλιστα, καὶ μιν Ἀθηναῖοι δημοσίῃ τε ἔθαψαν αὐτοῦ τῇ περ ἔπεσε καὶ ἐτίμησαν μεγάλως.

κεκτημένους πράττειν ἂν δεῖ. ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ
 πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι
 οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι 15
 12 γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφω-
 νεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκόασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν
 μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς
 πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις
 γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρή ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα 20
 καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις
 13 ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ
 νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα
 καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρω-
 πίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὖλο- 25
 γον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ—τούτο
 δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς—καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τούτο καὶ
 τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους
 καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
 τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. 30
 τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη
 ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

IX. Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ
 καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος

Ἀναξαγόρας. Cf. EE. 1215 b, 6 (p. 19) and D L. ii, 7 πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα 'Οὐδέν σοι μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' 'Εὐφήμει,' ἔφη, 'έμοι γὰρ καὶ σφόδρα μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' δείξας τὸν οὐρανόν.

§ 12. συμφωνεῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1098 b, 9 sqq. and Introd. § 25. The λόγοι here are the dialectical arguments derived from λογικαὶ προτάσεις, and these are said to be in harmony with τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκοῦντα, which form ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις. They must further be tested by the facts of life (ἔργα), and if they do not stand this test, they are to be regarded as mere λόγοι.

§ 13. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κ.τ.λ. It

has been objected to this passage (1) that it breaks the connexion of ideas, (2) that it is inconsistent with Aristotle's view of the relation between God and Man. Both objections are true, but neither is a sign of spuriousness. The words δοκεῖ and εὖλογον show that this is merely a new ἐνδοξον.

IX. § 1. Ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. We have now discovered what εὐδαιμονία is, and we have also seen how a man may attain it for himself; but our task is not complete. We have still to ask how the νομοθέτης is to produce it in the state.

τοῖς τύποις. Cf. Introd. § 26.

35 ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν
 1179^b ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ
 μάλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ 2
 εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως
 ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς 3
 5 τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δι-
 καίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόγνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσα-
 σθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι
 τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
 10 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι·
 οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέ- 4
 χεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·
 πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν
 αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ
 15 δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἐννοίαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευ-
 στοὶ ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσει; οὐ 5
 γὰρ οἶόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατειλημ-

τὴν προαίρεσιν. Here προαίρεσις is practically equivalent to πραγματεία or μέθοδος, cf. 1094 a, 2 n.

καθάπερ λέγεται, 1103 b, 26.

§ 2. οὐδὲ...ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι. Cf. 1105 b, 2. 1152 a, 8.

ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι, i.e. to have the ἔξις and produce the ἐνέργεια. Cf. 1098 b, 32 n.

§ 3. κατὰ τὸν Θεόγνιν, v. 432—434 εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ' ἔδωκε θεός,

ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν,

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον.

The quotation is suggested by Plato, Meno 95 e, where, after quoting ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά (1172 a, 13), he goes on οἷσθ' ὅτε ἐν τούτοις ὡς διδακτοῦ οὕσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;—Φαίνεται γε.—Ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς, “εἰ δ'

ἦν ποιητόν,” φησι, “καὶ ἐνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,” λέγει πως ὅτι “πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον.”

νῦν δὲ φαίνονται...ἰσχύειν go together.

προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι, an Isokratean touch.

κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ready to be ‘possessed’ or ‘inspired’ (κατέχεσθαι) by goodness. So in Plato's Ion *passim* ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχεσθαι.

§ 4. αἰδοῖ...φόβῳ. For the opposition cf. 1116 a, 31.

οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. This chiasmic repetition and amplification is exactly in the style of Isokrates.

§ 5. μεταρρυθμίσει, an Ionic word, also used by Xenophon. The Attic equivalent is μετασχηματίσαι.

κατειλημμένα, ‘shut up in,’ ‘locked up in.’ The term is probably a medical one; for in Probl. 870 b. 10

μένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι· ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων
 ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοι-
 6 μεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει 20
 οἱ δ' ἔθει οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς
 οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς
 ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴ
 ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς
 ἥθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ 25
 7 μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 ἀκούσειεν λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος
 ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τε
 8 οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βία. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος
 προϋπάρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ 30
 δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ
 γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν
 καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενό- 35
 9 μενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας 1180^a
 τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν

(Why do we sweat more in summer than winter though the body is drier?) we read that τοῦ χειμῶνος πεπυκνωμένων ἐκτὸς τῶν σωμάτων, πολὺ κατελημμένον τὸ τῆς φύσεως θερμὸν εἰς πνεῦμα οὐ διαλύει τὰ ὑγρά.

ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. So far from λόγοι alone sufficing, "we may think ourselves lucky" if the combination of all the recognised means of attaining goodness is effective.

§ 6. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1099 b, 9 sqq.

τὸ...τῆς φύσεως, cf. 1103 a, 20 n.

ἐφ' ἡμῖν. The words show that this is a formal βούλευσις.

δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι...ὥσπερ γῆν. Koraes compares Hippokr. (Nόμ. § 2) ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἡμέων ὁκοῖον ἡ χώρα·

τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων ὁκοῖον τὰ σπέρματα· ἡ δὲ παιδομαθίη τὸ κατ' ὥρην αὐτὰ πεσεῖν ἐς τὴν ἀρουραν. The doctrine is the same as 1095 b, 4 sqq. where too K^b has ἔθεισιν for ἥθεσιν (L^b).

§ 7. ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν. Cf. 1095 a, 8.

§ 8. δεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ., the Platonic view. Cf. 1104 b, 12 n.

ὑπὸ τοιούτοις...νόμοις, sc. ὀρθοῖς. After τρέφεσθαι and παιδεύεσθαι, ὑπό c. dat. is regular. The steps in the deliberative analysis are ἀρετῇ, ἐθισμός, νόμος.

συνήθη γενόμενα. Cf. Rhet. 1369 b, 16 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν.

αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων,
καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη
5 μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ 10
οἷονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν
ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὥς ἐπακουσομένων
τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφνε-
στέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ'
10 ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρε-
γόμενον λύπη κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασὶ
δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται
ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν 11
15 ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ'
οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ'
ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις
κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν· ἡ μὲν οὖν 12
πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,
20 οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοι-
ούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό
τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι
τοὺς ἐναντιομένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ

αὐτά. Susemihl suggests **ἅπτα**, while Rodier points out that Michael seems to have read **ἄλλα**.

§ 10. οἷονταί τινες. The reference seems to be to Plato's requirement in the Laws 722 d sqq. that all laws should begin with a *προοίμιον* of a persuasive and protreptic character.

τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους...ἐξορίζειν. Plato, Protag. 325 a *ὅς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὥς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν ἢ ἀποκτείνειν*.

Διὸ καὶ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b, 16 n.

§ 11. μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα. We must not press this. It is purely phraseological like *οἱ τ' ὄντες οἱ τ' ἀπόντες* in Soph. Ant. 1109.

βιουμένοις. Aristotle means *ζῶσι*, but he has slipped into a rare Ionism. This is quite on a different level from the common, though incorrect, *βιούν*, *βιώσαι*. The study of Isokrates has not effaced the early associations of Stageira (Wilamowitz-Möllendorf *Aristoteles und Athen* vol. i, p. 331).

§ 12. λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ...νοῦ. Pol. 1287 a, 28 *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον· ἡ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὁρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν*.

- 13 νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθῆς τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ
 Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει <ἢ> μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν 25
 δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ἐν δὲ ταῖς
 πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ
 ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ'
 14 ἀλόχου. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
 καὶ ὀρθὴν [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι]. κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων 30
 ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φί-
 λοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ** ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μᾶλλον
 δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς
 γενόμενος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νό-
 μων γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. γεγραμ- 35
 μένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν 1180^b
 εἰς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ
 γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
 ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἥθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν
 οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ 5
 τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέρ-
 15 γοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ
 καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς. κα-
 θόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία,
 τινὲ δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὃ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην 10

§ 13. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1337 a, 31 ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην. Cf. also 1102 a, 10.

ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων. The addition of ἢ is due to Professor Bywater. Aristotle means the Cretans and the Carthaginians. Cf. Pol. 1272 b, 24.

κυκλωπικῶς, Od. ix, 114 (of the Kyklopes)...θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος | παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν. Elsewhere Aristotle uses this quotation to describe the patriarchal stage of society. Cf. Pol. 1252 b, 20 πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυ-

τάτου...καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὁμηρος κ.τ.λ.

§ 14. καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι. Professor Bywater's suggestion that these words should come after συμβάλλεσθαι would certainly improve the sentence.

γεγραμμένων...ἀγράφων. This famous antithesis is only mentioned here because the laws of the domestic legislator will as a rule be unwritten.

§ 15. ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς. Cf. 1097 a, 11.

μάχην περιτίθησιν is a strange phrase. Stahr conjectures μείλιχην for μάχην and Stewart παρατίθησιν for περιτίθησιν.

περιτίθησιν. ἑξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκα-
στον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφό-
ρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν <ἂν> ἄριστα καθ'
ἐν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστής καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς,
15 τί πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοισδί—τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι λέγονταί
τε καὶ εἰσὶν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς 16
ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς
τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἐκάστω δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ
ἐνιοὶ δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι
20 ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γε-
νέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν
ἂν, καὶ κεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ
τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστήμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας 17
βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρα-
25 τέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γηνοίμεθ' ἂν. ὅντινα γὰρ
οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπι- 18
σκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ
30 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει

ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς. Cf. 1141 b, 22
εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.
Cf. also Met. 981 a, 10 πᾶσι τοῖς τοι-
οῖσδε κατ' εἶδος ἐν ἀφορισθείσι.

§ 16. δι' ἐμπειρίαν. Cf. Met. 981 a,
12 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία
τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς
ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον
ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἐμπειρία
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἔστι γνῶσις, ἢ δὲ
τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ
αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ
ἰατροῦν, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβη-
κός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν
ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ᾧ
συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· εἰς οὖν
ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχη τις τὸν λόγον,
καὶ τὸ μὲν καθόλου γνωρίζῃ, τὸ δ' ἐν
τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις

διαμαρτῆσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευ-
τὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἀλλ' ὅμως τό
γ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαθεῖν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς
ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἴομεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ
σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων
ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι
μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσιν·
τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν,
οἱ δ' οὐ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ τὸ ὅτι μὲν
ἴσασιν, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

§ 17. καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα, 'any
given subject submitted for treatment.'

§ 18. μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον. We
have found that νόμος is the means to
ἐθισμός and that therefore we must
become νομοθετικοί. The next step
in the βούλευσις is the means of
becoming νομοθετικοί.

μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει...εἶναι, sc. ἡ
νομοθετική. Cf. 1141 b, 23 sqq.

τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, 35 πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν 1181^a ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται—καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς—οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφε- 5
 19 τέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὖλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὲν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς 10 πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι. ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο 15

ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον κ.τ.λ. This whole passage is an echo of the well-known complaints of Plato in the *Meno* (91 a–100 c) and *Protagoras* (319 d–320 b) that the statesmen of Athens have not taught any one their art, not even their sons.

ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων. Cf. 1094 a, 10. b, 4.

§ 20. τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ. The history of the Greek word ῥήτωρ and its everyday use at Athens led to this identification, the criticism of which forms the first subject of Plato's *Gorgias*. But, as Spengel saw, *Iso-krates* is more immediately aimed at. Cf. e.g. *Antid.* § 80 νόμους μὲν θεῖναι μυριοί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ἱκανοὶ γεγονάσιν, εἰπεῖν δὲ περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἀξίως τῆς πόλεως

καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν πολλοὶ δυνηθεῖεν. ὧν ἔνεκα τοὺς ἔργον ποιουμένους τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους εὗρίσκειν τοσούτῳ χρή περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τῶν τοὺς νόμους ποιούντων, ὅσῳ πέρ εἰσι σπανιώτεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι καὶ ψυχῆς φρονιμωτέρας δεόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νῦν.

οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο κ.τ.λ. Here the reference is quite plain. Cf. *Antid.* § 82 ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐνταῦθα προεληλύθαμεν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους ἀναριθμήτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν νόμων ἐπαινέεισθαι τοὺς ἀρχαιοτάτους, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς καινοτάτους, οὐκέτι τῆς αὐτῆς διανοίας ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι προαιρουμένοις προὔργου γέγονε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κειμένων, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ζητεῖν δεῖ ἐτέρους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς

ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας
 τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
 τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον,
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικῇν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα
 20 κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συν-
 ιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν
 τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσ-
 περ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν·
 1181^b πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους
 κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμά- 21
 των γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θερα-
 πεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν
 5 ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις
 ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως
 οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς
 μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοῦναντίον
 καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ
 10 ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν

παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας πειρα-
 θῆναι συναγαγεῖν, ὃ ῥαδίως ὅστις ἂν
 οὖν βουλευθεὶς ποιήσειε κ.τ.λ. Aris-
 totle's words are a direct quotation
 from this.

ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν. The point is that
 the laws are τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης, not ἡ
 τέχνη. Cf. the criticism of the rhe-
 torical teaching of Gorgias and the rest,
 which consisted in giving their pupils
 speeches to learn by heart. Soph.
 El. 184 a, 2 οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ
 τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμ-
 βανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην
 φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν
 τοὺς πόδας, εἴτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ
 διδάσκει, μὴδ' ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι
 τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδα-
 πῶν ὑποδημάτων, οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε
 μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν, τέχνην δ' οὐ
 παρέδωκεν.

§ 21. ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων. We
 see from the context that this is an

argument *a fortiori*. Medical books
 are more scientific than collections of
 laws, and yet the doctor must use his
 own judgment.

ἴσως οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. 1360 a,
 30 χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ
 μὴ μόνον ἐπαθεῖν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει
 ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθόντων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ
 ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἀρμόττουσιν. ὥστε
 δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ
 τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ
 λαβεῖν ἔστιν τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους,
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς τὰς
 τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστο-
 ρίας· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ'
 οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

ἄνευ ἔξεως. This is the ms.
 reading, and is supposed to mean
 either (1) without the habit produced
 by experience and practice, or (2)
 without knowledge as a ἔξις ἀπο-
 δεικτική. Neither of which seems

ὑπάρχουσι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα
 22 τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύ-
 νητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον
 βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύνα-
 23 μιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν 15
 οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων
 πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν
 θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ
 ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν
 καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τού- 20
 των τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη,
 καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένῃ.
 λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

satisfactory. We might read *ἀνευ ἐξετάσεως*. The words are confused in MSS., e.g. in Plato Apol. 22 e.

§ 23. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The fact that the sketch here given does not agree with the order followed in the Politics as we have it, or, as Newman says, with "any conceivable order," seems to me decisive in favour

of its genuineness. Surely an interpolator would have given a more recognisable synopsis. On the whole question, see Newman's Politics vol. II, App. A.

ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν. We have at last one of these in the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, of which few will now suspect the Aristotelian origin.



APPENDIX A

De Anima 433 a, 9 sqq.

Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινούμενα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησιν τινα· πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός, διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἐνεκά του πᾶσα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινούμενα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρεκτόν. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. ἐν δὴ τι τὸ κινεῖν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἂν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως—ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις—ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δ' ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις τίς ἐστίν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ αἰεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν. τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, εἴαν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἔτι ὀρεκτικόν· ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαι ᾧσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἰσθησιν ἔχουσι—ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν τὸ μέλλον—εἶδει μὲν ἐν ᾧ εἴη τὸ

κινούν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἢ ὀρεκτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν—τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι—ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινούντα. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, ἐν μὲν τὸ κινούν, δεύτερον δ' ὃ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον· τὸ δὲ κινούν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινούν καὶ κινούμενον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινούν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν—κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησις τίς ἐστίν ἢ ἐνέργεια—τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῶον· ὃ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἢ ὄρεξις, ἥδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστίν· διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινούν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτόν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχή· διὸ τὸ μὲν ἡρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δ' ἀχώριστα· πάντα γὰρ ὥσει καὶ ἔλξει κινεῖται. διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ ὀρεκτικόν τὸ ζῶον, ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικόν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα μετέχει.

Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν τί τὸ κινούν ἐστίν, οἷς ἀφῆ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ οὐ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη. φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐνεστι μὲν, ἀορίστως δ' ἐνεστιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ὑπάρχει, ἢ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς· πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἥδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μείζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε δύναται ἐν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν. καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικόν οὐκ ἔχει ἢ ὄρεξις· νικᾷ δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν· ὅτε δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην, <ὅτε δ',> ὥσπερ σφαῖρα ἢ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται· φύσει δὲ αἰεὶ ἢ ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ· ὥστε τρεῖς φορές ἥδη κινεῖσθαι. τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικόν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἢ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα—ἢ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἢ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, καὶ γὰρ δὲ τοιόσδε—ἥδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἢ δόξα, οὐχ ἢ καθόλου· ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἡρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἢ δ' οὐ.

APPENDIX B

De motu animalium 701 a, 7 sqq.

Πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὅτε μὲν πράττει, ὅτε δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὅτε δ' οὐ κινεῖται; ἔοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζομένοις. ἄλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος—ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν—ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἢ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ' ὅτι οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς ἡρεμεῖ· καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μὴ τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ. ποιητέον μοι ἀγαθόν, οἰκία ἀγαθόν, ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς. σκεπάσματος δέομαι, ἱμάτιον δὲ σκέπασμα, ἱματίου δέομαι. οὐ δέομαι ποιητέον, ἱματίου δέομαι, ἱμάτιον ποιητέον. καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον, πρᾶξις ἐστίν. πράττει δ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. εἰ ἱμάτιον ἔσται, ἀνάγκη τόδε πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τόδε, τόδε· καὶ τοῦτο πράττει εὐθύς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ. ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἐτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δήλην οὐδ' ἢ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. ὅταν γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσῃ πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῷ νῷ, οὐ ὀρέγεται εὐθύς ποιεῖν· ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἢ τῆς ὀρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. ποτέον μοι, ἢ ἐπιθυμία λέγει, τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἢ αἰσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ νοῦς, εὐθύς πίνει. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῶα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὀρέξεως οὔσης, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως.

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TO THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

NOTE.—*I have not thought it necessary to give an Index to the Text, as those of Grant, Susemihl, and Bywater are amply sufficient. The references are to the pages of this volume.*

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
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